Asians in Kenya have made a key contribution to the growth and development of the country. However, a significant number, especially amongst the younger generations, are emigrating to the West every year creating a phenomenon known as brain drain. This paper has a special focus on South-Asians for two reasons.[1] Firstly, they have become renowned for their economic success abroad (Poros, 2001). Secondly, they have shown that they still have a strong emotional attachment to their country and retain a sense of ‘Kenyan-ness’ – this was especially well exhibited by the vocalisations of various Kenyan Asians in the US and UK during the post-election violence in 2008. Thus, despite what Kenya loses in the brain drain, it can still make gains from these diaspora networks, as well as through the new arrivals from South Asia.

Heizig (2006) makes the observation that South Asians in Kenya have passed through several stages of migration. During early years, the typical labour diaspora was due to indentured workers. However, with the improvement of passenger migration, they established themselves as more of a trading diaspora. Today, since the rise of globalisation, Kenyan Asians have increasingly become a transnational community. As Rasna Warah (1998) puts it, a unique feature is their ‘triple heritage’ – they are connected not only with East Africa and India as their ancestral places of origin, but also with Western countries, particularly Britain through colonial connections. These links result in facilitating further migration. Poros (2001) describes how transnational networks aid the movement of many Kenyan Asians to Canada, USA and the UK.

Migration is not a one-way process. In the past few decades, there has been a new wave of migration from South Asia, particularly India. This is still a relatively un-researched area but is likely to have an important impact on counterbalancing the brain drain, improving the labour market and, on the flip side, also adversely affecting socio-political relations with other ethnic groups in Kenya.

The main limitation to this study is that there is currently very little in the way of quantitative data on the numbers of Kenyans abroad. There is even less information on economic links between Kenya and the Kenyan community abroad such as flows of investment, remittances as well as support of charitable work and development agencies (Ghai, 2004). Therefore, the following commentary on the trends and impact of migration are largely based on subjective judgements made from observations and interviews conducted during fieldwork in Kenya between October 2008 and January 2009.

EMIGRATION OF SOUTH ASIANS FROM KENYA – BRAIN DRAIN?

The initial migration of South Asians from Kenya in the 1960s, particularly to the UK, was a consequence of Africanisation policies as well as to retain British citizenship (Gregory, 1993). However, in recent decades, the reasons have become more linked with academic and economic opportunities. Ghai (2004) points out that while the first two decades after independence witnessed high economic and employment growth in nearly all sectors, the situation has been reversed over the past 25 years – especially in the 1990s, with negative per capita income growth and worsening income distribution.

As one interviewee stated, the South Asians left behind now in Kenya are an ‘entrenched minority’. Figures are difficult to come by but it is estimated that there are 102,500 South Asians living in Kenya today, which is approximately 0.35 per cent of the total population.[2] The majority of third and fourth-generation Asians leave the country for higher education and employment.

The trajectory of their migration paths are often shaped by specific transnational network ties. These are ‘organisational, composite, and interpersonal ties that link local labour markets transnationally and channel immigrants to particular destinations and even into particular occupations,’ (Poros, 2001: 243) For example, take the story of Vinit.[3] He was born, schooled and gained a bachelors’ degree in commerce in Kisumu but found the economic prospects in Kenya unsatisfactory. In the early 1990s, he and his wife migrated to London on a visa sponsored by his uncle. Both Vinit and his uncle were part of the Patidar community, who had dominated the shop-keeping niche in London. Vinit’s uncle had a small shop initially, but with Vinit’s help, he managed to expand his business with two more branches across the city. Thus, as Poros (2001) explains, Kenyan-Asian immigrants have become successful merchants and traders through transnational interpersonal ties that assist their entry into business niches controlled by others in their community or network.

It is hoped by government leaders, and to a certain extent the remaining population, that the pursuit of many Kenyans in higher education abroad will result in the eventual return of such skills and experience, thereby contributing to the ‘building of the nation’. In his inaugural speech, President Mwai Kibaki, appealed to all Kenyans ‘who have been hounded out of our shores by repressive policies of our predecessors to come back home and join us in nation-building,’ (cited in Okoth, 2003).

One informant commented that many Kenyan-Asians do not return, often finding higher-paid employment and preferring to settle down overseas. This pattern adds to questioning thoughts amongst black Kenyans about whether these Asian migrants can be truly ‘Kenyan’.

However, there is a significant amount of gain, in various forms, from this type of migration. For instance, it is a fact oft cited that remittances today exceed the total amount of official development assistance in the world (Chanda, 2008). Professor Francis Mwega from the Department of Economics, University of Nairobi, stated that in 2004, net official development aid (ODA) to Kenya was the equivalent of 2 per cent of the country’s GDP. ‘Remittances were about nine times the size of net foreign direct investment and about twice the size of net ODA.’[4] The World Bank reported that by 2008, Kenya ranked as the second most popular destination for remittances in Africa with US$1.3 billion, ahead of Sudan (US$1.2 billion), Senegal and Uganda (US$0.9 million each), and South Africa (US$0.7 million). Kenya’s Central Bank estimates that Kenyans remitted US$53.9 million in January 2008 at the height of the political crisis.[5]

In addition, Macharia (2003) quotes a recent survey by Western Union, which showed Kenya and Nigeria to be leading in sending money through their wire service. Therefore, this is certainly a positive consequence to the ‘sending nation and regions’. Remittances are viewed as a particularly innovative form of financing for development because, unlike development assistance, these transfers go directly to family members without any intermediaries. They play a crucial role in financing destitution relief as well as in the stimulation of economic activities at local and regional levels. For the country, remittances from migrants are an essential source of foreign exchange to finance the import of goods and services (Ghai, 2004).

Ghai (2004) states that there is sparse information on the origin and use of remittances in Kenya. Nonetheless, the general trend shows that it has augmented considerably in recent years. Therefore, if emigration continues to increase, the role of remittances in development may, in fact, assume even greater importance.

Solimano and Pollack (2004) outline another advantage brought about by emigration – that of ‘scientific diasporas’. These are defined as networks which connect professionals and scientists dispersed around the world and function to promote the scientific and economic development of their home countries. This type of transfer of scientific knowledge generation enables, to some extent, ‘the de-linking of the contribution of scientists from their physical place of residence,’ (Solimano and Pollack, 2004: 12). For example, through intellectual diaspora organisations such as the Association of Kenyans Abroad, the sending country is able to fully utilise the technical knowledge of expatriate experts for development projects at home.

These forms of networks have not only contributed to science and technology but has also supported the cause of civil society. For instance, around the time of the contested elections in 2008, an ad hoc organisation was formed called, Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ). A number of its most vibrant members included ‘transnational’ Kenyan-Asians, such as Shailja Patel. These individuals, although residing outside of Kenya, campaigned passionately to uncover the truth behind the post-election violence and used their geographical location to draw international attention to the crisis. Furthermore, despite national media censorship at this time, other modes of communication such as Internet blogs allowed these networks to stay intact through the transfer of up-to-date information about the situation within the country.[6] One interviewee, a member of KPTJ, argues that without these social activist networks, the appeal for help may not have been heard at an international level and thus the necessary UN intervention may not have taken place.

In summary, the nature of the brain drain issue in Kenya is changing. The emigration of Kenyan-Asians is no longer a one-sided loss of valuable human capital. This process of international mobility also has ‘big returns’ associated with it, such as significant remittances and links to the wider scientific, technological as well as civil society networks. This is not to say that brain drain is not a reality in Kenya. After all, Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk (2007) estimate that Kenya’s skilled emigration rate to OECD countries is between 35 per cent and 40 per cent.[7] Instead of merely repressing this outflow, its benefits need to be duly recognised in order to pave the way for solutions to turn brain drain into brain gain.

BRAIN GAIN: NEW WAVE OF MIGRATION OF SOUTH ASIANS INTO KENYA

Alongside the emigration of Kenyan Asians, there has been a new migration from South Asia to Kenya. As Chanda (2008) argues, there is a lack of data not only on numbers but also on the skills and occupational composition of South Asian expatriates from the source countryside. The contribution of people of Indian origin to the Kenyan GDP is estimated to be between 30-35 per cent (Vertovec, 2002). Of this group, which also includes Kenyan and British citizens, about 15,000 are calculated to be Indian citizens.[8] However, this statistic is likely to be higher, since there are increasing reports of South Asians involved in human trafficking and other undocumented, illegal migration routes.[9]

One interviewee observed that these new South Asian migrants are not just occupying positions of administrators, clerks and educators, as was the norm for such ethnic groups during the British Empire. Today, a sizeable number of Indian expatriate professionals render highly useful services in various sectors of the Kenyan economy. For example, they often take up management positions in a range of industries from car-manufacturing e.g. Tata, to pharmaceuticals, such as Ranbaxy.

One major impediment to these new South Asian migrants participating fully in Kenyan society is due to tensions between them and established Kenyan Asians. The latter call the former by the term, ‘rockets’, since these ‘new Asians’ are presumed to use Kenya merely as a ‘launch-pad’ to get to the US, UK or Canada. Kenyan Asians and new South Asian migrants isolate themselves, mentally and physically, with both groups using the justification, ‘They are different from us’. Unlike the situation described by Poros (2001) in the UK where interpersonal links are used to facilitate activities of new migrants, the case in Kenya is that social friction between residents and migrants actually thwarts such efforts. This has a knock-on effect on the labour market and also wastes an invaluable opportunity to fully exploit the brain gain potential. Instead of sharing experiences and reaping the benefits of the knowledge spill-over, both parties lose out on the possibility of improvement through knowledge transfer.

CONCLUSION

The processes of brain drain and brain gain cannot simply be associated with emigration or immigration respectively. Rather, they form part of a complex, multi-dimensional dynamic tied up with increasingly transnational identities (Poros 2001; Faist 2000). With particular regard to Kenyan Asians, their departure to Western countries does not necessarily diminish their ‘Kenyan-ness’. The fact that remittances to Kenya are one of the highest in the world suggests that migrants certainly do not forget their home country. In addition, the loss of professional workers is partially compensated by access to a range of knowledge transfer networks. No doubt, there needs to be significant socio-economic development undertaken in Kenya, particularly through the fostering of political will. This will enhance the opportunities available and provide incentives for skilled personnel to stay within the country. However, at the same time, this should not devalue the benefits brought about by emigration. There is a currently a large Kenyan Asian diaspora spread throughout the world, many of whom still retain an emotional attachment to their country of birth. This is a vital resource that should be utilised fully. The government of Kenya needs to ensure that they recognise these prospects and take heed of the policy implications.

The brain gain resulting from the new wave of migration from South Asia is also an important one. This is an issue that has not been given the attention that it is due in the past. If the most is to be gained from this potentially advantageous population movement, greater work needs to be carried out on the myriad of dialogues that exist within the South Asian communities in Kenya. Not only is it critical to better understand and improve relations between Asians and black Kenyans, there also needs to be a focus on bridging the divide between ‘new’ and ‘established’ South Asians.

The biggest challenge remains the need to collect a greater quantity of and also better quality data on both the South-Asian diaspora in Kenya and the Kenyan Asian disapora in the West. Only then can one begin to calculate the real socio-economic costs and benefits of brain drain to Kenya. With the necessary political support, this may just act as the impetus for much-needed policy changes to help Kenya achieve its full potential for development.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Grace Puliyel spent three months in Kenya with the British Institute in Eastern Africa, researching the issue of contemporary India-East Africa relations. She is currently working for a research and funding organisation based in Pune, India.
* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at Pambazuka News.

NOTES
[1] There has been much debate about the identifier label placed on Asians in Kenya. In practice, it boils down to an issue of self-definition. In this paper, with the intention to enable readers to begin from the same starting point, the term ‘South-Asian diaspora’ will refer to all Asians living in Kenya at this present moment in time. Whereas ‘Kenyan-Asians’ will be used to distinguish those who can trace several generations within the country or have gained Kenyan citizenship.
[2] Government of India, Report of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora, 2001
[3] An anonymous name was used to protect interviewee confidentiality.
[4] http://www.nextbillion.net/news/remittances-dwarf-aid-investment-in-kenya
[5] http://migrantremittances.typepad.com/blog/east_africa/
[6] Waki Report, 2008
[7] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – this organisation brings together about 30, mostly high-income, countries from around the world which are committed to the principles of representative democracy and a free-market economy.
[8] http://www.isasnus.org/events/workingpapers/33.pdf [Accessed February 28, 2009].

Daily Nation (2007) ‘How human traffickers snare poor victims to Kenyan misery’.

Docquier, F., O. Lohest, A.Marfouk (2007), ‘Brain drain in developing countries’. World Bank Economic Review 21: 193-218.

Faist, T. (2000). The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ghai, D. (2004) ‘Diasporas and development: the case of Kenya’. Global Migration Perspectives No. 10. http://www.gcim.org/attachements/GMP%20No%2010.pdf [Accessed March 5, 2009].

Government of India (2004) ‘Report of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora’. http://www.indiandiaspora.nic.in/ [Accessed March 3, 2009]

Gregory, R. G. (1993) South Asians in East Africa: An economic and social history, 1890-1980. Boulder: Westview Press.

Heizig, P. (2006) South Asians in Kenya: Gender, Generation and Changing Identities in Diaspora. Munster: LIT.

Macharia, K. (2003) ‘Migration in Kenya and Its Impact on the Labour Market’. Paper prepared for Conference on African Migration in Comparative Perspective, Johannesburg, South Africa, 2003. http://pum.princeton.edu/pumconference/papers/4-Macharia.pdf [Accessed March 1, 2009].