The 'S' word: The demise of the doctrine of stability in Africa?

Used as an excuse to prop up dicators across Africa, the doctrine of stability has produced instability rather than reducing it. It’s time for the international community to drop the idea, says H. Nanjala Nyabola.

It’s not very often that a single word becomes a definition of and explanation for a specific approach to politics, but over the last 40 years ‘stability’ has become just that for many nations – as an all-encompassing political agenda, a call to inaction in rejecting change and an excuse to tolerate brutality and blatant disrespect for even the most basic of human rights. The Stability Doctrine has been the guiding force of domestic and international politics in many parts of the world, and has been the justification for flagrant abuses of power, including abolition of any semblance political freedom in places like the Gambia, or even for situations where those in power can simply ignore the needs of the general population and still find acceptance in the international sphere, as in Ethiopia. Yes, the Stability Doctrine has been the cornerstone of diplomacy when dealing with African governments but following a tumultuous start to 2011, could it be finally falling out of fashion?

The problem with stability is not in the desire for peace or predictability in politics. Rather, it is in the means that have been employed in the pursuit of this goal, and the lengths to which international actors especially have been willing to go in order to attain it. Stability has been the excuse for Western governments to look the other way or actively work to keep the most unsavoury types in power, providing arms and military support to Moi and Mubarak, or giving Bongo and Eyadema a place to stash their plundered millions. 'Stability' for the citizens of many African nations has become synonymous with disempowerment and marginalisation, not to mention complete exclusion from the day-to-day governance of their own countries. Whether said power is indirectly given to the military or handed over to autocratic leaders and secret police cadres is inconsequential; inevitably the Stability Doctrine produces vulnerable shell states that practically invite the kinds of revolution that we’ve witnessed over the last three months.

It is easier to pinpoint the emergence of the Stability Doctrine than to account for it’s continued implementation. The rise of Cold War realpolitik is likely the key driver of an idea that had been toyed with in Southern Africa and South East Asia, as international ideological concerns – fears is perhaps a better word – pushed Soviet and Western Governments to keep predictable, if distasteful leaders in office. Volumes have been written about the impact of the Cold War on domestic politics in Southern Countries, and while the era did indeed leave an indelible mark on said countries, it’s been over 20 years since the Berlin wall fell, so why hasn’t this approach to diplomacy evolved? Why in the absence of any formidable ideological opposition are African leaders, particularly of nations with appalling rights records, still making appeals to stability as a reason to maintain the status quo? Why, even in the face of difficult economic times, are Western governments especially still spending significant portions of their national income keeping certain leaders in place across the continent, especially in situations where the local population has rejected them?

A simple answer is oil, and the Western nations’ thirst for the resource has produced its own corpus of analysis and discussion. But beyond this, I believe that there are important sociological explanations related to the highly personalised nature of international diplomacy when dealing with individual fiefdoms like those that are common especially in Africa. In fact, the persistence Stability Doctrine makes the most sense when modern international relations is conceptualised as a giant playground, in which friends are bought and traded, and popularity matters more than actual ability or character. These aren’t just international diplomats negotiating on behalf of nations – in many cases they are personal friends with real economic or social interest in keeping their friends in power. The case of France in Africa is a critical example of this. Far too embedded with the Ben Ali regime, the foreign minister and president were caught out by how quickly the regime fell in part because they were blinded by personal, predominantly economic relationships. Similarly, senior members of the British monarchy and government, some of its most prestigious universities and institutions have been caught red handed cosying up to the Gaddafi regime, even though its excesses are matters of public record. These examples are in the limelight now given the way in which the citizens of Tunisia and Libya rejected stability in lieu of governance, but there are other potential points of friction across the Africa that will soon present similar challenges, such as Uganda, Chad or Senegal.

Indeed the unrest in North Africa and the Middle East, not to mention Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti and Gabon is a stark reminder of the need to dump the Stability Doctrine – its inherent shortcomings are significant contributors to the unrest. For one thing, this approach to politics always produces dictators. Always. Without fail. It may take some time between the rise of the young military ingénue and the emergence of the heavily botoxed 'benevolent' but all-powerful leader, but it is generally a question of when rather than if. It involves continuous appeals to the usually non-existent goodness of the leader, rather than his (so far never her) abilities as a leader or association with the people. It involves systematically inflating the ego of said leader to the point where he believes that only he is capable of stewarding the country, thereby robbing the public of any power that they may have to criticise or challenge.

In short, it creates an indispensability complex that robs the general public of any right to participate in the governance of their country. More importantly for the citizens of these nations,the resulting shell states make true political transition difficult if not impossible. It also involves implicitly tearing apart any institutions of accountability in order to prop up the myth of indispensability. Electoral commissions, independent judiciaries, credible opposition parties – all of these institutions have and continue to be sacrificed for the sake of perpetuating the apparent indispensability of some of the most unsavoury characters in international politics. Plus, it costs a fortune in arms deals and military support for nations that will inevitably at some time of need support the enemy anyway.

The end result of these factors is the kind of instability that plagues Africa today – even where authoritarian regimes are overthrown there are no credible institutions left to hand over to a transitional administration. This in turn breeds the kind of dissatisfaction and sustained aftershocks of unrest that are being felt in Tunisia and Egypt. Indeed, the reasons for ditching the Stability Doctrine can be neatly summarised in that it simply doesn’t do what it says on the jar – it is a perfect recipe for the kind of instability that is rocking North Africa today.

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