Côte d’Ivoire in the clutches of its political elites

In October 2006 as it became clear that the presidential election slated for the end of the month could not take place, the UN adopted Resolution 1721. The resolution extended the mandate of the Ivorian president, and that of Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny, who had been appointed a year ago. It maintained the powers of the prime minister, while envisaging the end of October for the elections to be held. The resolution also emphasised the finality of the president’s term of office, specifying that in the event of a collapse in the transition, the ruling cadres would be replaced by others from Ivorian civil society. However, nothing in the current situation points to any of these provisions coming to pass, in spite of a clear transition roadmap.

In December 2006, the president suggested a direct dialogue between himself and Guillaume Soro, head of the Forces Nouvelles, who control the northern part of the country. The dialogue took place in Ouagadougou under the auspices of the Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré, and resulted in the Ouagadougou Accord, signed on 4 March 2007. Commentators saw this accord as a means for the Ivorian president to dispense with Resolution 1721 and rid himself of the prime minister, who was imposed upon him as a way out of the crisis.

The accord laid down a precise timetable, according to which elections needed to take place within the first three months of 2008. By this time, neutral forces policing the buffer zone would have been replaced by a joint force composed of elements from both the National Army and the Forces Nouvelles, under the command of the Integrated Command Centre. Also by this time, public registration drives to issue birth certificates to Ivorians who did not have them would have been held, government officers deployed to all parts of the country, the various militias dismantled, and the Forces Nouvelles disbanded and assembled in designated debriefing centres.

All political stakeholders accepted the accord, despite the fact that the key players were excluded from the negotiations. A new government headed by Forces Nouvelles leader Guillaume Soro was installed, bringing together all signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis Accord. Shortly after his appointment, Soro survived an assassination attempt at Bouaké airport. This however, did not affect the peace process.

An interim accord signed in 2007, postponed the elections to 30 June, but this did not happen. In the meantime, the public drive to issue birth certificates took place.

Several other interim accords were subsequently signed, issuing new election dates. The last deadline agreed upon was 30 November, but this was not met either. A fourth interim accord was signed before the end of 2008, but it did not specify any new election date. It tasked the Independent Electoral Commission with setting a new election timetable before the last day of the year. This date has come and passed like all the others.

The IEC argues that the enrolment process, which would issue both identity cards and voter cards to Ivorians, was not yet completed. This is a separate exercise from the public drive to issue birth certificates, without which neither identity cards nor voter’s cards can be issued. The process was completed in Abidjan and began in the rest of the country. The process was to have been completed in other regions by 28 February, but it was not clear whether this target would be met.

The process has met with several implementation problems. Financial difficulties have led to registration agents going on strike several times over unpaid wages. Since its start in Abidjan the process has been dogged with violence over allegations of fraud.

These allegations emanate from the presidential camp, which blames foreign west African elements from Burkina Faso and Mali, of trying to register without legitimate Ivorian nationality. The head of state himself has warned foreigners against meddling in Ivorian affairs. At the same time several northerners have complained about being turned away from registration centres for not being Ivorian.

When the process commenced there were incidents of violence in the Williamsville area between the locals and members of FESCI, a student union allied to the president. The students had mounted barricades outside registration centres to prevent ‘foreigners’ from gaining access, based on their appearance and dress. Ivorian nationalism, or ‘L’ivoirité’ is clearly still prevalent. The registration is still ongoing, albeit very slowly.

In the meantime, the demobilisation of ex-rebels has still not taken place. On several occasions the demobilisation and resettlement of ex-rebels on farm plots has taken place before the media, but as soon as the journalists leave, everything reverts to normal. In 2007 a ‘Peace Flame’ ceremony took place in Bouaké, attended by several African heads of state. The ceremony consisted of a symbolic burning of weapons. However, more weapons still remain in the hands of ex-rebels who continue to control large swathes on the country.

The Ouagadougou accord called for the centralised collection of taxes and levies. In 2008, the Minister of Finance and economic development formally posted a group of customs agents from Abidjan to the Burkina Faso border. As soon as the minister left, rebels from the Forces Nouvelles ejected the agents. A new target date of 15 January 2009 was set for the centralisation, but this too has given way to a new date: 2nd February…

A symbolic disbanding of militias took place in 2007 at Duékoué, in the west of the country in the presence of the president. However, the militias still exist, and frequently speak to the media. In Abidjan they even train openly.

Even with the deployment of administrators to rebel-held areas, the warlords still hold the real power. British NGO Global Witness stated in a recent report that the rebels were earning 15 billion francs a year from cocoa transiting through their territory for sale in Togo, via Burkina Faso. This not to mention diamonds, timber, coffee, cotton and other resources that they regularly plunder from areas under their control. The rebels also plundered the Bouaké branch of the Central Bank of West African States, with total impunity.

Most Ivorians increasingly feel that the president and the prime minister are doing everything in their power to delay the election, while benefiting from the ineptitude of the political opposition.

The president is apparently at risk of being indicted by the ICC for war crimes committed by death-squads during the 2004 protests, and therefore cannot afford to lose the election. Besides that, Gbagbo is not willing to give up the power he fought for over 30 years to attain, in the process battling the likes of Bédié and Ouattara. He speaks frequently of how much he went through to get to power and that he would never give it up. He stuck with this theme at this year’s state of the nation address.

Gbagbo is however not assured of an electoral majority. He is well aware that with his electoral base he would not have come to power if Robert Guéï had not knocked Bédié and Ouattara out of the race. He also knows that his delivery record leaves a lot to be desired, what with all the corruption, human rights violations, impunity, and widespread poverty under his tenure.

In 2008, women held a march protesting the high cost of living. The police intervened, leaving two dead. Then there was also the toxic dumping case, and a number of other scandals. With this in mind, Gbagbo does not intend going into an election unless he is absolutely sure he will win it.

The National Assembly has not convened for a long time, and Gbagbo has not held as much power as he does now, to the extent that for the third consecutive year the budget has been passed by decree without the input of the legislators. For a while now, Gbagbo has managed oil revenues without transparent accounting, and used large amounts to build palaces in Yamoussoukro. It was only under pressure from the international financial institutions that he finally clamped down on officials of the cocoa industry, who were mercilessly fleecing the sector while the poor farmers continued to live in abject poverty. Cocoa is the country’s principal industry.

The IFIs also insisted upon an audit of the petroleum sector. Last year alone the president’s sovereign funds stood at 60 billion CFA francs. This is a fund over which he has complete control.

The delay of elections also benefits the prime minister, who remains in his position, all the while transforming himself from warlord to statesman and building up a war-chest for his open presidential ambitions. In an interview with Jeune Afrique he stated that he could not wait for the announcement of an election date so he could declare his candidacy for the presidency.

Soro controls a sovereign fund of 20 billion CFA francs. He remains head of the Forces Nouvelles that control the resources of northern and western Côte d’Ivoire. He thus continues to benefit from the status quo. At the age of 37, he is still ineligible to contest the presidency.

Another major beneficiary of the current impasse is Blaise Compaoré. He is currently chief mediator in the Côte d’Ivoire and Togo crises. He was widely blamed for fomenting regional conflicts, particularly in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and has now transformed himself into a peace-broker. His present role however, may see him escape indictment in the Charles Taylor trial before the ICC. Moreover, most of the resources plundered in northern Côte d’Ivoire are invested in his country. I have personally seen several residences and developments in Ouagadougou belonging to Ivorian rebel leaders.

Blaise Compaoré has indeed become the kingpin in Côte d’Ivoire, and no decision is taken without his input. There is irony in this given the decades of suffering and exploitation of Burkinabés at the hands of Ivorians.

Public patience is wearing very thin in Côte d’Ivoire as a result of the endless delays in holding elections. The weak protests of the opposition parties make them appear complicit in the situation. Whereas Bédié has had a wake-up call and toured the country deploring Gbagbo’s rule, Ouattara remains strangely silent. Opposition members are in government and hold cabinet positions, and thus are not in any hurry to go into an election. It is common knowledge that the various parties are funded through the ministries they control. The press carried photographs of a house belonging to the minister of construction and planning, a member of Ouattara’s RDR (Rassemblement des Républicains), that would have cost more than a billion CFA francs. There was no public denial.

The general feeling among Ivorians is that their politicians are holding them hostage. Despite the fact that parliament sits very rarely, the members’ terms were prorogued and they continue to draw all their allowances and perks. The same applies to mayors and all local government officials. Parliamentary terms should have come to an end in 2005 and those of local government in 2006.

All the while, poverty deepens. Mamadou Koulibaly, president of the National Assembly admits that more than 70 per cent of Ivorians are surviving on one meal a day. The World Bank estimates that about 50 per cent of the population are living below the poverty line. At the same time, there have been several cases of corruption involving those close to Gbagbo, as well as members of the opposition.

Public discontent is growing perceptibly. Even Gbagbo’s supporters are voicing their disapproval. Within his own party, the FPI (Front Populaire Ivoirien), there are dissenting voices. The opposition is currently too weak to mount a popular uprising. The April 2008 protests indicate that the public is no longer prepared to await directions from above to take to the streets. Spontaneous, uncoordinated protests do however run the risk of provoking violent suppression, given the security forces’ predilection for using live ammunition on protesters. This would also open up a veritable Pandora’s box, and even the possibility of a military coup.

Some commentators do not discount the resumption of hostilities, more so since the protagonists remain armed. Despite the amiable public mien, there is a deep lack of trust between the two sides.

It is vital for Ivorian civil society and the international community to pressurise the country’s leadership that the people may be free.

* Venance Konan is a journalist and writer from Côte d’Ivoire. He is the author of ‘Négreries’, released in 2007.
* Translation by Josh Ogada.
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