Forty-eight hours after a fire of unknown origin damage African Independent Television’s (AIT) offices in Lagos, SSS agents stormed the station’s studios in Abuja in the middle of yesterday afternoon and, at gunpoint, ordered all employees to lie face down.

The Africa Regional Sexuality Resource Centre (ARSRC), a project of Action Health Incorporated (AHI), under the auspices of the African Federation for Sexual Health and Rights is pleased to call for abstracts for the 3rd African Conference on Sexual Health and Rights to be held in February 2008 in Abuja Nigeria. The theme of this conference is "Sexuality, Poverty and Accountability in Africa."

I write to congratulate Ike Okonta on his wonderful analysis. It is the best I have read, since the current intensification of media attention on the Nigerian elections.

But I am curious as to why Okonta totally left out any serious mention of the fate and possible role of the Igbos in the emerging scenarios he painted?

This ethnic group, hitherto one of the so-called tripod on which the country stood, has suffered untold marginalisation and denial of rights since the end of the civil war. Have they become so irrelevant that they no longer count in the calculus of Nigeria's political evolution?

Thanks again for a wonderful piece. I hope Obasanjo and his foreign and domestic minions are paying attention.

Sincerely,
Innocent Ukabam

Two new Lagos-based broadcast media, Link FM and GTV, were abruptly shut down by the security forces on Wednesday 11 April, three days before elections for state governors and state parliaments. Eight members of the security forces burst into the Link FM and GTV studios in the Lagos district of Ketu, ordering all the employees to leave and placing seals over the entrances.

The Nigerian president's declaration of a public holiday has delayed a supreme court hearing into whether the vice-president may stand in next week's election.
Olusegun Obasanjo has designated Thursday and Friday, 12 and 13 April as a holiday, directly threatening the electoral campaign of Atiku Abubakar.

In spite of the previous protests and the international pressure exerted upon the Nigerian government since the infamous Anti-gay bill, all efforts now seem to have come to a standstill pending the federal elections on 21 April this year.

Nigerians go to the polls this Saturday in a historic, highly contentious election. Tadjudeen contests the election may be determined more by local factors than powers of incumbency. It may also spur the opposition to unite behind a candidate against the ruling PDP at next weekend’s presidential election.

Nigerians go to the polls this Saturday in a historic, highly contentious election.

It is historic because it is the first time that an elected government will be handing over to another elected government through universal adult suffrage.

It has been highly contentious. It will leave people with negative forebodings because of the violence, generalised insecurity and uncertainties that elections continue to generate across this continent; as we try to deepen democracy beyond ‘voting without choosing’; and make a difference to the way in which we are governed politically, economically and socially.

As with any challenge faced by other African countries, the challenge facing Nigeria, by virtue of its size, is multiplied several times.

This weekend’s election is the first in a two week marathon to choose public officials for both state and federal governments of Nigeria. This Saturday, voters are choosing members for 36 state parliaments and 36 state governors. There are at least two dozen contestants for every available post. There are over 30 political parties contesting.

The resources at the disposal of many of the states are bigger than the national budgets of a majority of the member states of the African Union.

Therefore a lot at stake at these 'local' elections. It is not surprising that most of the electoral violence tends to occur at these elections, because the local elite is most visible at this level.

At this level, they can legitimately access a bigger share, second only to that of the federal government, of the nationally allocated oil revenues.

So if you do not control power at the centre, doing so at state levels is second choice. Local government is a very distant, and relatively poor third option.

At the federal level the contest is narrowed to two main parties: usually the ruling part and whatever coalition of ‘eaters’ and other foot lose opportunists on the one hand; and a coalition of opposition parties on the other.

At the state level things, are complicated by specific local conditions: personalities, historical memories and local rivalries.

The party in power at the centre always has the advantage of ‘changing political facts’ locally through all kinds of uses and abuses of the powers of incumbency.

Thus in 2003, the ruling PDP went on a rampage claiming victory in more than two thirds of the states across the country, mostly through blatant rigging, including massive votes in most of the oil-producing southern states where there were successful boycotts of the polls.

In Obasanjo’s home state, where he even lost his deposit in his own family ward in 1999, an election in which his own Yoruba people did not endorse his candidature, he was seen as sponsored by the Hausa–Fulani north.

The PDP reversed the course by giving Obasanjo more votes than there were registered voters! An election petition later nullified the result, but with no effect on the presidency.

However in at least one state, e.g. Imo, the rigged results were overturned, and the legitimate winning opposition party regained the governorship.

In two other states, Lagos and Kano - the two most populous, metropolitan states with very conscious civic populations, the leading opposition parties, AD and ANPP respectively, were sufficiently vigilant and organised in a balance of terror against the PDP, so as to ensure that there victories were not stolen.

At Saturday’s elections, the PDP may attempt to sweep everything again. But the party is no longer as formidable as it appears, in spite of its control of the state machinery.

First, its umbrella symbol is now so tattered that it no longer holds its various factions together. It is bitterly divided between Obasanjo loyalists, Atiku supporters and all kinds of anti-Baba PDP grandees. Those who did not defect with Atiku have gone to other parties.

Secondly, Atiku’s group had control over most of the party's financial machinery which was used to rig the PDP to power, notably in 2003. Therefore Obasanjo’s people do not have monopoly over the manipulations. Hence the mortal fear of having Atiku on the ballot, and risk having to content with his counter-rigging infrastructure.

Thirdly, Obasanjo does not know how to make friends, although he is field-marshal in manufacturing enemies by the seconds. He has caused more disenchantment in his ranks through the whimsical way he imposed governorship candidates in many states.

In one state Obasanjo imposed the fourth-placed candidate, while in other states, the names of winning candidates were substituted with Aso Rock favorites. Two of those went to court to have the decision quashed, and were successful.

But rather than reinstate them, Obasanjo’s party declared that they will not be contesting in the states. They expelled the victorious candidates in order to deny them the PDP platform. All these will militate against PDP at state level.

By no means are the other parties any more democratic than the PDP: most of them will rig where they can, and are able to.

What this all means is that this Saturday’s elections may be determined more by local factors than the powers of incumbency, whether at local or federal levels. The opposition parties may do better than feared. They may also spur the opposition to unite against the PDP at next weekend’s presidential election behind a candidate best placed to challenge the PDP candidate, Umar Musa Yar Adua, who remains the front runner.

* Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem is the Deputy Director for the UN Millennium Campaign in Africa, based in Nairobi, Kenya. He writes this article in his personal capacity as a concerned pan-Africanist.

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

If Nigeria successfully holds local and federal elections on 14 and 21 April, it will be the first time that an elected civilian government will hand power over to another. Will the elections hold? Will clear winners emerge? Will alleged losers accept their defeat with good grace, actuated by the larger national interest? Ike Okonta places Nigeria’s forthcoming elections in historical and political context.

Given the country’s turbulent political history, the choice confronting Nigerians in these difficult times is between democracy and national disintegration. Some analysts would like to add a third into the mix: a military coup d’etat. But I have firmly ruled this out. Ambitious officers might well attempt a takeover, but Nigerians’ current deep aversion to military rule will see to it that they will not last in office.

In times past the army always stepped into the breach when the politicians failed to abide by the rules of the game, using the coup to truncate the party-political process, abolish the constitution, and govern the country from their barracks. The armed forces had a modicum of respectability in the 1970s, fresh from a bitter civil war. They were viewed – at least in the western and northern parts of the country – as the nation’s saviour.

But the Babangida and Abacha regimes (1985-1998) exploded the myth of the Nigerian military as guarantors of peace and drivers of national progress. The campaign for democratic rule that seeded in the late 1980s was deeply-rooted, popular and enduring for the simple reason that ordinary Nigerians had by this time seen through the mask of the soldiers. Now they clearly recognised that their very survival depended on them winning back the right to govern themselves or elect their representatives as they saw fit.

Ordinary Nigerians are still struggling to consolidate the democratic government they won at such high cost in 1999 when their protests finally forced the General Abubakar-led junta to hold elections. It is not likely that they will tolerate another military adventurer, no matter how well-meaning, in the corridors of power.

If the mass of Nigerians prefer to live in a united country rather than go their separate ways – and all available research points to the former – and if they are firmly set against renewed military rule – as indeed they have – then it stands to reason to argue that they will work strenuously to ensure that the elections are duly held.

After all, multi-ethnic nations are best held together by dialogue and consensus. They will also likely engage the electoral process with great care knowing as they do now that inconclusive or chaotic elections could throw Nigeria on to the path of disintegration along the ever present fault-lines of religion and narrow ethnic nationalism.

They will want the elections to be peaceful, transparent and the results fair and credible. They will want the victors to demonstrate humility in their triumph, and the losers to accept that democratic elections are not a one-off event but an on-going process, holding out the hope of their own triumph in the next electoral round. Above all, Nigerians will want the out-going Obasanjo government to display statesmanship; and with an eye on history, to ensure that all conceivable obstacles to a smooth transfer of power to its successor are removed.

All evidence supports the contention that the majority of Nigerians are working hard to achieve this outcome. But there are also worrying signs on democracy’s road, as the country approaches the elections. Some of these danger signals are born of residual structural problems in the polity; the rest are largely attitudinal, driven by the personal quirks of certain political actors. It is important that we highlight these danger signs, separate those that can be remedied from the intractable, and urge well-meaning Nigerian political actors to channel their energies towards those that can be remedied. The point of political diagnosis is to identify and remove elements that impede the healthy functioning of the polity.

Three danger signs

Nigeria’s current political regime is a very young electoral system struggling to achieve democratic consolidation. Thirty years of military rule foisted a culture of impunity, authoritarianism, and disempowered citizenship on the people. The vital institutions that support representative government – a free and robust press, an independent and impartial judiciary, and political parties driven by policy issues and buoyed up by a freely associating and enlightened citizenry – that began to emerge in the 1940s when the struggle for independence really commenced, were stifled following the first military coup in January 1966.

Efforts of progressive politicians and civil society leaders since the end of the civil war in January 1970 have been directed largely towards winning back the open civic space in which these crucial institutions can thrive and prosper again. The Second Republic of 1979-1983 was too short a period for these supportive institutions of representative rule to re-embed in the wider society. Generals Babangida and Abacha’s unrelenting and all-encompassing attacks on the civic-political space killed off the tender shoots that began to bud during that brief spring. In a real sense therefore, the advent of the Third Republic in 1999, for all its imperfections, offered the first real opportunity, after the demise of the First Republic in 1966 and the bloody civil war which followed in its wake eighteen months later, for the institutional ramparts of democratic government to take root again.

This is the reason why Nigerians will go into the April 2007 elections without the benefit of real political parties and politicians to represent their views and interests. The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the ruling party, has since 1998 when it came into being, transformed into a bloated, vote-rigging machine intolerant of opposition within or from rival parties. Run along highly authoritarian lines and dependent on the president for funds and policy, the PDP has been reduced to a branch of the government. The latter is also subject to the whims and commands of President Obasanjo.

The leading opposition parties – All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) and Action Congress (AC) - are run along more consensual lines. But they are hampered by a lack of experienced and trained personnel; a narrow and opportunistic membership base; perennial shortage of funds; and a domineering presidency which has not hesitated to use government largesse and paid agents provocateurs to undermine them.

The judiciary, after the battering it endured at the hands of the soldiers, is still struggling to find a credible role for itself in the new civilian dispensation. The Nigerian press is fiercely combative and fearless, but journalists are yet to make the transition from being guerrillas fighting off military dictatorship to cool-headed analysts nudging politicians and public discourse towards policy issues.

To correct these structural problems will require time and a great deal of political skill. Because they will endure into the coming 2007 electoral cycle, the gaps they will open up in the political system could be exploited by a ruling party anxious to retain power at the centre and in the states. Having rigged the 1999 and 2003 elections with impunity, the PDP will be sorely tempted to enact a repeat performance this April, taking advantage of the weakened opposition, a cowed judiciary, and a still tactically-challenged press. This is the first danger sign on the road to the elections.

Whilst Olusegun Obasanjo is still the head of the federal government, he is no longer in power. This might sound paradoxical; but the architecture of power in Nigeria is as multilayered as it is complex. Obasanjo rose to prominence in the Nigerian armed forces in the late 1960s riding on the coat tails of the northern coup-makers of July 1966, most notably General Yakubu Danjuma.

Burdened with his close friendship with Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, leader of the abortive January 1966 putsch in the north, and with his own role in that event still shrouded in mystery, Obasanjo had necessarily to demonstrate his loyalty to the new power elite – led by Col. Yakubu Gowon, Col. Murtala Muhammed, and Major Danjuma. It was on the rump of this group that he relied when Muhammed was assassinated in February 1976, after he had replaced Gowon as head of state the previous year and he (Obasanjo) was asked to step into the breach. He reigned; but real power lay with chief of army staff General Danjuma and chief of staff, supreme headquarters, General Shehu Yar’Adua. Obasanjo’s pay-back was his strident defence of ‘Nigerian unity’; and along with this, a pro-northern political stance when the time came to hand over power to politicians in 1979.

This pact, forged in the turbulent period of military rule in the 1970s, was to be replayed in 1999 when the northern military and political elite, reeling from attacks from pro-democracy elements in the wake of General Babangida and Abacha’s excesses, looked for a safe pair of hands to cede power. This was meant to be a tactical manoeuvre, designed to placate frayed nerves in the progressive camp in southern Nigeria. Babangida, acting on behalf of a loose coalition of northern elites, though by no means all northern interests, again sought out Obasanjo and finessed the politics that took him to Abuja as President in May 1999.

Throughout his military and later political career, Obasanjo never took any risks that could put his life or career on the line. He was content to let others take the risks, including dangerous military putsch. He would emerge from the shadow when the gun smoke had cleared and scout for rich pickings. Obasanjo’s sole attempt to make a bid for real power on his own behalf was the ill-fated attempt to get his minions in the PDP to tinker with the constitution that he might stay on as President beyond the two terms stipulated by the constitution. The powerful coalition of Babangida, Danjuma, and Vice President Atiku Abubakar – all northerners - united with pro-democracy elements in the press and civil society and promptly slapped down Obasanjo in May 2006.

That episode, more than anything else, demonstrated where real power in Nigeria lay. It also pointed to Obasanjo’s fragile position in the country’s nascent democratic game. He would, ideally, like to retire as a king-maker now that he can no longer extend his stay in office. But he has never had a secure power base to call his own: neither in the armed forces; nor in his Yoruba region home where he is distrusted by a populace who still see him as a northern ‘stooge’; nor in civil society; nor amongst the intelligentsia who regard him with a mix of loathing and disdain.

Nevertheless, Obasanjo has made it clear that come April he is determined to steamroll his chosen presidential candidate, Umar Yar’Adua, younger brother of the late Shehu Yar’Adua, into State House. The northern political elite is equally determined to demonstrate that Obasanjo has neither the right nor the political clout to appoint a new political leader for them. They see the April polls as the proving ground.

Obasanjo and his unpopular party will go into the elections with the full backing of the PDP state governors who are anxious to ensure continuity and thus shield themselves from later prosecution for corrupt enrichment and a supine police force with armed elements drawn from the army and paid thugs that Nigerian cities now have in abundance. This group will have to confront a vengeful Northern elite and their allies in the south, grouped around General Muhammadu Buhari, presidential candidate of the ANPP, and Atiku Abubakar, Obasanjo’s vice president, whose bid for the top job under the Action Congress is still under a cloud.

Were the supporting institutions of Nigeria’s young democracy autonomous and functioning, all eyes would have turned to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the courts to ensure free and credible polls; thus removing the prospect of a free for all between these two bitterly opposed political factions. But INEC, following its recent pronouncement banning Vice President Abubakar, a noted critic of Obasanjo, from contesting the presidential election even though the electoral act does not accord it such power, has demonstrated that it is an interested party, on the side of President Obasanjo and the PDP government.

The Buhari and Atiku groups have stated that they view INEC as a partial entity that will work on Obasanjo’s behalf during the elections. This means that they will put into place their own independent machinery to police the electoral process and ensure that neither the INEC nor PDP’s agents rig the polls. Obasanjo, who was recently quoted in the press as saying that the election would be a ‘do or die’ affair for him will be expected to use the machinery and financial resources of the government to ensure that his will prevails. The inevitable clash between these juggernauts will reverberate in wider Nigerian political and civil society, already stretched to breaking point. This is the second danger sign on Nigeria’s democracy road.

Then there is a third danger sign, as ominous as the first two. This is the international politics of oil and the extent to which the major oil-consuming nations in Western Europe and North America seeking to secure their strategic interests will attempt to shape the political outcome in Nigeria to their advantage. At the heart of this realpolitik is the growing armed insurrection in the Niger Delta, fed and sustained by five decades of economic exploitation and political marginalisation that the local communities have suffered at such terrible cost.

The United States and the European Union backed the Obasanjo government in 1999 and again in 2003 even though there was abundant evidence that those elections had been marked by rigging and violence. Obasanjo was seen as friendly to their interests. He was also seen as a competent general who could be counted on to rein in the youth activists in the Delta region and ensure that Western oil companies continue to extract oil undisturbed.

Local democracy and corporate social responsibility were thus sacrificed for cheap oil. This democratic deficit is at the heart of the present crisis in the Niger Delta. Continued backing for Obasanjo’s political agenda in April will certainly escalate this crisis, which in turn could spill out into other regions of the country igniting a political cyclone.

These then are the three major danger signs on the road to the April general elections. So far, ordinary Nigerians in their millions have remained spectators in this great game, even as their economic and social condition continues to deteriorate. They are waiting anxiously for the April elections to settle accounts with those whom they see as having betrayed them, leaving them worse off than they were in 1999. If they are denied their day in the voting booth, the three danger signs will meld with popular anger and frustration. There is no knowing whether Nigeria will still be there on the map when the storm settles.

Alternatively, Nigeria’s ruling elites can elect to head off this storm by insisting on fair elections. But how might the end game play out?

Endgame of a defeated General

President Olusegun Obasanjo will quit power in May. There is no getting around it. The current power constellation is firmly against him despite his strenuous efforts since he assumed office in 1999 to build an independent power base of his own. The question now is the manner of Obasanjo’s going, and how to ensure that Nigeria as a corporate entity remains after the storm has quietened.

Forecasting the ramifications of Nigeria’s coming general elections is now a booming industry in the United States and Western Europe. These forecasts and analyses run the gamut from the sober to the downright loony. Most centre on the rising armed conflict in the oil-bearing Niger Delta, and how the elections might likely impact the flow of oil to the Western countries.

But for Nigerians and other Africans, the stakes are higher. A conflict-ridden Nigeria in the wake of inconclusive or rigged elections will trigger powerful waves of chaos and anarchy throughout West Africa, suspend the ambitions of ECOWAS to transform the region into a belt of economic prosperity, and open up west and central Africa to natural resource hunters intent on fomenting war and pave the way for easy pickings.

It is therefore important that Nigerian political thinkers step out to combat the muddled, self-serving analyses of those who have put themselves forward as ‘interpreters’ of political trends in their country. Indeed, they are challenged to articulate a clear road map to fair, peaceful and conclusive elections: to an electoral outcome that will provide a framework in which the task of repairing the damage Obasanjo and his lieutenants have wrought these past eight years can commence.

The Washington based Eurasia Group had this to say about the coming elections: ‘An election delay and the constitutional crisis which will likely follow could tempt the country’s military and influential ex-military establishment – which ruled Nigeria for four decades – to consider re-entering politics...Obasanjo’s relationship with key figures within the ex-military establishment, such as former head of state General Ibrahim Babangida, former long-time National Security Adviser Mohammed Gusau and former Defense Minister Theophilus Danjuma, is currently strained. In any political crisis it is not clear that these powerful figures, and many others within the ex-military establishment, would back Obasanjo rather than someone else to replace him.’

Underpinning this controversial analysis is nostalgia for a return to military rule in Nigeria. This nostalgia is to be found mainly in neoconservative political and business circles in Europe and the United States whose favourite business model in Africa is using corrupt dictators to repress the ordinary people, thus paving the way for them to pillage the continent’s natural resources undisturbed. General Ibrahim Babangida, Mobutu Sese Seko and others of their ilk were feted in London and Paris and Washington for precisely this reason. There are many in the power corridors of these three cities that still yearn for the return of the ‘good old days’ of Babangida in Nigeria.

While it is true that the likes of Babangida and Danjuma are still powerful, due to the stupendous wealth they illegally amassed following the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970, it would be a mistake to see power as influence in the country today. The generals have virtually no political influence in a country where the ordinary people view soldiers with a mix of contempt and loathing, and are determined to protect the right to vote they won back in 1999. Obasanjo was able to deny Babangida and Gusau the presidential ticket of the Peoples Democratic Party not because he himself is powerful, but because he was canny enough to recognise that Nigerians would not shed a tear for Babangida and Gusau when they were fed with a dose of their own medicine.

Likewise, Babangida, working in partnership with Vice President Atiku Abubakar, was able to frustrate Obasanjo’s plot to remain in office. Not because Babangida himself is overwhelmingly politically influential, but because he too recognised that the majority of Nigerians detest the President’s authoritarian pretensions and want to see the back of him in May 2007. Babangida tapped into this powerful current and Obasanjo’s third term ambitions bit the dust.

What the foregoing tells us clearly is that ordinary Nigerians and their desire for representative and accountable government are now firmly in the saddle and will ultimately determine the direction in which the country will go in May – democratic rule or a return to dictatorship. The wind, I hazard to say, is blowing in the direction of democratic consolidation.

The prospects of a successful military coup in the wake of chaotic elections this April are not very bright. It does not even register on the political radar of the Nigerian street. Nor are there signs among the rank and file in the armed forces that they are yet again beginning to see themselves as the nation’s saviour. The army’s sense of self-worth took a battering in the 1990s as Babangida and his successor General Sani Abacha systematically destroyed all hopes of social and economic progress in the country. Ordinary soldiers, who were deployed in the cities to shoot and maim democracy activists, and students have since those tragic events been lumped together with their commanders as destroyers of the nation. This unflattering image, still powerful and enduring, is one which officers and the other ranks are yet to live down.

We are thus left with a charged political arena in which the ex-military gladiators will have to slug it out among themselves, while an impoverished populace look on from the sideline, waiting for yet another breach in the rampart to claw back more of their purloined freedom. Olusegun Obasanjo had an easy ride in 1979 when, as military head of state, he worked in concert with his fellow generals to shape the general elections and handed power to their preferred candidate. Indeed, Obasanjo had declared a few months before those elections that victory would not necessarily go to the most qualified candidate, a clear indication that the likes of Malam Aminu Kanu, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo, still widely venerated in the country, would not be allowed to take power.

Shehu Shagari, presidential candidate of the National Party of Nigeria, was the least qualified in a field bristling with intellectual and political giants, tempered and burnished in the furnace of the independence struggles of the 1940s and 1950s. Obasanjo, notorious for his envy of intellectuals and political figures more accomplished than himself, chose to put personal interest above the national imperative of supporting a politician and statesman able to guide Nigeria seamlessly from unaccountable military rule to a democracy delivering the essentials of life to a still hopeful and expectant populace.

The depredations of the Shagari years and punitive IMF-sanctioned structural adjustment, shortly after the return of military dictatorship, were Obasanjo’s parting gift to Nigerians in September 1979. The present challenge, insist Nigerian democratic activists, is to ensure that he will not have the opportunity to give the people a similar gift this coming May.

‘Popular’ political analysis led by the BBC presents Umar Yar’Adua, presidential candidate of the PDP, as the favourite to win the election. The argument is that a candidate has to have an enormous war chest and a powerful election-rigging machine – which the Obasanjo government has in abundance - to win. This analysis not only forecloses the democratic option - i.e. the choice of the majority of ordinary Nigerians freely expressed in the polling booth - it also subtly encourages the belief that there will be no credible challenge to the PDP machine this April.

This, then, is the area in which Nigerian democrats have been channelling their energies: to prove that free elections, without which any talk of democratic government is just much hot air, are possible in Nigeria. They are also looking ahead. In the eventuality that they are unable to ensure free elections, they plan to make the cost of rigging so expensive that the perpetrators will be forced into an untenable position, making it impossible for them to form a government.

Obasanjo’s critics say the PDP government can only point to an abysmal record in office these eight years. The fundamental challenges that confronted Nigerian state and society in May 1999 are still staring Nigerians in the face: a new constitution that addresses the terms of association between the federating units and thus ensures political order; a home-grown economic strategy capable of tackling the scourge of mass unemployment and deepening poverty; and a social compact led by a visionary political elite restoring hope and love of country in a battered and increasingly cynical populace.

PDP candidates cannot therefore rely on their ‘performance’ in office to win the argument on the campaign ground. True, the campaign strategies of the other presidential candidates have been rather short on concrete alternative policies – the exception being Prof. Pat Utomi, presidential candidate of the African Democratic Party (ADP), and to a lesser extent, General Muhammadu Buhari of the ANPP. But these two candidates are in a powerful position to reap bountifully from the widespread distrust of the PDP and its politics of plunder and incompetence. In a free and fair context, Buhari and Utomi could easily emerge as hot favourites for president. The task, say those desirous of easing the PDP out of office, is to build a nation-wide coalition of vote-watchers capable of counting the vote and making the vote count.

Power at all costs?

The Obasanjo government has fired the first salvo in its ‘war’ to retain power at all costs. All manner of obstacles, including police harassment, were put in the path of Buhari’s campaign team as they went about canvassing votes in the northern part of the country in March. Desperate PDP officials, faced with the awful prospect of a long Harmattan out of government, and being made to account for the billions of dollars they frittered away on the altar of corruption and indolence, are likely to resort to even worse tactics as the electoral battle is joined.

Advocates of political liberty and fair play at the polls are preparing themselves for the bruising context ahead. They argue that given past performance, it would be foolhardy, even suicidal, to look to the Independent National Electoral Commission to conduct fair elections, and the police to maintain order. Recent actions and pronouncements of ranking INEC officials have made it clear that they are riding on Obasanjo’s PDP wagon. The use of the police to prevent rival politicians from campaigning is also a signpost pointing to close PDP-police collaboration during the elections.

Political parties working to replace the PDP government are increasingly looking elsewhere for countervailing civic machinery able to secure peaceful and orderly elections. Faith leaders, the independent media, labour unions, women’s organisations, ethnic associations and town unions, progressive student groups and democracy activists, among other non-violent civic organisations, are being actively courted, mobilised, and empowered to perform this function.

But they also recognise that it is not enough to focus only on policing the vote on election day. Leaders of these political parties and their allies in civil society say they are already thinking ahead and have factored in the possibility that their forces could be overwhelmed by the PDP juggernaut, as the vote tally stacks up against them. If that day comes, they could borrow a leaf from the recent elections in Mexico and peacefully mobilise their followers and sundry Nigerians desirous of fair elections to demand a recount or another round of elections.

They have also put the National Assembly and the judiciary on notice, for these institutions to stand ready to do their duty if the government in power proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is no longer capable of governing a fair and orderly transfer of power. There are strong speculations in the media that pressure could be brought to bear on Ken Nnamani, President of the Senate and third in line as President, to commence impeachment proceedings against Obasanjo and Vice President Abubakar, using a recent Senate report indicting both of fraud.

Continuing speculations concerning the health of PDP presidential candidate Umaru Yar’Adua, and Obasanjo’s strident assurances that all is well with him only point up the vulnerable position of both, even as ordinary Nigerians continue to yearn for a paradigm shift in the politics of the country. A recent meeting between Muhammadu Buhari and the leadership of the influential Christian Association of Nigeria during which the ANPP candidate gave firm assurances that he would not tamper with secular provisions of the constitution and favour his fellow Muslims unduly indicate that inter-ethnic and inter-faith coalition-building in pursuit of a broad-based response to the PDP is emerging. Likewise, the positive nation-wide response to Prof. Utomi’s visit to Oloibiri, the Niger Delta village where oil was first struck in 1956, points to burgeoning civic support for political leaders with a record of service and integrity.

It is these powerful supporting pillars of the dawning democratic moment that Obasanjo’s desperate end game is up against. The resort to election rigging and strong-arm tactics will not be an effective response to this moment. To rig the vote is one thing; to form a government based on rigged polls is quite a different ball game.

Presently Nigeria stands at a crossroads – to follow the path of democratic consolidation and its attendant fruits of stable, orderly and accountable government and prosperity; or to return to authoritarian rule and its diet of poverty, corruption, and ethnic conflict.

This drama is unfolding in a new international arena in which the peaceful rise of China and India as major economic powers are changing the balance of power, re-ordering the traditional flow of raw materials from Africa to the Western industrialised countries, and reshaping the way in which powerful corporations think about and do business on the continent. The present presents threats. But it also presents opportunities for resource-rich but technology and capital-poor countries such as Nigeria.

The proliferation of international terror networks, the resurgent scramble for nuclear bombs and other weapons of mass destruction, and rising ethnic wars on a mass scale make a compelling case for arenas of stable and peaceful government in resource-rich areas such as Africa.

Nigeria is one of the most important players on the continent, perhaps the most important. A peaceful, stable and democratic Nigeria can function as an agent of world peace, in a continent that has come up on the foreign policy radar of established and rising powers as crucial to their future economic health.

But a Nigeria in thrall to an incompetent and authoritarian government will open up this vast country to vendors of terror and pillage, further pushing the global order towards cataclysm. Fair elections are therefore as important to ordinary Nigerians as they are to those among the global powers anxious to navigate the new order into calmer waters.

* Ike Okonta is currently Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, UK. His book, When Citizens Revolt: Nigerian Elites, Big Oil, and the Ogoni Struggle for Self-determination (Africa World Press, Trenton, 2007) is forthcoming.

* Please send comments to

The first and last time I ever voted in an election in Nigeria was in 1979. Ironically it was the military regime of General Olushegun Obasanjo who gave my generation (the independence kids) our first opportunity to exercise our voting rights as young adults. The military had overthrown the first civilian administration in 1966 and had retained power through more coups and counter coups for 13 years (nine of which were spent by General Yakubu Gowon including the three years of bloody civil war to ‘keep Nigeria One’, 1967-1970) until the Obasanjo regime returned the country to ‘democratic rule’ in 1979.

That election, like previous elections in Nigeria’s short lived experience of democracy as an independent country (1960-1966), was marred by violence, brazen irregularities, extreme polarization and allegations of official and unofficial bias in favour of the five registered parties.

The military regime was not seen by many as impartial observers. Their alleged partiality was not unfamiliar because, even under British colonial over-lordship, elections were rigged or tilted in favour of particular groups, regions, or ethnic interests amenable to British neo-colonialist designs. Therefore the British were never neutral about who succeeded them whether in Nigeria, Uganda or Kenya, although they miscalculated in some cases, most famously Ghana and the emergence of Nkrumah and the CPP.

Nigeria’s 1979 Presidential election, and the majority of the Governorship at the state level and also the National Parliament, were ‘won’ by the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), whose presidential candidate, a northern Hausa-Fulani Muslim, ex-school master and former Minister, Alhaji Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari became the President. The closest rival to Shagari and the NPN was veteran politician, an Ijebu-Yoruba Methodist from the South West, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN).

The Chief came from the same state, Ogun, as Obasanjo but he and his fanatical supporters predominantly among the Yoruba accused Obasanjo of ‘betraying the Yoruba’ and of being ‘an agent of the Hausa –Fulani Feudalist North’. Since Lagos is the centre of Nigeria’s financial, industrial and commercial activities and the Yoruba had historically had hegemony over the media both, Obasanjo and Shagari were pilloried, abused and put under siege in the federal capital which was under the UPN.

The Chief, himself a successful lawyer, gathered together a formidable team of lawyers and took his election petition against the electoral commission, the military government and the NPN up to the Supreme Court. But the highest court decided against him. The election of Shagari stood.

By 1983 the Shagari government /NPN was in charge of the elections. Not only did Shagari win in a ‘landslide’ across the country, but in his home state, Sokoto, he had more votes than the total population of the state! So brazen was the NPN manipulation of the votes that even Chief Awolowo, a very litigious and cantankerous old man in Nigerian politics, unrivalled up to now, did not feel the need to go to court again. He thought it a waste of time. Instead he gave up the case to God and public opinion.

Less than 4 months after those controversial elections in December 1983 the civilian regime was overthrown in yet another military coup and General Muhammadu Buhari (he is, without any sense of irony, today a leading Presidential candidate) became the military head of state.

The military remained in power for another 16 years until 1999 when the country again ‘returned’ to civilian rule under a ‘civilianized’ Obasanjo. So the story of democracy in Nigeria has become one long journey from Obasanjo to Obasanjo!

The General is again at the threshold of another historic transition in Nigeria. He was the first military leader to handover to an elected civilian President and if all goes as well as possible in spite of the current uncertainties on May 29 2007 Obasanjo will become the first ‘elected’ president to peacefully handover to another elected president.

Less than three weeks before the elections the omens do not seem to be good.

There are two sets of problems even though one has received greater media space than the other which may be more important.

The first set are political issues related to the reluctance and very active resistance of Obasanjo to leave office, the third term ‘prolongation manoeuvers’, as Nigerians call it, but which Ugandans will be more familiar with as the ‘sad term’ or ‘Ekisanja’. This has brought on a credibility deficit to his legacy and public perception of the transition processes. The worst consequence of the checkmated futile term extension is, of course, the Vice President, Atiku Abubakar’s desperate struggle to be on the ballot, and Obasanjo’s blatant ‘do or die’ stratagems to block him.

The other set of problems concern the level of technical, administrative and organizational preparedness of the Electoral Commission – aspirationally called Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC. It pleads readiness, but the average Nigerian believes otherwise. The evidence on the ground does not inspire much confidence. Many of the challenges could actually be technical incompetence. But so divided is the public that many think the incompetence is deliberate and orchestrated to create chaos and secure a ‘sad term’ extension for Obasanjo.

I do not believe in this conspiracy theory about Obasanjo creating chaos in order to remain in power. There is too much obsession with Obasanjo’s shenanigans that is really frustrating to any sane person. Some of his critics are so consumed by their hatred for the man that they even behave, talk and write as though Obasanjo is the worst leader Nigeria has ever had.

Yet many of these critics were resounding in their silence while others were active collaborators under the IBB and Abacha dictatorships. A lot of the animosity against Obasanjo is self-earned because of the man’s ‘I-know-best’ and often rude public profile. However hatred for Obasanjo should not confuse one to the extent that even if there is no rainfall (or even if there is too much rain!) it could be blamed on the regime. The Atiku supporters or their fellow travelers using this line need to wake up to the stark political realities. Neither Atiku nor Obasanjo will be on the ballot.

Would this be fair to Atiku? Of course not, but what will be new about political injustices by the Nigerian political elite?

Chief MKO Abiola won the fairest and freest election ever held in that country but it was annulled and he died in prison .The world did not collapse. The dictator, Babangida, banned 15 presidential aspirants (some of them ex-Generals including Atiku’s political God Father, Shehu Musa Yar Adua) and other Plutocrats were prevented from standing. The world did not collapse on that occasion either. It will not collapse if Atiku did not stand.

Somehow the country will muddle through. There is no military option anymore therefore Nigerians have to find ways and means of making democracy to mean more than just one set of oppressors and exploiters periodically posing to be their liberators. There are hopeful signs in the growing assertiveness and clear political demands of a new generation of CSO activists who want to deepen the democratic process beyond the Donor-driven project cycle and its complimentary protest by per diem culture.

In spite of all the gathering dark clouds one can hazard very quick guesses.

One, Atiku will not be standing and has to be content with enjoying his unlikely victim status and dubious rebranding as a ‘martyr to democracy’ even if he was a chief architect in all the scams and fraud that got Obasanjo elected both in 1999 and 2003. There may not be honor among con men, but the Obasanjo–Atiku saga is a just desert for both of them.

Two, the elections will be marred by all kinds of irregularities including ‘rigging where you would have won’ by all the leading contenders. But finally the ruling class will go back to ‘business as usual’ while the masses continue ‘suffering and smiling‘ as Fela Kuti once sang, in a country where the elite is unashamedly committed to only one ideology: LOOTOCRACY (government of looters, by looters, for looters).

* Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem is the Deputy Director for the UN Millennium Campaign in Africa, based in Nairobi, Kenya. He writes this article in his personal capacity as a concerned Pan-Africanist.

* Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org

As Nigerians move towards elections that mark the first time one elected civilian government has handed over to another, Chippa Vandu provides an historical overview of military and civilian rule in Nigeria and assess the probable outcome of the April elections.

As a nation, Nigeria has come a long way. 1999 was meant to be its year of hope—the return to democratic rule after a decade and a half of military dictatorships. Of all military rulers in Nigeria’s history, only one voluntarily gave up power to a democratically elected government. His name was Olusegun Obasanjo and the year was 1979. General Obasanjo became a military ruler by chance in 1976, having inherited the seat of power when the then Head of State, General Murtala Muhammed, was assassinated in Nigeria’s second bloody coup. Obasanjo handed power over to the democratically elected Shehu Shagari, who was toppled in a bloodless coup by Major General Muhammadu Buhari in 1983. Then began the decade and a half of military dictatorships that saw General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993), General Sani Abacha (1993-1998) and General Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-1999) rule Nigeria..

Olusegun Obasanjo once again ascended to the highest office in Nigeria in 1999 filled with expectations. The exceedingly corrupt government of one of his predecessors—the late Sani Abacha—had all but destroyed the semblance of civil society in Nigeria. Together with his deputy, Atiku Abubakar, Obasanjo set out to work, promising to take Nigeria where military dictatorships had always prevented it from reaching. Four years went by and the government was re-elected for a second term. All this while, there were reforms in the banking and financial sectors of the economy, with the country literally settling its huge debt problem. The government, it appeared, had also solved the perennial problem of fuel shortages, which were common during Sani Abacha’s era. A mini telecommunications revolution also took place in Nigeria, with the birth of GSM telephone networks.

Technocrats were brought into government, some of who excelled at what they did. But to most Nigerians, events were far from rosy. Corruption remained endemic and special agencies were created to deal with it. Even then, it remained a part of daily life. From those who sat at the apex of power, to the janitors in government ministries, everyone expected to be settled—Nigeriaspeak for bribed—for simply doing his or her job. And, while the Nigerian government spoke of impressive economic growth, a concurrent increase in population (and corruption, of course) made for an almost unperceivable improvement in the life of the average man or woman on the street. And there lay the paradox—the desire by Nigerians for change, a government that was promising change, but change that was simply too slow to be perceivable.

Democracy, it appeared, had come to stay—or so Nigerians thought. Sometime in late 2005, the Nigerian presidency silently began pushing for the nation’s constitution to be amended to allow Olusegun Obasanjo run for a third term in office. Opposition to this amendment grew like wildfire, with Obasanjo’s deputy being one of the most vocal opponents. Good enough, the amendment failed as it was thrown out by the Nigerian legislature in May 2006. Without a doubt, this came as a surprise to Obasanjo, who accused his country’s media houses of being vile and insensitive for the manner in which they went about reporting about the third term agenda. And one person in particular whom Obasanjo never forgave was his deputy—Atiku Abubakar. In months to come, Abubakar (who by the way happened to be very much interested in contesting the presidency) was to be frustrated to the point of political suicide.

Abubakar was expelled from the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) at the behest of Obasanjo. At the PDP national convention in December 2006, Obasanjo picked an obscure governor—Umaru Musa Yar’Adua—as his likely successor. Yar’Adua’s health became the subject of media speculation in Nigeria. When he had to be abruptly flown to Germany for treatment during one of his presidential campaigns, it became clear that all was not well. The media, it appeared, was right in stating that Yar’Adua’s frail state of health was a cause for concern. Yar’Adua remains the presidential candidate for the ruling PDP.

Atiku Abubakar’s expulsion from the ruling PDP did not in anyway weaken his desire to contest the presidency. In late 2006, he became instrumental in the formation of a new political party called the Action Congress (AC), which eventually nominated him as its presidential candidate. But Olusegun Obasanjo, not wanting to have any of that, began what may be termed a calculated campaign to ensure that Abubakar was not allowed to contest the presidency. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) published a list of corrupt politicians in February 2006. Top on the list was Abubakar, along with other politicians who, though corrupt, also happened not to be friends of the president.

Though he won a couple of court cases over corruption allegations brought forward by Nigeria’s corruption watchdog, Abubakar was eventually given the final blow when the Nigerian electoral commission omitted his name from the list of those eligible to run for the office of the presidency. Furthermore, in the third week of March 2007, the Nigerian Senate indicted both Abubakar and Obasanjo for mishandling petroleum technology development funds. The Senate further recommended that they both be referred to a disciplinary committee (i.e. the Code of Conduct Bureau) for further action. Calculated as it seemed, this was to partly to ensure that Mr. Obasanjo erased all hopes of extending his tenure beyond May 29, 2007—the stipulated handover date. The Senate indictment literally put a full stop to Abubakar’s political ambition—at least, for the time being.

Two things appear certain when Nigerians begin voting in a couple of week’s time: it has become close to impossible for Mr. Obasanjo to extend his stay in office as he had once hoped. However, by selecting Umaru Yar’Adua as his successor, Obasanjo believes he has found a wall of refuge that would eventually protect his interests after he ceases being Nigeria’s first citizen. Secondly, Abubakar will most likely not run for the presidency, even though the slimmest of chance still exists that the courts might rule in his favour.

With Abubakar out, Yar’Adua’s main challenger becomes Muhammadu Buhari—one time military dictator and presidential candidate of the All Nigeria’s People Party (ANPP). While it is most certain that the ruling PDP will do all in its power to rig the elections in favour of Yar’Adua, an easy victory cannot be guaranteed. Unfortunately, some of the brightest candidates—like Pat Utomi of the African Democratic Congress (ADC) party—have weak political bases. Thus, at the end of the day, most Nigerians will practically be compelled to choose between mediocrity and mediocrity. Such is the life of the game called politics.

It would take nothing short of a miracle from the heavens to stop the ruling PDP from producing the next president of Nigeria. In other words, Nigeria’s next president would most likely be the very man chosen by the incumbent president. Despite being labeled honest, Yar’Adua’s frail health should be a cause for concern. If the man who intends on becoming the next president of Nigeria has to keep running to Germany to be resuscitated each time his health starts to fail, one could only be left wondering what sort of message that sends to the very people he intends to govern. But then, all through Nigeria’s delicate history, there have always been two sets of rules—one for the upper class and another for others. Shattering this barrier could be but a first step towards creating the sort of society that would treat people for what they are—human beings. In this regard, the next government of Nigeria is already failing.

* Chippla Vandu is a Nigerian research engineer with an interest in governance, history and philosophy. He currently resides in Amsterdam, The Netherlands and blogs at

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org

Corruption at the highest levels of the Nigerian government is hampering the economy of the oil-rich country at every level, retired general and presidential candidate Muhammadu Buhari told United Press International in an exclusive interview from the campaign trail in Port Harcourt.

With less than one month before parliamentary and presidential elections, Nigeria's Freedom of Information Bill 2004 still awaits presidential assent, human rights groups note. They now urge President Olusegun Obasanjo to make a last effort to secure right to transparency in Nigeria before he leaves office later this month.

A Nigerian court has ruled against Atiku Abubakar, Nigeria's vice-president, dealing a blow to his plans to run as a presidential candidate. The court of appeal ruled on April 03 that the electoral commission did have the authority to remove names from the official list of candidates, upholding Abubakar's disqualification from running.

Many voters in Nigeria’s general elections in April say that little appears to have changed from previous elections that were characterised by massive fraud and violence followed by military takeovers.

Nigeria's traditional rulers have launched a new initiative to encourage the development of science and technology by using local languages. Using Nigeria's three main native languages in science aims at making science results more easily applied by the country's regional and local administrations.

Political analysts say Nigeria's democracy faces a crucial test. Presidential, parliamentary and state gubernatorial and assembly elections scheduled for 14 and 21 April 2007 "must be transparent and credible" if the country and the region are to make progress and to avoid instability and violence.

The latest report from the International Crisis Group, analyses the approaching vote, which is one of the most important challenges the country has ever faced. Success would offer Nigeria the first opportunity to achieve a genuine constitutional succession from one civilian administration to another since independence in 1960, thus consolidating democracy.

Technology Mentoring Opportunity for Young Nigerian Women Community Activists – The Networking for Success Project is part of the Blogs for African Women (BAWo) initiative, a technology mentoring initiative working to encourage African women to become more active users of technology. BAWo is supported by Fahamu, an organisation using information and communication technologies (ICTs) to serve the needs of organisations that aspire to progressive social change.

For further information: please send a paragraph describing your organisation’s work to oreblogging [at] yahoo.com by Friday, March 31, 2007.

The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) is urging the President of Nigeria to sign into law the freedom of information bill that will allow Nigerian citizens, researchers and the media to have access to information on government business, from government agencies or from private bodies performing public functions.

An angry mob of Muslim students in northern Nigeria beat their teacher to death on Wednesday for allegedly desecrating the Qur'an, police and witnesses said. Oluwatoyin Olushekan was attacked and killed by the mob in Gandu Secondary School in Tudun Wada district, northern Gombe state.