An opposition boycott threat and bloody clashes with Islamic militants on Wednesday raised tensions ahead of Nigeria's presidential election -- the most closely watched poll since independence. A group of 18 opposition parties said the national election commission should be disbanded and Saturday's presidential ballot postponed until "transparency and fairness" can be guaranteed.

Nigeria holds a presidential election on Saturday that is widely seen as a democratic watershed for this country and the whole of Africa. But two days before the vote there are serious doubts over whether it will be seen as a valid, democratic election. The vote in Africa's most populous state should usher in the first handover from one civilian president to another in a nation deeply scarred by three decades of military rule.

Uganda uses indiscriminate and excessive force in fighting bandits in its unruly northeast and 69 civilians have died in recent months as a result, the United Nation's top human rights official said on Thursday. U.N.High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, accused the Kampala government of ignoring her appeal in November "to respect its obligations to protect the human rights of all individuals".

The World Bank's board on Friday delayed a final decision on bank chief Paul Wolfowitz's role in a promotion he arranged for his girlfriend and referred some issues to a committee for further investigation. After a late-hour meeting, the 24-nation board said it had agreed on a procedure to deal quickly with the issue.

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) reports that a shortage of contributions has forced it to cut food rations for 1.28 million people driven into camps from their homes during a 20-year rebellion by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

Arnold Tsunga is a lawyer based in Harare Zimbabwe and working on human rights law in Zimbabwe. In March, Saloman Kebede interviewed him on the upcoming Grand Debate on Continental Government during the next African Union Summit, June – July 2007. The full proposal being considered by the Heads of States can be viewed at

SK: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current proposal for Continental Union?

AT: The recommendations in the Study for Continental Government are not currently binding. Our leaders will end up doing what favours their governments as opposed to what would be of benefit to Africa as a whole. This weakens proposal. The appalling state of leadership is a great misfortune in Africa and has victimized citizens through the violation of human rights in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Rwanda and elsewhere. The strength of this proposal shall lie in its ability to uphold the status of human rights in Africa and address situations in particular countries where democracy has been abused.

SK: Should it be adopted in Accra in July 2007, what would you like to see the African Union Commission achieve within the first phase (2007-2009)?

AT: Enable Africa meet the Millennium Development Goals. As the African Union is still a growing institution, civil society organizations can assist to ensure good political leadership and the governance that will guarantee that Africa meets the MDGs.

SK: And why would this form of continental union be important to African citizens & particular the poor and marginalized?

AT: It is important for Africa to have a unified focus and accountability as a continent.

SK: How could states and non-states ensure that continental union efforts are transparent, participatory and driven by an appreciation of political and economic rights?

AT: The effective involvement of grass root communities is central to its success. We must consider the power of civil society actors, the power of human right defenders and the power of political activists on the ground. We must take into account what they say and try to implement.

SK: What obstacles must the AU overcome for the continental union to be successful?

AT: The AU should do away with the culture of a leadership uniting against its own people. They instead must empower the people to facilitate development.

SK: In what policy area, would you like to see greater convergence and unity across Africa and why?

Economic integration.

This interview is the first of several interviews with African citizens and CSO leaders on the AU proposal for Continental Government. Emily Mghanga of Pan Africa Programme Oxfam edited this interview. The views expressed here are the perspectives of the interviewee. Arnold Tsunga can be reached at Email: [email][email protected]

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Nine African countries have yet to fully implement international anti-corruption conventions, according to detailed country studies issued by Transparency International (TI). Algeria, Burundi, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, and Uganda have legal gaps with regards to the provisions of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the African Union (AU) Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related Offences.

A working paper by Developpement Institutions & Analyses de Long terme (DIAL) sets out to make a detailed analysis of five Sub-Saharan African countries, focusing on inequalities of income and other resources required for economic activity such as land, education and health. It is innovative in that it allows measuring for the first time the inequality of opportunity in Africa, aside inequality of resources and of living standards.

The Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi have relaunched a regional economic bloc that is seen as a key step in restoring peace and stability in the turbulent central African region.

In Part I of Pambazuka News published yesterday we featured:

ANNOUCEMENTS: Pambazuka News celebrates its 300th issue
FEATURES: Sam Kebele asks whether Zimbabwe’s civil society is ready to act
COMMENT AND ANALYSIS:
- An interview with the Zimbabwean feminist activist Shereen Essof
- Raj Patel provides background to the recent hunger strike by five Abahlali members
LETTERS:
- Nicholas Watson presents a cultural paradigm for Liberia’s reconstruction
- Innocent Ukabam responds to Ike Okonta’s piece on the Nigerian elections
- Sharie Blanton on Grace Kwinje's article 'The woman in me'
PAN-AFRICAN POSTCARD:
BLOGGING AFRICA: Nigerian elections; environment riots in Uganda; language policy in Senegal
BOOKS & ARTS:
- Poem by Annie Quarcoopome; review of the film Yes I Am; call for submissions from Kenyan writers
AFRICAN MONITOR: Countdown to AU and CSO activity around the 'continental government' debate

Today in Links and Resources, we feature:

WOMEN AND GENDER: The African Charter of Feminist Principles
CONFLICT AND EMERGENCIES: Algerians in shock after attacks
HUMAN RIGHTS: DRC soldiers ‘rape and execute civilians’
REFUGEES AND FORCED MIGRATION: UN cuts food rations to 1 million Ugandans
ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE: Rigged ballots intercepted in Nigeria
CORRUPTION: World Bank board delays decision on Wolfowitz
DEVELOPMENT: Inequalities and equity in Africa
HEALTH AND HIV/AIDS: HIV rates go up in Namibia
EDUCATION: Rural education suffers in Zimbabwe
LGBTI: Botswana rights group protests ill-treatment
RACISM AND XENOPHOBIA: Ugandan president reassures Asian community
ENVIRONMENT: Resistance to illegal logging in Mozambique
LAND & LAND RIGHTS: Land allocations suspended in Kenya
MEDIA AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: Assassinated Burkinabe journalist commemorated
INTERNET AND TECHNOLOGY: Special computer developed for rural schools
PLUS: e-Newsletters and Mailings Lists; Fundraising and Useful Resources; Courses, Seminars and Workshops and Jobs

*Pambazuka News now has a Del.icio.us page, where you can view the various websites that we visit to keep our fingers on the pulse of Africa! Visit

The Schools Development Unit (SDU), an established professional outreach unit of the School of Education involved in developing levels of excellence in teaching and learning in schools, seeks a Director for appointment to a permanent position. The Unit has a number of current projects that will take the SDU into a new era of development. eadline for applications is 30 April 2007.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/300/zim-violence.jpgSam Kebele’s analysis of recent events in Zimbabwe highlights the internal and external complexities at work in the country. He considers the possibilities of a broad non-partisan front emerging from the ranks of Zimbabwean civil society with a common agenda. He suggests ways in which outsiders and human rights activists can support Zimbabwean civil society in effecting sustainable change in the country.

Following Mary Ndlovu’s excellent article in Pambazuka News...

From last month, possibly for the first time, it seemed that in the African context, Zimbabwe was finally losing the propaganda war it had successfully pursued amongst its traditional allies.

The beatings in March of Morgan Tsvangirai and others flashed around the world caused an immediate drop in the Zimbabwe dollar of a quarter of its value. Any remaining tourism took another hit with mass cancellations at Victoria Falls hotels.

The strategies of the Zimbabwean state of both structural and physical violence reminiscent of the last years of apartheid seem to be both unravelling and becoming more vicious.

The combination of a centrally directed, presidential-inspired incitement to violence, securitisation of state institutions, state of emergency in all but name, use of informer networks and hit squads to destroy the opposition, and manipulation of the media seek to provide ideological justification for the demonisation of the opposition, and licensed informal violence.

Greater unity amongst independent democratic forces and the statement of the Catholic bishops conference unequivocally laying the blame for the first time for the current situation at the door of a ‘corrupt, greedy and repressive elite’ marks a significant step.

It is clear that regional uneasiness and internal ZANU PF struggles have created space for independent voices to organise for systemic democratic change. But, as in the scenarios that Mary Ndlovu outlines, there needs to be a realistic assessment of what can be done as well as strategic regional and international solidarity directed towards progressive targets.

The emergency Southern African Development Community (SADC) leaders' summit in Dar es Salaam on 29 March discussed the crisis. It appeared to give some succour to Mugabe’s regime, in line with its stance since the start of the crisis seven to ten years ago.

SADC appointed Thabo Mbeki, seen here in Zimbabwe as Mugabe’s chief defender, as mediator. It called for sanctions, i.e. the asset freeze and travel bans on Mugabe and cronies, to be lifted; and for the UK government to honour its land reform aid package promises.

Since these changes are unlikely to be implemented without some serious reform, this appears to some as yet more of the same non-interference and ‘Áfrican leadership solidarity’.

The alternative more optimistic assessment was that these two demands were a face-saving formula to get Mugabe to accept that SADC wanted an end to the crisis, which has begun to have a serious impact on the region.

For the first time there has been recent and outspoken public criticism of ZImbabwe from continental and regional leaders, notably the Zambian president Levy Mwanawasa, on more than one occasion.

This reading of the situation suggests there will be a more sustained engagement in Zimbabwe and the possibility for opening a space for manoeuvre.

Widely believed sources say that Mugabe was given the choice either to leave office at the end of his current term in March 2008, or to introduce significant reforms to end the economic and political crisis.

Many inside Zimbabwe felt that SADC could and should have gone much further in applying open political pressure. They argue that the regional organisation has dealt Mugabe a card to play.

The government press has certainly trumpeted the SADC statements as vindicating Mugabe’s speech to his fellow leaders: outlining his liberation war credentials, and berating the British as the sole cause of the crisis. One effect has been to give Mugabe a stronger hand to deal with his internal party critics.

At one point in the week of 26 March just before a politbureau meeting, sources within the Mujuru faction were reportedly informing journalists that they could persuade Mugabe to stand down for re-election in 2008. They allied opportunistically with the Mnangagwa faction (see below) to see off Mugabe’s bid to ‘standardise’ the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2010.

The assumption has been widely canvassed that Mugabe would become a ceremonial president with a Prime Minister. He would retire soon afterwards with no dangers of being whisked away to the International Criminal Court in the Hague. Then opposition factions could re-engage with the West.

The problem for both factions was that Mugabe was too paranoid to trust anyone, and had probably seen that impunity often has a limited shelf life.

The party’s central committee, packed with Mugabe supporters such as the youth and women’s league, duly endorsed the president as their sole candidate for the 2008 elections.

This has left the two different factions on the back foot. Despite claims that this time they would force the issue of succession, they appear to have retreated. They are perhaps biding their time to see what the SADC mission looks like.

At face value though, and as has happened without fail in the past, Mugabe has proved a better street fighter when he has his back against the wall than his would-be party presidential opponents. But the deep rifts in ZANU PF are very unlikely to go away.

It is far from certain, however, that Mugabe will automatically see off his critics outside the party whether internal, regional or international.

There was huge support for a signed petition in the press from regional civil society. There is considerable international support for the ZCTU stay away on 3-4 April. There has also been consolidation of concern and critical statements from church leaders. The deposing of the President of the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), Trevor Mananga, who was suspected of getting to close to the ruling party, and who denounced the ZCTU stay away on state television, points to renewed energy amongst opposition forces, and possibilities for change.

Since the late 1990s, Zimbabwe has been trapped in major interlinked crises that have resulted in economic and political free fall. This situation has been described by diplomatic sources, even with the examples of DRC and Somalia in mind, as ‘just about unsustainable’.

A series of disastrous land reform policies; the adoption by ZANU-PF of draconian measures curbing civil and political liberties; a devastating HIV/ AIDS epidemic; widespread hunger and food; 80 per cent unemployment in the formal sector has driven tens of thousands of professionals to leave the country to find work abroad in the region and Europe.

This was compounded by the attack on urban dwellers known as Operation Murambatsvina (‘clear out the filth’). Inflation is now running at 1,720 per cent and rising, expected by the IMF to hit 5000 per cent by the end of the year.

The Fund says Zimbabwe is losing control of its economy. Anecdotal evidence is of the government having to visit the parallel market to gain US dollars to pay off debts on a day-by-day basis. Fiscal deficit is 40 per cent of GDP, which has fallen by 35 per cent.

Official UN statistics show that life expectancy for women is now just 34 years. The HIV infection rate has been 25 per cent, one of the highest in the world.

Zimbabwe has fallen 23 places over the last decade in the ranking of the world’s poorest countries and now stands as the 145th poorest out of 177 ranked countries (UNDP Human Development Report 2005).

So what is the likelihood of serious change? For those who remember some of their Leninist theory, the ideal conditions for radical change include fractures in the state and its apparatuses, unity of the opposition with a vision, leadership and a strategy, serious multiple crises and significant outside support.

It is hard to say that any of these major elements are in place, although there are some recognisable characteristics and opportunities for the development of more. According to a young civil society activist the current choice is between ‘Á New Zimbabwe’ or Somalia’.

There are other options beyond this binary interpretation, including the danger of a tainted and compromised transition brokered by the region with the support of the West. This could leave in place the systemic features of the repressive and kleptocratic regime, impunity and little real democratic change.

There is a danger that there will not be adequate forces to prevent this as many in Zimbabwe may accept this arrangement, especially if accompanied, as it was apparently proposed at the SADC meeting, by a substantial rescue package put together by the US and UK governments. It would probably save lives.

In terms of possible fractures in the state, divisions, often underpinned by ethnic rivalries within and without the majority Shona-speaking group, have been endemic in ZANU-PF for many years, although they have sharpened considerably over the last year.

Mugabe has been able to use and contain divisions with lesser or greater degrees of coercion, given his awareness of ‘where the bodies are buried’.

The current major divisions are between the equally corrupt Vice-President Joyce Mujuru (and husband Solomon) and Emmerson Mnangagwa factions, all of whom represent the ageing liberation generation.

Mugabe appears to retain most support. Although now arguably a faction leader himself, he remains dominant and is unlikely to be unseated before 2008.

As a result of the fallouts, Mnangagwa’s faction may be on top at the moment. Since Mugabe has explicity attacked the Mujuru faction for plotting against him, it might be now or never for Mnangagwa since he is widely believed to be dependent on anti-retro virals.

Much of the faction-fighting – beyond the usual desire for power and control of resources - is over who controls the army, Mugabe’s power base. The army controls most of the major institutions of the state and is likely to be a power broker in any new situation, through, it is generally thought, Solomon Mujuru, given his former position as liberation war vet and post independence army commander.

At his recent 83rd birthday party, Mugabe attacked Joyce Mujuru in a long rambling tirade that even ZBC felt obliged to censor - in itself an amazing step. Joyce it is understood subsequently to have resigned, but was reportedly persuaded by her husband to withdraw it.

Mujuru remains one of the richest men in ZImbabwe. Whilst he is largely believed to have significant army support, there is talk that this is not as strong as previously thought. There may be elements in the army who prefer Emmerson Mnangagwa to come out on top in the feuding over who would succeed Mugabe.

Whether there would be actual armed violence between the two factions is a matter of debate with younger activists seeming to expect it and older ones less sure. However, there have been no reports of conflicts so far. If they do occur, the point of conflict may be the recently discovered diamond field (se below) in which the Mujurus have a stake. There are also reports of plenty of buried weapons just over the border, from Mozambican war days.

There have been reports of great disaffection within the lower ranks of the army and police, even within the presidential guard, with reports of shootings at State House (and allegedly 22 executions, although in Zimababwe wild rumours are not uncommon).

It is believed that the presidential guard now consists of Congolese troops which suggests a deep mistrust of Zimbabwe’s own military. The lower ranks have also seen an increased rate of desertions which the regime has been unable to stem even by using the war veterans and the Green Bombers.

Reports of the imminent deployment of Angolan police units have been denied, with Luanda claiming they are providing ‘training’ to help replace the deserters. If, as is claimed, 3,000 Angolans will be deployed, this is clearly more that just a training mission.

There are also no facilities to support their deployment. According to the (London) Times correspondent, the police being sent are supposed be the dreaded Ninjas, famed for their brutality in Angola and in action against illegal garimpeiro miners from the DRC - which may not be coincidental.

If the Angolans are sending police, this strategy could backfire by generating further resentment from the ranks of the ZRP indigenous police as well as the population. Even the Angolans stressed the need for peace and security in overcoming internal problems.

It would not seem necessary that the Zimbabwean police need training in handing out beatings. There have been suggestions that the beatings meted out on and since 11 March are the responsibility of several special units, possibly including army in police uniforms. The violence also suggests the involvement of special units in ‘black operations’, such as the attacks on police stations and a passenger train – which the regime subsequently used as part of its propaganda in the region to portray their actions as necessary in the face of 'terrorism', which the state claims is being orchestrated by the MDC. The confessions in the Mail and Guardian at the beginning of April of ‘John Gweru’, a special operative in the Charlie Four hit squad, provide disquieting reminders of the tactics of the last years of apartheid.

For the people, the major problem remains the expected massive food deficit of 1.2 million tonnes (Zimbabwe needs 1.8m tonnes), and the likelihood of politicisation of any aid, especially in an election.

The region as a whole needs to monitor this situation far more carefully than for instance at the time of the 2005 election. Assuring independent verifiable information must be made a central component of the mediation.

The government continues to deny there is a problem, yet in one incident a permanent secretary is believed to have followed the visiting World Food Programme head out of a meeting saying that he had made denials of food shortages because CIO intelligence people were present in the meeting and that Zimbabwe really did need emergency and food aid.

Only belatedly has the country asked the EU to provide food aid. Nor is the region likely to help out with maize, given shortfalls and drought in countries such as Zambia and South Africa: the latter will have to import in a situation of high world maize prices. Malawi may have a surplus, but wishes to build up a strategic reserve. Discussions about a regional food security stockpile are only in an early stage. The UN has already launched a US$215 million appeal, of which $62m is for food aid. The Zimbabwe government has so far imported 400,000 tonnes to cover deficit. Zambia says it will honour existing contracts.

On energy, South Africa will also need all it produces and Zimbabwe is in debt to ESKOM (the South African energy parastatal), Mozambique and to SNEL, the Congolese power authority, which was in Harare in early April chasing the money it has already been promised several times.

Tobacco farmers who provide much of the foreign exchange are in dispute with the government over price and are not bringing their reduced crop to the selling floors.

So are the Zimbabweans losing their automatic regional and continental outside support? The Zambian president Mwanawasa, who will be the next chair of SADC, has compared Zimbabwe with a sinking Titanic - a statement that drew an immediate visit to Lusaka from Zimbabwean officials.

This followed a visit from Jakaya Kikwete, president of Tanzania and head of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. The SADC troika of Tanzania, Lesotho, Namibia allegedly want Zimbabwe to be top of the agenda at the next organ meeting (or did do before the recent summit). As well as being tasked with re-engagement with Zimbabwe and with the SA ambassador having had talks with Tsvangirai, the South Africans had already made it clear that they wanted commitment to at least formal democratic practices.

Furthermore, given their own history and that of the region, a declaration of a formal state of emergency would be received very negatively. It is arguable of course that Zimbabwe already has an informal one given the defiance by the state of its own repressive legislation e.g. refusing to obey court orders on allowing the opposition to stage rallies.

The ACP countries are also planning a special mission, according to diplomatic sources. Harare is said not to be resisting – presumably on the grounds they can continue to play the line: ‘imperialists are using terror against us’. Leaders of the African Union and African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights have offered to help Zimbabwe. This marks a further stage on from initial non-interference, then concerns expressed over Operation Murambatsvina, and now offers to help. Credibility will no doubt depend on what any mission does and who it talks to, and not falling for the benign guided tour Harare is likely to provide.

It seems unlikely that Harare’s historic allies, the Angolans and Namibians, will abandon their fellow invader of the DRC – despite reports that the Brazilians warned Angola not to overtly support Mugabe. But interestingly, the Namibian president remained silent during the Mwanawasa statement.

There is of course China and the ‘Look East’ policy. This policy follows a long line of failed rescue initiatives from the Libyans to the Malaysians. But each of those in the end want something in return for support, and the Zimbabweans had little to offer. According to diplomats, the Chinese are 'risk averse' and were tired of the Zimbabweans claiming after meetings that the Chinese would be providing support e.g. building a steel mill – a story the Chinese immediately denied. Zimbabwe was notably absent from the itinerary for the recent Chinese Premier’s visit.

The five person Southern African team charged with negotiations and coming up with solutions looks like being coordinated from the President’s Office by Rev Frank Chikane, a one time key anti-apartheid activist. According to reliable sources, the Tanzanian president, Kikwete, will be brought in to talk to Mugabe, Mbeki will liaise with the MDC, AND South African local government minister Sydney Mufamadi with ZANU-PF. There are two deputy ministers and two other DGs as part of the team.

This will occur against the background of the US and EU looking at how they might sharpen up existing ‘sanctions’. Such sanctions possibilities might be extended to include relatives of those banned from travelling to the EU, business leaders of ZPF companies or to widen areas.

SADC’s call for the lifting of sanctions is a sign of moral disapproval rather than a serious overture to ease Zimbabwe’s economic woes, despite claims by Harare that sanctions are responsible for the economy’s collapse.

It is highly unlikely that there would be major investment anyway given the economic downturn and extremely unfriendly investment climate with threats to nationalise major parts of the economy. One possible advantage to the Zimbabwean government is, as stated, the recent discovery of a major diamond field near Marange whose ownership is disputed and could exacerbate tensions within ZANU PF. However the possible deal with Equatorial Guinea trading oil debts for diamonds could run into legaL problems with the Kimberley Process, which regulates the diamond industry.

How united are the democratic forces and the opposition?

It is clear that the Mugabe regime retains some measure of support both within SADC and the AU leaderships. Domestically, Mugabe can call on much of the party, in particular the women’s league. Mugabe/ZANU PF also retains some support amongst sections of the church and other civic leaders, although outright support does appear to be waning.

But this situation is far from static. A shrinking economy has inevitably eroded the regime’s ability to service its client or find new sources of patronage. This situation has undermined the government’s means to retain all-inclusive loyalty from the police and army, to some extent elements of the war vets, and from other state employees.

This is a serious problem for the authorities, and will only get worse as the economy continues to shrink. Indeed, the state can no longer insulate most civil servants from the desperation that ordinary Zimbabweans have been living with for some time as they try to make ends meet.

Already, teachers, nurses and other civil servants have signalled their displeasure with the government – the reports of mass desertions from the police and military are a signal of these groupings voting with their feet. The extent to which, if at all, the democratic opposition can capitalise on these fissures remains to be seen.

But larger questions must be asked. It remains to be seen whether SADC’s intervention will take heed of Zimbabwean civil society’s concerns and priorities. For it to do so, Zimbabwe’s civil society will need to organise itself sufficiently to ensure the mediation team is aware of those concerns and priorities and not leave it at state and party level. The prospective mediation may provide an unprecedented opportunity, but this will certainly require significant coalition building and greater cohesion amongst opposition forces, as well as an awareness that reliance on US funding is not going to help their regional image.

As mentioned, Lenin stressed that democratic opposition must have have unity, vision and leadership. The democratic/social movement in Zimbabwe, however, has been largely characterised by turf wars, parallel forms of opposition, a multiplicity of largely uncoordinated activities, and personalist forms of leadership.

Since January 2006 and the launch of the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA) and the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, there appears to be signs of a greater unity and sense of purpose – not only rhetorically, but also in practice. It was noticeable, for example, that when police raided ZCTU offices and stole the posters advertising the stayaway of 3-4 April, other parts of civil society were able to help out.

So what are the possibilities of a broad front emerging from the ranks of Zimbabwean civil society, a non-partisan platform, with a common agenda in relation to a new constitution, and a commitment to no engagement with electoral process without major changes and a level playing field?

Despite the split in the main opposition MDC and a sustained attack on their structures, the two factions, Tsvangirai and Mutambar, are generally working together; although there are clearly differences and many of the issues that precipitated their falling out have not been addressed.

Nevertheless, their cooperation intensified after the events of 1 March and was much in evidence at the memorial service for activist Gift Tandare – shot by police and secretly buried. It seems as if police tactics of allowing Mutambare rallies to go ahead with the objective of promoting suspicion that he was a government stooge have failed to work. Unity is thought to be better in rural areas – activists belong to most of the relevant groups and work together, although there has been a major crackdown on opposition supporters in rural areas.

The ZCA report great enthusiasm for their approach from the grassroots and their driving of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign. Civil society at one time appeared purely reactive, but some now feel that they have the government on the back foot instead of proactive. Certainly, continuous pressure appears to be forcing the regime to commit unnecessary public relations blunders like the beating up of opposition MP Nelson Chamisa at the airport on his way to an EU-ACP meeting.

Whether or not civil society groupings have the capacity and commitment to take advantage of these developments is a moot point. As ever, the problem is how to keep the democratic momentum going, and what route it should take. Their inability to capitalise on opportunities in the past does not generate much optimism in the current circumstances.

In terms of strategy, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) is continuing its brave street protests with the state seemingly only too willing to accept the invitation to commit unacceptable brutality. But these are often not well supported. A possible second phase to street protests is not yet there.

Amongst the talk of a new constitution there is also some disagreement around issues of process and what are the necessary preconditions. The opposition needs greater coordination behind the scenes as well, so that medics and lawyers who are prepared to put themselves in the front line, facing threats, do not end up doing all the mundane work.

What underground structures might be necessary, and who is willing to be out of the limelight? This ‘twilight zone’, between acting above board and covertly, has contributed to inertia and confusion – as the MDC and most of civil society continue to operate within the parameters of laws that they do not accept. Whilst some see the inevitability and utility of operating covertly, most are unwilling and indeed seemingly unprepared to do so.

There is also need to establish what strategies should be employed towards talks with the government. At the same time as calling for stayaways such as the partially successful one on 3-4 April 2007, the ZCTU is engaging with the government through the Tripartite National Forum on Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono’s ‘social contract’ – not that the latter which calls for price and wage stabilisation is likely to have any success given that even if prices stabilise -when they are rising astronomically - most goods only come through the parallel/black market.

The big question is whether civil society concerns are even on the mediators’ agenda. The intervention is essentially political – to talk to the Zimbabwe government (and Mugabe), ZANU PF and the MDC.

Civil society will not be on the radar screen unless they put themselves there. The small space will soon be gone. Unless civil society uses this brief opportunity to sent clear articulated message on what must be addressed they will be sidelined. They must do this in concert with their solidarity partners in the region, so they can also exert pressure on their respective governments.

In this regard, their link to the South African groupings is critical – but to date, solidarity has been piecemeal. This requires a clear communication strategy, not only between Zimbabwean groupings and the region, but within Zimbabwe civic society itself. At present, civil society is seen as a group of disparate groups and individuals, with a limited constituency base. Why should the mediators take them seriously? Despite the parallels with South Africa, there has not been the emergence of a UDF-type leadership that could provide strategic direction and utilise the practical energies of its constituent parts. Much work has been generated over the last few years, but there has not been a strategic division of labour that will pull activities and outputs towards a common vision.

Up to recently, church leaders in this very religious country have been seen as either ineffective, in collusion with the government, or silent, or self-serving, with notable exceptions such as the Archbishop of Bulawayo Pius Ncube. Even those who were not ZANU PF and/or alleged intelligence (CIO) agents (and there are plenty of allegations) had appeared more concerned about their hierarchical status and their conversations with the President and Gono, not dissimilar from other parts of civil society that seem to prefer constructive engagement, at cost to their perceived integrity. This had disappointed many Zimbabweans, given what impact they could have had.

There now appears to be a turning point: the pastoral statement from the Catholic Bishops’ Conference stressed the unacceptable face of the state in repression, violence, economic decline and lack of moral values. Unlike previous ecumenical statements from the Catholic, Protestant and Evangelical churches, which have been watered down to the lowest common denominator, and attempted to equate blame for violence to ‘both sides’.

The recent Catholic declaration followed a rather more hard-hitting Zimbabwe Council of Churches statement and was followed by the ousting of Bishop Mananga as President of the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe, who was seen as getting closer to the ruling regime. We wait to see if the recent Catholic pastoral letter has similar impact to their Malawian counterparts in 1993, or is dismissed as has happened to previous statements.

However it does not appear that the churches want to lead a civil society movement as yet, preferring for the time being to attempt to represent ‘all of their flock’, including no doubt their fellow Catholic Mugabe; and to continue ‘negotiations’ with the government; and talk to the South African churches about their government’s role in negotiations.

In talks with a church leader, there is as yet no follow-up on the letters although the called for days of prayer and fasting could provide such opportunities. There is also the National Vision Document process to integrate into this, whereby church leaders produced a document ‘The Zimbabwe We Want’; for some in the church this process had many contradictions and was seen as very hierarchical and topdown.

The consultations with government led to a second draft which had been substantially watered down at presumed government insistence. There is also, as with the trade unions, the contradictions of debating with the government as the space for debate is brutally closed down in all other areas. As one civil society activist put it ‘why engage with the government when they are beating you up?’

The ways forward

Are there yet key demands, commitments to an understood and widely-accepted process and some awareness of interactions with outside forces? It is difficult to ascertain, although the new situation presented by SADC’s intervention presents an opportunity that needs to be quickly seized.

There needs to be a solid front especially on not contesting elections under the present unfair and unfree conditions and for civil society and other democratic forces to organise to make that apparent to the South (ern) African team. To some extent as with the Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe (grouping NGOs) there could be a dual approach of calling for a boycott but preparing in case minimum conditions can be achieved.

The two MDC factions have stated both their wish to cooperate (possibly re-merge) and their determination not to stand in ‘pre-determined elections’ -said by Tsvangirai at the memorial service for killed activist Gift Tandare. In the past there have been calls for electoral boycotts but the MDC has then taken part, often under outside pressure. How can MPs, often desperate to keep their posts, be persuaded not to take part in elections; or even if the boycott is maintained not to enter stooge parties set up by the regime to provide democratic veneer?

One approach from a leading human rights activist says:

'The government is illegitimate and therefore it must go. We need a transition authority just to narrowly get the economy back on feet and perhaps prepare the ground for elections. Once in place we can have free and fair elections internationally observed.'

Other thinking revolves around calling for a national convention (parallel parliament) on the West African model, involving different sectors in policy making and transition. There may be need to call on outside regional civil society assistance. In other places the churches have played a major role in these types of initiatives, although that would not yet seem the case in Zimbabwe. Any such actions must incorporate an effective communications strategy within and outside the country, especially key players in the mediation process (including the MDC).

Areas that also need consideration are: who can help recapitalise and reprofessionalise the country? What mobilisation strategies are possible against rural chiefs in the regime’s pocket? What would be the earliest time it is possible to hold free and fair elections?

Possible outcomes

1) Stasis quo – maintenance of the present system whilst Mugabe purges his opponents inside ZANU-PF, enlarges the number of parliamentary, especially rural seats to ensure his tenure in power, and maintains what the South Africans called the kragdadigheid system of brutality.

This of course would be contrary to what SADC is planning, and would further economic and political freefall, anger and mass migration, and is not sustainable for much longer.

How would the Mbeki team counter it, and is the South African president wanting to make solving Zimbabwe part of his legacy – the recent interview with the Financial Times made reference to the Blair fix of Northern Ireland?

Some, including within diplomatic circles in Zimbabwe, would suggest that South Africa is too crippled by its own contradictions of the African Renaissance, bridge between North and South, not acting at the behest of the West, incomplete transition from liberation movement to governing party, historic and present day neo-liberal policies of the ANC to be able to make a significant difference. Zimbabweans are going to remain very suspicious of the true intentions of Pretoria/ Tshwane – despite the welcome from the MDC.

2) Outside-brokered incomplete transition. This still seems the most likely. Weary Zimbabweans might prefer it to what they have now, or to complete breakdown. The parallels with the incomplete transition of 1979 when ZANU took power are many.

If the solution is a government of national unity/ reformed ZANU-PF without Mugabe acting more or less under international tutelage, what happens to issues of accountability, impunity, genuine grass roots reconciliation, and whether the thieves keep their loot?

As well as keeping sections of the elite in power, the problems are of who can staff the transition given the systemic corruption and repression of precisely those organisations/institutions that need to lead change.

The alternative of parachuting in outside experts would quickly lead to alienation and possibly similar events as seen in Timor Leste. There is the diaspora to call on, but there is little sign of planning for the future bar some small organisations, mostly outside the country. There are however other transitions to provide comparative work – reunification of Germany, South Africa, Liberia perhaps.

Secondly who is it precisely that Mbeki is negotiating with and with what mandate? He seemed to pull out of involvement in Zimbabwe when things got tricky and much the same could be said of his peacebuilding attempts in DRC and Cote d’Ívoire He has courted disillusionment in Zimbabwe, feeding in wildly optimistic assessments of the government and opposition parties willingness to undertake genuine discussions and consider transformation. Few in Zimbabwe trust him given South Africa’s track record in defending Zimbabwe at the Human Rights Commission (as was) and in other forums. Obviously the democratic forces need enormous support from allies in South Africa such as COSATU, the church leaderships, the human rights activists and indeed ordinary people.

3) Spontaneous explosion possibly leading to option 4? There is the danger that anger could suddenly erupt out of nowhere as an inchoate explosion leading to possible reprisals and the dangers of formal army action.

4) Military option – either by a more overt military coup than the creeping securitisation that has so far characterised the state, or disaffected different parts of the army allied perhaps to different factions contesting power.

5) Civil society driven transition with some kind of national convention/ constitutent assembly process? At present there is no sign of this achieving critical mass and there needs to be an assessment what needs to be done internally and what pressure outside forces can provide – regionally and internationally.

There needs to be a multipronged approach, involving information gathering and dissemination on human rights abuses in international and regional forums, showing that the government is acting extra-legally as a matter of state policy.

The record of human rights abuse is a sustained and entirely credible one, but pressure for international reaction and action needs to be maintained. There is talk of a Human Rights Council office in Zimbabwe to monitor abuse. This needs to be backed up with interventions to the mediation team and maintenance of international support.

Outside supporters role

Assistance to Zimbabwean civil society in working out its strategies including toward the SADC/South African ‘negotiating’ team. There needs to be pressure from outsiders such as the EU to provide greater and practical support for human rights defenders; maintaining the Common Position (‘sanctions’) in particular on no invitation to Zimbabwe to the EU-Africa Summit in November/December 2007; what use can be made of the money from the European Development Funding (EDF) line from 2002 and can it be used to help Zimbabwean civil society?; to ask trades unions, churches, youth groups to create/sustain links with Zimbabwean counterpart groups and to engage with South African counterparts to the same purpose; to ensure that the Commonwealth remains focused on the Zimbabwean issue (despite Zimbabwe expelling itself from the body); help Zimbabwean civil society and take up the issue for further discussion at CHOGM in November in Uganda.

5-8 April, Harare/Johannesburg

* Sam Kebele is a writer on Zimbabwe currently having to use a pseudonym.

* Please send comments to

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/300/blogs_grandiose.gif comments on the apathy amongst Nigerian bloggers not writing on the elections and is particularly irritated by the response from bloggers and media using the phrase 'I am not surprised' in reaction to the violence and chaos. He goes on to say

'We can’t all fold our arms and watch some rogues make nonsense of these votes. Although the majority of Nigerian bloggers operate from the Diaspora, of the Nigeria-based blogs, very few has substantial posts on the elections.

If 70 year old men and women spent hours in the sun waiting to vote, if foreign observers dodged bullets and confronted teargas fumes to capture the “tone of the elections,” then Nigerian bloggers have no excuse!.....For the sake of those men and women that voted, the least Nigerian bloggers can do at this time is do a post on the elections - if you can’t write, link to another blog or a news site that has something relevant on the elections.'

It is disappointing that considering the number of Nigerian bloggers, so few have commented or reported on the elections. Any comment whether negative or positive is better than silence which in the Nigerian blogosphere has become very loud indeed.

More and more bloggers are writing about Uganda, both Ugandans and foreigners working in the country. Below are a couple of relatively new entries to the blogosphere.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/300/blogs_countryboy.gifCountry Boyi Boyi celebrates the election of Susan Abbo as guild president at Makerere Univeristy as she becomes the third female to hold this position and quotes her acceptance speech.

'I’ve come as the only organic students autonomy who will never give up in times of moral crisis', she said amid thunderous applause. 'I’ve come as an agent of transformation because our freedom has been bedevilled by agents of false propaganda, of inefficiency, and of slavery. Am going to use my strong will and dedication to make things happen.'

However all is not well with this post as the Boyi has a strange way of emphasising the need for the university authorities to work with Ms Abbo and the students – surely he could have come up with something less offensive and sexist than this:

'Can she woo the university authorities to come to bed with her so that the great power that the 84-old Makerere once wielded is rejuvenated?'

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/300/blogs_africanminute.gifIn An African Minute is a blog by an American working on post-conflict development in Uganda. In the 'Dark Side of Mobilisation' he comments on the Ugandan governments intention to 'hand over one of the nation's most prominent tropical forest to Kakira Sugar Works, a subsidiary of a huge Asian-owned conglomerate'. The response by grassroots organisation has been to start a campaign to block the move. One of the tools they are using are SMS messaging via mobile phones. Unfortantely last week the campaign turned ugly as:

'we wondered what the results of such a massive mobilization would be. Western observers may be saddened that the results may be far from positive, and even catastrophic. A peaceful protest march in Kampala gave way to anti-Asian riots which resulted in three deaths, including one Asian who was stoned to deal in the streets.'

What is interesting is the use of mobile phone technology as a tool for activism. Using SMS for campaigning, distributing information and education is becoming more and more widespread across the continent.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/300/blogs_ernestbazanye.gifErnest Bazanye has a different take on the riots mentioned by 'In An African Minute'

'Ugandans don’t care about the environment. Well, you might, but that that mob doesn't. If Ugandans gave a shit, why would we still have a problem with buveeras and why would people still not be using energy saving bulbs, and why would they still be doing their laundry at the lakeside, right next to the sign that asks them not to, and what about that mess called Nakivubo channel? And why are they always encroaching on wetlands? They are encroaching on forests too! And what about all the kasasiro and rubbish heaps everywhere you go? And why is it everyone’s ambition to own a gas-guzzling smoke belching 4-wheel drive?'

I think he is being somewhat harsh on the Ugandan public. If we are honest most people in the world don’t care about the environment. Ugandans are not the only people aspiring to drive around in huge guzzling 4x4s – the same can be said of Americans who use 3 and 4 litre engine vehicles not to speak of the hummer which is basically a tank for god’s sake. The same goes for plastic soda bottles, bags and so on. Partly it is lack of information but it is also a 'don’t give a damn selfish' mentality driven for one thing by capitalist imperatives to constantly produce more for less.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/300/blogs_oneafrican.gifOneafrikan tried to organise a Web2 conference in South Africa but unfortunately there has so far been little interest in the idea possibly because of the marketing strategy used. The conference 'Technology for Africa 07' is due to take place in May. It reminds me of the Africa Blogging Indaba that took place last year under much controversy, although this one will cover technology in general and not just blogging. It will be interesting to see, if it does happen, who attends, who the guest speakers are and the content of the discussions especially how they address access and take up of technology in South Africa.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/300/blogs_sociolingo.gifSociolingo I am not sure who writes this blog except that at present s/he is living in Mali and writes about a wide range of African issues including language and in this piece he posts an interview with Senegalese Deputy Minister in charge of Basic Education and National Languages of Senegal on language policy in Senegal. I chose this piece as the issue of codification, translating and teaching African indigenous languages is essential if languages are to remain alive. In Nigeria for example where there are some 250 languages, there are still many that have not been codified and because of the movement from the rural areas to cities are in danger of dying out in the next 50 years. Sociolingo also raises the point of a “common” language or linga franca in those countries where multiple languages are spoken. This has generally been the colonial language such as English, French and Portuguese. The question

'Can languages be planned? Is it desirable to intervene in the maturing process of languages?(2)……If that quotation is put back into context, it means that, where languages are concerned, there is a need for mediation that a decree cannot resolve. This problem has come up in Senegal. It has been said that In order to achieve national unity, there must be a language of unification in Senegal. But which language should we choose? Obviously, if the government decides to choose one language rather than another, that doesn’t mean that the social process taking place in the real world will obey the decree exactly as issued. Languages have their own dynamic. There are many factors involved, such as trade, migrations, historical and social factors, that cause one language to spread more than another. If a government arbitrarily decides that a particular language must be the language of national unification instead of acknowledging these ongoing processes for what they are, it’s on the wrong track.'

It will be interesting to see how Senegal deals with this issue which affects a large number of African countries with multiple languages. Languages do not exist on their own, they are an intricate part of culture, tradition and history so choosing one over another can easily become a highly continuous issue.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/300/blogs_blacklooks.gifBlack Looks comments on the Don Imus affair in which he, a US TV journalist describes a black female basketball player as 'nappy-headed ho'. Fortunately he has since been relieved of his job but the fall out from this remains in the news.

Last week hip hop commentator Chuck “Jigsaw” Creekmur of AllHipHop.com was calling for Hip Hop to apologise to Black women for it’s misogyny and sexism. This week an American sports commentator was openly dissing Black women 'nappy head ho' - how bad can it get? Where did this white man get to speak this language - well he got some of it from this same Black Hip Hop and street language. So before we rush and condemn the white man and hey on that side I have learned to have little expectations but lets speak the truth - and the truth is that this is Black man talk. Not just in US but also in Britain and here in Africa as local youth get off on using this same kind of misogynist language.

• Sokari Ekine is the Onlne News Editor of Pambazuka News and produces the blog Black Looks, http://www.blacklooks.org

• Please send comments to [email protected]

In advance of the June 2007 African Union Summit in Accra, Ghana, the AU-Monitor has uploaded a draft calendar of African Union and CSO activities, and events related to the debate on 'continental government'.

This debate is set to be the single issue on the formal agenda of the African Union proceedings in Ghana. The calendar is meant to provide updated information to African civil society organisations to enable them to stay abreast of events, activities and advocacy opportunities. Please send additions or comments for the calendar to [email][email protected]. Remember to check the AU-Monitor regularly for new entries, information and analysis.

According to Andre Nonguierma a Geographic Information Systems Officer from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the promotion of information communication technologies (ICTs) should not be a substitute for the efforts to ensure the development and modernisation of basic sectors of the economy, but should compliment and enhance these efforts.

I write to congratulate Ike Okonta on his wonderful analysis. It is the best I have read, since the current intensification of media attention on the Nigerian elections.

But I am curious as to why Okonta totally left out any serious mention of the fate and possible role of the Igbos in the emerging scenarios he painted?

This ethnic group, hitherto one of the so-called tripod on which the country stood, has suffered untold marginalisation and denial of rights since the end of the civil war. Have they become so irrelevant that they no longer count in the calculus of Nigeria's political evolution?

Thanks again for a wonderful piece. I hope Obasanjo and his foreign and domestic minions are paying attention.

Sincerely,
Innocent Ukabam

I have been following this story for quite sometime and was so glad to read the account by Grace at the end of her ordeal. Unfortunately the fight will continue until justice arrives in Zimbabwe. I have spent the last six years working in southern Africa, and often in Zimbabwe. The Africare staff there were all courageous. Each person that we helped through our programmes were probably the neediest out of all eight countries where we had operations in southern Africa.

I applaud their ongoing commitment to human rights and pray that they will be safe and for peace and prosperity to return to Zimbabwe.

Aluta continua.

Sharie A. Blanton, Executive Director St. Alban's Child Enrichment Center Coconut Grove ~ South Miami ~ Little Havana

To initiate consideration of the reconstruction of Liberian cultural traditions is a worthwhile enterprise. The view there is need for cultural renaissance in Liberia must be welcomed by the marginalised, indigenous and economically disadvantaged. It is interesting to note that this enterprise requires rigorous and sustained efforts imbued with dedication and commitment.

The arrival of the settlers from 1821-1822 to the present day on to these shores has been over a considerable period of time. Let it be noted that during this period, much has happened that can not be easily undone. The devastation of our traditional culture, which once cohesively held us together prior to the advent of the freed slaves, has been massive.

The settlers have calculatedly manipulated the environment, thereby giving them advantage to firmly hold on to their power base. They are too economically potent; they are well educated; they cooperate mightily; and they are firmly united, disallowing penetration by any outside force.

Persons like us who have been in the country since, and have witnessed many unfolding events: political as well as military have endeavoured to identify the attendant dynamics. The natives failed to consolidate the power they obtained by staging the 1980 coup which brought Samuel Doe from Grand Gedeh County to power. We failed to entrench ourselves.

The settlers 'divide and rule' tactics disintegrated the government. They bounced back in December 1989 by using ourselves against one another in full scale rebel unconventional warfare. Their resolve was to totally disorganise, disintegrate, neutralise; in fact to politically, economically, socially and inhumanely vaporise us.

The settlers, through their strongman Charles Taylor, made children murder their own parents; and brothers fought and killed one another. The by-product of the over 14 years' conflict is a whole wasted generation, trained only to understand ruthlessness, crime, quick-fixed financial gains and drug addiction. They lack interest in education of any kind. Above all, there is a void in the ability to reason by logical analysis.

To mention the worst, our sacred ancestral shrines have been ruined and desecrated, therefore exposing our traditional heritage and beliefs. The settlers have made significant gains.

The Pambuzuka movement must endeavour to undo this by challenging what has been established. It must begin now. The many of you in the diaspora must begin to establish the movement at home. You who have acquired such a level of education from amongst the grassroots have resided among the white man and learnt his culture. If you return to your people, they will definitely respect your views. You must come, and have an impact on their lives by establishing institutions, building capacities and empowering them.

The presence of the indigenous brothers in the diaspora on the ground will reinvigorate the masses with new ideas, experiences and professionalism. The return of qualified indigenous Liberian professionals to contribute to the reconstruction of the country will buttress the success of the culture renaissance.

The movement to re-establish indigenous traditions must empower and engage communities, especially the poor and vulnerable within the villages and towns of our country. The recognition and embracing of the movement will be predicated upon investment in human capital, human development focusing on health education, and poverty reduction. These will guarantee food security by facilitating the expansion of food production and distribution; making food accessible and affordable; and improving food absorption.

Some of us have been here, watching and waiting to exert our full potentialities in a peaceful and normal environment. We want to see a very competitive society: native versus settlers. We can win, only if we trust and believe in ourselves and cooperate in unity and oneness in purpose. Our number is more than theirs. We have the numerical strength as well as the geographical advantage. The cultural renaissance must begin now. The change we desire to see must be ourselves.

Thirty Ghanaian, regional and international faith-based, labour and advocacy organisations attended the 'Teach-in Workshop on the African Union: Understanding the African Union and Seizing Opportunities for Change'.

Meeting on 2 April in Accra, the organisations reviewed the African Union’s progress, discussed the proposal for continental government and generated plans for the forthcoming summit.

The meeting was organised by the Ghanaian Poverty and Growth Forum, The Global Call to Action Against Poverty – Ghana and the Organisation of African Trade Unions and supported by Oxfam, ActionAid International and the UN Millennium Campaign. The Heads of CIDO at the African Union Commission and the AU desk at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs also attended and spoke at the meeting.

China is to train 10,000 agricultural technicians for Africa over the next four years, a Chinese academic has announced. Professor Heping Jiang from the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, who headed a mission to apply the program to four Angolan provinces (Moxico, Bié, Huila and Kuand Kubango), told Angolan news agency Angop that of the total Angola would have 60 technicians trained.