What does it take to do business in Uganda? This is the question that Doing Business 2007--a new World Bank and International Finance Corporation study sought to find out. The study compared 175 economies including 23 high-income Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development economies, 45 from Sub-Saharan Africa, 23 from East Asia and the Pacific Region, 28 economies from Europe and Central Asia, 31 from Latin America, 17 from Middle East and North Africa and eight from South Asia.

AU-Monitor website provides the latest intelligence on what is coming up at the next summit meeting.

* The AU Commission has decided not to organized CSOs and women pre-summit this time
* The Summit aims at focusing on the role that Science and Technology and innovation could play towards Africa’s socio-economic development

The following issues will be discussed at the summit:

* Modalities for the election of Members of the AU Commission (Executive Council and the Assembly)
* The African Charter on Democracy, Governance and Elections (PRC and Executive Council)
* African Union Government (Assembly)
* Conflict – Peace and Security Council
* Chairperson of the African Union - who will be next? Will it revert to Bashir?
* Integration of NEPAD into the AU Structures and Process – by the Assembly
and lots more.

Like most countries in Africa, the Nigerian opposition seems to be at a critical crossroads. With a few months before Presidential elections, the strongest opposition parties in Nigeria - Action Congress (AC) and All Nigerian People Party (ANPP) - are in a wonderland as to who would become the single candidate after the two parties seek for a coalition to unseat the ruling party from power.

This edition of Pambazuka News includes the fourth in a series of four special issues published over the last year dealing specifically with issues of trade and justice. Together with this edition, over the last year, we’ve published a total of 26 articles tackling all aspects of Africa’s involvement in the global trade regime.
FEATURE: Developed nations have failed to address the issue of food security in agricultural negotiations, argues Jagjit Plahe
COMMENT AND ANALYSIS:
- Tope Akinwande explores the links between the unequal terms of global trade and immigration of Africans to Europe.
- Richard Kamidza documents the lack of consultation in the Economic Partnership Agreements negotiating process, claiming that in some cases even cabinet ministers don’t know the details.
- Babacar Ndao says the subsidy regime is tragic for African countries.
- Patrick Bond writes about Africa's largest ever industrial subsidies in South Africa and what they mean for the poor
PAN AFRICAN POSTCARD:
- Tajudeen Abdul Raheem decries the degeneration of African leaders demonstrated by Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia
- Issa Shivji points out that the Tanzanian government needs to seriously revisit its development paradigm.
CONFLICT AND EMERGENCIES: Links to news on Sudan, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Senegal and the DRC
HUMAN RIGHTS: Protect Somali children from conscription
WOMEN AND GENDER: War crimes against Congo’s women
REFUGEES AND FORCED MIGRATION: Kenya deports Somali refugees
ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE: A new administration for Hiran region
DEVELOPMENT: Cape Verde wants special status at ECOWAS
CORRUPTION: The South African Communist Party slams corruption in South Africa
HEALTH AND HIV/AIDS: HIV/AIDS spread linked to malaria
EDUCATION: Review of 2006 higher education highlights
ENVIRONMENT: Keeping the Sahara in check
MEDIA AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: Africa and Western media hostility
NEWS FROM THE DIASPORA: Bad blood, blood diamonds
PLUS: e-Newsletters and Mailings Lists; Fundraising and Useful Resources; Courses, Seminars and Workshops

The South African government is channeling Africa’s largest-ever industrial subsidies into the Coega industrial zone complex and port, located in the country’s fourth largest city, the Nelson Mandela Metropole (better known by its apartheid-era name, Port Elizabeth). Government proponents say Coega represents sound industrial and development policy, but a growing legion of critics are labeling it a corporate welfare boondoggle in a country that does not have resources to spare.

Aside from tailor-made infrastructure, including a 20 meter deep port, the key attraction of Coega for foreign investors is super-cheap energy. Following a year of frequent brownouts in the two largest metropolitan areas, Johannesburg and Cape Town, a fierce debate has erupted over the idea of providing discounted electricity to industrial users when citizens cannot get a dependable supply at any price. Mismanagement of the state electricity company, Eskom, in the course of its corporatization has interfered with a steady supply.

The main beneficiary of Coega's cheap energy, the Canadian firm Alcan, agreed in early December to a quarter-century power supply agreement from Eskom -- the world’s fourth-largest power company -- at an extremely generous price, less than the $0.02 cents per hour that bulk industrial consumers pay. This is already the world’s cheapest electricity, but Alcan insisted on the subsidy due to volatile commodity prices, a factor that has caused consternation in prior deals the South African government made with large mining houses and metals smelters such as BHP Billiton, the Anglo American group and Mittal Steel.

Alcan and Eskom claim that the deal will bring job creation and foreign exchange earnings, and pay off for the country. Using imported bauxite, Coega’s $3 billion aluminum smelter could by 2014 produce 720,000 tons of the metal annually in one of the world’s biggest smelters. Fewer than 1,000 permanent jobs will be created in the process, however

Coega is one in a long list of post-apartheid megaprojects undertaken by the South African government. These include the Pebble Bed Nuclear Reactors (one of the first global deployments of a new nuclear energy technology that purports to offer new safety guarantees), the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (six vast dams under construction) which supplies Johannesburg its water [see "Making the Earth Rumble," Multinational Monitor, May 1996], and the "Gautrain" elite fast rail network that will link Johannesburg, Pretoria and the country’s largest airport. An impoverished South African majority, increasingly well organized and mobilized, is challenging these megaprojects and demanding instead that state resources be deployed to deliver basic services to the majority, on a more ecologically sustainable basis.

The costs of corporate welfare

Coega’s site will include a new port, container terminal and Industrial Development Zone (IDZ), utilizing vast public investments -- at least $1.5 billion, including a $300 million tax break for Alcan -- and enormous quantities of land, water and electricity. The new employment anticipated at the port/IDZ would be the most expensive, in terms of capital per job, of any major facility in Africa. Environmentally, the costs of the Coega projects in water consumption, air pollution, electricity usage and marine impacts are potentially immense.

The infrastructure under construction is unprecedented in Africa, and dwarfs the basic-needs development infrastructure required by deprived citizens of Mandela Metropole and across the Eastern Cape. Hence controversy has surrounded the decision-making process to construct the port and IDZ. Reports of conflicts of interest for key decision-makers cloud the project’s governance. Coega was also initially meant to represent a key site at which European industrial firms involved in arms sales to South Africa could make “offset” investments that would create jobs, so government could justify to the public its corruption-ridden $6 billion weapons purchase. These so far haven’t been forthcoming.

Socially, there are significant costs as well. Several hundred families were already displaced to build Coega’s infrastructure, and those in the area will bear the brunt of the environmental toll exacted by the project. The opportunity costs of Coega include as many as 10,000 jobs lost in economic sectors which either must close or cannot expand, including the existing salt works, mariculture, fisheries, agriculture and eco-tourism. Most importantly, community and environmental activists point to far better prospects for employment creation and socio-economic progress if resources were used elsewhere. Six years ago, the Mandela Metropole Sustainability Coalition proposed an alternative economic development scenario. The alternative strategy prioritizes basic-needs infrastructure investment throughout the Eastern Cape and, at Coega, the development of state-supported eco-tourism and black-owned small-scale agriculture and mariculture.

Of the many subsidy components of Coega, civic groups find Eskom’s new deal most worrying, given the persistent electricity shortage across South Africa and the problem of mass disconnections of poor people for whom electricity remains too expensive. Using roughly 1,300 MegaWatts, about 3 percent of the country’s total, Coega will constitute an enormous new drain, requiring expensive new transmission lines from Eskom’s coal-fired generators 1,000 kilometers away.

Moreover, South Africa’s carbon dioxide emissions are already running approximately 20 times higher than even the United States on a per capita income basis. Ironically, Environment Minister Martinus van Schalkwyk returned triumphant from the November climate change treaty renegotiations in Nairobi, claiming that "South Africa achieved most of its key objectives." Those included promoting "Clean Development Mechanisms."

By bringing the vast "ghost on the Coast" (the long-empty Coega’s nickname) to life through the new subsidies, the national government will substantially increase carbon emissions. Yet because Alcan promises to use relatively energy efficient technologies, the market-oriented New York-based group Environmental Defense has suggested that Coega be considered worthy of Clean Development Mechanism investments by large international polluters, which would permit them to continue present rates of emissions. In promoting these kinds of investments, Van Schalkvyk says that his government is sending "a clear signal to carbon markets of our common resolve to secure the future of the Kyoto regime." But there are vast problems with the new emissions trading system, and projects such as Coega show why this market should not be expanded in ways that generate new ecological problems without making a dent in overall emissions.

Captive regulation and revolving doors

From the standpoint of meeting basic needs for electricity, South Africa's regulation of Eskom and municipal distributors has not been successful. This is not only because of an extremely weak performance by the initial National Electricity Regulator -- Xolani Mkhwanazi, who subsequently became, tellingly, chief operating officer for BHP Billiton Aluminum Southern Africa -- but also because government policy has increasingly imposed "cost-reflective tariffs," as a 1995 document insisted. The key issue is whether all consumers must cover the costs of the electricity they use, or whether richer and industrial consumers pay higher rates to subsidize the poor.

The 1998 White Paper allowed for "moderately subsidised tariffs" for poor domestic consumers. (White Papers are formal governmental policy statements.) But it also stated, "cross-subsidies should have minimal impact on the price of electricity to consumers in the productive sectors of the economy," meaning industrial users should not subsidize costs for poor residential consumers.

In addition to Mkhwanazi, the man responsible for Eskom’s late-apartheid pricing -- Mick Davis -- left the parastatal’s treasury to become the London-based operating head of Billiton. Davis took the post after former Finance Minister Derek Keys gave permission for an Afrikaner-controlled industrial company (Gencor) to expatriate vast assets in order to buy Billiton from Shell. After apartheid ended, Keys became chief executive of Billiton.

Ironically, the deals that gave Billiton, Anglo American and other huge corporations the world’s lowest electricity prices came under attack in 2005 by Alec Erwin, the minister of public enterprises. The package Davis had given Billiton for smelters north of Durban and in Maputo, Mozambique, during the period when Eskom had extreme overcapacity, resulted in prices that often dropped below $0.01 per kiloWatt hour, when world aluminum prices fell. (Most households pay five times that amount.)

Erwin reportedly insisted on lower "financial-reporting volatility." Because the amount the foreign companies pay for energy changes with the value of the rand, every time the rand changes value by 10 percent, Eskom’s wins or loses $300 million. Erwin said the utility should work to escape from existing contracts. From Billiton’s side, Mkhwanazi replied that any change to the current contracts could be "a bit tricky for us. … We would adopt a pragmatic approach and, who knows, perhaps there will even be some sweeteners in it for us."

But the allegedly new approach was not applied at Coega, where Erwin as trade and industry minister from 1996 to 2004 had led negotiations for a new smelter. According to the chief executive of the parastatal Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), Geoffrey Qhena, "The main issue was the electricity price and that has been resolved. Alcan has put a lot of resources into this, which is why we are confident it will go ahead."

Meanwhile, however, to operate a new smelter at Coega, lubricated by at least 15 percent financing from the IDC, Alcan and other large aluminum firms were in the process of shutting European plants that produce 600,000 metric tonnes between 2006-09, simply "in search of cheaper power," according to industry analysts.

The main Alcan negotiator, 49-year-old Cynthia Carroll of the United States, was recognized for her skill in browbeating South African officials when in late 2006 she was named CEO-designate at Anglo American Corporation. Breaking the longstanding tradition, dating to the era of founder Ernest Oppenheimer, of giving the top job to insider elderly male candidates, Anglo’s offer was seen as a way to better position the firm -- South Africa’s largest even though its financial headquarters since 1999 is in London -- for further international metals deals.

Coal-fired power, climate change and carbon trading

The state’s decision to provide Alcan such vast subsidies at Coega comes amidst rising elite and popular consciousness about climate change problems. For years, global rulers have avoided action on CO2 emissions, as reflected in October in Monterrey, in the wake of the July St.Petersburg summit of the G8 group of rich countries, which ignored climate change. In Monterrey, the G8’s energy ministers were joined by 12 other major polluters, including South Africa, but again, no commitments were made to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Three weeks later, however, the British government released The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change, which estimates climate change costs of 5-20 percent of global GDP at current warming rates. Former World Bank chief economist Nick Stern calls for demand-reduction of emissions-intensive products (the opposite of Coega), energy efficiency, avoiding deforestation and new low-carbon technology.

The key problem is that Stern and the establishment want many of these improvements to be financed via carbon trading. Likewise, in 2002, Princeton University researcher Nipun Vats and Environmental Defense – through its “Partnership for Climate Action” relationship with French aluminum firm Pechiney (subsequently purchased by Alcan) – promoted Coega as eligible for subsidies under the Clean Development Mechanism. Coega could receive such subsidies if it can show its technology is cleaner than existing aluminum suppliers, and in turn that the energy-savings smelter technology can only be profitably financed through "additional" investment resources using carbon trading mechanisms like the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund.

In November, Alcan said it would proceed with the $2.7 billion aluminum Coega smelter thanks to vast electricity subsidies from Eskom. Within days, University of Cape Town Environmental Studies Professor Richard Fuggle -- the country’s most respected environmentalist -- attacked the increase in CO2 emissions due to Coega in his retirement speech. He described Van Schalkwyk as a "political lightweight" who is "unable to press for environmental considerations to take precedence of “development."

According to Fuggle, "It is rather pathetic that van Schalkwyk has expounded the virtues of South Africa’s 13 small projects to garner carbon credits under the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM, but has not expressed dismay at Eskom selling 1360 megawatts a year of coal-derived electricity to a foreign aluminum company. We already have one of the world’s highest rates of carbon emissions per dollar of GDP. Adding the carbon that will be emitted to supply power to this single factory will make us number one on this dubious league table."

Civil society begins to react

In Mandela Metropole, emerging resistance to Coega’s guzzling of water and power will add to existing popular unrest. In South Africa during 2004-05, the police counted more than 5,800 protests against government, possibly the highest per-person rate in the world. In China, with 1.3 billion people, there were 87,000 mainly rural protests, while South Africa’s population is 45 million.

Thirty years ago, in the wake of the Soweto uprising near Johannesburg, the revitalized anti-apartheid social movements known as civic associations were founded in Port Elizabeth’s impoverished townships, thanks in part to the legacy of black consciousness and community empowerment activist Steve Biko, killed by the city’s police in 1979.

Twenty years later, the assistant city engineer for hydraulics wrote a blunt memo about the prospects for imposing a redistributive tariff to help poor consumers through cross-subsidization, funded by higher prices paid by large industrial users: If such a plan "were to be implemented for industry, Coega would not go ahead."

The redistributive scheme subsequently adopted by the city does not assure low-income citizens basic electricity and water access. In other words, the perceived need to pump cheap water and electricity into Coega industries will likely sabotage government’s objectives of social justice, public health, and economic growth via municipal services.

In all these respects, say critics, the Coega port and IDZ exacerbate the apartheid economic legacy of division, marginalization and grandiose, unworkable public-investment schemes. Such ventures were traditionally grounded not in a logic of development, but instead reflected the power of special interest groups.

Civil society resistance to this sort of maldistribution is already quite advanced, but often takes the form of illegal reconnections after prolific disconnections by municipalities and Eskom. To alter policy decisions, what is needed is a more sustained campaign for radically new industrial policies as well as tough state regulation of emissions. It may be inspired by the case of Coega, which stands out as a beacon of irresponsibility and corporate welfare.

• This article was originally commissioned by
and is reproduced here with kind permission of the author. Patrick Bond is director of the Centre for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban: [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

This edition of Pambazuka News is the fourth in a series of four special issues published over the last year dealing specifically with issues of trade and justice. Together with this edition, over the last year, we’ve published a total of 26 articles tackling all aspects of Africa’s involvement in the global trade regime.

The first edition in this series was released in January 2005 and asked the question: Can trade in the era of globalisation be ‘just’? Articles examined Africa’s historical and current trading relationship with the rest of the world. The second edition was released in June 2005, and tackled the relationship between trade and human rights. Articles looked at the impact of trade policies on the right to health in Kenya, the crude oil trade and community rights in the Niger Delta, the rights of informal traders in Africa, genetically modified crops and the right to food, cotton and farmer rights in West Africa. The third reader, released in September 2005, explored the issue of trade and women’s rights. The articles profiled the damaging effect of trade policies on women’s rights. The articles in today’s edition deal predominantly with trade and agriculture.

Taken together, these articles provide an insight into how ill-considered trade policies have a profoundly negative impact on the rights of communities. Whether it’s the absence of women’s voices at global trade negotiations, the decimation of country health systems as a result of international trade policies or the sacrificing of community rights in the interests of multi-national corporations in the Niger Delta, it’s clear that trade polices impose a profit first and people last regime on Africa. You can read all of these articles by clicking on the links below. Each of the articles has a comment function, enabling you to debate the points made in each article.

The focus on trade justice has been complemented by the launch and development of a Pambazuka News web page featuring recorded interviews, poetry and performances with a general theme of trade and justice. Visit to listen to these broadcasts.

Many of these articles have also been published in the French edition of Pambazuka News, either in their original French versions or in translated form. Visit
Trade justice two:

This initiative has also included the production of a series of interviews and recordings that can be listened to or downloaded at

We acknowledge with thanks the support of HIVOS for the production of these special issues of Pambazuka News and associated podcasts.

Negotiations between African countries and the European Union aimed at finalizing free trade deals known as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are continuing apace. As part of the process that will finalise EPA deals sometime in 2007, Eastern and Southern Africa countries have just submitted a draft EPA document to the EU. But, in this article, Richard Kamidza documents the astonishing lack of consultation in the negotiating process, claiming that in some cases even cabinet ministers don’t know the details. One of the sectors that could face the biggest battering is agriculture, already buckled by three decades of structural adjustment and rich country subsidies.

Southern Africa hosted several Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) events between September and November 2006. Of these, the 7-8 September 2006 regional conference organized by the Trade and Development Studies Centre (Trade Centre) - whose theme was ‘Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) experiences in negotiating the EPAs with the European Union (EU)’ - is my point of reference. Senior officials of the ESA configuration, the EU delegation in Harare, policy makers and civil society organizations (CSOs) attended the event.

At that meeting, the ESA-EPA draft document, which was officially submitted to the EU with a response timeframe of end of September 2006, was circulated to participants. An excited Dr Moses Tekere, ESA-EPA Advisor, remarked: “It is a wise strategy meant to outwit our counterparts in the EU…The ball is now in the EU’s court, and a timed response is likely to work in favour of the ‘happy family ESA’…”

However, this mirrors a competitive race of African configurations of wanting to be the first to reach out to the EU’s negotiating machinery in spite of limited capacity, timeframes and space to assess outcomes in light of emerging national and regional economic units and the aspirations of consumers.

But, being the first to knock at the EU negotiating machinery’s doors not only fuels pessimism in the process, but also points to a bleak future for ESA economies under a legally binding trade regime. While the ESA-EPA advisor expresses triumph and optimism on the draft, the failure to widely consult at various stages of the process has a strong bearing on outcomes, especially with regards to consumers, smallholder farmers and other small to medium-producers.

ESA-EPA intellectual leadership [1] opted for ‘text-based’ negotiations, hence compiled a comprehensive ‘wish list’ document to form the basis for actual negotiations with the EU. Its main highlights include the scope of the agreement coverage: trade cooperation, trade related issues, trade in services, fisheries, economic and development cooperation, development finance cooperation, institutional framework and dispute settlement; and the schedule for eliminating customs duties a day after the agreement’s entry into force. These provisions aim to increase production, supply and trading capacities as well as enhance capacity to lure investment and technology.

The submission of the draft has fuelled fears of negative implications and outcomes likely to tie ESA economies to Europe in an unbalanced framework. This scenario perpetuates an unjust trade regime that has the potential to undermine national and regional economies, and in the process, compromise regional integration efforts.

Various meetings of the ESA processes and lobbying missions to the EU have continuously raised the need to redress supply-side constraints including unreliable public utilities (electricity and water); poor public infrastructure (run down roads, bridges and railways); weak institutional policy frameworks (fluctuating exchange rates, high inflation rates and poor fiscal measures); low labour productivity (arising from poor education, health and housing provisions); and an unfavourable investment climate coupled with inadequate resources to foster socio-economic transformation. In addition, countries have weak production structures and/or capacities.

While the above requires huge resources in order to improve the situation, many countries do not have the capacity to mobilise such resources both externally and internally due to a poor investment climate and low gross national savings (GNS) ratios, respectively. In addition, many countries have been experiencing dripping developmental assistance inflows.l

In this respect, the ESA-EPA draft text says “…every 5 years the ESA-EU EPA Council shall undertake a formal and comprehensive review to ascertain if the development benchmarks have been attained by individual ESA countries as well as determine whether EU’s trade and development policies and assistance have contributed to individual ESA countries achieving the development benchmarks.” This vindicates the prevailing fear that outcomes may fail to assist in the development of respective countries and that development may be overlooked, and in the process remain elusive to the future developmental trajectory of the respective ESA countries.

The ESA text was crafted against the backdrop of increasing pressure from the World Trade Organization (WTO) to open up their markets and let their farmers “compete” with the heavily subsidised food and other agricultural produce dumped into their economies by the EU and other industrialized economies. The same economies have been subjected to neo-liberal policies driven by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for over three decades, which forced African governments to dismantle public agricultural research and extension programmes and drop whatever protection and incentive mechanisms existed for their small farmers and other small-to-medium-size producers. In addition, the same African governments are then forced by the same agencies to devote their most fertile land to the growing of export commodities for markets in the North, thus pushing small farmers off their land and food production out of rural economies.

The concluded South Africa-EU Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) has impacted on the economies of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and other regional countries, especially on agricultural development, market competitiveness of both agricultural and non-agricultural products and policy space for future intervention in support of vulnerable sectors (such as rural farmers) and consumers.

To date TDCA exposes other regional economies (SACU and non-SACU countries) to the highly competitive EU environment which heavily subsidises its agricultural producers. It is therefore possible that products from EU end up flooding the markets of non-TDCA signatories due to porous boarders that are difficult to police, a development that leads to de-industrialisation (downsizing), de-agriculturalisation (forcing farmers off their agricultural activities), unemployment, underemployment and poverty.

EPAs are associated with huge adjustment costs relating to revenue losses. As the TDCA shows, Swaziland, Lesotho, Namibia and Botswana, which prior to the new trade regime were guaranteed 45, 42, 28 and 17 percent respectively of the total SACU imports are estimated to lose between R1.9 billion and R3.5 billion in revenue. This translates to falling fiscal expenditures necessary to support agricultural development, social service delivery, infrastructural development and livelihoods.

In the case of ESA, the rejected text acknowledges that agriculture supports a significant number of people (about 70% of the population) whose production is solely for household consumption with a minor role in commercial agricultural market. The text further lists areas that require assistance from the EU. What is instructive is the fact that EPAs are likely to flood ESA markets with subsidised agricultural products, a development that has future negative implications to the sector and the entire economy.

Many ESA citizens have memories of the negative implications of the neo-liberal policy project on their economies and subsequently to their livelihoods. Many economic units are now exposed to globally driven ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy agendas in addition to EPA driven global market competition. While many stakeholders through various levels of interventions hope to contribute to the outcome, it seems that the ESA-EPA intellectual leadership is now immune to such crying voices in addition to being unwilling to reach out to many noble ideas through consultation.

Knowing very well that most ESA countries are largely dominated by agriculture and agricultural related activities, failure to involve constituencies in this sector display ESA-EPA intellectual leadership’s insensitivity to the plight of smallholder farmers, other producers of agricultural related products and consumers.

To date a significant number of the population live on one meal a day. Wide consultation and deep involvement of other stakeholders and citizens is in line with the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement. Consultation is not about making assumptions on other social and economic units, but rather about direct or indirect soliciting of their views. While the ESA-EPA leadership has not appreciated the above, it is sad that an opportunity that should have facilitated ESA stakeholders and citizens inputting to the process prior to the submission of the said draft is missed. ESA-EPA intellectual leadership has less confidence in wide consultations and deep involvement. They seem to only consult those with moderate views. So in the process, they leave out the views of broader constituencies. Given this critical moment, it is thus imperative to consult even radical views, including those calling for a stop to EPAs.

Since the launch of the ESA-EPA road map in Mauritius, February 2004, the intellectual leadership has not organized a single meeting with non-state actors’, particularly civil society, a separate platform that is necessary to broaden their horizon on issues of livelihoods and survival strategies of ordinary citizens. This is not a resource-constraint weakness, for on some occasions, configurations of officials have failed to avail themselves when resources were made available. This is equated to snubbing civic body meetings and processes meant to benefit the future trade regime between Africa and EU; and to lack of ‘open door policy’ ready to embrace civic bodies’ voices – both moderate and radical, a platform that has been ably provided for by their EU counterparts.

In this respect, many campaign missions by civic bodies to the EU, have seen them directly engaging with the EU Commissioner, Director-General Trade, Director-General Development, EU Parliament and other influential institutions. However, a lot of inputs from these missions have failed to filter into the said draft because the ESA-EPA intellectual leadership has failed to open its doors for such voices, which are deemed radical. Lobbying powerful EPA institutions and structures in Europe require radical elements. One wonders why those in charge are not yet ready to accept and value such inputs.

Historical bilateral trends show EU emerging a ‘winner’, a position likely to mirror the current EPA process. African configurations need to learn why this is always the outcome. While it is necessary to appreciate the prowess of EU in defining trade relationships with its former colonies, it is equally important to harness all available resources, particularly views of non-state actors which have not filtered through.

The ESA region can improve its negotiating capacities by harnessing all available human resources, including critical voices. Many stakeholders engaging EPAs have valuable inputs, which have the potential to add value to the outcomes. Coordination of all voices, especially of critical constituencies calls for an “open door policy” coupled with expressed intent to accommodate different views. Coordination is about accountability of outcomes; reaching out to broader constituencies; and building synergies and networks aimed at ensuring positive outcomes necessary to promote pro-poor development and address livelihood needs in ways that ameliorate widespread poverty. Coordination is about soliciting other views on emerging positions deemed not yet official.

While there have been appeals to popularize the draft, one wonders what are the appropriate messages and strategies to use, and which constituencies to target given that the fourth draft has been rejected by the EU and the ESA team has remained numb about it. Its rejection filters from European civil society networks. Why the draft was not shared with stakeholders boggles the minds of citizens, especially those likely to be affected by the outcomes.

The appeal to popularize the draft raises questions including: should we focus on the weakness of the document with the view to improve the final output or to lobby its acceptance in the EU negotiating machinery? Should we focus on the inherent intellectual weakness at the ESA leadership level that fails to widely consult broader constituencies before serving the ‘menu’ on the EU’s table? Should we focus our energies on exposing those, who, all along have been seeking glory, that is, eager to append their signatures regardless of the flawed process and outcome? Should we focus our energies on intellectual ESA-EPA leadership, which is increasingly detaching itself from the reality on the ground?

The above not only raises serious challenges within all African configurations, but also points to deficiencies in synergy building, strategic alliance formations and policy driven strategies among various stakeholders aimed at concluding a just trade regime. Soliciting opinions of other stakeholders has remained elusive in the ESA-EPA intellectual leadership.

At the 21st Plenary Assembly of the SADC Parliamentary Forum, it emerged that the EPA processes have not been shared adequately with other organs of states in respective member-states despite the relevance of such institutions. Though MPs are important they are largely at the periphery of the process. From the discussions, it was clear that no sharing of countries’ positions was done. In fact, from the sentiments, most of them were not consulted and in many states EPAs are yet to be discussed at the Cabinet level. Indeed, some MPs in this Forum are Ministers who profess ignorance on the process. This development illustrates poor coordination of all organs of state, and non-state institutions in the process; and lack of intellectual supervision by those in charge with the view to ensure that all the voices are consulted.

• Richard Kamidza is a senior researcher at The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)

• Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Notes

[1] Its role is to guide the EPA process, provides technical direction and is responsible and/or accountable for the outcomes.

Fahamu

Mobile phone technologies have taken Africa by storm. The technology has raised new possibilities for activism by human rights and social justice organisations and for service delivery in fields such as health care, banking and agricultural information.

In 2007, Fahamu and Tactical Tech will hold a conference in Nairobi, Kenya, that will aim to enable those using mobile phone technologies in activism or service delivery work to exchange their experiences of using the technology in the African context and plan strategies to support their work. The conference will explore areas related to the use of mobile technology in the African context, future trends, best practice and available tools and resources.

The conference will establish an African regional network of those who use mobile phone technologies and facilitate an ongoing support network. The meeting will also lead to the development of a toolkit on mobile phones put together by an international team of practitioners with relevant expertise.

As part of the development of this initiative, Fahamu is conducting research to consult widely and involve as many interested parties as possible in the network and 2007 conference.

Fahamu would like to hear from you if you have:

- Used, are currently using, or planning to use, mobile phone technology in human rights and social justice work in Africa;
- Used or are currently using mobile phones in service delivery work in Africa;
- Developed or are in the process of developing technologies related to mobile phones;
- Plan to use mobile phone technologies in the future in Africa.

Interested individuals and organisations are asked to send an expression of interest not longer than one page to [email][email protected] with the following information:

- Name of organisation or individual
- Contact Details
- Country
- Nature of past, existing or planned work involving mobile technology, including a description of the project, the problem it sought to address and its successes or failures. Alternatively, we would welcome seeing any reports you may have produced (any such information will be treated confidentially if that is your preference).

If you would like to discuss this on the phone (preferably using something like Skype) please let us know.

It is envisaged that the conference will be held in May 2007. Funds will be available for travel, accommodation and limited expenses of invited participants.

Further information about Fahamu can be found at and www.pambazuka.org

In 2005, the United Nations Convention against Corruption became the first legally binding, global anti-corruption agreement, marking a historic milestone in the fight against corruption. On 9 December 2006, a day set aside to celebrate international anti-corruption day, 28 African countries committed themselves to tackling corruption by signing the Convention.

This is not the first time that many African governments have committed to cracking down on corruption. Yet, actions speak louder than signatures and corruption remains rife across the region. In fact, it was once estimated by Transparency International that over $30 billion in aid for Africa – an amount equal to twice the gross domestic product of Kenya, Uganda and Ghana combined –has ended up in foreign bank accounts. It is safe to say that corruption has played an undeniable role in preventing economic prosperity, democratic development and civil society’s trust in governments across the African continent. This has been reflected yet again in Transparency International’s latest Corruption Perceptions Index. Of the African countries surveyed, Botswana was viewed as the least corrupt, being ranked at number 37, while Guinea performed especially badly, coming in at 160 out of a potential 163.

For the first time, the UN Convention against Corruption provides a single, overarching means for all countries in the region to fight and eventually remove the scourge of corruption. More specifically, chapter two of the Convention provides different measures that a country should implement in order to achieve the ultimate goal of stopping corruption and removing the fog of secrecy that often clouds government operations and decision-making processes.

One means by which African countries can go a long way to battling corruption is by adopting and implementing an effective right to information law, which would also underpin many of the other measures set out in the Convention.

An effective right to information law places an obligation on the government to regularly disclose as much information as possible about its policies and decisions to the public, and provide information to individuals when they request it. If a right to information law is introduced, then it can act as an important tool in fighting corruption - it can effectively transform the strong and traditional culture of secrecy within government into one of transparency and openness.

An effective right to information law also helps to ensure that governments formulate and implement development projects in a responsible, transparent and participatory manner. Development projects often significantly suffer as a result of funds being siphoned off, resulting in severe delay, and sometimes even a failure to complete projects. With a right to information law in place, governments would be obliged to share information on such projects with the public who can then monitor their development. In fact, the right to information would give the public a voice in determining what local projects should take place in the first place and how these can be designed to more effectively improve their lives.

If governments in Africa are serious about cracking down on corruption, cleaning up their governments and securing the long term democratic development and economic prosperity for their citizens, then there is no better time to implement their commitments under the UN Convention against Corruption and prioritise the drafting and implementation of an effective right to information law.

I enjoyed reading the article ‘On Transgender Human Rights Issues in Africa’ . As an African woman and AIDS activist, I think we have to be real about sexuality and stop thinking we can tell other human beings how they should enjoy sex. When are we going to learn to do what is right instead of telling people what they need to do to be happy? We enjoy Western values, but when it comes to homosexuality, we know what Africans need. How can we fight HIV/AIDS if we are busy assuming all Africans are heterosexuals? We need to break the silence and keep it real because we are killing our people through isolation, discrimination and stigma.

It is unfortunate that people are focusing on what is going on in the private lives of Africans instead of fighting poverty, HIV/AIDS, rape, and domestic violence which women of Africa face daily.

We have to respect South Africa for accepting homosexuals as citizens too, who deserve the same rights as heterosexuals. When are some Africans going to stop acting like judges or God and let people enjoy God's blessings to have sex without their input? African traditions prepare women to serve men. When are we going to be free Africans enjoying our lives without biased rules and regulations imposed by other human beings?

The Somali president Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed has issued a decree on Monday (1 January 2006) installing a new administrator in Hiran province, central Somalia. The new administrator will replace Yusuf Ahmed Hagar Dabageed, who was the chairman of the province.

Joseph Kabila, the newly-elected president of the Democratic Republic of Congo, has named Antoine Gizenga, the 81-year-old opposition veteran, as the country's new prime minister.

In some South African communities, tokoloshe is believed to be a wicked genie that inhabits a good person who gradually or suddenly turns into an ogre. An ogre is a "giant or monster in legends and fairy tales, that eats humans." This article from the East African Standard discusses Africa's leaders.

The management of Transnational Corporation of Nigeria (Transcorp) Plc has declared that the company is not enjoying any special privilege from the federal government. This declaration was made by the Group Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer of the company, Mr. Bernard Longe.

One of the biggest threats facing democracy in South Africa is corruption, the South African Communist Party (SACP) said on Wednesday (27 December 2006). "Apart from HIV/Aids, joblessness and poverty, the single biggest threat facing our democracy is growing corruption in both the public and private sectors," said SACP president Blade Nzimande in the party's new year message.

After entering into negotiations with the European Union (EU) over special ties and leaving the West Africa free travel union, the government of Cape Verde now has announced its desire to loosen its attachment to the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS). The Cape Verde government soon will present ECOWAS with proposals for "special status" of the island nation.

Resource companies operating in Africa have increasingly been eyeing Chinese investment with mixed feelings. On one hand, they view the Chinese as useful partners because they offer vast markets for commodities, but on the other hand their emergence as investors in African resources presents unwelcome competition.

Relief assistance efforts in emergency situations that hitherto were based on a single approach have not been effective and mainstreaming disaster risk reduction in to the development program is what the country needs, a new research recommended.

United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon started his first day on the job on Tuesday (2 January 2007) by departing from the traditional UN opposition to the death penalty, saying nations can make their own decision.

Sudan's air force has carried out new bombing raids against two rebel areas of Darfur province, the African Union says. The fresh attacks on Saturday threatened to de-rail a peace deal between Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), the main rebel group, the AU said in a statement on Sunday (31 December 2007).