One of Africa’s utmost press freedom heroes, Cameroonian journalist Pius Njawe has faced relentless harassment by the authorities throughout his career. In the past thirty years he has been arrested 126 times and served prison time on three different occasions. Despite ongoing adversities, Njawe continues to publish his newspaper Le Messager. In 1993, he was awarded the WAN Golden Pen of Freedom in recognition of his outstanding contribution to the independent press in his country. Pius wrote this article for the World Association of Newspapers on the occassion of World Press Freedom Day on May 3.

I have been a journalist since the age of 15. I started as an errand boy at a newspaper called Semences africaines, in the city of Yaoundé, Cameroon. Over the past 34 years, I have been arrested 126 times while carrying out my profession as a journalist. Physical and mental torture, death threats, the ransacking of my newsroom, etc., has often been my daily lot in a situation where repression and corruption, even within the press, have become the norm. Woe betide the slightest dissenting voice in this context, for it attracts all kinds of wrath, even from so-called colleagues…

My longest detention lasted ten months. I was arrested on 24 December 1997 for daring to wonder about the President's health after he had experienced heart problems whilst watching the Cameroonian football cup final. On 13 January 1998 I was sentenced to 24 months in prison. Four months later, the sentence was reduced to 12 months under pressure from national and international public opinion. But that was not enough to remove the pressure, and after ten months, the President resigned himself to pardoning me, a pardon I had never asked for.

I have never felt like a prisoner when I have been behind bars. You can be in prison without being a prisoner; the real prisoners are those who imprison journalists whose only crime is to inform or to express an opinion. On the other hand, being deprived of your family, your colleagues and the people you love is a real ordeal; and the tears you cry say less about being behind bars than about the pain and suffering your absence causes on all sides. I used to shed my tears in the arms of Jane - my late wife - and my children, when I saw the suffering they had to endure to come and see me in prison, as if my absence from them was not enough for my persecutors. I could not stop myself from crying when Jane gave birth to a still-born child on 9 January 1998, four days before my trial, following beatings she received the previous day when she brought me food, by prison guards who did not even have pity on her late pregnancy.

While my many detentions have largely contributed to confirming my convictions about certain democratic and human values, my long stay in prison above all stimulated my sense of solidarity with others, particularly the poor and the outcast. It strengthened my determination to use journalism as a weapon against all kinds of abuse. For there is no better weapon than words for restoring peace and justice among people, although it depends how those words are used.

To have the privilege of writing taken away from you overnight feels like being victim of a crime. The prison governor called me into his office one day to warn me that as a prisoner I did not have the right to write, and that my persistence would land me in solitary confinement. I immediately started to think about what my long days would be like in a cell I was sharing with more than 150 fellow detainees, almost all of them crooks, if I could not write. So I decided to defy the governor's ban by stepping up my bi-weekly column, "Le Bloc-notes du bagnard" (The Convict's Notebook), in my newspaper Le Messager. The chain of people I was bribing - including prison guards - to get my column out, was long; I have always wondered how I would have survived in that prison without writing.

During a lecture I once gave to students from a well-known university in New York, the director of the school of journalism made the following remark: "Mr. Njawe, my students and I appreciated your brilliant exposé of the situation regarding press freedom in Cameroon and in Africa in general. But I cannot help wondering one thing: either you invented all these stories to impress us, which I could understand, or everything you have told us is true and I am dying to ask you why you continue to work in the profession in the suicidal situation you describe?"

It is indeed difficult to understand why people persist in a profession that causes them so much misery and suffering. As regards my own case, I invariably reply to everyone who wonders this, that I entered journalism the way you enter a religion; journalism is my religion. I believe in it, and a thousand trials, a thousand arrests, a thousand imprisonments and as many death threats will never make me change job. On the contrary, the harder it is, the more you have to believe in it and cling to it.

Even in the depths of a prison cell you can feel good about being a journalist. How many times have I not rubbed my hands in my cell, my fingers itching to once again hold a pen between them, when thinking back over my career? How many times have I smiled when recalling an editorial or an article that helped foil the most atrocious plans against Cameroon and its people? If only for consolation, one sometimes ends up saying: "They're right to take it out on me like this, after all, I haven’t spared them in my articles…". Provided, of course, that you adhere to the best practices of journalism - that you scrupulously respect the canons that make our profession so great.

Respecting ethical standards is of fundamental importance for anyone wishing to be a journalist. It protects you against all kinds of people who would like to teach you a lesson. When you are facing a judge who is being manipulated, it is your irreproachable professional defense that makes that judge examine his or her own conscience. It is what wins your colleagues over to your cause when you are in difficulty. Doing your job properly therefore seems to be the best advice anyone can give a journalist operating in a context of constant harassment. And doing your job properly also, and above all, means avoiding "gumbo journalism", a practice becoming increasingly widespread in our profession, where people write what they are paid to write instead of giving real information and the truth. While journalists have the right to earn a decent living, even in emerging nations, honest journalists never need pockets in their shrouds…

Journalists perform a social function, which gives them not immunity, but the right to look critically at the way a nation is being run. While playing this crucial role, it is important for them to be protected by the law, but also by the whole of society for which they work. Mobilization is therefore essential every time a journalist is thrown into prison, or threatened with arrest or death. Because every time a journalist is silenced, society loses one of its watchdogs.

* This article was made available by the World Association of Newspapers to mark World Press Freedom Day on May 3. Visit for more information.

* Please send comments to [email protected]

The first elections in 40 years are now scheduled to take place in the DRC on July 30, it was announced this week. Joseph Kabila, former taxi driver and president since the 2001 assassination of his father Laurent Kabila, will be one of 33 presidential hopefuls, while 9,587 candidates will stand for 500 seats in the senate and national assembly. Hopes are that elections will end years of war which some predictions say have claimed 3.9 million lives. Pambazuka News questioned Ernest Wamba dia Wambia on what to expect from the elections.

Pambazuka News: The date for DRC elections – June 18 – was postponed and the latest date put forward has been the end of July. Given the current circumstances in which the DRC finds itself, are elections likely to take place at all?

Ernest Wamba dia Wamba: The latest date for DRC elections has been set at July 30. It is most probably going to be changed again. Most of the political actors are unhappy about how the elections calendar is being fixed, without prior political consensus from all actors. Voices are being heard saying that elections are not likely to take place as planned. Others think that by June 30 - when the Transition was set to end, troubles are likely. Tshisekedi’s UDPS (Pambazuka News note : Étienne Tshisekedi was a former Prime Minister, UDPS stands for Union for Democracy and Social Progress) and others are now saying that only a mini intercongolese dialogue can save the situation. The dialogue should recreate a consensus for the way elections are going to be organized past June 30.

Pambazuka News : It is hoped that when elections do take place, they will provide a fresh start to the DRC. The fact that there will be 33 presidential candidates and nearly 10,000 applications for the parliamentary elections does at first sight appear to be a positive democratic development. But to what extent will the polls be democratic and to what extent is there a danger that elections could result in further disruption related to disputes over the results?

Ernest Wamba dia Wamba : At no time since independence have Congolese agreed on fundamentals of national ideals or interests (and their articulation to world powers and neighbouring countries’interests) without external arbitration. While no sum-up of the 1960s UN Congolese mission has been really done, the country is again under another UN Congolese mission. The ICD Accord (Pambazuka News note : ICD stands for Inter-Congolese Dialogue, which followed the Lusaka Accord in 1999 that officially ended armed conflict) made the CIAT (Pambazuka News : The French acronym for the International Committee to Accompany the Transition) the last resort in the conduct of the Transition.

The Congolese do not really own the very elctoral process itself - not just because the international community finances most of it, but even the fact that the whole conception of what democracy we must have seems to be outside influenced (thus, the tendencies of carving the laws with certain people in mind). By the way, people went to vote, in the referendum, for a Constitution they had not seen. And since there were four different constitutional texts the day before the referendum, those who had seen one did not know which one they were approving.

There is a general will and enthusiasm, among people, to go to elections to settle the legitimacy crisis. But, increasingly, it appears that free and fair elections, the way things are being conducted, are out of the question. Those who feel to gain argue that it does not matter the quality of elections ; with time in the future, things will improve. Right now, what counts is to start. The manipulatory character of Congolese politics based on the conception of winning against rather than with makes it difficult to have agreements over the need to set up a positive political atmosphere, acceptable to all, conducive to an acceptable and thus credible electoral process. Certainly, results are going to be disputed. The institution for settleting the conflits, the Supreme Court of Justice, has already been discredited in many actors’ views. The great number of candidates is mostly due to the fact that politics is seen, and has been functioning, as the only way to have access to some income.

Pambazuka News : The involvement of foreign powers – both regional and international – is well documented in fuelling the conflict in the DRC. How will these interests effect the elections?

Ernest Wamba dia Wamba : The most important thing is that for the first time, there seems to be a consensus in the international community to have elections, even if only symbolically. Their countries’ respective people whose money is used to finance the elections in the DRC may ask for explanation if there is nothing to show. There is a sense, hence the precipitous character of the electoral process, that there are particular puppets some powers would like to see win in the elections ; people who may guarantee their interests to the extent of not needing instability to secure them. Those powers, it is hoped, will discipline their allies that are Congolese neighbours.

Pambazuka News : The tremendous potential of the DRC is often cited. Yet the country faces enormous problems: Its infrastructure has been destroyed, there is still widespread fighting etc etc. Does anyone have a viable recovery plan on the table or will it just be business as usual following the elections?

Ernest Wamba dia Wamba : Some of us are actually raising that same issue. The transitionary government has not even had an awareness of the fact that the country is in a castrophic situation and has thus failed to proclaim it to the world and provoke a general solidarity to focus on trying to get the country out of that situation and actually come up with a plan for doing it. Few candidates seem to be aware of this need, let alone to think of the essential tasks to pursue after the elections.

I did want to stand for the presidential elections to make sure this issue is made part of the electoral campaign discussions. As I opposed paying the so-called caution of $50,000 (such a high price or tax to pay to exercise one’s right to be candidate - This favors of course looters-past, present and puppets), my candidacy was not retained, one of among 40. We (in a group) are still agitating for that position; we are about to release a public statement.

Pambazuka News : What should be the top five priorities of any newly-elected government?

Ernest Wamba dia Wamba : I believe that the general framework should include two essential global tasks: proclaim the fact that the country is in a catastrophic situation and work out a plan to get out of the situation, on the basis of people’s involvement; start to build a State, from below, different from the one, now decomposed, built from a colonial model.

The top priorities should include: radical improvement of fiscal structures (it is easy to spend money, but tough to raise it, especially when the country is like now), address fast the rehabilitation of economic-related infrastructures with an aim to integrate parts of the country; stop all the leaks, especially the looting structures (mines, oil, wood, etc.), rebuild basic state apparatuses, with people involvement (reduce government and administration sizes); a lot of work for people mobilization linked to job creation - where feasible without forcing, people must be displaced from overcrowded cities to the country side where the agriculture policy and local State structures being built may be tested. It is hoped that the solidarity demand may mean a temporary stop on the debt payment.

Pambazuka News : Marie-Madeleine Kalala, DRC Minister for Human Rights, in briefing the UN Human Rights Committee in March 2006, declared that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission had been established, as well as a national human rights monitoring institute. This was in order to identify people responsible for human rights violations. How important are these processes to healing the DRC?

Ernest Wamba dia Wamba : The existence of institutions is often seen here as its only value. Not only are they ill manned, with incompetent people or people who hardly know what reconciliation implies or people who happen to be puppets of forces that are scared of real reconciliation. Nothing very serious has taken place to actually say that there has been attempts at reconciling Congolese. No ceremony, even at the presidential level, even just symbolically has taken place.

To be effective, like a palaver, reconciliation must involve first the leaders themselves who are willing to accept their own misgivings and are willing to pardon others and be tolerant to hear all kind of grievances voiced, etc. Reconciliation cannot be done privately. The whole healing process is still to be started and done. In fact, most Congolese are counting on the performance of the International Criminal Court to get the criminals judged. It is not easy to identify people responsible for human rights violations, when those are in power.

I do know some human rights advocates who have been threatened because of their work of identifying certain human rights violators, one or two had to leave the country. If archives can be safely organized to be used when some of those people are out of power, that may be a good thing to do; but, that does not deal really with the healing part yet.

Pambazuka News: Lastly, the situation of the DRC can be seen as unique, given the complicated nature of the country in the first place, as well as the role of international and regional actors. Yet, the solution seems to be: Have an election and everything will be okay. Has the complicated nature of the country been adequately considered?

Ernest Wamba dia Wamba : It is true the international community pushes the thesis : have an election and everything will be okay. This seems to be the only way of justifying neocolonialism these days. Most of the recommendations are thus not specific, only things done elsewhere taken to be master keys used everywhere, including the so-called post-conflict economic measures.

When you have a leadership of a complicated country that knows close to nothing of the country’s history and the advisors are only interested in self-enrichment, not much can be expected. The present ones are in fact hostile to any Congolese intellectual who may make the difference. Universities are left to rot. The foreign partisan advisers don’t pay attention to the complicated character of the country either, not even the long term interest of the country. The consequence is a country in a catastrophic situation. There has to be a real break, from the leadership perspective, from the past.

There has to emerge really committed intellectuals, patriotic enough, willing to really come up with a vision to grasp fully the problems of the country and clearly specify its short and long term interest and the latter relation to foreign powers and countries’ interests. A real plan is necessary to prioritize the elements of a government programme. We need a think tank devoted to that task of mapping what must be known and done to make the country occupy its real place in Africa and the world. I would enjoy being involved in this work.

* Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba is a historian who has taught at a number of universities including Harvard University and the University of Dar-es-Salaam

* Interview conducted by email. Please send comments to

“We are far from reaching the end of the tunnel,” writes Yveline Dévérin of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, as she describes the complicated progression of the conflict over the last four years. She writes that: “All those who are in the position to have the power to turn the situation towards peace have an interest in the crisis continuing, not only because it is lucrative but also because it is validating. And this is exactly the same for the powers that be, as for the opposition powers, as for the rebel powers.” For further information on Côte d’Ivoire, see last week’s Pambazuka News article at

From the 15-19 January 2006, the Côte d’Ivoire experienced a new wave of violence of the kind it has been hitherto accustomed. Both in Abidjan, but also in the west and different parts of the south of the country, for some four days, troops from the ‘patriotic galaxy’ (the presidential side) occupied the streets, hijacked cars and duly occupied the Ivorian radio and TV network (Radio Télévision Ivorienne) so as to broadcast their messages. Most significantly – and this is without precedent – they attacked UN premises, and even the Blue Helmets of the United Nations Mission for Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) themselves, forcing them to withdraw into the ‘security zone’ which separates the government zone from the ‘ex-rebel’ zone.

In order to appraise the ins and outs of this new phase of the crisis, it is first appropriate to review the general circumstances that have brought about this situation.

The inexorable march of immobilisation since September 2002

The immobilisation is on the march, and nothing can stop it. ¬– Edgar Faure

Without going back over the different episodes of the saga of the Ivorian crisis, it is nevertheless useful to review the recent context of these events. It should be remembered that in the Côte d’Ivoire, since September 2002, there have been six agreements and dozens of mediation operations and that these have not succeeded in progressing the situation. Now in 2006, the population has reached the stage of exasperation. The regular refrain, repeated in Abidjan for over two years: ‘We’ve had enough’, has now become ‘Even the Bétés [1] have had enough’.

In January 2006, the escalating tensions linked to the various deadlines to which the people had grown accustomed – an announced military coup, presidential elections, the nomination of the Prime-Minister, the formation of the government – came to a head. At every hurdle, the population fears a reprisal of the war, and so lives in a constant state of expectant anxiety.

The military coup announced by General Doué

Along with other exiled soldiers, the former Head of the Army has been sending several open letters via the internet to the Abidjan press. Whilst there are some who have recognised an unpleasant build-up in these undisclosed letters, it was nevertheless a shock that a broadcast on the 19 August 2004 on Radio française internationale (RFI – the French language world news service) disseminated an interview with the disgraced general, in which he is cited as explaining:

“I have chosen to break the silence because I am of the opinion that the situation has lasted for too long and that a return to peace in the Côte d’Ivoire is wholly conditional on the departure of President Gbagbo. If the international community is not willing to commit to making him go quietly, I will do so myself, by any means necessary. And let it be understood that this will not be done without serious damage.”

Nothing has happened yet, but the waiting is causing everyone to live in a state of nervous exhaustion. The mysterious attack on the military camps at Akouédo on the 2 January 2006 has raised the tension yet another notch (the reasons for, and circumstances of this attack had still not been established at the beginning of April 2006).

Elections

It was constitutionally anticipated that elections would take place on the 30 October 2005; but they did not, leaving a constitutional void. On the 20 October, the UN decreed the impossibility of holding elections. In accordance with Resolution 1622, it decided instead to prolong the mandate of President Gbagbo for another 12 months, which allowed him to remain ‘head of State’, whilst at the same time delegating a major component of his executive powers to a Prime-Minister who would be ‘acceptable to everyone’. This state of affairs was supervised by the International Working Group, whose members include the African Union, ECOWAS, the UN, the EU and France.

Nomination of a Prime-Minister ‘acceptable to everyone’

After endless dithering (the differences in nuance between ‘acceptable to everyone’ and ‘acceptable for everyone’ caused huge problems), Charles Konan Banny, the governor of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) was finally accepted as - or rather, designated - Prime-Minister on the 4 December 2005.

Formation of the Government

After more than three weeks of bitter disagreements, Charles Konan Banny formed his Government on the 28 December 2005. The arguments were essentially over the sharing out of posts, how many were allocated to each party, and which individuals were chosen. (The parties each preferred their ‘Party bosses’, whilst Charles Konan Banny wanted technocrats.). And for the politicians the stakes were economic as well as political: as much do with personal enrichment, as with party-financing. The Ivorians refer to them as ‘fat-cat Ministers’, which aptly summarises the real problem!

The issue of the Minister of Finance

This one is far and away the fattest cat of all the ministers, and a major source of funds. He returns to the Government in the Cabinet, therefore escaping from the Ivorian Popular Front, which is finding itself cut off from a major part of its provisions. This is a crucial element in grasping the succession of events.

The National Assembly

2004 has amply demonstrated how the National Assembly has been used by Laurent Gbagbo as a mechanism for blocking reforms. But it is also a financial godsend. The members of parliament receive a not negligible amount, in a country which is weakened, and where numerous people have lost their jobs or seen their incomes much reduced following the events of November 2004.

Moreover the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI- Gbagbo’s presidential party) is largely in the majority, and therefore, importantly can make payments to the militias again: ‘A militant is someone who shares and who distributes’, declared the ‘Patriote’, the daily paper close to the opposition RDR party, remarks attributed to a mysterious and anonymous ‘official of the central office [who] was questioning Gbagbo’.

Gunpowder

Against this background, there is the additional problem of the mandate of the MPs, which, constitutionally, was supposed to expire on the 16 December 2005. As was the case for President Gbagbo, there was the problem it would be prolonged. The question was put to the International Working Group which is supposed to ‘consult all Ivorian parties with the aim of ensuring that all the Ivorian institutions function normally until elections are held’, conforming to the UN Resolution 1633. The position of the working group is clear: it acknowledges the fact that the mandate of the MPs ended on the 16 December 2005. According to the Closing Remarks of the Meeting of the International Working Group, 15 January 2006):

“In conformity with paragraph 11 of Resolution 1633 in relation to the expiry of the mandate of the National Assembly, the International Working Group has held lengthy consultations with all the Ivorian parties about the functioning of state institutions. The working group has come to the conclusion that the mandate of the National Assembly, which expired on the 16 December 2005, should not be extended.”

Incidentally, this communiqué is only repeating the terms of Resolution 1633.

The reaction was very violent by MPs, the Ivorian Popular Front, the ‘people on the streets’ and the ‘young patriots’. But we should point out that the MPs who protested were less concerned about the vindication of their function than of their status: they are quite happy no longer having legislative power, but are keen to remain MPs or to put it another way, to have their hands on the allowances. The Ivorian people were not duped by a scant mobilisation of about 3000 ‘patriots’, and this part of negotiations was notably suspect, marked by the image of the behaviour of the MPs as compared to the ordinary population.

The reaction is assuming new forms, compared with what has happened before. The ‘patriotic galaxy’ in the presidential sphere is still ahead of the game, but it is no longer mobilising the same crowds as it did in January 2003 or November 2004. Its power to cause a stir is intact, perhaps more concentrated. The theme of independence that was blown-out by the international community has been taken up again, as on previous occasions.

On the other hand, we are witnessing few physical attacks against the French (largely owing to the lack of targets). Though without historical precedent, these attacks are now being directed against the UN and the Blue Helmets. The UN headquarters are being attacked to the point where the UN is being forced to evacuate its staff. All UN symbols are being attacked; and the offices of certain UN agencies and NGOs, such as the UNOCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), UNHCR and Save the Children are being pillaged, ransacked and set on fire. These attacks on NGOs are also a new phenomenon.

Another difference between this new wave of violence and those that occurred earlier is that this time, movements can be observed in all the towns of the southern zone (Daloa, Guiglo, Douékoué, San Pedro, Yamoussoukro). In the west, recent attacks on UN bases at Guiglo led to four deaths in the ‘patriot’ ranks. Everywhere, equipment essential for working is being savaged. UN military equipment was abandoned on the spot when the Bangladais Blue Helmets had to evacuate their bases in Douékoué and Guiglo, and to withdraw into the security zone, escorted by the ‘Ivorian Defence and Security Forces’ (Agence France Presse 18 January 2006). These are the same security forces which a number of observers have seen openly supporting the militias in the field, for example, opening the doors of the Ivorian Radio/TV network (Radio Television Ivoriennes) for them.

The patriots are demanding the departure of the UN. Pascal Affi N’Guessan, the Secretary General of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI- Presidential party) has been very clear on this point. In a declaration, he has ‘demanded the departure of all UN and ‘Licorne’ [a French army operation] forces from the country which are exploiting and enslaving the Côte d’Ivoire’. At the same time, in line with the intentions of Abidjan, he has called for ‘the establishment of a national liberation government, which will bring together all the patriotic forces’. Which would mean the end of the government so painfully assembled by Charles Konan Banny.

Consequences

Paris is finally able to retreat from a perilous tête-à-tête with Abidjan. For once, ‘Licorne’, the French occupation army, is not in the firing line.

In contrast, the UN is totally discredited. Once again, it is brandishing threats it is then reluctant to apply: sanctions have been regularly announced for three years now. Not until the beginning of February 2006 were three names to be proposed, and then sanctions came into force on the 7 February. But those who have been sanctioned are of secondary significance – the heads of the two patriotic movements, Charles Blé Godé and Eugène Djué, and, for the sake of balance, one war leader from the north, Fofié Kouakou, the commander of the zone [2] of Korhogo (responsible for human rights violations).

Moreover stirring the UN to impose sanctions first required that its own equipment was set fire to, and its own soldiers were displaced. And yet again the ‘valets’, those who are politically responsible for the crisis remaining completely untouched by them. Meanwhile the UN has succeeded in overcoming the dilemma of its credibility: to dare to sanction despite the fear of a reprisal of violence against its personnel and equipment, so as not to make it obvious that fear of the latter is preventing all effectiveness.

Above all, we are witnessing the total discredit of the United Nations Mission for Côte d’Ivoire. The Blue Helmets have been attacked and have the Ivorian Armed Forces to thank for their ‘welcome’ to the west (Douékoué and Guiglo). This army escorted them as far as Bangolo (in the [UN] ‘security zone’!) where the Licorne army could protect them.

In Abidjan, French soldiers from the Licorne army had to intervene by helicopter to ‘filter out’ UN soldiers from their headquarters, where they had been barricaded. The UN soldiers are all the more discredited given that they had already been denounced as ‘tourists’ before this particular crisis [3]. Some newspapers have referred to them as ‘armed tourists’. Perhaps the most surreal development is that in February, transferrals of soldiers liberated by the peace in Liberia were effected not to safeguard the population, but rather, to safeguard UN agents.

The political consequences are important too: UN soldiers were supposed to ensure the security of the ministries of the ‘G7’ group (grouping of the 7 opposition parties). But the New Forces are refusing to invest any confidence in soldiers who are incapable of ensuring their own security! They are therefore demanding the return of their ministers to the northern zone, under their own control, or the possibility of providing for their own security – which would suppose allowing ex-rebel armies to enter Abidjan!

In view of the escalation of violence, John Bolton, the US Ambassador to the UN recently declared to the Security Council that it was possible that the United Nations Mission for Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) is more of a problem than a solution to the Ivorian crisis’. (UN Press Agence 0/02/2006).

In the event, the New Forces have identified excellent lines of argument and a supplementary excuse for postponing the deadlines for disarmament. This at any rate is what has been posted on their website since 21 January: ‘Unilateral Disarmament of the New Forces? The Ivorian Popular Front can give up hope of that’. The incapacity of the ONUCI to fulfil its mandate, added to open concern of the Ivorian Security Forces’ for the patriots is unlikely to reassure them.

Nevertheless, the international community has reaffirmed its support for Konan Banny, and this alone appears to reinforce his power.

The ‘patriotic galaxy’ has shown that it is now mobilising fewer people (about 3000 patriots – against several hundreds of thousands in November 2004 – though this weakness has however effectively succeeds in mobilising 7000 Blue Helmets of the UN). Manifestly, there are some cracks at the heart of the ‘patriotic galaxy’, particularly between the supporters of Blé Goudé and those of Eugène Djué. The latter have already protested against the fact that they are less ‘highly regarded’ (understand, ‘highly paid’) than those of Blé Goudé. It was Djué’s supporters who delayed in ‘liberating the streets’ on the 19 January 2006.

It should not be forgotten either that the military check points were also opportunities for racketeering. The troubles should not last too long: the armed forces which are collecting taxes from the population could not allow civilian ‘patriots’ to replace them for too long at the check points, and thus to compete with them: ‘The armed forces have come back in order to racketeer.’ (Le Front No: 111 8, 21 January 2006)

To understand the inward tensions of the different groups, particularly those at the heart of the army and of the patriotic galaxy, it is essential to understand the financial motive – which is a crucial element in deciphering the crisis. Exploiting the divisions within the opposing side is effectively also a component in the struggle between the ‘G7’ (coalition of Houphouétistes – the opposition) and Laurent Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front. Cutting the Ivorian Popular Front off from its resources through the biased redistribution of the ministries was one element of a strategy designed to force the government party to negotiate a peace process.

Conclusion

We are far from reaching the end of the tunnel. Sometimes it is even tempting to ask oneself if it is not circular. The sanctions the UN has finally decided to apply (freezing bank accounts, travel bans) have only affected the intermediary figures, and have not touched either those who are making the biggest profits out of the crisis, or those who are fuelling it. The ‘patriots’ who have been affected have transformed the impact of the sanctions into martyrdom – into a grand ceremony glorifying the heroes. Their flourishing investments in the Côte d’Ivoire – cyber-cafés, petrol stations, property acquisitions – have not been hit, and they continue to receive tax-breaks from the presidential milieu, which, needless to say, is not affected by the sanctions either.

All those who are in the position to have the power to turn the situation towards peace have an interest in the crisis continuing, not only because it is lucrative but also because it is validating. And this is exactly the same for the powers that be, as for the opposition powers, as for the rebel powers. It would be reasonable to assume that considerable severance of the income linked to the crisis would mean that a large part of the interest in it would be lost, especially if this could be matched with the promise of an appearance before the International Criminal Court, which would at least cause some discomfort in retirement. But this would require all those responsible to be sanctioned. On both sides. And would therefore run the risk of another wave of anti-UN violence, which, the solidarity between heads of State makes all the more difficult to imagine.

* Yveline Dévérin is Lecturer in Geography, University of Toulouse-le-Mirail, France

* This article was translated from the original French version by Stephanie Kitchen. See [email protected]

Notes

[1] The ethnic group of President Gbagbo, who is accused of pursuing ‘tribalist’ politics, which favours his own group.

[2] The ‘commander of the zone’ is, in the rebellion organisation, responsible for the region (zone). He has functions similar to those of a ‘Préfet’ [a State representative in Fraoncophone political systems – translator’s note]

[3] The people from Abidjan criticise their excursions in 4-wheel drives, in the trendy areas, their sexual tourism; which is all the more distasteful given the Ivorian population is financially shattered, and because it creates the impression they are benefiting from the crisis.

Voting has ended in Chad's presidential election, in which President Idriss Deby is seeking a third term in office. Opposition parties boycotted the poll and voter turnout was reported to be extremely low. Rebel groups did not carry out threats to disrupt voting, the BBC's Stephanie Hancock in the Chadian capital, N'Djamena, reports. However, the country remains divided, with serious security concerns dominating the election. Mr Deby faced four challengers, but the poll was controversial since the main opposition party had refused to put forward candidates. Results will not be known for another ten days, but everyone in Chad is certain that President Deby will win, our correspondent says.
* Related Link:
Idriss Deby, a President Under Siege

A plan by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to shift the relative voting power of some of its 184 member-nations will almost certainly be of no benefit to East African countries, which will remain heavily dependent on loans from the global financial institution. But some analysts say the IMF itself is becoming increasingly irrelevant to parts of the developing world. And, they add, the fund's waning power may presage a day when it no longer exercises decisive control over the economies and budgets of poor countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

Local communities in Nigeria are taking the World Bank before an internal auditor over claims that the lender neglected its duties and anti-poverty mission when it funded a controversial gas pipeline in the region, whose construction they say will harm the environment and area residents. Twelve Nigerian communities said they were filing the complaint about the West African Gas Pipeline with the inspection panel of the World Bank, the investigative arm of the Washington-based public lender, charging the Bank with derelict conduct in carrying out necessary "due diligence" about the project's impacts.

I would like to comment on the Charles Taylor issue. I am a Zimbabwean.

According to my understanding, of which I stand to be corrected, Charles Taylor negotiated with the mediator Obasanjo (of Nigeria). Taylor decided to exchange his pride of being a president with exile. He stepped down to save many lives. It is important to honour set agreements, since it affects other nations.

The following points are worthy noting:

AU negotiators do not stick by their promises for peace. Obasanjo betrayed Taylor. He is supposed to have protected Taylor to maintain his promise for the good of peace. If Taylor had not chosen to step down, he could still be president and many people would be dead by now. He chose to save many lives and for such a bold move, he has to be protected. Its more difficult for any other President or dictator in Africa to step down under same conditions as Taylor, since protection is not guaranteed. If I were a dictator, and Obasanjo came for negotiations, I wouldn’t step down. I would rather protect my life and let other people die than ending up in Taylor's situation. I strongly feel that injustice has been done to this dictator. I know that he was a dictator. I am convinced that he caused serious sufferings to the people of Liberia, but please note that he decided to step down to stop further suffering.

It’s now very difficult for any dictator to trust the AU.

I cannot say that I followed every interview Soyinka gave in his visit to the San Francisco Bay Area, but in all of them, including the one excerpted in the latest issue of Pambazuka News, there was something striking: not a word about African literature. It was almost as if the ones doing the interview had decided that the subject did not even exist or that (just as bad) it was not worthy of discussion. One is reminded of Oxford Historian, Trevor-Roper's words in relation to African History: "There is no such a thing as African history." Sure, Soyinka is very committed to politics (Nigerian, African, planetary) in ways which tend to encourage this kind of public humiliation which says without saying that there is no such a thing as African literature. And to the face of the first African Nobel Prize Winner for literature, to boot.

Clearly, the interviewers were more interested in showing off by pulling Soyinka into an arena in which they felt more comfortable rather than showing their ignorance or contempt for African literature.

Would it not have been interesting, informative, to hear from Soyinka how writers in other parts of the Continent were doing, (e.g. in Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa?). How often is there a chance to listen to someone like Soyinka share his understanding, his knowledge of the literary scene on a Continent which continues to be treated as a sort of tabula rasa? What is the state of African publishing? Why has the Western publishing industry favored certain African writers over others? Did his prize lead to greater interest, among Western publishers, in searching for new literary talents in Africa? The list of questions which could have been posed and were not is so long that their avoidance was difficult not to notice.

Interestingly Soyinka did try to steer (ever so subtly) the conversation toward his passion for theater. Still, one wishes he had pushed harder. One can only marvel at the durability of the Discovery Syndrome and the multiple ways in which it manifests itself.

Thank you for the good work and do take care.

The United Nations, which is fielding over 19,800 peacekeeping troops in war-ravaged Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), is virtually fighting a losing battle to contain the ongoing recruitment of child soldiers in a country the size of Western Europe. Asked why child soldiers continue to be a recurring problem in the DRC despite the presence of the largest single U.N. peacekeeping force in the sprawling African nation, Julia Freedson, director of Watchlist of Children and Armed Conflict, told IPS: "The size and broken-down infrastructure of DRC prevents U.N. personnel from reaching many corners of the country."

Renewable energies can go a long way toward helping deliver electricity in developing countries, a United Nations official said. Tapping into green energy sources more can boost both development and the environment, UN Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs Jos Antonio Ocampo said.

This is a unique event for media professionals to exchange knowledge about media productions with children and youth in developing countries. Forum topics include: quality production; technical aspects; training; project planning; monitoring and evaluating impact, networking and fundraising. Register today and contact the organisers to be a speaker.

Hosted by the Community Development Resource Association, this five-day course is aimed at helping practitioners learn essential facilitation concepts and skills for working developmentally with groups of people in small group, workshop or training course settings.

The United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR) has said that it had re-established a presence in western Côte d'Ivoire following January's violent destruction of the premises of several humanitarian organizations in the town of Guiglo, which led to the departure of most humanitarian staff and UN peacekeepers.

Kjell Magne Bondevik, the U.N. special humanitarian envoy for the Horn of Africa, has said after a visit to Somalia, "It was especially moving to visit the country where several thousand ... displaced were living under the worst conditions I have ever seen." He added that governments must do more to ensure drought and hunger are eradicated in the long-term.

Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo have been delayed until 30 July this year, electoral authorities say. The election is to be the first multi-party poll in 45 years, ending a turbulent post-war transitional period that began in 2003. Voting was scheduled for mid-2005, but has been postponed repeatedly to allow more time for candidates' registration. The presence of militia groups in the east of the country has also posed a further threat to free elections.

More than a quarter of Cameroon's national debt has been cancelled by creditors including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The reduction amounts to about 27% of Cameroon's total debt, worth $4.9bn (£2.6bn;3.8bn euros) in cash terms. The decision makes Cameroon the 19th state to complete the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Cameroon was given the reduction after meeting poverty reduction targets and social services investments.

Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo are the world's most vulnerable states, according to a new study. The report - compiled by the US Foreign Policy magazine and the US-based Fund for Peace think-tank - ranked nations according to their viability. Judged according to 12 criteria, including human flight and economic decline, states range from the most failed, Sudan, to the least, Norway. Eleven of the 20 most failed states of the 146 nations examined are in Africa.

The Kenyan government plans to introduce tough new laws to fight corruption, which will enable the state to, among other things, seize property suspected to have been acquired illegally. The new laws published by the attorney-general and tabled in parliament late last month seek to empower the government to go to the high court and ask a judge to appoint a receiver to seize property suspected to have been acquired corruptly. If enacted into law, this will remove a major loophole in the current law where corrupt individuals continue to enjoy their ill-acquired wealth even after investigators have confirmed that it was acquired through graft.
* Related Link
Graft whistle-blower sued for defamation

Kenya is the only East African Community member that has completed a self-audit on its socio-economic performance under the New Partnership for Africa's Development. According to the South Africa-based Nepad Africa Peer Review Mechanism secretariat, Kenya's audit report will be tabled at the APR meeting to be held in June in Banjul, Gambia. The report is being compiled by the secretariat and will be sent back to the Government for comments before being published. APRM is a self-monitoring mechanism voluntarily acceded by African Union member states to foster adoption of policies, standards and practices that will lead to high economic growth, sustainable development, political stability and accelerated regional integration.

Egyptian blogger, Baheyya (http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2006/04/on-eve-of-hearing.html) reports on the arrest of peaceful demonstrators holding a vigil in support of judges campaigning for judicial independence.

“Amid screams, sobs, and cries of ‘Down with Hosni Mubarak,’ ‘Down with Habib al-Adli,’ riot police cornered protestors as plain clothed agents removed them one by one. In a final, eerie scene, police peeled off the huge Egyptian flag that demonstrators had strung up to frame their vigil.”

Baheyya also provides a series of background posts to the demonstrations, explaining the last 4 years of confrontation between the judicial system and the President.

Another Egyptian blogger, the Skeptic (http://elijahzarwan.net/blog/?p=109) posts on the renewal of “the Emergency Law” last Sunday, adding to the picture of an extremely repressive and dictatorial regime in Egypt. He also writes that 25 members of the Muslim Brotherhood have been arrested for putting up posters protesting the renewal of the Emergency Law.

Lavina Live (http://lavinialive.blogspot.com/2006/04/our-freedom-was-not-free.html) comments on the recent Freedom Day holiday in South Africa celebrating 12 years of democracy. She comments on life in present day South Africa and feels privileged to be part of it:

“Living in South Africa right now is wonderful for me. I never forget how privileged I am and have been all my life. There is still a lot of work to do with education, development, in the public service and many other areas but we have come very far in 12 years. There are equal opportunities for everyone, disability and education grants for the poor, decent housing for those who never had access before and dignity for everyone, especially those who were never treated with it in the past.”

But she reminds us of the people who sacrificed their lives and liberty for her to live in an independent country and makes the insightful comment:

“Our freedom was indeed not free. I remembered that, the first time I went to vote in the national elections in 2004. I remember it each time a political figure is busted for corruption. I remember it each time I go to my comfortable suburban home in an area black people were not allowed to live less than 2 decades ago.”

Sudan Reeves (http://www.sudanreeves.org/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=102) writes on the genocide taking place in Darfur and asks: How do we quantify the deaths? He believes that current data shows some 450,000 people at least have been killed over the past three years of conflict.

“As Rwanda marks a grim twelfth anniversary, we must accept that while vast human destruction in Darfur has unfolded plainly before us, we have again done little more than watch, offering only unprotected humanitarian assistance while some 450,000 people have perished as a result of violence, as well as consequent malnutrition and disease. Human destruction to date, however, certainly does not mark the conclusion of the world’s moral failure in responding to genocide in Darfur - on the contrary, this massive previous destruction is our best measure of what is impending.”

He then states the Khartoum government’s “decision to stage yet another large scale military offensive is designed to assure the failure of the Abuja peace process”. In addition to that the latest statement by the SLA suggests “strong disapproval” for the peace process.

He expects that without any intervention from anywhere the situation will rapidly become much worse.

“All that can reverse this course of humanitarian collapse and accelerating human destruction is urgent intervention, with all necessary military resources and an appropriately robust mandate for civilian and humanitarian protection. At present, there are no signs that the UN is planning for such an urgent, well-equipped, and robust mission.”

Gukira (http://gukira.blogspot.com/2006/05/sexual-offences-bill.html) comments on the Kenyan Sexual Offences Bill that is presently being debated in parliament.

“Although sold as a bill against sexual offences, the current document is nothing less than a referendum on the status of gender relations in Kenya. And the news is not good. It is also an attempt to legislate sexuality and, by inference, the social worlds we create and inhabit. And, there too, the news is not good.”

He believes the Bill represents an ongoing struggle between tradition, religion and modernity and that at some point:

“We have to challenge what I now call the Culture Kiboko – that invocation of Culture used to discipline and control…We need good legislation on sexual offences. As is, this bill is not that legislation.”

Black Looks which has moved to a new site (http://www.blacklooks.org/2006/05/781.html#more-781) comments on the recent events in the Niger Delta. Specifically she questions the worthiness of Obasanjo’s latest 5 year development plan for the Niger Delta:

“The President in a panic and eager to sell the Niger Delta to the Chinese, felt he had to come up with a quick solution to the growing militancy in the region so in his ignorance of the depth of dissatisfaction and sheer misery of peoples lives, he chose to use leaking buckets to put out a raging forest fire.”

She considers his offer to the people of the region an insult which in no way even begins to meet their demands. “The people have been calling for resource control; for 25% leading to 50% deviation of oil monies; for compensation for the environmental destruction of land and water; for clean up of oil spillages over the past 40 years; investment in education and training. Obasanjo’s answer? A few thousand jobs, conscription of youths into the army and police and building 12 mega petrol stations.”

* Sokari Ekine produces the blog Black Looks,

* Please send comments to [email protected]