The World Bank is urging its steering committee to approve a new breed of loans and grants that would go to developing countries to help them make power generation cleaner and more efficient. A report drafted for this weekend's meeting of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank at the request of Group of Eight leading nations already seems to have gained traction among some emerging countries.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan says the most likely way a settlement can be reached in Western Sahara is for the Moroccan government to negotiate directly with rebels in the region. The United Nations has spent 15 years and $600 million trying to broker a peace deal between Morocco and the Frente Polisaro rebels.

The United Nations said it has successfully completed a program to resettle more than 300,000 Liberians who were displaced during that country's 14-year civil war. "We consider it a success," said Ron Redmond, spokesman for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which plans to continue assisting and protecting refugees returning to the West African country from abroad.

Liberia's newly-elected but cash-strapped government has begun to find ways that the U.N. sanctions can be lifted to allow the country to exploit its immense timber resources for the benefit of its war-ravaged people. The move follows the passing of Executive Order Number One, canceling all logging concessions effective from Feb. 2, in compliance with conditions set under the U.N.'s Security Council Resolution 1521 (passed in 2003) for the lifting of sanctions on timber exports.

A public discussion with eleven former African leaders attending an African Presidential Roundtable, crowned the two-day event held at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) in Johannesburg recently. About four hundred people -- including staff, students, invited guests and other members of the public -- filled the Wits Great Hall for an exchange of views with the ex-leaders. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Africa bureau chief Milton Nkosi moderated the proceedings, which saw the floor opened for queries to the former presidents.

The international community must press Mauritania’s leaders who seized power in a coup in August 2005 to respect their promises of democratic transition. The new strong men have made a good start in some ways but some are closely linked to the old regime and may prefer not to redress past injustices. This could fuel political tensions. Deep and controversial reforms cannot be completed quickly, but the government should at least work closely with all national political forces to take initial steps.

The World Bank has been accused of publishing false accounts and wasting money on ineffective medicines in its malaria treatment programme. A Lancet paper claims the bank faked figures, boosting the success of its malaria projects, and reneged on a pledge to invest $300-500m in Africa. It also claims the bank funded obsolete treatments - against expert advice. The bank has denied the allegations and says it is investing $500m to $1bn (£280m-£560m) over the next five years. The claims against the bank, made by 13 international public health experts headed by Amir Attaran, of Canada's University of Ottawa, centre on the financial pledges the fund made to fight malaria on the African continent and a programme in India.

The World Bank says it has secured enough backing from member countries to proceed with $37 billion in debt relief for 17 poor countries. "We have secured the total votes necessary to enact the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative," World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz said in a statement. "Countries will now be able to put more resources into programs that directly help those who need it most - the poor who need better education, better health services and greater access to clean water, for example," he added.

Over the past five years, labour unions and their civil society allies in Latin America, Africa, Europe and Asia have successfully organized to win important victories over the private interests that depend on IFI loans to set the conditions for corporate control over water, electric power and other basic services. This paper focuses on six such victories, starting with an analysis about how trade unions in Uruguay took the lead in organizing that country's historic referendum on water.

Unusually for the World Bank - IMF meetings in Washington, much of the talk this year is focused on what is happening at the Fund. With the managing director's strategic review being considered by the board of governors, many probing questions about the Fund's role and continued relevance are being posed. Having finalised its share of the G8 debt deal, the World Bank's governors were left to discuss the controversial clean energy investment framework, while in the corridors all discussion has been about president Wolfowitz's high-profile announcements on corruption. See further details in this round up by the Bretton Woods project.

The African Development Bank has said it was writing off the debt of 13 African countries including Uganda, amounting to $8.54b. Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia will all have their debt cancelled, the bank said in a statement. "This is a significant step forward in the initiatives by donor countries, both Group of Eight and others, on the issue of debt, which is to be applauded highly," according to the bank's president. The bank said the debt relief was intended to allow the 13 countries to channel resources into poverty relief, but also to stimulate economic growth and encourage governments to stay on track with reforms.

Is Pambazuka really 250 (years) old? If so, Happy 250th Birthday to you! if not, Happy Birthday all the same. Do continue the good work. Mostly, Pambazuka News is highly informative and partly depressive of spirit, yet it is essential that we are aware of the progress of our African family, albeit sometimes, the questionable direction of its progress. All the same it makes good fuel for prayer. I have solidly come to believe that desirable and pleasing change for the African continent can only come about with firstly initiating spiritual change. Take the physical chains off a slave and he will still act as a slave, but to teach a slave that he is a worthy human being, then he will rise as a free man. Many thanks for your continued endurance.

Pambazuka News Replies: Ummm, that would be 250 issues old, although maybe sometimes it feels like years!

Great article. It should be sent to major newspapers. It should be translated into Portuguese and sent to all Angolans to read. Please write Part II and III And IV… Thank you for a job well done. I am from Angola and I know people who are both benefiting and suffering in Angola. Once again, thank you for putting in so many words what most Angolans feel but cannot express it the way you did.

On Wednesday, Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos declared that his country would go to the polls before the end of 2008. Elections, not held since 1992, have been constantly delayed in the country, leading human rights activists to accuse the government of clinging to power. Steve Kibble analyses the complex nature of the Angolan state, concluding that: “Despite rhetoric on increased transparency, accountability and democratisation little has yet been accomplished to overcome the gap between ruler and ruled.”

Angola became independent from the Portuguese in 1975 after a costly and long running liberation war with three antagonistic independence movements based on different ethno-linguistic, ideological constituencies. In its almost fourth year of peace there is no immediate reason why war should resume. This follows 27 years of nearly continuous civil war between Uniao Nacional para a Independencia total de Angola (UNITA) rebels under their dictatorial leader Jonas Savimbi, and the governing Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA). The former were US and apartheid South Africa-backed, with a rhetoric of representing the poor ‘real’ rural Africans of the interior. The governing party was based on the coastal elite which has large urban and mestizo elements, with a commitment to nationalism, socialism, and anti-imperialism in a conflict overlaid by the Cold War.

In 1991 the Stalinist state with an inefficient command economy changed to a supposed multiparty democratic state and market economy. Few freedoms were realised although free and fair elections were won by the government in 1992 – the ‘excuse’ for UNITA to renew the war. The state remained heavily centralised with the president able to control extra-budgetary revenues for his own accumulation and clientilist purposes. It has massive oil production, revenues and potential. Much of the infrastructure, agriculture and rudimentary health services were destroyed by war with millions of landmines being laid - with knock-on effects on agriculture, transport as well as people’s lives.

War also meant excess mortality of one million deaths - roughly a tenth of Angola’s population, displacement and urbanisation with about half of all Angolans, perhaps seven million people, living in cities and towns. The agrarian system collapsed as did the health and education services – only 37 percent of primary-aged children were enrolled in school whilst most of the health budget goes to hospital-based curative services, including elite spending in South Africa and Portugal.

Peace broke out in April 2002 when Savimbi was killed, leaving the MPLA-controlled government undisputed victor, but espousing reconciliation (Although reconciliation here largely means (six) blanket amnesties, no truth commissions and inviting selected opposition elements into the elite) - for which civil society can claim some credit. The country in theory faces a triple transition from war to peace, from devastation to reconstruction, and from a state/elite patronage system to a transparent market economy. The first two are better advanced including a greater commitment to infrastructural (re)construction. Many in civil society express concerns over delays in and government commitment to reform. Inflation has been brought down although no major structural reform has occurred. In particular there is unlikely to be a challenge to the key nature of the bazaar economy (Cadongo) in trade and services controlled upstream by commercial tycoons and army officers able to accumulate resources by using special powers, granted them by senior politicians, to import goods (Angola is ranked 133 out of 145 countries on Transparency International’s corruption index. Between 1997 and 2001, $8.45 billion of public money was unaccounted for (an average of 23% of GDP)- IMF.).

Transition or Steady State?

There is an assumption that Angola is in transition and that its current dysfunctionality will change. Conversely we can see the ‘politics of disorder’ as a functional ‘steady state’ for the Angolan elite. It holds a number of cards, despite dependence on conditionalities such as high oil prices and ability to attract concessional oil-backed loans such as from Standard Bank and $2billion from the Chinese Eximbank in 2005 (As part of the loan agreement, the Chinese are repairing infrastructure but in an opaque non-competitive deal with only 30% of the work going to local (elite-linked) firms.).

Africa's second largest producer is one of its fastest growing economies with some of its poorest people (Revista Energia’, a publication that monitors the country's energy sector, puts yearly government oil revenues at between US $4 billion and $5 billion). In 2005 oil production was 1.3 million barrels a day set to increase to two million by 2008. Much of this estimated $6.88 billion revenue goes to a small number of wealthy Angolans with little reaching citizens (Nearly all of Angola's production is offshore and for every million invested in the industry, only $100,000 is spent onshore.). The government budgeted for 16% growth although the IMF paper projected annual growth at 18% a year over 2005-2007 [1].

The country had a UNDP Human Development Index of 0.445 – making it 160 of 177. There was neither formal agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2005 or the much-heralded donors’ conference. Donors appeared reluctant to commit to a poor country with a rich elite in relation to a conference or humanitarian appeals.

Angola is also the 4th or 5th largest diamond producer - like oil, an enclave sector with little regulation or accountability, where forced labour, ill-treatment and disappearances were common. Production was expected to raise around $900 million despite continued smuggling (Despite expulsions of 127,000 foreign nationals involved in the illegal diamond trade between April 2004 and February 2005 – accompanied by allegations of brutality).

Like many oil-producing countries. Angola sees the paradox between exploitation of oil, gas and minerals and high rates of poverty indicators of child malnutrition, low health care spending, low school enrolment rates and poor adult literacy (and war). Over one million Angolan people remained dependent on food aid, and one child died every three minutes of preventable causes – 480 per day.

The effect of oil wealth (‘Dutch disease’) is to cause economic contraction and inflation through high local prices, expensive exchange rates and depressed levels of manufacturing in other sectors plus lack of national accountability, especially with increased world demand, tightening supply and in 2005 continued high prices. The underlying problem is the ‘resource curse’ of oil-based economic enclaves with greater external than internal linkages, meaning a lack of reciprocity between domestic rulers and ruled in all spheres – ‘a state without citizens’ or certainly state-citizen reciprocity [2]. The industry employs only 10,000, although accounting for 90% of exports and 80% of tax revenues. Necessary economic diversification is complicated because it is uncertain the elite wants diversification given its control over import and export and reluctance to allow an unfettered free market.

There have been changes. Transparency has improved in revenue if not expenditure through publication of an oil diagnostic undertaken by outside consultants KPMG and moves towards declaration of signature bonus payments. Although allegations of corruption persist, with high-ranking government officials implicated in private business deals related to their public office, there were successful prosecutions of senior officials in 2003-2004. In July 2004 Angola signed up to the African Union’s Peer Review Mechanism – although it is far from meeting its conditions.

Angola then faces the task of moving from a state of non-war to a ‘Civil / Social Peace’. But despite GDP growth, a current account surplus, and the lowest inflation rate ever [3], transition would have to be from a fragmented national economy with a history of financial embezzlement and misappropriation of funds, a lack of international confidence and donor coordination, poor administrative capacity, a large child population at risk from disease, and largely weak opposition and civil society. If a genuine transition it would mean ending corruption, tackling poverty, allowing the development of a genuinely independent private sector, creating an open and transparent tendering process, transforming the political system into a pluralist democracy. Civil society also calls for action on disarming the armed civilian Angolans (an estimated one third of the population but not a government priority), clearing (the unknown numbers of) landmines, and addressing the exclusion of the poor and marginalised, especially women. A widely owned electoral process would legitimise the institutions of government, debatedly without it since 1996, and lead to a constitution guaranteeing citizens' rights.

But there are a number of reasons why the government can ignore these problems whilst maintaining its own stability and security. Renewal of war is highly unlikely whereas continued high oil prices and fields for development and oil-backed loans look set to continue. The latter are not as cheap as multilateral funding, but are more government controllable. Continued Middle East instability combined with US (disputed) hegemony over the Gulf of Guinea/ the ‘American Lake’ means that Washington is looking to increased African oil, expecting it to provide 25% of its supplies. The increasing market share for Angolan oil going to the USA and other states means national and international security considerations precede transparency or human rights questions.

Angola is a strong security state under few internal or regional threats. Cooption, division and occasional repression work well to negate any possible internal threats. The Angolan elite remain largely immune to what international pressure there is for good governance - directed more towards questions of transparency, and a secure climate for foreign investment (FDI) rather than democracy and poverty alleviation. The West wants to engage with a booming economy, keen to compete with China’s lion’s share of contracts for infrastructural (re)construction.

The continuing geo-petroleo-strategic interest of the USA in the Gulf of Guinea and Angola in particular as alternative sources of supply to the Middle East was shown in continued good relations. The country gained a growing share of the US market (although oil exports to China overtook those to the USA) and the latter continues as Angola’s chief trading partner, political patron and major aid donor and gives it on rather inconsistent grounds preferential African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) treatment. Relations improved with Bern after the resolution of ‘Falconegate [4]’ whereby the Swiss released $17m for humanitarian purposes of frozen Angolan funds [5].

This lack of international pressure is against the background of declining world oil production now over the ‘Bell curve’. Regionally, excluding Zimbabwe and (parts of) the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the region has been stabilised - in part by previous Angolan interventions to destroy UNITA bases. Angola is able to use the rhetoric of sovereignty and anti-imperialism which resonates well in the southern African region, despite the more partial AU view of sovereignty as opposed to the absolutist OAU version.

Luanda alleges negotiations are taking place on ending the Cabindan separatist conflict - distinct from though entangled with the civil war. Cabinda enclave from where oil wealth derives has separatist factions fighting for independence. Cabindan human rights organisation Mpalabanda Cabinda Civic Association (MACC) says although it received a document from the government in February 2006 on ‘greater autonomy’ for the enclave, it has heard little since of any negotiations. If Cabinda can be stabilised, Angola’s rulers can open up human rights a little especially in the coastal region/ Luanda without endangering control.

Additionally, rather than seeing forthcoming elections whenever they are as an opportunity, the population being only too aware of what happened in 1992, seems as much fearful or apathetic.

The governing MPLA can pay off and play off other parties [6]. Whilst there are factions, the president runs a parallel state and seems in control as with his reversal of not standing as its presidential candidate. Through government reshuffles he negates existing and potential opponents such as the chief of external intelligence agency General Fernando Miala (who paid the price for becoming too popular).

UNITA formally reconciled its three factions after 2002, but leader Isaias Samakuva is under threat for operating a patronage system and expelling possible leadership challengers. Other parties seem more concerned with ‘getting their snouts in the trough’ rather than representing distinct interests and policies.

Political disorder and its uses

Angola is an example of the use of ‘disorder as a political instrument’ where non-transparency, non-accountable authority, and a weak legal framework provide dynamics for elite accumulation. Historically there has been a ‘Bermuda triangle’ of resource flows between Presidency, Sonangol and the national bank, bypassing formal organs such as the Ministry of Finance (although the latter is gaining greater control). As well as vast corruption in the past detailed by many reports including from the IMF, Global Witness and Human Rights Watch etc, practices continue as shown in the reports from Brazil alleging illegal financial dealings linking the Angola Minister of Finance, and the Governor of the Central Bank [7].

Sogge notes that the domestic Angolan political economy “cannot be separated from the external constituencies, chiefly the global oil and banking industries, and strongly favourable diplomatic and military currents driven by Western (especially US) strategic interests.” [8] In this sense Angola’s problems of domestic governance “are at the same time problems of global governance” in which the constrained forms of global citizenship “practised by institutions offshore set limits to citizenship for ordinary Angolans onshore”.

Elections – paths to democracy or ensuring the right result?

Elections have been promised and not held since the end of the war in 2002. The parliamentary and presidential elections announced unconvincingly in 2005 for September 2006 and 2007 respectively are now postponed until there are infrastructural improvements – for which the government would gain electoral advantage and increased control over the process.

Civil society - small, autonomous but with some resistance

A third of Angola’s population live in atomised musseques (shantytowns), with little spontaneous collective action to solve common problems. Despite little alternative leadership and vision, there have recently been protests over forced removals in some neighbourhoods in Luanda, leading to the arrest of SOS-Habitat coordinator Luis Araujo and others. Change due to citizen pressure has been limited by the absence of public systems and institutions – part of the general disorder that has served elites well for many years. There has been civil society questioning the continuation of José Eduardo dos Santos as President, transparency and corruption in government, the land law and the new constitution, the DDR process, police and military impunity, freedom of expression and political action, and Cabinda.

International activism has raised issues and set agendas in corporate behaviour such as the ‘Publish What You Pay’ campaign on transparency of payments by oil companies.

There has been talk of freeing up government control of the media and willingness to address the low rate of HIV/AIDS and associated vulnerabilities despite difficulties in access to rural areas.

Despite low population density land is scarce, with an estimated four million people relying on subsistence agriculture for survival as the only source of family income. Land tenure and use are flashpoints for disputes with large-scale population return to rural areas. In the ideological shifts of the early 1990s, a huge privatisation programme saw an elite land grab at the expense of small peasants. There is potential for conflict between customary law and state land law with the former discriminating against women.

Although the 2005 land reform law allowed communities to access and legally register their land - leading to hopes of greater security for and improvement in Angola's agricultural production - it is doubted it will eliminate conflict.

Women – the burdens of war become those of peace

Women suffered enormously during the war both through the direct effects of violent conflict and the indirect effect of poverty on families and communities. 80% of IDPs were women and children, suffering high levels of mortality, malnutrition, illiteracy, poverty and HIV/AIDS and lack of access to health, information, education and water – and decision-making. Current government crack downs on informal commercial activity increase poverty levels amongst poor urban women with a knock on effect on domestic violence against women.

Enter the IMF – or not?

Angola has applied for an IMF programme to restructure its debt [9], but not for new loans given the ‘tiny amounts’ compared to Chinese and other loans. A syndicate of European banks led by French bank Calyon are organising a $2.25 billion [10] oil-backed loan to Sonangol to refinance existing debt and $800 million in new money for undisclosed use, with the Chinese buying the oil. Finance Minister Jose Pedro de Morais said endless failed talks with the IMF were due to its not having an accumulated knowledge of Angolan economics – interpreted locally as being unwilling to understand elite needs.

Conclusion

The ruling MPLA has for many years with justification been able to blame the war for its repressive and unaccountable policies. Subsequently it has been able to point to the need to move from a war economy and polity into transition. But we do not have to believe the rhetoric over transition and its difficulties if we consider Angola as is in a ‘steady state’ with economic and political policies marked heavily by the structures established by war and from command economy and state. It is able to use its oil wealth for elite accumulation and for overcoming resistance to its rule. Clientilism has largely replaced more repressive measures. As its oil wealth and ultra deep oil exploration possibilities increase it is increasingly able to ride out any international disquiet over its policies – accessing available if expensive oil-backed loans and able to put resources where it wishes. There are some constraints in the present and future - such as wanting to present itself as not so corrupt to attract FDI, a desire to deal with its debts and its dependence on the maintenance of high oil prices – but not sufficiently to disturb the equanimity of the elite and its accumulation strategy. Any opposition can be marginalised, bought off or in the last resort got rid off.

Despite rhetoric on increased transparency, accountability and democratisation little has yet been accomplished to overcome the gap between ruler and ruled. Apart from some NGOs it seems there is little help they can expect in terms of support or pressure from the international community. As well as the increased autonomy for the elite with high oil prices and vulnerable supply, there are significant shifts in international and regional alliances in the face of the ‘Chinese threat’ and the war against terror.

* Dr. Steve Kibble is Advocacy Coordinator for Africa/Yemen, Progressio

* This is a revised version of a talk to the Africa Business Group at SOAS, 16 March 2006, and based on a chapter on Angola for Africa Yearbook 2005 to be published by Brill on behalf of Africa Institute in Hamburg, Afrikacentrum, Leiden and Nordic Afrika Instituut Uppsala. A longer version has been commissioned by the Review of African Political Economy for publication later in 2006. Visit for more information.

* Please send comments to [email protected]

References:

[1] IMF, 2005, Staff Report for the 2004 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 05/228, Washington DC: IMF July.

[2] Thanks to David Sogge (personal communication) for this insight.

[3] In January 2006, the National Statistics Institute estimated it as averaging 18.5% over the year whilst the EIU country report thought 23.4% more likely (EIU Angola Country Report December 2005 p.11).

[4] French businessman Pierre Falcone was suspected of embezzling funds flowing from the restructuring of Angola's debt to Russia.

[5] although $37 million held in a Luxemburg-based bank account owned by a Panama-based company called Camparal, which belongs to Dos Santos allegedly vanished into tax havens

[6] Over 150 political parties continued to exist, many with identical platforms, undemocratic internal practices and with little parliamentary initiative, coalitions between opposition forces or promulgation of alternative policies or monitoring of government policies. A recent law on political parties allows government funding of parties not represented in the National Assembly during the election period (Diário da República 1.7.05).

[7] Over 150 political parties continued to exist, many with identical platforms, undemocratic internal practices and with little parliamentary initiative, coalitions between opposition forces or promulgation of alternative policies or monitoring of government policies. A recent law on political parties allows government funding of parties not represented in the National Assembly during the election period (Diário da República 1.7.05).

[8] Sogge personal communication.

[9] With estimated external debts of $10 billion Angola wants IMF approval of its would-be home-grown programme through a Policy Support Instrument (PSI) to tackle its $1.5 - $1.8 billion Paris Club debt and provide a seal of approval for creditors wanting assurances before discussing debt rescheduling.

[10] According to Global Witness, although the French press says over $3 billion.

In the countdown to the World Social Forum due to be held in Nairobi in January 2007, Mouhamadou Tidiane Kasse analyses the trajectory of the social forum movement in Africa and warns that a lot of work remains to be done if the transformative potential of the movement is to be optimised. “By taking the torch from Bamako in January, the Kenyan social movement and the secretariat of the WSF find themselves faced with a lot of work, at the level of the structuring of the social movement in Africa, to raise awareness and popular mobilisation within the country itself, and to consolidate the dynamic of regional solidarity,” he writes.

When Africans first participated in the World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Alegre, they were only about thirty people, drowned by tens of thousands of others. At the meeting in Mumbai in 2004, their delegation was bigger, but they still comprised no more than 500 people in a sea of anti-globalisation protesters which exceeded 100,000. Their lack of presence was almost laughable.

Africa’s voice was nonetheless heard at the International Council of the WSF, when it was raised to lay claim to the big-tent anti-globalisation event for Africa. Despite the scepticism of some people, even amongst the African delegates themselves, that Africa could welcome such a popular mobilisation on the continent, and could host an event of freedom where so many freedoms are abused, the request was granted. Holding the WSF in Africa will become a reality in 2007, and it will fall on Kenya to host it. But behind the enthusiasm, the challenges facing the Africans are numerous.

When the Indian Social Forum took place in Mumbai, the aim was to de-localise an event associated with Porto Alegre, and to enhance its popular dimensions, thematic richness and excellent organisation. Moreover, on the Asian continent, there were particular concerns at stake within the framework of structural global inequalities. In Asia, the imbalances are not only vertical between the South and North. They are also horizontal and endogenous, and cut across the societies of the Southern countries: the issue of the Indian caste system characterised the Mumbai forum.

The successes of India strengthened Africa’s wish to host the big anti-globalisation event. This was despite some doubts about the suitability of its political environment to host the iconoclastic and critical debates, about the continent’s capacity to host and organise an event for tens of thousands of people, and to ensure real, mass mobilisation.

Until the polycentric World Social Forum in Bamako in January 2006, meetings of African social movements had never been anything but quasi-confidential conclaves. The African Social Forum in Lusaka in December 2004 failed to attract more than 1000 people to the Mulungushi International Conference Center, which resounded with a despairing emptiness. Barely 50 people participated in the march on the streets of Lusaka, and in any case, a ban on demonstrations would have aborted the skeleton procession, which only made it as far as 500 metres from conference centre.

The first west-African social forum in Conakry in November 2004, which attracted about 2000 people, gave a glimpse of the kind of local mobilisation that is possible. But the ensuing events have not exceeded this level of participation, and the popular voice remains restrained. That the events have no roots in the majority populations is evident. Nowhere, with the exception of the last WSF in Bamako, which claimed some 30,000 participants, has the event been strongly linked to the local agenda. It is as if there is a disjuncture between the ferment of opposition and the daily lives of ordinary people.

The African social movements still lack visibility even though the pertinence of the ideas and causes they embrace are in keeping with the urgent matters confronting Africa in the construction of a better world. There have been delays in implementing mechanisms which would allow this dynamic to reach through to the roots of society, and create a genuinely popular movement. From one meeting to another, the debates struggle to escape from the circles of those in the know. Panel discussions are essentially bringing together the same people, going over the same old ideas, and struggling to find an anchorage in people’s realities. The structure of the organisation probably also needs to be challenged, and their chief instigators could do with being reconsidered.

Getting it off the ground

Said Saadi, a member of the Moroccan social forum, stated at the African social forum in Lusaka: “After three meetings, we are at a turning point. The forum must be strengthened by opening it up to all the other groups, which are fighting on the ground. What about the trade unions for example?...We must avoid looking like a group of NGOs, which are keen on travelling but do little real work at grassroots level. The forum must position itself to redress the balance, and outline an opposition agenda with a precise timeframe.” In the same tempo, Abdourame Ousmane from Niger remarked: “It is time to develop alternatives that take account of the aspirations of the populations at the bottom of society, that will be legitimised by nature of their democratic anchorage.”

The social forum evidently remains a space where participation is not predetermined. It is not about groupings that anyone is looking to engineer, rather is organised in such a way that ideas ferment reciprocally and experiences inspire change elsewhere. But certain tendencies are favoured. There will not be real change unless there are veritable actors at the centre of the processes. Whatever the merits of the unions and the rural movements, there is a virtual absence of organised social movements in Africa at present. The themes discussed in the panels and workshops are omnipresent, discussions about the future – ‘a different world is possible’ ¬– are shaped from the perspectives of ordinary people, and yet their own dynamic does not let itself be felt.

The question of the unions in Africa in relation to globalisation was usefully analysed at the Conakry meeting in 2004 in terms of the necessity for their re-orientation. First of all, solidarity is an imperative. When the multinationals set out to blackmail the workers, there is no better defence than union solidarity. How can this be achieved? There must be a fusion of the groups of affiliated unions at both national and global levels. In this respect, the Anglophone countries are further on. COSATU in South Africa is a good example. The second stage involves the promotion of international norms: International agreements, treaties, UN institutions, the World Bank and the IMF must integrate union liberties that symbolise the social dimension of development politics.

The final stage of mobilising the unions in the struggle for ‘another world is possible’ involves the ‘enlargement of the mandate of the union movement’. This change must take effect in several stages. It requires the mobilisation of supporters, sourcing of funding, the democratisation of the union movement, and the construction of partnerships with governments and multinationals. But the union representation in Conakry was not sufficiently consistent to institute a real debate on this ‘road map’.

For the five years that the African social movement has been aligned with the anti-globalisation movement, it has still not identified the motor to get itself off the ground. The key actors for change and the path of ‘liberation’ has been identified, but the forces yet to be unleashed remain marginal to the event.

Can the ‘Women’s Court’ for example, launched in Lusaka in 2004, and again in Bamako in 2006, push for the mobilisation to change the situation of women, moving beyond the mere habitual condemnations of violence and the denial of all sorts of rights, which through being churned out again and again, risk becoming clichés? Will the ‘youth forum’ be a space for the raising of awareness where the identity of the future can be constructed around values which break with the discredited politics of the day? The discourse often betrays a willingness, but the means of bringing about change are neither clearly identified nor widely-embraced.

Paving the way for the younger generation

At the centre of the youth element of the African Social Forum in Conakry, the Ivorian Ouattara Diakala expressed the problem thus: “Young people are out of touch…with the objectives of the WSF. The struggle against neo-liberalism for example - what does that mean to them? What are the ins and outs of it? When someone does not understand a given situation, it is difficult for them to engage. We are going to have a find mechanisms for supporting mass youth participation in these discussions, to generate more activities in which young people can get involved locally.”

At the 2006 forum in Bamako, the rallying cry to pave the way for the young people was around Thomas Sankara, a symbol of protest, defined as an anti-globalisation pacesetter – in word and in deed – ahead of his time. But a representative from an NGO in Burkina Faso remained unconvinced about the impact of this strategy: “Sankara lived what he lived, but the important thing is what he did. He had a strong instinct of what had to be done, and this is what young people today must imitate. Today’s youth strikes me as being more ideological than pragmatic. They need to flesh out their talk with work.”

The secretariat of the WSF is conscious of the importance of the Nairobi forum for the structuring of the movement in Africa. The choice of Kenya from amongst several other candidatures, more-or-less the officially advanced countries such as Morocco, was decided on the basis of criteria drawn up and approved at the World Social Forum held in March 2005. These imply, that at the level of the host country, there is the opportunity for the freedom of expression of opinions, including through public marches and demonstrations, publications, radio and TV broadcasts, and contact between the local populations and the organisers from abroad; and for the possibility of ‘mass social mobilisation’. To ensure the forum achieves an impact, the application must issue from the mainstream social movements of the candidate country, and the sub-region. At the same time, the social movement of the candidate country must prove a certain level of organisation and dynamism, as well as the capacity to mobilise the population around national, continental and international issues.

By taking the torch from Bamako in January, the Kenyan social movement and the secretariat of the WSF find themselves faced with a lot of work, at the level of the structuring of the social movement in Africa, to raise awareness and popular mobilisation within the country itself, and to consolidate the dynamic of regional solidarity.

From Bamako to Nairobi, one trend is to favour ‘linkages’, to give a reality, indeed an identity, to the African social movement. The aim is to construct a continental solidarity which goes beyond the linguistic divisions and sub-regional groupings which have thus far marked the evolution of the WSF through its polemics and internal conflicts.

Bamako also identified a trajectory: “Beyond all political, cultural, economic, and social resistance at the basis of anti-globalisation, one of the challenges in Nairobi will be to resume the process of establishing a Charter of unity, for the people and future of Africa, the foundations of which were laid sixteen years ago in Arusha. Between now and then, there must be a process of consultation throughout society and within social movements, so as to achieve a meeting of ideas, consensus, and an affirmative assembly in Nairobi in 2007.”

* Mouhamadou Tidiane Kasse is Coordinator of Flamme d’Afrique, a daily newspaper published by IPAO and ENDA on occasions of meetings of social movements.

* This article was translated from French by Stephanie Kitchen. It was originally published in the French version of Pambazuka News, Please send comments to [email protected]

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COMMENT AND ANALYSIS: When it comes to the 2007 WSF in Nairobi, the hour has come to leave the beaten track, says Mouhamadou Tidiane Kasse
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Read the Pambazuka News French edition by visiting Subscribe online at http://www.pambazuka.org/fr/subscribe.php or send an email to [email][email protected] with 'subscribe French edition' in the subject line. Please forward widely!

I praise the courage of these women who gathered in J'bourg and came up with such insight (See As all women in her condition, Khwezi needs the protection of the law. If the police in South Africa have failed to protect her against the threats and intimidation, the court is in a good position to order the police to do so. In order not to send a wrong signal to the other women in similar situation, the time to act is now.

We should not fail to understand that the fear of intimidation, threat and rejection has kept many victims of sexual violence from speaking out against the violators of such inhuman acts. Thus, the few who dare to speak out, do so because they want to help put a stop to such acts. These persons should be praised and protected by the institutions that are charged with such powers of protecting the citizens.

Khwezi should be saluted for her courage.

Activists renewed calls for official recognition of Islamist opposition group the Muslim Brotherhood after dozens of the banned-but-tolerated party’s members were arrested in recent weeks. “We call for the government to recognise the Muslim Brotherhood as a legitimate political party,” said Nigad al-Borai, director of the Cairo-based Group for Democratic Development. “Only then will political disputes between the government and the brotherhood be resolved legally.”

At the end of two months in office, Liberia’s peacetime government has released a five-month development agenda to get the country’s post-war reconstruction rolling. The agenda entitled “First 150 Days Action Plan: A working document for a new Liberia” commits President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s government to a host of goals from economic reforms to humanitarian initiatives before the end of June.

Voters in the Comoros went to the polls on Sunday to select final-round candidates in the race to become President of the Union, but the constitutional court - the highest electoral body - could still determine the outcome. The ballot is aimed at breaking the cycle of coups and political strife that has plagued the three islands in the Comoros group since they won independence from France in 1975.