The United States will not seek to close a free trade agreement with Egypt this year because the "timing" is not right, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said before a trip to Middle East that includes a first stop in Egypt. It was widely believed Washington, which had planned to reach the agreement with the government of President Hosni Mubarak by year’s end, had switched course after what it saw as backsliding on Egyptian promises to reform its political system. There was widespread police-inspired violence during parliamentary elections late last year as the government openly sought to block opposition voters from reaching the polls. Nearly a dozen people were killed in the election violence. Rice, however, denied the trade pact was being withheld to penalize the Egyptian government.

Ungana-Afrika is developing a replicable concept for ICT student development programs that involve ICT students to provide capacity building and technology support for civil society organisations, SMEs and smaller public sector offices. Visit their webpage for more details.

A Nigerian court has ordered oil giant Shell and its partners to pay $1.5bn to the Ijaw people of the Delta region. The Ijaw have been fighting since 2000 for compensation for environmental degradation in the oil-rich region. They took the case to court after Shell refused to make the payment ordered by Nigeria's parliament.

Cameroon has detained three former senior officials and 13 others on corruption charges, a week after the International Monetary Fund warned that graft remained an obstacle to debt relief. "Judicial cases have been opened against a number of officials accused of embezzlement, corruption, forgery and use of forgeries," Deputy Prime Minister Ahmadou Ali, in charge of Justice, said in a statement late on Tuesday. The communique did not name those detained but sources at the state prosecutor's office said the three senior officials included the former general managers of Cameroon's state real estate company (SIC) and the state land loan fund (CFC).

There are many similarities between the Ugandan political situation and that of Zimbabwe. While Uganda did not have political parties from the post Idi Amin era, Zimbabwe has had a dictator in President Robert Mugabe.

The Congo crisis of 1998 was a political situation which benefited the Uganda army as well as the Zimbabwe army in addition to all top officials in these countries. The visit in Congo was not nationalistic at all but very selfish, causing clashes between African states

Considering that after the first shock at the coming back of Besigye from exile and his announcement of the formation of the opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), Museveni launched a militia to suppress the strength of opposition, a replica of what Mugabe did in 2000.

Zimbabwe has gone through the militia era but not through a military coup era as yet and I do not see many of us longing or wishing for any such experience anyway.

The difference between Uganda's passage to freedom and that of Zimbabwe is that Uganda has a rich background of very able leadership, unlike Zimbabwe which was born and is dying under the pillage of a dictator of the magnitude of Idi Amin. Ugandans need to be praised for sustaining a fight for democracy. Besegye like many other heroes of liberation should be encouraged to fight on and set a better face of Uganda. Similarly, Morgan Tsvangiarai has to be given exhortation to carry on.

The article "From Salman Rush-to-Die to the Danish Cartoons", Pamabazuka 2006-02-16, by Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem, refers.

The author has marred his point of view with lots of "ifs" and "buts" to an extent the confused reader starts wondering which of the two opposing camps the writer really supports – the extremists or the moderates. On the other hand, it is unreasonable to expect a totally peaceful demonstration out of 1.4 billion angry Muslims worldwide.

Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem got too philosophical on an otherwise simple and straightforward case of people outraged by the publication of what they regard blasphemous stuff. His reference to Salman Rushdie, Khomeini's Fatwa and Bradford clerics is somewhat irrelevant here, though his style will please those Muslims who strive to be in the good books of the West. Judging from his name I take that the author is a Muslim. I sincerely hope he is not one of those "Muslim Liberals" who antidote their "Islamic Stigma" with atheism so as to become acceptable to the Anti-Islamic West. It is always "Islam and the West" and not "Islam and Christianity" simply because there is little of Christianity left in that part of the World.

Last week, the South African defence minister Mosiuoa Lekota took final delivery of the SAS Amatola, a R1,5-billion, 36 000 ton, 121 metre long warship complete with biological and chemical defense mechanisms, automated damage control and armour protection. The state-of-the-art Amatola is the first of four corvettes to be fully completed and is currently docked at the military harbour in the picturesque naval town of Simon’s Town near Cape Town.

The mountain peaks above Simon’s Town provide the best view of the four warships moored in the harbour below and while this may seem like an odd place to begin a discussion about South Africa’s March 1 local government elections, the ships speak to a number of issues that are relevant to the vote for 9 000 councilors in 284 South African city, town and district councils.

Amidst much criticism that the money could have been better spent on services delivery, the purchase of the corvettes formed part of a multi-billion rand arms deal which also included a shopping list of 30 helicopters, 24 Hawk fighter trainers and 28 Gripen light fighter aircraft. It was with the corvettes that the controversy over the arms deal started, with contractor Richard Young alleging a conflict of interest involving the government's former acquisitions chief, "Chippy" Shaik. Schabir Shaik, brother of “Chippy”, was a shareholder in the Thomson Group and African Defence Systems, which were awarded the contract to provide combat technology for the four corvettes. Schabir Shaik was found guilty in 2005 on two charges of corruption and one of fraud, and sentenced to an effective 15 years' imprisonment. His appeal will be heard later this year. But it was Judge Hilary Squire’s assertion in that case that Shaik had enjoyed a “generally corrupt” relationship with former deputy president Jacob Zuma that rocked politics in South Africa to its foundations.

As a result of the outcome of the Shaik trial, Zuma was fired by president Thabo Mbeki and now faces court later in the year on corruption charges. The charges have been characterized by Zuma’s camp as an attempt to eliminate him from the race for the presidency in 2009 elections. Zuma also faces a March trial in connection with the alleged rape of a 31-year old Aids activist. The events have pitted factions in support of Zuma against those of Mbeki and further strained the relationship between the ANC and its alliance partners, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP).

So when you’re looking down on the four corvettes in Simon’s Town harbour its impossible to divorce them from South Africa’s wider political reality. There’s no doubt that the arms deal has been part of a defining period that will resonate far into the future. For this reason, local government elections, taking place in an atmosphere of heightened national political tension, seem far more significant this time around than when they were last held in 2000.

Simon’s Town and the resident corvettes are linked to the rest of South Africa in other ways. The town forms part of a string of coastal villages along the False Bay coast that since 2000 have seen a doubling and in some cases even a trebling of property prices. The coastal enclaves that hug the mountains have become the home of a mix of foreign property owners, old and new money, all attracted by the beauty of the False Bay coast and the massive returns offered by a lucrative property portfolio.

Yet alongside this boom are communities that the wealth windfall has bypassed completely. Just over the hill from Simon’s Town harbour is the shack settlement of Red Hill, where high unemployment rates, poor housing and lack of services are common problems. A few valleys and mountains from Red Hill is Ocean View, where the apartheid government dumped the original inhabitants of places like Simon’s Town under its forced removals policy and where unemployment, gangsterism and drugs are rife. And a few kilometers from Ocean View is Masiphumelele, where unemployment and lack of housing are common problems.

These communities, segregated by high walls, electric fences and an enormous privatized security industry from properties literally next door to them that sell for millions of rands, mirror the broader South African picture that shows a widening gap between rich and poor, a gap already large as a result of apartheid but compounded by market friendly economic policies which have favoured those who are able to access resources.

It’s in communities like Ocean View and Masiphumelele where a new flank has opened up in the South African political story. In May last year, Ocean View erupted in protest over housing shortages and poor services. Protests in Masiphumelele over education led to clashes with the police. These small, localized protests have sprung up in towns across South Africa, peaking across the country in a 2005 “winter of discontent” and simmering ever since. Although the causes of these protests have been diverse and sometimes rooted in local politics, a common characteristic has been that they have all included an element of protest against a lack of government delivery in the area of housing, electricity, water or sanitation.

As the local government elections near, the media has sometimes used these protests as evidence that the ANC is going to be punished at the polls through low voter turn out, even if victory is assured (Only 48% turned out in 2000). This may still turn out to be the case in some areas, but there are also indications that the equation might not be so simple. A recent ACNielsen survey, for example, shows that support for the ANC does not dissipate in correlation with support of protests. Factors such as loyalty to the ANC exists together with support of protest.

This suggests that the protests could oddly assist the ANC, something a recent Markinor poll published by the Sunday Times newspaper pointed out. Protests had raised awareness in some municipalities and would increase voter turn out. In this sense the protests could assist the ANC not only by getting voters to the polls, but by pressurizing councilors to get on with the job of delivering services. This line of argument, however, only holds for so long as the ANC can maintain some kind of control over the protests. Arguably, events of the last week, where Lekota, a senior ANC figure and defence minister, was chased out of the town of Khutsong and prevented from addressing a rally, is not an example that the ANC leadership in Pretoria would want to encourage.

But what these community actions have done is to raise the profile of issues of delivery at the local government level, even though the voices of those protesting seem to have been sidelined from the mainstream political debate, characterized by reports which show the protestors as violent even when the police fired on them first, or by a lack of voices articulating the concerns of communities beyond the initial sound bites in media coverage of protest action.

Why has there been an apparent short out at local government level? The reasons advanced are many. Massive apartheid era backlogs at local government level meant that the process of service delivery started out on the back foot. The ANC top guard, typified by President Thabo Mbeki’s remote style of leadership and centralization of power, has detached itself from the hurly burly of service delivery. Bruising battles within the ANC for control of the organisation have detracted attention from grassroots delivery. Local councilors, faced with massive backlogs and little capacity, have simply buckled under the pressure. Widespread corruption based on power and patronage has permeated the local government level. The Growth Economic and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, the unilaterally adopted market-focused growth path adopted by the ANC in 1996, limited the amount of money that could be invested in social development projects, boosting the rich to be even richer, but leaving the poor behind.

Which ever or all of those reasons you choose it’s clear that the ANC has an ever-increasing workload if it is to meet its service delivery commitments. As long as this situation is allowed to continue, the pressure from below is likely to increase rather than decrease, no matter what the result of voting next week.

* Patrick Burnett is online news editor, Pambazuka News

* Please send comments to [email protected]

The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Working Group has released an initial study of the performance and impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in that country. The objective of the study is to open up debate that will lead to an independent evaluation of the performance and impact of the TRC in Sierra Leone. Key issues that the report addresses includes the role of the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva, the appointment and role of Commissioners, the issue of local ownership and participation and the role of International NGOs.

It is now over 15 months since the presentation on 5 October 2004 of the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to the President of Sierra Leone at a well-attended ceremony in Freetown. The presentation should have ushered in the ‘follow-up phase’ to the work of the TRC. Yet at the time of writing, the work of implementing its recommendations is not even close to beginning. First, there was a long delay in making the report of the TRC available to Sierra Leoneans. Copies of the report only arrived in August 2005. In the previous month, the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) published a White Paper in response to the report that was widely regarded as weak and inadequate. All this prompted many Sierra Leoneans to fear that the TRC process had fatally lost momentum.

In recent months, there has been progress. Following private interventions by the Commissioners of the TRC and civil society campaigning, there was a parliamentary debate on the TRC report in November 2005 and a Bill has been laid before the legislature which contains many of the key recommendations in the report.

This bumpy start to the ‘follow-up phase’ is only the latest of many difficult moments for the TRC. It has been a deeply flawed and problematic process from its birth in 1999, when the peace agreement was signed. The TRC aimed to help heal divisions caused by 10 years of brutal civil war. Tens of thousands of people were killed, maimed or tortured during the conflict - most by rebels of the Revolutionary United Front.

Although the story of the TRC process is not yet over, the Sierra Leone Working Group on Truth and Reconciliation (WG) has undertaken an initial assessment, based on over 30 interviews and meetings between April and August 2005 with Sierra Leonean and international stakeholders, of the performance and impact of the TRC – this with a view to identifying what lessons can be learnt for future transitional justice initiatives elsewhere and developing recommendations for action that will help ensure that the ‘follow-up phase’ in Sierra Leone is credible and effective.

We hope that this report will be seen as a constructive early contribution to what should be a much wider and deeper debate in Sierra Leone and internationally. The WG believes that an independent evaluation of the TRC should be jointly commissioned by all stakeholders to the process during 2006, with a commitment to publishing its conclusions and recommendations promptly and in full. This should include a systematic sampling of public views through focus group work. The importance of getting down to community level cannot be overstated. The sampling would also be an opportunity to discover public views about the Special Court, which ran concurrently with the TRC (We asked David Crane, the then Prosecutor of the Special Court, if it had undertaken any surveys recently of how Sierra Leoneans viewed the Court. He responded that the Court was “not in the popularity business”. However, earlier he had described the Court as “for and about the people of Sierra Leone”.)

It is particularly important that Sierra Leonean voices are heard at the international level, where criteria for assessing the successes and failures of the Sierra Leonean ‘experiment’ may be different from those locally and where different agendas may shape the conclusions reached. People have a right to know the truth about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

With regard to the ‘follow-up phase’, we are aware that the historical record elsewhere is not encouraging. Few TRCs have been characterized by effective follow-up. Even in the South African case, there is widespread disaffection on the part of victims’ support groups about the response of the Government to the recommendations of the TRC report, not least in the sphere of reparations. If there is not a credible and effective ‘follow-up phase’, many Sierra Leoneans will legitimately ask whether the TRC was ever more than an expensive ‘talking shop’.

Our study has identified a series of key issues in relation to which important lessons should be learnt regarding the TRC process in Sierra Leone.

Firstly, when the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) agreed in 1999 to play the leading role in organising and overseeing the implementation of the TRC process, the decision was widely welcomed. Mary Robinson, then High Commissioner, had been a signatory in June 1999 of the ‘Human Rights Manifesto for Sierra Leone’, which endorsed the idea of a TRC. However, based on the interviews we conducted, Sierra Leonean and international stakeholders were generally very disappointed by the performance of the OHCHR. There was a remarkable consensus on this issue amongst interviewees who disagreed on many other issues. The OHCHR was widely seen as having fatally combined an unhealthy obsession with micro-management with an inadequate capacity to undertake a professional oversight role. It was allegedly weak at raising funds and then very slow to release them.

Secondly, the majority of Sierra Leonean and international stakeholders that we interviewed felt that the TRC process had fallen seriously short of what had been hoped for in terms of local ownership and participation. The sensitization exercise during the preparatory phase was widely viewed as deficient. For example, there was a tendency to assume that radio messages would be enough by themselves to alert Sierra Leoneans to the existence of the TRC when what was needed was to work with civil society organizations to ensure that each chiefdom and village was visited and re-visited. Only by these means could public confidence and understanding of the TRC process – and its relationship to the Special Court - have been achieved. While this failure partly reflected lack of funds, it also reflected a reluctance to develop a genuine partnership with local civil society organizations that could have assisted.

Strong views were also expressed about the failure to use traditional reconciliation mechanisms appropriately. Particular anger was directed by some at incidents where such mechanisms were allegedly ‘customized’ to fit the time available before the Commissioners and staff had to move on to their next appointment. In general, many felt that not enough time had been given to the reconciliation aspect of the TRC’s mandate. At other points, ‘western’ models of reconciliation were reportedly employed, such as handshakes or hugs, which had little relevance to the Sierra Leonean context.

Thirdly, a number of Sierra Leonean stakeholders that we interviewed expressed the view that the role of international NGOs in the TRC process was not always as positive as it could have been. Sierra Leoneans have become aware of the international networks that exist in the sphere of transitional justice in the course of the TRC process. The time may have arrived for these international networks to be rendered more transparent and for potential conflicts of interest such as those raised by our experience in Sierra Leone to be addressed. Nobody doubts the need for professional expertise in the sphere of transitional justice; however, experience shows there will be occasions when the perspectives and interests of governments, multilateral agencies and local civil society will diverge.

The Sierra Leoneans we interviewed between April and August 2005 were deeply frustrated by the long delay that had occurred in publishing the final version of the TRC report. So too were many international stakeholders, although some felt that it had been unavoidable because of the poor quality of the report – including the omission of some conclusions and recommendations that had previously been agreed – that was presented to the President in October 2004. Whatever the reasons, between October 2004, when it was presented to the President, and August 2005, when copies of the final report arrived in Freetown, there were reportedly only ten copies of the report in the entire country. Expectations had been raised, only then to be dashed. The former Chairperson of the TRC, Bishop Joseph Humper, claimed that the reason for the long delay was that the report was being re-edited and typographical errors eliminated.

Based on its findings, the Sierra Leone Working Group on Truth on Reconciliation makes the following recommendations to those involved in the designing and implementing of future transitional justice initiatives. They should establish stronger safeguards to prevent political interference in transitional justice processes. They should ensure that international commissioners working for TRCs spend enough time in-country to discharge their roles effectively. They should ensure that local ownership and participation are more strongly reflected in sensitization work, evidence giving/collection and reconciliation initiatives. Finally, they should establish the principle that all transitional justice processes should be subject to independent evaluation and that reports arising should be published promptly and in full. Amongst other recommendations, the Working Group calls on the Government of Sierra Leone to take steps to encourage the dissemination of the final version of the TRC report; undertake a reparations programme that is open, consultative and inclusive, working closely with civil society; support the immediate establishment of an interim follow-up committee comprising all Sierra Leonean stakeholders; and support the establishment of an independent evaluation of the TRC process.

* For a copy of the full report, please contact
- From outside Sierra Leone:
John Caulker, Chairperson of the Working Group via johncaulkerfoc (at) yahoo.com
- From within Sierra Leone:
Mr. John Koroma Jr. Tel 232 76 634465 email: johnkoroma2001 (at) yahoo.com

* Please send comments to [email protected]

It’s make or break time for Ugandans as they go to the polls February 23 following a bitterly fought campaign between long-time president Yoweri Museveni and his rival Kizza Besigye. Onyango Obbo, a columnist with the East African Newspaper, argues that it’s the first time the opposition feel that Museveni can be beaten. These elections, they say, present the last opportunity to choose the democratic option.

Ugandans vote in presidential and parliamentary elections February 23, in make or break polls. It has been the most bitterly fought and personality-attack filled campaign since President Yoweri Museveni came to power in January 1986 at the head of a successful rebellion. It's the first time that the optimists in the opposition feel that Museveni is beatable.

Uganda and Museveni have come a long way. The first presidential election under the new constitution in 1996 was nothing more than a coronation for the president. That Museveni is thought to be vulnerable today is testimony as much to the corrupting impact a long unchallenged rule can have on what started out as an enlightened presidency, and the toll the passage of time takes on even the best champions.

The Museveni government imposed what it called a "no-party" system, but critics said was no different than an old-style African one-party rule. Under the "no-party" system, candidates for presidential and parliamentary office stood on their own "individual" merit, not on political party platform.

Museveni's ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM), on the other hand, could back candidates because, unlike the old political parties, its supporters were understood to be standing on the "individual merit" principle. They would also get campaign contributions from the NRM Secretariat, which was funded by the taxpayer.

This made sure that Museveni won handily. On the other hand, the pro-multiparty opposition were always doomed to be a tiny minority. To some, it was a little too Kafkesque. But the country embraced the no-party idea, and between 1986 and 1996 Museveni enjoyed a level of popularity unparalleled in recent Uganda history.

One of Museveni's successes came from understanding the country's desperate need for normalcy, and tapping into it. The results were dramatic. By the mid-1990s, inflation had been wrestled from the highs of 300 per cent just ten years earlier, to –1 per cent! These were the times of heady growth rates nearing 10 per cent. Museveni became the archetype of the "new breed" of African leader, and Uganda was touted as the continent's "economic success model".

Yet, for all that, in 2001 a doctor and former military officer, Kizza Besigye, gave Museveni a run for his money in the presidential elections. Besigye was the NRM's first chief political ideologue, the National Political Commissar, and then minister of State for Internal Affairs. He left in the early 1990s to take a military command at a barracks in the western part of the country, and little was heard of him. Besigye resurfaced to play a role in the first early crack in the then formidable and united NRM edifice.

In 1994 there were elections to the Constituent Assembly that the NRM swept. The fate of political parties became a big issue in the Assembly. Several NRM supporters, notably the military representatives, argued that the no-party system was a temporary arrangement, and the new constitution should either provide immediately for a return to multiparty politics or adopt a timetable for it. Besigye was an outspoken member of that group. However, Museveni cracked the whip and used the ruling party's majority to adopt the no-party (or Movement) system as the permanent form of politics, which could only be changed by a national referendum.

In order to deal with criticism by the small pro-multiparty delegates that the NRM was creating a one-party dictatorship, some sweeteners were thrown in. Among these was a two five-year term for president. Because at that point Museveni was about to serve out two unelected terms, it was provided that the counting of the two terms began from when the new constitution was enacted.

In any event, the beginning of the tensions between what came to be known as hardliners and moderates or progressives in the NRM, had been born. In addition, events soon demonstrated that the problem with competitive politics in Africa is not so much that it creates divisions, but that the dynamics of elections generally work the same way in most societies. This is because although the NRM banned political parties under the auspices that they create divisions, it proved unable to cure itself of the same maladies. Just as particular ethnic communities and religions come to dominate particular parties in underdeveloped countries with a multiparty system, so do they come to dominate the sole party under a one-party arrangement. Soon, the Museveni regime was being accused of being dominated by politicians from the western region where he came from.

Parts of the country that weren't substantially represented in the NRM felt alienated, none more so than the northern region. In the British colonial division of labour, the north was the reservoir for manual labour and the army. The southwest provided the professional classes and civil servants. Despite gaining some power, the elite from the region became just another addition to the middle class with other Ugandan communities. They set up shop and invested their new wealth in the south – helping only to exacerbate the regional differences.

Museveni's ascendance to power brought a profound crisis for the north. For the first time in Uganda's history, the region neither held military or political power. Without that, it lost all means of negotiating for the political spoils at the centre. It required a great dose of political sensitivity to recognise the crisis that had befallen the region.

That, and the fact that in many parts of the country "northern rule" had become so deeply resented, combined to make for a potentially explosive situation. The eruption came when after Museveni's victory, units of a right wing group called Uganda Freedom Movement that had been absorbed in the National Resistance Army massacred civilians in the north. Feeling threatened, members of the old defeated army, the Uganda National Liberation Army, fled to southern Sudan, regrouped as the Uganda Democratic Army and started a rebellion against the Museveni government.

That conflict was settled through a negotiated settlement in 1988. However, the fact of the rebellion meant that a wider national reconciliation with the north became difficult. It also reinforced most of the rest of the country's view that the northern leaders remained intransigent and unrepentant about the atrocities of "their" past rule.

To complicate matters, a social movement, which saw the 1988 peace agreement as capitulation by a corrupt northern elite, mushroomed. A Prophetess, Alice Lakwena, who preached to her believers that if they smeared themselves with shea oil, the bullets of the government soldiers wouldn't kill them, led it. After Lakwena's defeat, the present Lord's Resistance Army led by her cousin Joseph Kony emerged.

Perhaps without the rebellion in the north, the outcome of Museveni's rule would have been totally different, and today he might well have been enjoying a status near that of South Africa's Nelson Mandela. However, the insurgency and several other smaller ones in the south and west that were quickly snuffed out, meant that Museveni's consolidation of power proceeded with a lot of distraction, and the whiff of illegitimacy from a failure to fully pacify the country.

Today everything is worse off in what was an already economically depressed northern region than in the rest of Uganda. Poverty levels are almost twice as high; HIV infections are double the national average; life expectancy is nearly 10 years less than the rest of the country; and the school enrolment rate is the worst too.

There is a widely held view that such bleak conditions could have been prevented, with a different set of decisions in Kampala. In any event, the war in the north strengthened the hand of the hardliners in the NRM, and when the first adult suffrage elections under Museveni came, the fact that the conflict was still alive meant that politicians could only exploit it. The rebellion in the north was used by Museveni's opponents to argue that the "no party" was a failure. For the NRM, it was a reason why they needed to have a strong showing in the CA - to make a constitution that would ensure that the "backward forces of the past", as they called their rivals, didn't return to torment the country. And so the country went to the polls.

Museveni's NRM won a marvellous victory in the 1994 Constituent Assembly election. Sadly, from then on, the NRM grew addicted to playing the "northern card", because it was the magic formula for winning elections. However, that addiction progressively transformed it into a reactionary organisation, and widened the gulf between the progressives and the hardliners in the ruling party. The big clash between these two sides, however, never came until 2001.

Up to about eight years ago, Uganda was heavily dependant on aid. In return, the donors exercised a lot of influence over government action and policy. After many years of uncritically supporting Museveni, they started to speak, softly though, about the need to find a political settlement to the war in the north, reducing defence expenditure, and what they called "opening up the political space". However, defence expenditure had by now become a critical source of political slush funds for the NRM.

In response to this situation, and the need to find new sources of support, the privatisation programme was accelerated. The attempt to use the process to create a class of moneyed people who were grateful to the NRM, led to massive corruption in the exercise. The smell of corruption did a lot to damage President Museveni's standing. Then, with shrinking wiggle room for the government to cream off money from the budget without getting the donors' hackles, Kampala found a disastrous way out.

Uganda had sent its army into a security buffer inside the Democratic Republic of Congo to prevent attacks by Allied Democratic Front rebels. However, when the DRC's president Laurent Kabila became embattled when fresh rebellion broke out in his country again in 1998, Uganda took advantage of the resulting chaos and power vacuum to send its army deep into the vast central African nation. There it either occupied or controlled through an alliance of local militia, a large swathe of territory from the Uganda border up to Kinshasa and beyond.

The DRC expedition became an exercise in which some elements of the ruling NRM exploited the troubled country's vast resources to raise money for politics back home, particularly for the 2001 elections. There is a widely held view that the DRC occupation was the turning point for Museveni's presidency.

It was in this situation that Besigye announced in 2000 that he was to challenge Museveni. Unaccustomed to the kind of audacious internal challenge from a Movementist (as supporters of the NRM are known), Museveni overreacted to Besigye's ambitions. A special militia, the Kalangala Action Plan, was set up to unleash violence on Museveni's rivals' supporters. The election, that Museveni eventually won, was to be marred by extensive rigging.

Besigye challenged the result in the Supreme Court. By a unanimous decision, the five judges agreed that the elections had been stolen. However, by a razor thin margin of 3 against 2, they also held that the margin by which the election was rigged couldn't have affected the final outcome. In that sense, like US President George Bush in 2000, Museveni owes his 2001 victory partly to the courts. The president's prestige suffered further, and the star status he enjoyed at home and internationally eluded him in his next term. Besigye, claiming he was being persecuted, fled into exile in South Africa, where he lived until the end of October last year.

The idealism that had made Museveni so admired has been largely shrinking the last five years. And sharp internal divisions inside the NRM marked his last term. Because the reputation of the president and government had taken a big hit, there was no way they could create what critics claimed was a presidency for life, without making some political concessions and finding new sources of legitimacy. This they attempted to do by abandoning their long held opposition, and supporting the re-introduction of multiparty politics late last year. The calculation was that the country could live with Museveni being allowed to run again, if it got multiparty politics in return.

Besigye's return from exile suggests that that might have been a miscalculation . Huge and passionate crowds received Besigye. The new party, the Forum for Democratic Change, that had been formed through the merger of Besigye's 2001 election organisation, Reform Agenda, and other pro-democracy groups, quickly elected Besigye as their presidential candidate.

As he travelled around the country, he received a reception that no other politician had ever got. In some towns, they had to cancel his rallies as the crowds went out of control. Besigye seemed to tap into the pent up frustrations at 20 years of Museveni's rule. The government panicked, and barely two weeks after his return, Besigye was arrested and charged with a rape that allegedly took place eight years ago, and treason. At the same time as he faced those charges in the High Court, he was also charged with terrorism in the High Court.

The day Besigye was arrested, running battles broke out between his supporters and heavily armed police and soldiers in armoured vehicles. It was the first time since the last years of colonial rule in the 1950s that ordinary Ugandans, other than university students, had taken to the streets in a political protest.

Besigye spent a month in prison, with dramatic scenes whenever he came to court. Because of large crowd turnouts on the days he would be in court, streets would be closed off. And in a shocking display of force, on the day he and his co-accused were to be granted bail, a hitherto secret commando unit, the Black Mambas, surrounded the court. The prisoners and their sureties, fearing what might happen to them if they were taken away by the commandos, gave up their right to bail and decided to be taken back to the civilian prison.

This was a Uganda many thought had gone with Amin, and it did little to help Museveni. The only thing it achieved was turning Besigye from a party leader, to a symbol of democracy. It also gave him national recognition far more than anything he or his party would have done to get. However, after his release late December, the novelty that he had as a candidate running from a prison cell seems to have begun to wear off almost immediately.

According to opinion polls, the combined support for Uganda Peoples' Congress leader Mrs Miria Obote, the country's first female presidential candidate; the Democratic Party's Mr Sebaana Kizito; and the independent Mr Abed Bwanika, is less than 15 per cent. The Daily Monitor polls show that if they were to back the single candidacy of Besigye, his support would rise, but not enough for him to leap in the lead. Only the 'Weekly Observer' has, so far, done polls that showed Besigye leading with 47 per cent saying they would vote for him, against 35 per cent for Museveni.

However, so far both Museveni and his trusted generals have suggested that they will not hand over power if they lost. So whichever way this election turns out, it is difficult to see how Uganda's democracy can win. Indeed since 1980, every election has left the country more divided, and the victor and his government more discredited. It's therefore unlikely that the elections will result in the notable expansion of democratic space that happened in Kenya in 2002, for example, with the opposition National Rainbow Coalition (Narc) defeat of the Kenya African National Union, which had been in power for 38 years at that point.

Nevertheless, it could all still have turned out differently. Even after amending the constitution to allow himself to stand for another term, Museveni would have salvaged some of this old prestige from these elections. Because the other parties have only been able to operate legally for five months now, they face an uphill task running against an entrenched NRM, which is still enjoying access to state resources. Already, it's only the NRM that has fielded candidates for Parliament, who will be elected simultaneously on February 23, in all but one of the constituencies. While Besigye might get the bigger crowds, he doesn't have the political machine to turn those numbers into votes.

A free election, as most of the independent polls suggest, would at worst result in a run off if Museveni, who leads in most of them, wouldn't be able to get the more than 50 per cent that the law requires the winner to get. In a run-off, it's not certain that all the candidates would back Besigye. Or that if they did, they he would win because the polls indicate that Museveni would still do better.

Also Museveni would probably have won clean if he had fought a positive campaign and focussed on his achievements, which still resonate with many voters. However, the campaigns have degenerated into a carnival of crude personality attacks, with everything from the two leading candidates' sexual transgressions, to theirs and their wives and children's health and private shortcomings being aired.

However, a Museveni margin in a high-minded election would be thin. Because of the inexplicable mindset in the NRM that a slim win is not legitimate enough, the Museveni campaign has always had to resort to underhand methods to bolster the margin of victory. In so doing, as in the past, he is set to pluck moral defeat out of the jaws of political victory.

At a wider Eastern Africa level, the Uganda elections are being watched for something larger. By 2013, the three partner countries in the East African Community – Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda – plan to establish a political federation. By that time, Rwanda, and possibly Burundi, might have joined the EAC, although they would be part of the common market only, not the political federation. In this grouping, Uganda would be the only country without presidential term limits. There are many voices in Kenya and Tanzania that are already saying Uganda has set out on a path that makes it "incompatible". Uganda is also the only country in the EAC that has never had a democratic change of leaders at the polls.

The test for the country has always been whether it can break with its past, and establish civil democratic politics, or would revert to its violent ways to change its leaders. The February 23 elections are the last opportunity to strike a blow for the democratic option.

* Onyango-Obbo is Nation Media Group's managing editor for Convergence and New Products. Email: cobbo (at) nation.co.ke

* Please send comments to [email protected]

On paper, negotiations for Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) allow for the involvement of a range of organisations that should to some extent ensure the voice of the poor are heard in the construction of the agreements. Richard Kamidza outlines how in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) the reality is far different. The process of negotiations has deliberately excluded the poorest in Africa though their structure, complexity and a general lack of political will to be inclusive. “Surely poor constituencies cannot dream for a positive EPA when the process totally excludes them,” writes Kamidza.

There are sixteen countries in the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) configuration that are preparing negotiations on the economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with the European Union (EU). The negotiations are focusing on six clusters: agriculture, development issues, fisheries, market access, services and trade-related issues. All EPA-related work at regional level is being coordinated by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), to which all ESA member-states are signatories. Other regional secretariats attend as observers. To facilitate preparations in the process, several structures were established but only the National Development Trade Policy Forum (NDTPF) and the Regional Negotiating Forum (RNF) are analyzed for the purpose of this discussion.

Who represents the poor constituencies?

In line with the Cotonou agreement, the ESA-EPA road map allows non-state actors (including the private sector, non-governmental organisations, the media, community based organisations, religious organisations and trade unions) to participate in the on-going EPA negotiations both at the national and regional levels. Civic bodies, since their work involves interacting with both policy-makers and grassroots communities, are assumed to represent the poor constituencies. Thus, engaging civic bodies implies involving and consulting poor-constituencies in the EPA process, a development that enables them to appreciate the dynamics associated with the process. Impliedly, the structures facilitate the participation of the poor in the on-going EPA negotiations. But, are the poor constituencies’ voices already influencing the structures?

What is the extent of the poor constituencies?

The ESA configuration is the poorest in Africa with some countries having between 60-80% of the people living below the poverty datum line and up to 80% unemployment. Twelve member-states are classified as least developing countries (LDCs), which also suffer from serious supply-side bottlenecks that impose equally serious limitations for locally produced commodities to compete favouably with the EU market despite the provision of duty free access under the “everything else but arms” (EBA) initiatives. Anecdotal evidence shows that the existence of EBA initiatives has nothing positive to show in terms of benefits accruing to countries. Even countries categorized as non-LDCs such as Zimbabwe are not only facing similar production constraints, but also massive de-industrialization and de-agriculturalisation as a result of both neo-liberal policy frameworks and irrational nationalistic policy agendas. Indeed, the rates of socio-economic and political indicators prevailing in some ESA member-states are at variant with the zeal to “fast-track” the EPAs process.

A significant number of countries are also classified as highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) meaning that the huge but growing external debt overhang is not only retarding economic growth and development of respective member-states, but has also become economically exhausting and unsustainable; politically destabilizing; and ethically unacceptable. The debt is denying member-states resources to improve the supply-side constraints, particularly human resources development at a time when poor socio-economic conditions and political instability in many states is causing massive brain drain to developed economies. Both EBA and HIPC initiatives assume the existence of a higher proportion of poor constituencies, which are also finding it difficult to cope with any emerging trade regime. Also, lack of political will by institutions and individuals coordinating the process to include poor constituencies has remained a challenge that seems to be allowed to continue - albeit some few months before the deadline for the conclusion of an EPA between the ESA configuration and EU.

ESA negotiating Structures and the State of Play

National Development Trade Policy Forum

Each ESA member-state has established the National Development Trade Policy Forum (NDTPF) whose main function is to develop national positions that will be subsequently tabled at the Regional Negotiating Forum (RNF). NDTPFs are all cluster-inclusive and/or multi-sectoral, and cut across all stakeholders in the country. They are supposed to ensure wider and deeper consultations or involvement of key stakeholders and citizens, including the poor constituencies in this process. Stakeholders at the national level are supposed to collectively come up with strategies, synergies and options leading to just and fair EPA outcomes for respective member-states. In this respect, stakeholders are supposed to participate in EPA-related national conferences, seminars and workshops organized to discuss proceedings, processes and findings of commissioned sustainable impact assessment (SIA) studies and cluster studies. Each NDTPF is expected to produce written progress reports for onward presentation to RNF meetings and submission to the COMESA secretariat for future references. Lastly, NDTPFs are expected to come up with both offensive and defensive cluster interests and positions which feed into regional preparation agendas.

However, the events to date indicate that NDTPFs lack wide and deep consultations or involvement of all stakeholders. It has been observed that participation in NDTPFs of some countries excludes those stakeholders who are perceived as critical of the prevailing governance and political systems and socio-economic conditions. This means that the limited democratic space constrains free participation of civic bodies in the process.

For instance in Zimbabwe, a sour relationship between civic bodies and government means that mostly regional civic bodies have been participating in this process. To date, no members of nationally-based civic bodies have been part of the government delegation attending RNF meetings. In other countries, the civic bodies are largely inactive and very weak, therefore unable to mount a serious engagement in NDTPFs activities. This means that wide and deep involvement of all stakeholders, particularly the poor constituencies, still remains one of the biggest challenges facing NDTPFs in their engagement in EPA negotiations. This also means the low mobilization of citizens and/or exclusion of the poor in this process. Further, this means weak networking and synergies of strategies among stakeholders. Ultimately, this leads to relatively weaker negotiable positions vis-à-vis the EC, and dangerous and unviable EPA outcomes that are incapable of assisting in transforming economies to the benefit of poor constituencies.

Due to deliberate exclusion of civic bodies from the process, the publicity of EPAs has remained largely unsatisfactory. Most EPA-related events and activities have gone without notice by the media at the level of both the NDTPFs and RNF. Chances are therefore that the citizenry, let alone poor constituencies, may fail to follow the process with the view to how to deal with the pitfalls of any agreement.

In addition, the COMESA secretariat seems to have failed to monitor and ensure that countries comply with their own rules and procedures of engagement in the EPA process. Indeed, failure to deposit reports make it impossible for interested stakeholders in the ESA configuration and beyond to review the process with the view to understand the dynamics at each NDTPF, and subsequently RNF negotiation process. Without publicity and close scrutiny, it becomes difficult to assess the level of NDTPFs’ accountability, transparency and the democratic process, let alone encompassing poor constituencies in the process.

Regional Negotiation Forum

The Regional Negotiating Forum (RNF) is a structure that brings together representatives from NDTPFs, four regional secretariats and a regional civic body; Brussels-based ambassadors, especially cluster lead spokespersons; and selected observers and consultants to deliberate progress and ultimately prepare EPA positions for the ESA configuration. Participation support at the RNF is given to two government negotiators, a representative of non-state actor in each ESA country, representative of the regional civic body, regional secretariat officials and invited observers, experts and consultants. All supported participants have speaking rights and status during the meeting.

However, given the complexity of the negotiations coupled with deficiencies in both technical and financial capacities to undertake EPA negotiations in most ESA member-states, the coordination becomes equally complex and technical, requiring an equally broad-based and sound technical depth. This unfortunately, has not been satisfactory, leading to instances where crucial documents ended-up being distributed during the onset of the meetings and deliberate omission of items from the programme that had earlier on been circulated. This has a negative impact on member-states contribution at the regional meetings. However, this is not entirely of COMESA’s making but also a function of too much congestion on the EPA calendar and limited technical advisory (It is only this year that the Chief Technical Advisor has been hired to assist in the process) coupled with other regional mandates requiring similar attention.

Some countries have been sending only two participants to the RNF meetings in spite the availability of resources which end-up being returned to the EU – the sponsor of the process. This raises the question, “whose problem is it?” as well as pointing to the state of governance systems that are guiding the process in respective member-states. This development further indicates weak status of NDTPFs in terms of consulting and involving widely and deeply all stakeholders. Other countries have failed to establish viable NDTPFs that are capable of generating offensive and defensive positions to be subsequently tabled at the RNF meetings. In this respect, a few countries have been bringing more delegates using their own resources to support the process, a development that is encouraging in terms of providing the necessary moral support to negotiators.

It is thus fair and just to allow more civic bodies, especially the social movements, to become part of governments’ delegations to RNF and other meetings. Only when this happens, will the crying voice still at the periphery of defining a long-term trade regime with the EU, become louder. This is more so given that the invitation extended to regional civic bodies in 2004 meant to bring the voice of poor constituencies into the process has been withdrawn. The purging means no invitations to future RNF meetings and no accessing of sustainable impact assessment (SIA) studies of member-states that are deposed at the regional secretariat. But, the major casualty of COMESA’s reaction remains the “crying voice” that is watching the unbalanced and heavily biased match from outside the pitch.

Given the above, it seems as though COMESA lacks the political will to assist in widening and deepening the level of involvement and consultations. It also suggests that the organization has assumed the role of monitoring intervention of critical voices in this process with the view to purge all those who happen to be critical of them.

From the table, many countries’ delegations consist mainly of government officials and to some extent private sector representatives. Only Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe have widened the size of their delegation to RNF by including officials from relevant ministries and departments. From the table Kenya too has brought more participants to all the RNF meetings including a member of parliament.

The Secretariat as at the beginning of 2005 reported that it had not received any written reports on the activities of NDTPFs. This means that all past presentations by delegations on the progress and constraints were/are verbal, a development that often mislead the process aiming at achieving positive EPA outcomes. As expected, no criticism has arisen from country presentations, and as it stands, it is difficult to review the process in future.

Conclusion

The above discussion clearly shows limitations to including poor constituencies in the process of negotiating an EPA with the EU. There is generally lack of political will to centrally involve and consult civic bodies regarding the on-going process. There is no political will to ensure availability of resources for mobilizing poor constituencies.

At the beginning of 2005, only five studies out of 16 countries were deposited with the regional secretariat. While the studies have been produced, no rigorous engagement of the findings has taken place with the view to translating the pitfalls to poor constituencies. This position is further worsened by limited space for civic bodies to participate in the process. It therefore tends to reason that the participation of civic bodies are constrained by imperatives on the ground such as limited democratic space, poor state-civic relationships and outright exclusion by coordinating institutions in the capitals and beyond. The “poor’s voice” continues to cry out, pleading with the technocrats that “ESA is not for sale”. Surely poor constituencies cannot dream for a positive EPA when the process totally excludes them.

* Richard Kamidza is Senior Researcher at the African Centre for Constructive of Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).

* Please send comments to [email protected]

EDITORIAL: It’s make or break time for Ugandans as they go to the polls February 23. Charles Onyango-Obbo surveys the landscape
COMMENT AND ANALYSIS:
- What impact has Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission had on healing the country? A new report examines the issues
- Richard Kamidza writes about how the poor are excluded from trade agreements like Economic Partnership Agreements
- Black History Month in the US must evolve to consider a broader Pan-African historical context, argues Netfa Freeman
- South African local government elections are due next week
LETTERS: Readers tackle Kenya’s campaign against corruption
PAN-AFRICAN POSTCARD: The Ugandan elections are either the end or the beginning of the end for Yoweri Museveni, writes Tajudeen Abdul Raheem
BLOGGING AFRICA: Bloggers on the Ugandan elections, drought in East Africa and more
BOOKS AND ARTS: Nairobi’s first poetry slam takes off
CONFLICTS AND EMERGENCIES: Latest news on DRC, Sudan, Nigeria
REFUGEES AND FORCED MIGRATION: Remittances dwarf aid and investment in Kenya
WOMEN AND GENDER: New pressure needed to scrap gender-biased laws
ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE: All the news from Uganda
DEVELOPMENT: Questioning the links between economic growth and poverty reduction
CORRUPTION: Rights body honours 'Whistleblower' Githongo
HEALTH AND HIV/AIDS: A global campaign for the right to health
RACISM AND XENOPHOBIA: Citizenship and xenophobia in Southern Africa
ENVIRONMENT: Citizens space for democratic deliberation on GMOs
MEDIA AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: Ugandan elections website blocked
ADVOCACY AND CAMPAIGNS: Stop forced evictions in Angola
PLUS…Internet and technology; e-newsletters; fundraising and useful resources; courses; jobs.

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WIN TICKETS TO UK SCREENING OF TSOTSI

Come to an exclusive preview of this year’s most critically-acclaimed film, Tsotsi, in the Magdalen College Auditorium (Longwall St entrance) in Oxford at 8.00pm on Friday 10 March, a week before the film goes on general release across the UK on 17 March.

ABOUT THE FILM
Set amidst the sprawling, crime-ridden streets of Johannesburg - where survival is the primary objective - this award-winning film traces six days in the life of a ruthless young gang leader, who ends up caring for a baby he accidentally kidnaps during a car-jacking. With the baby’s welfare at stake, he is compelled to confront his own brutal nature and face the consequences of his actions, if he ever wishes to find redemption in his life.

Nominated for an Academy Award, a Golden Globe and two BAFTA Awards, Tsotsi is an epic and uplifting drama about the ultimate triumph of love over rage.

Tsotsi is in cinemas nationwide from 17 March (certificate 15). For more information, go to www.tsotsimovie.com

In addition to its Oscar, Bafta and Golden Globe nominations, Tsotsi has already won numerous awards including: Audience Award, LA Art Film Festival; People’s Choice Award, Toronto International Film Festival; Audience Award, Edinburgh International Film Festival; Audience Award, Denver International Film Festival; Greek Parliament Award, Thessaloniki Film Festival.

Screening takes place on Friday 10th March at 8pm
At Magdalen College Auditorium (Longwall St entrance), Oxford
Entry £5 (£3 concessions)
Proceeds to Fahamu’s programme in South Africa

WIN FREE TICKETS!
Email [email protected] with the names of the countries that by 12 February 2006 had ratified the African Union's Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa. Closing date 6 March at 0900 hrs GMT. The first 10 correct entries picked out of a hat will each receive a free ticket.

Seven armoured trucks drove into an opposition crowd in Mukono, injuring several people, two of them critically. The brand new trucks- Humvees- fitted with communication gadgets and machine guns, were heading to Kampala. Opposition leader Kizza Besigye, who was waving to the crowd through his open-roof car, shouted at the soldiers as they forcibly pushed through. As the trucks moved ahead, after injuring several people, the angry crowd, which was heading for Besigye's afternoon rally, shouted at the soldiers. Sensing animosity, the soldiers, strapped with bullet chains, aimed their guns at the crowd sending the people in disarray.

The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights has honoured John Githongo "for his courageous whistle blowing on the Anglo Leasing scandal." "By exposing corruption and cover-up networks within government, Githongo has made an outstanding contribution to the fight against corruption," the organisation said in its citation. It praised the country's former ethics and governance PS, as the "high priest of good governance" for his "boldness, creativity and audacity."

Poverty is on a sharp increase despite the high economic growth recorded last year, says a report. Prepared by Kenya's Ministry of Planning and National Development, the report says runaway poverty rates can only be reduced if the country achieves growth levels of more than seven per cent, same as those of Asian countries. "The economic growth recorded in recent times is not sufficient for reducing poverty and sustaining development," it says. The country's unstable economy has seen poverty increase by from 48 per cent in the early 1980s to 56 per cent last year.

Corruption costs African countries an estimated 25% of its combined national income, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo said - some $148bn a year. The outgoing leader of the African Union called the problem "a preventable loss" and said that industries such as oil, gas and minerals were worst hit. The popular 'paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty' is a daily experience in many African countries rich in oil, gas and minerals, the president said. "The majority of citizens in these countries still lack basic health and educational facilities."

The Ugandan elections are in the news and a number of African bloggers provide commentary on the subject.

Ethan of My Heart’s in Accra - http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/?p=380 - reports on the ongoing pre-election violence and most worrying of all the deployment of 12,000 soldiers by Museveni to “prevent poll violence”.

“…opposition supporters see this as clear intimidation, a sign that Museveni will use the army to retain power even if he’s unsuccessful at the ballot box.”

There is also the situation in war torn Northern Uganda where the Lord’s Resistance Army have been fighting what Ethan describes as a “incomprehensible war” for the past 10 years. There has also been reports that the army has threatened voters in the region that they will pull out if people do not vote for Museveni. Despite all this it seems many Ugandans do not know there is an election on Thursday.

“According to their survey, only 53% of Ugandans polled knew the election was taking place on Thursday. This may reflect an attempt to dampen voter turnout by Museveni, or the complications of advertising an election in a poor nation… but it seems surprising that a pivotal election would be so poorly known about.”

Kenyan Pundit - http://www.kenyanpundit.com/?p=131 - posts a speech by Prof. Joe Oloka-Onyango who provides some context behind the elections. Kenyan Pundit writes:

“The upcoming elections in Uganda will have implications on the future of democracy in the region as a whole…perhaps the ‘African Big Man’ syndrome is not about to vanish after all.”

Uganda-CAN - http://www.ugandacan.org/item/944 - focuses on Northern Uganda and the plight of child soldiers who even when they are rescued and returned to their homes continue to suffer – this time from friends and family.

“Uganda's former child soldiers, haunted by exposure to violence at a young age, often find little solace when reintegrated into their home communities. Abducted as youth into the throes of the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), children are forced to commit acts of violence against the country's northern population until they escape or are captured by the Ugandan military. But when they return home, the nightmare continues, as they face stigmatization from their family and peers.”

Ethiopian blog, written by journalist Andrew Havens, Meskel Square - http://www.meskelsquare.com/archives/2006/02/two_scenes_from.html - has been reporting on the drought faced by Ethiopians in the southern Moyale zone of the country.

“Moyale is at the heart of a devastating drought that has left an estimated 737,000 Ethiopians struggling to survive without access to clean water. Beyond Ethiopia, the drought has spread out to affect more than 8.3 million people, including 1.2 million children aged under five, across the Horn of Africa.”

Meskel Square personalises his report by focusing on the driver of the only water truck, Tafesech Sahele, a 45-year-old mother-of two from Addis Ababa, who delivers water after filling up from the only three boreholes in the area.

Kenyan Blogger – Gukira - http://gukira.blogspot.com/2006/02/cartoons.html - discusses the recent Danish cartoons by placing them in an historical context of Euro/America race relations.

“To trace a history of cartoons in Euro-America is to trace a history of race relations…At the turn of the 20th C., Sambo art was in vogue. If one could not own a nigger, one could own a mug, a picture, a doll, an object that featured coal-black skin, bright red lips, and milk-white teeth.”

As the West defends freedom of speech, Gukira writes that people of colour have to ask “freedom for whom” and asks us to remember that lynchings were social occasions.

“Families assembled, complete with their cherubic children. Eager women rushed to take pieces of nigger clothing or skin or hair as souvenirs.”

Black Looks - http://okrasoup.typepad.com/black_looks/2006/02/dorothy_akenova.html - comments on a BBC programme called IChallenge which interviews an amazingly progressive Nigerian activist who has set up an organisation called INCREASE. “The organisation seeks to promote sexual health in the traditional Northern Sharia state of Niger.” INCREASE (International Center for Reproductive Health and Sexual Rights) is based in Niger State in the North of Nigeria and was started by Dorothy Aken’Ova, who writes:

“I believe in equal rights. I challenge the injustices, the discriminatory practices, all forms of inequalities that exist in Nigerian society, especially those that are fuelled by differences in gender and sexuality and especially sexual orientation.”

In addition to INCREASE, Ms Aken’Ova started a group for young gays, lesbians and transgenders in Abuja called IConnect which provides users with a supportive environment and opportunities to network with each other.

The UN secretary general representative in the Great Lakes region, Ibrahima Fall, called on the international community to create `a second Marshall Plan` to salvage countries of the region. Speaking at the opening of the 3rd inter-ministerial regional committee meeting of the Great Lakes region, Fall said his appeal was based on the need to "help countries of the region rediscover the path to stability and development". The four-day meeting, convening at the Central African National Assembly, should offer delegates from the region`s 11 member countries the opportunity to endorse several documents, including 31 projects and 9 protocols to the regional convention on security, stability and development, for adoption by the second summit of the heads of State, slated in June/July 2006.

The NRM has written to a US-based Internet firm to block access to the www.radiokatwe.com website. NRM spokesperson Ofwono Opondo last week said the website was publishing malicious and false information against the party and its presidential candidate. It has also asked local ISPs to block the site. The New Vision received complaints that the site was inaccessible within Uganda. When opening the site, a message pops up saying, “The page cannot be displayed.” The site hosted in the US features information on presidential candidates, security agencies, operatives and their lifestyles. A liner on the site reads, “Radio Katwe: outrageous, amusing, conspiracy theories, not to be taken seriously.”

The South African authorities have seized a luxury house belonging to a former Nigerian state governor accused of corruption in his own country. Officials confiscated the property - said to be worth more than $1.7m - on the waterfront in Cape Town. Diepreye Alamieyeseigha was impeached and removed from his post in the Nigerian oil-producing state of Bayelsa in the Niger Delta last year.

The proliferation of corruption and abuse of power dominated the intense debates at the People's Assembly this week. The fireworks began on Sunday, when the assembly met to discuss a preliminary report about the sinking of the Egyptian ferry Al-Salam 98 in the Red Sea two weeks ago. The report, prepared by the assembly's transport committee, called it the most tragic disaster to hit Egypt in its modern history. Committee chairman Hamdi El-Tahan said "carelessness, indifference and corruption [were] the main culprits."