Kenyans are fed up of waiting for a new constitution which seems to be dragging on indefinitely. To break the impasse, several meetings, attended by stakeholders such as legislators and civil society groups, have been held this year to put the constitutional talks back on track. The draft constitution was drawn by the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, after collecting views from Kenyans on what they wanted in the document.

The School of Public Health, University of Ghana, is pleased to announce an intensive 6-week residential certificate course in social mobilization for health and development from June 6 - July 16, 2005. The course is structured under modules, units and sessions. Each module and each unit has its specific objectives. The course takes into account the desire of several countries in the region to have such training carried out in the African socio-cultural context. It is anticipated that the course will serve the needs of Anglophone Sub-Saharan Africa in behavioural change communication for health promotion and development.

The news of opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai's acquittal on the charge of treason two weeks ago has been hailed as a step forward in the quagmire that is Zimbabwean politics. It was certainly welcome relief in what is otherwise a political terrain of sustained demoralisation. The case itself was based on suspect evidence, and a rebarbative state witness who became an embarrassment even to the state itself.

Information minister Jonathan Moyo proclaimed that the judgement "confounds, exposes and shames those merchants of lies and falsehoods...always given to maligning and denigrating Zimbabwe as undemocratic and without an independent judiciary".

It would be a mistake, however, to regard this judgement as a reversal of the politics of repression that characterises Zimbabwe.

Firstly, the judgement does not detract from the immense damage that has been inflicted on the judiciary by the executive since 2000. The combination of highly politicised judicial appointments at the highest levels, executive disregard of court rulings and the continuous use of the judiciary and police to undermine the opposition and the civic movement have played a decisive role in shaping the current political terrain.

Secondly, the state has shown little additional indication that it is willing to open up political space in the country. The major pillars of repressive legislation, namely the severe controls on information dissemination and freedom of association, remain in place. Recently both the ministers of Information and Legal Affairs have reiterated the government's refusal to allow the opposition access to the public media on the basis that the MDC is not a loyal opposition.

This characterisation of the MDC is consistent with the declaration that the 2005 general election will be an "anti-Blair" election. The implications of such a discursive assault are that the MDC is not a national entity and therefore not entitled to speak on national issues. The ruling party has set the parameters of national legitimacy and in so doing has unilaterally delineated the boundaries of what is acceptable in the political arena.

A further message of such state censure is that those parties that fall outside such a selective definition of the "national" must accept to be dealt with by any means necessary. This language of selective citizenship has marked the authoritarian nationalism of the ruling party and there are indications of its infectiousness in other countries in the region.

In the light of such prevailing conditions it is necessary to read the positive judgement in the case of Tsvangirai extremely cautiously.

It is now clear that the Mugabe regime needs a "legitimate" outcome from the 2005 election, and to that purpose has instituted some minimal election reforms that it argues are in accordance with the Mauritius guidelines on minimal standards. An international acceptance of the 2005 election would serve as a launching pad for the ruling party's return to the international community.

Thus far President Robert Mugabe has retained the support of the Southern African Development Community (Sadc) and the African Union and there is little to assume that such support will not remain in place until next year.

Certainly there is a general position in the region that the 2005 election could serve as the means to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis, even if such a resolution takes place at the level of form rather than substantive content. South African President Thabo Mbeki appears to favour such a denouement for his policy of quiet diplomacy.

Thus Sadc will certainly be pushing the MDC to take part in next year's election, and there are indications that sections of the European Union favour such a course as well, if only to get Zimbabwe off the international agenda.

The purported election reforms, combined with the favourable court judgement of the opposition leader, will thus be used as evidence of goodwill from the ruling party, and a strong push for the opposition to enter the 2005 electoral race.

In the current political environment, in which so much damage has been done to the political process, a decision by the opposition to oblige such pressures will more than likely lead to a major defeat of the MDC.

In the event of such an outcome the Sadc minimum standards will have been used to ratify an authoritarian regime in the name of the interests of Zimbabwe and the region, and Mbeki will have walked the tightrope of maintaining African legitimacy while remaining the "pointman" of the West. The major victim of such a process will be the struggles for democratisation not only in Zimbabwe but in the region.

* Brian Raftopoulos is associate professor of development studies, IDS, University of Zimbabwe. This article first appeared in the Zimbabwe Independent and is reprinted with permission of the author. Please send comments to

Without doubt, the star of the October 12-13 international conference on anti-corruption that brought together delegates from more than 90 countries to Kenya was Georgian Prime Minister Zhurab Zhvania. He was remarkable in his clarity on anti-corruption efforts, expressing his willingness to take on the high and mighty as a way to tame corruption in Georgia. He did not mince his words in a typical bureaucratic and diplomatic manner as most leaders do, winning over the vast majority of the audience. He said anti-corruption efforts must be multi-faceted, including political, social and legal censure, especially since finding the evidence to sustain a legal charge can be hard to come by.

His statement that serious circumstantial information against a minister or top civil servant was a reflection on him directly as prime minister and therefore merited political action through suspension from office until investigations were complete, brought thunderous applause from the audience perhaps reflecting on the differences between Kenya's fight against graft and Georgia's. Mr Zhvania described how on taking office he reduced the size of his staff from 600 to 90, recruiting new and highly qualified people as a way to bring in reformers to implement the changes required.

He talked of how he dismissed 20 of the 23 generals in the military and how he scrapped the entire traffic police unit which was the most obvious corruption machine in the country. The leader emphasised that one cannot have reforms without reformers, a statement that has begun to emerge strongly in Kenya and which Mr Justice Aaron Ringera also endorsed. One of the most important tools for fighting corruption, he declared, was a Freedom of Information Act that strips away the secrecy in and of government, on which grand corruption thrives.

This in Kenya would mean the discarding of the Official Secrets Act that some top officials love and throw in the faces of potential whistle blowers on corruption attempts. But critically, for us in Kenya, it would also mean ensuring that the declarations of wealth introduced last year be made public.

By the end of the conference, participants remarked that this was the approach that Kenya, and Africa needed to tackle corruption. The meeting was an outstanding success, having been organised by the Department of Governance, Transparency International-Kenya, and Transparency International Secretariat in Berlin. The fact that so many leaders in politics, civil society and anti-corruption commissions from across the world agreed to come to Kenya attests to the international recognition that Kenya has gained - even if only slightly - from the days of the Moi regime. It is unimaginable that a conference of this nature could have been held in Kenya two years ago.

The presence of so many leaders was a tribute to the international credibility that Ethics and Governance permanent secretary John Githongo brings to the anti-corruption struggle. The gathering included the Prime Minister of Norway, who reminded the audience that fighting corruption is not done for the sake of it, but to reduce poverty and realise economic and social rights.

Others were the Mexican minister for Public Administration, who together with his president is responsible for taking action against public officials who engage in corruption, the Peruvian Speaker of the National Assembly and the chairman of the Parliamentary Oversight Committee, and the Norwegian Minister for International Development.

There were five leaders of anti-corruption agencies from Pakistan, Malawi, Zambia, Indonesia, Guatemala, and South Korea who were all relatively new in their positions, reflecting the start-stop-start nature of anti-corruption efforts across the world.

President Kibaki got the ball rolling by reaffirming his personal commitment to leading the fight against corruption. He stated that like any battle, the war must be led from the front by generals so that officers and foot soldiers can carry it on. Justice minister Kiraitu Murungi repeated his clear and unequivocal attack on corruption saying: "We must not feed corruption by hiding it away."

He also reiterated his oft-quoted view that the networks of corruption still existed and were clearly operating within the State bureaucracy. He stated that corruption must be at "the top of the development agenda, since it destroys everything including the fabric of society." And he is right, since State tolerance of corruption makes nonsense of any efforts geared to improving human rights record, security and eradicating poverty.
But was this meeting simply an attempt at public relations on anti-corruption? What lessons were learnt, if any?

Mr Zhvania spelt it out clearly that anti-corruption efforts need a strong, concerted and determined approach, without fear of making mistakes, to succeed. It needs strong will, clarity of mission and decisiveness. And it needs political and legal action. Some in the audience attributed his direct and total approach to anti-corruption crusade to the fact that he is only 41 years-old.

But the Prime minister explained the approach was a direct result of having watched the slow but sure collapse of the Shevardnadze regime in Georgia of which he had been a part of and which had come to power following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Mr Shevardnadze had come to power with massive popular support, promising to reform and rebuild Georgia and its overwhelming corruption problem. Some of his advisors, such as Mr Zhvania, urged him to move quickly on corruption before the window of opportunity closed.

But Mr Shevardnadze was indecisive, allowing the return of the networks of corruption and endemic corruption. It was so big a problem that it infected Mr Shevardnadze himself, and he attempted to steal the November 2003 election to remain in office. He had to be forced out in what became known as the "Rose Revolution" because thousands of protesters carried roses to symbolise their peaceful intentions.

On becoming prime minister, Mr Zhvania vowed not to make the mistakes of his mentor and moved fast before the window of opportunity closed. His radical approach has borne fruits, not just in terms of massive political support but also economically, as both domestic and international investors increased their confidence in the country. Moreover, his war on graft has reduced some of the costs that arise with irregular deals, making life a lot more affordable. The government has also recovered some stolen assets, adding to its capacity to realise economic and social rights.

Notably, many Kenyan ministers and senior civil servants were not fully engaged in the conference, despite the presence of the international VIPs. Indeed, some of the foreign guests, such as the Norwegian minister for International Development, organised important side meetings during the conference, something that our ministers, many of whom either did not attend or only made technical appearances, would have gained from.

But perhaps the enduring lesson for us is the immensity of the gap between official rhetoric and actual implementation. The rhetoric is spot on, and if Kenya were to be judged from the number of official speeches and pronouncements made against corruption, I am sure we would be at the top of Transparency International's Perception Index. Given some of President Kibaki's actions, such as restoring Mr Githongo to State House, only but a small minority in this country do not recognise his depth and personal commitment to the crusade.

The problem is the considerable public doubt on the commitment of some of the key players in his Government - both political and bureaucratic - to anti-corruption measures. This apparent lack of commitment is gauged by the immense defensiveness and discomfort exhibited when "new" corruption is discussed and by statements that attempt to whitewash scandals such as Anglo Leasing.

It is expressed in the lack of consistency in dealing with circumstantial evidence to force key people around the Anglo Leasing scandal to step aside like Mr Shem Ochuodho and Mr Maurice Dantas of Kenya Pipeline were. They were suspended, not because they engaged in corruption, but to facilitate free investigations.

The lack of commitment is shown by the refusal or time wasting tactics employed whenever questions of expenditures in ministries - especially with regard to the buying of luxurious vehicles at the tax payer's expense - are raised.

Make no mistake: The line between wasteful expenditure of taxpayer's money to buy vehicles worth Sh15 million each for Government officials and official corruption is thin. The mindset that focuses on entitlements in office and using taxpayer's money unreasonably is extremely close to the one that dispenses of the pretence of buying items and simply pocketing the money directly.

As stated by the Norwegian prime minister, Mr Zhvania and Mr Githongo, the window of opportunity to fight official corruption is very small. Mr Githongo suggests 24 months. I think that is too much and the revival of grand corruption in Kenya; through such scandals as Anglo Leasing; attests to the very real possibility that our window of opportunity has closed.

Information in the public domain suggests that the officials who signed the paperwork with a fictitious entity called Anglo Leasing should be charged, at the very least, with criminal negligence and attempt to commit fraud. But this has not been done. Yet there is a real possibility that doing so could lead to further evidence of the real people behind Anglo Leasing.

Similarly, it is not enough for Mr Murungi to continuously complain about the inherited civil servants who facilitate corruption and are an obstacle to reform. For he is a minister, and a powerful one at that, who should act to bring about change instead of just complain like a civil society activist.

That is the challenge before us today. For Kenyans to reap the benefits of all this anti-corruption talk, then the litmus test is the final dismantling of the networks of corruption inherited from the Moi regime which seem to have found a comfortable home within the ranks of the Government.

Only then can we feel confident that the more than US $1 billion stacked abroad from our taxes from the past regime's will bear solid fruit as a dividend on the war against corruption. Only then will we begin to trust the Government to close the door on irregular and illegal allocations of public land and plots.

Time is short but with strength, clarity and leadership, we can still turn this boat called Kenya around.

* Maina Kiai is the Kenya National Human Rights Commission chairman. This article first appeared in the Daily Nation and is reposted here with permission of the author. Please send comments to

With its focus on skills development, capacity building and employment practice in Africa, this issue of Interim Developments examines training and development projects in Africa, South Africa’s international branding campaigns and highlights some of the work Interims for Development is doing to build the skills and capacity of Africa’s professional base.

Certainly no one can ignore the relationship between income inequality and long term political stability in nations (Kenya: New report shows huge inequalities in income, welfare [http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=43877]). Crimes in the inner cities of the US and in Brazil and increasing crimes in both urban and rural Kenya are symptoms of income inequality.

The first study on income inequality in Kenya was carried out by ILO in 1972 and a report was published. Like other important documents this one gathers dust in the archives. This issue of economic disparity has a relationship with race and ethnicity. In the US the Republicans stand for 'merit' and the Democrats stand for 'welfare state' - maybe through their words not in action. The Scandinavian welfare state model is despised in the US.

What kind of model do we want for Kenya? Is it not time to reduce government's role in economic development so that we can embrace a private lead economic growth that does not fall prey to the politics of ethnicity, religion and regionalism? The state should provide basic infrastructure and create a suitable environment for entrepreneurs to thrive. It should not be the role of the state to channel resources to some favoured regions. This is a political decision that often incubates political upheaval.

I have not read the whole document but I hope the researchers investigated not merely regional disparities which are misleading, but the petty bourgeoisie in Kenyatta's and Moi's administration, the capture of Kenyan strategic economic sectors such as banking and finance by British investors, capital flight, fall of the coffee, tea, tobacco and cotton industries and the role of ethnic conflict in development.

Blind statistics taken by a 'non partisan' party may be a 'convenient weapon' of a 'learned' politician who wants to unfairly direct national resources to his region. No wonder the report fits well with views of some Kenyan politicians. Moi had the same conclusions and his solution was to strangle Kikuyu entrepreneurs so that the rest of Kenya could catch up with them. He introduced a quota system to limit the number of qualified Kikuyus going for higher education. This was very punitive to people who had no understanding of why their hard work has anything to do with other peoples failures. This is very political research and I hope the researchers understand the 'implied' message in their 'authentic' conclusions. One must consider history, culture, politics and accessibility to resources before deriving some convenient blueprint conclusions about development in the 'only stable' country in strife torn Africa.

From the editorial to the comments on the Darfur piece earlier to the piece on the UN vote on ending the embargo in Cuba, to the essay on the squeeze on land by Robin Palmer, thank you.

All of the essays and comment point in the same direction and lead one to ask one question: why and how do we (i.e. those who side with those without land, work, health, clean air, etc.) manage not to unite?

The bi-centenary of Haiti is passing us by (1804-2004) as if it never happened. In contrast, remember how 1492-1992 and 1789-1989 were celebrated?

President Bush, almost at the same time American and French troops were kidnapping President Aristide, in a speech meant to defend "American Freedom" concluded "there can be no compromise between Freedom and Slavery".

Is it possible to say that our problem can be described as "failure (hesitation, resistance?) of fidelity to the freedom achieved by the slaves who overthrew slavery in Haiti?"

Could that failure be explained by our inability (reluctance, hesitation?) to maintain Atlantic (and Oriental) slavery and the wiping out of Native Americans as Crimes Against Humanity against the dissolving effect, on our collective conscience, of what these crimes gave birth to: capitalism as we know it today, in which everyone is free to torture, maim, kill in order to maintain what is described as the one and only triumphant socio-economic system of all times.

Following the success of the slaves in 1804, the enslavers-capitalists motto has remained the same and can be summarized as follows: "the discovered can never ever discover anything, and if they try, the most severe punishment shall be dispensed". No one has been able to document the terror suffered by those who were kidnapped and shipped across the Atlantic, no one can imagine the terror suffered by those whose land was robbed.

It is easy to see wars in various parts of the Planet as driven by the search to monopolize resources. Has it changed from the time when land and labour were the keys to opening up the Promised Land of capitalism?

Not many media referred to it, but Aristide's crucial faults (from the point of view of the US and the French governments) were not only putting an end to the Army, asking for the French to repay what the Haitian governments paid between 1825 and 1947, more than 20 billion Euros. More serious was the fact that Haiti was resorting to Cuban doctors and teachers to resolve its health and educational problems.

Cuba is seen as one of the trespassers of the above mentioned "No Trespass" sign, and has been punished ever since. (There are other many examples). I agree with Tajudeen that Africans should unite (not just the governments) with the Cubans and all those who, since and before 1804 said no to slavery in any form, degree or shape.

The crisis of landlessness is not recent. It is genetically tied to the early beginnings of capitalism which has multiple roots and not just medieval Europe.

Nigeria's main trade union has said it will hold a second general strike in protest at fuel rises, warning it would specifically target oil production. The umbrella union body Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) confirmed the action would start on 16 November. Union leaders accused the Anglo-Dutch oil giant Shell of being the "enemy of the Nigerian people" and called for action against the firm.

A full-blown emergency is threatening Ethiopia’s Somali region, the UN warned on Thursday. Wells are drying up and malnutrition is beginning to set in, according to a joint UN rapid-assessment team sent to monitor the crisis. Somali region officials said last week that panic was beginning to set in among communities who fear they might suffer on a scale like that of the 2000 drought in the same region. In that year, an estimated 50,000 people died, mainly from measles.

“There is simply no law and order in Zimbabwe," declared Cosatu vice president Violet Seboni upon her arrival back in Johannesburg after the deportation of her 13 strong delegation from Zimbabwe by the Mugabe government. "A nasty, horrible experience," was how Seboni summed up her ordeal at the hands of the Mugabe government. The consolation for her is that her mind has been cleared now: "There is no respect for labour rights in that country, no respect for human rights and the rule of law," she said.

Police arrested 34 supporters of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party attending a meeting here, in what the opposition party said was yet more evidence of continued harassment of its members by state security agents. Officials of the opposition party said heavily armed police stormed a community hall in Mpopoma constituency here and force-marched the MDC members who were meeting there to West Commonage police station nearby.

The Bush administration is poised to steal this election as it did the one in 2000. Thousands of voters, mostly African Americans, are in danger of being illegally disenfranchised by Republican party manipulations. In the year 2000, tens of thousands of African Americans were improperly purged from the voting rolls. Given that African Americans -- when they did vote -- overwhelmingly cast their ballots for Gore, and given that the margin in Florida was only 537 votes, it is clear that the last presidential election was stolen. Or was it? Imagine this defense of Republican scheming: "If Gore had been able to win his home state of Tennessee, he would have won the election. If he had been able to appeal to Arab American voters in Florida, he would have won. And so on." Our response to this should be obvious: the disenfranchisement by Republicans of Florida's Black voters was not a sufficient cause for Bush to win the election, but it was a necessary cause.

* Editorial: Henning Melber unpacks the blockages to regional integration in southern Africa
* Comment and Analysis: Poor people are struggling for land against increasingly long odds in a hugely hostile global climate, writes Robin Palmer
* Pan-African Postcard: Columnist Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem urges African countries to unite against the US embargo on Cuba
* Conflicts and Emergencies: Violence continues in the DRC with malnutrition rates hitting 30% in some areas, says a new Amnesty International report
* Women and Gender: Women are gaining a place at the political table in a growing number of African countries
* Elections and Governance: SA’s quiet diplomacy challenged as unionists booted out of Zimbabwe
* Development: An Actionaid report reveals how the taps have been turned off for the poor in Tanzania after a water privatisation scheme
* Racism and Xenophobia: South Africa’s president and the opposition trade blows over HIV/AIDS and race
* E-newsletters and Mailing Lists: Fiftieth edition of Peacewomen e-news out now
* Books and Arts: Tackling HIV/AIDS means challenging power structures that lead to ill-health, says a new publication, ‘AIDS: In Search of a Social Solution’.

The UN Security Council has voted unanimously to meet in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi next month in order to forge peace in southern Sudan, Africa’s longest running civil war. "My hope is that the parties will certainly close the differences very, very substantially, and it would be great if there were a peace agreement," said US Ambassador John Danforth, who sponsored the resolution. The Security Council will hold official sessions in Nairobi on November 18-19, which will be aimed at giving momentum to solving the crisis in Darfur, in western Sudan.

With U.S. voters anxiously contemplating the body count arising from the United States' deployment in Iraq - as well as the associated threat of terrorism - it was probably to be expected that Africa would get little "face time" in the presidential election. But as the campaign enters its final week, the continent has received even less attention than some might have hoped. Nonetheless, certain observers believe Africa will be less easily sidelined after Nov. 2.

The United Nations officially launched a nationwide programme to help educate thousands of former combatants in this war-battered West African nation. The UN will pay for basic education costs for young fighters participating in a disarmament programme that ends on October 31. It is unclear how much the project will cost.

Recent trends seem to suggest a shift away from strengthening of regional cooperation in Southern Africa. But such regionalism has been hitherto a declared priority on development agendas. Hampering factors presently include political differences such as the controversy over Zimbabwe. This escalated into a sharp division of views among the member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It is hardly an exaggeration to state that the inability to agree on a common approach has an almost paralysing effect. The following analysis is however concentrated on socio-economic factors of concern, which divide the region further instead of bringing it closer together.

Strategic shift towards NEPAD

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) seems to emerge increasingly as a type of mega-NGO to channel aid-funds into developmental projects, which at best claim but in reality fail to be driven by a desire towards enhanced regional collaboration. The programmes and policies funded under NEPAD are implemented mainly by countries and not by regional bodies. Hence NEPAD in effect more undermines than strengthens an agency such as SADC (or any other regional institution).

This is a trend notwithstanding the fact that NEPAD attributes substantial relevance to regional bodies when identifying ways and means to achieve the defined socio-economic goals. NEPAD claims that its agenda is “based on national and regional priorities and development plans”, which ought to be prepared “through participatory processes involving the people”. So far, however, no visible signs in the SADC would indicate that the collective (multilateral) efforts aim at a united approach of the region in its relations with the outside world.

Nor does NEPAD so far translate its noble aims into practical steps for implementation. The blue print emphasises sub-regional and regional approaches even under a separate sub heading. It stresses “the need for African countries to pool their resources and enhance regional development and economic integration … to improve international competitiveness”. But the crux of the matter lies there: the emphasis on international competitiveness comes at the expenses of strengthening the local economy and the local people. Instead, integration in Africa should as a priority meet the socio-economic and environmental needs of its citizenries and not seek to turn even more into an export platform.

NEPAD claims further to enhance the provision of essential regional goods as well as the promotion of intra-African trade and investments, with another focus on “rationalising the institutional framework for economic integration”. But again, such an approach neglects the local/internal in favour of the global/external orientation. The implementation of NEPAD will hence most likely have the adverse effect and assist in an increased outward orientation of a regional bloc at the expenses of internal consolidation. It is interesting to note in this context, that notwithstanding the decisive role of South Africa within NEPAD, SADC has so far hardly acknowledged and certainly not embraced the initiative.

Divisive Free Trade Agreements

The Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and South Africa (EU-SA FTA) negotiated since the mid-1990s, had a similarly divisive effect on the Southern African region by entering into a preferential trade relation with one country and thereby enhancing differences within the region resulting from existing conflicts of interest among the national economies.

South Africa herself, the monetary zone, the South African Customs Union (SACU) and SADC are already not in harmony at any time and less so given the effects of the FTA on regional economic matters. Hence the EU intervention adds more friction. The new Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiated between the countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific Islands (ACP states) on the one hand and the EU on the other hand not only seek to replace the previous Cotonou Agreement by means of sub-regional separate negotiations but also aim towards compatibility between EU-ACP trade relations and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). They are hence dependent upon the settlement of the Doha Development Agenda's controversial and yet unresolved issues.

Interesting enough, the draft European Constitution makes no reference to cooperation with ACP states. It is only fair to assume that the EU enlargement shifts interest even further away from the neighbouring continent towards more collaboration closer to Brussels. In addition, the negotiations by the EU aim at separate accords with each region, and no country may negotiate in more than one bloc. As such, SADC is reduced to seven member countries (half of the 14 SADC states) under the EPA negotiations.

It is not far fetched to see that there is an inbuilt conflict between regionalism as it exists and the negotiations of new multilateral processes. Countries might differ over the advantages between benefits from the continued protection of regional arrangements or the creation of individual preferential access within other trade agreements. But if regionalism is considered as a problem or obstacle towards further global harmonisation under the WTO, it stands little chances of being a viable point of departure for strengthening in particular the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the South within the global trade arrangements.

Instead, the predictable outcome of the current negotiations under the WTO related agreements will be a shrinking of “development space”. To avoid such in-egalitarian pseudo-partnerships, a shift in balance from the drive to homogenize trading commitments to other states towards granting states reasonable scope to choose appropriate levels of national protection is required. A development strategy would therefore have to operate in a zone where both internal as well as external integration reinforce rather than undermine each other. Instead, issues of internal integration (including issues of regional integration) have largely dropped out of the development agenda as the gospel of the free trade paradigm dominates the discourse.

EU and US as partners?

The same limiting effects can be expected from the Free Trade Agreement between SACU and the USA. The SACU-US FTA seems to promise nothing different from the US-American African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which tends to separate and divide instead of bringing African economies and interests closer. The benefits from AGOA differ among African countries according to their resources.

Ironically, within those countries having been allocated a LDC status under AGOA (receiving additional preferential treatment), external capital (from mainly East Asian countries) has managed to exploit the opportunities created for supplying the US market under preferential tax regimes with cheap textiles from these countries. The by and large unqualified and underpaid workforce in the local sweatshops is hardly reaping any benefits from the super exploitation. Nor does the fiscus in these states, as initial investments and running costs for operations are substantially subsidised with public revenue instead of providing any tax income from the profits generated.

Such recent trends indicate towards less rather than more regional cooperation and integration. The political and security interests might provide with increased support by the G8 (the group of 8 most industrialised countries of the Northern hemisphere) and the strengthening of initiatives towards closer regional collaboration in reducing armed conflicts and securing more stability. Such stability continues however to be perceived as regime security, in contrast to a concept of human security. The latter would give primacy to human rights in favour of the citizens and not preference to the governments in power.

Even if there would be achievements in this direction, the multidimensionality and heterogeneity of a region like Southern Africa is likely to persist and may eventually increase. This does not prevent external support towards further positive regional interdependence. But this requires more than merely the opening up to the global economy. More so, it would have to re-visit matters of regional economic collaboration and seek involvement of the majority of the African population in these countries. The current initiatives by the EU and the US under the WTO offer little to no promise to contribute to such a desirable tendency, neither in SADC nor elsewhere.

* Henning Melber is Research Director at The Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala/Sweden and has been Director of the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU) in Windhoek between 1992 and 2000.

* Please send comments to

The United Nations is set to launch a new initiative to strengthen its support in promoting and protecting human rights in countries around the world. Known as "Action Two," the plan is a response to a report by Secretary-General Kofi Annan on ensuring that the world body devotes its attention to the priorities identified by its Member States. The scheme ultimately aims to develop a common understanding of the linkages between human rights and development or humanitarian actions, establish thematic groups to deal with human rights issues in UN country teams, and have UN agencies develop cooperative programming arrangements to support national efforts to foster a culture of human rights, including through education.

At the invitation of the Independent Electoral Commission of Botswana, Prof. Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, sent a 15-member multidisciplinary team of observers to participate in the forthcoming general elections, which will be held countrywide on October 30. The African Union Observer Team, led by Hon. Justice J. B. Kalaile, Chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission in Malawi and composed of Parliamentarians, members of Electoral Management Bodies, Civil Society Organisations and other officials drawn from various African Countries, arrived in Botswana on October 24.

Parliamentarians from around the world have called for greater action to defend sexual and reproductive rights of all individuals. Over 130 parliamentarians from 90 countries committed themselves to a set of actions that would help realize the ICPD Programme of Action, agreed upon ten years ago by the governments of the world in Cairo, with the goal of bringing about sexual and reproductive rights and health for all by 2015. The missing MDG: Universal access to reproductive health services by 2015 is for millions of women and men simply a matter of life and death.