Democratic revolutions in North Africa

Many years have passed since Braudel studied societies around the Mediterranean Sea as a system. Centuries since Europeans reinvented their Greek cultural origins (science, philosophy) via the Arab world. Centuries since Muslim and Christian pirates created their ‘democratic’ utopias in the borders of the two worlds. I think it is now time to set democratic struggle in both sides of the ancient world in its international context and to recognise its routes, which by no means follow a single direction.

DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

After the collapse of the Communist Bloc and the subsequent lack of an economic and political antagonistic model, the western peoples’capacity to effectively challenge their native ruling elites deteriorated to a substantial degree. So did the capacity of the ruling elites in the Arab countries to exploit the competition between two Great Powers in the name of an independent policy. Since the communist threat disappeared, the ruling elites in both the Arab and the Western World searched for its new equivalent and they found it in the Islamic fundamentalist movement.

The expansion of neoliberal policies across the world was based on the capital’s ability to abandon western developed countries for the non-democratic developing ones, where workers weren’t able to protest that easily to demand better wages and labor rights. In the past, the extreme exploitation of workers in non-democratic countries could diminish the workers’ exploitation in western developed – and in part, exactly because of this reality – democratic countries. Today, in contrast, the capital’s capacity to exploit workers in countries in development has brought about a systemic blackmail upon their western counterparts, in order for the latter to accept their increasing exploitation.

Therefore, because democracy in the West and dictatorship in the Arab world and other areas are interrelated processes, if not a differentiated angle of the very same process, we have to consider the struggle against neoliberalism in the West and the struggle against authoritarianism in the Arab world as parts of a common struggle for democracy.

Charles Tilly, an emblematic figure in the movement research field, had included a prediction in a book published in 2004[1]: Democracy is going to lose ground in the coming years in the western developed countries and emerge in countries under development. His hypothesis seems to maintain its credibility.

The Arab peoples rose up demanding a real democracy (one of the western type). Their successful struggle against authoritarian regimes, which, until then, seemed to be impervious, triggered a wave of democratic consciousness in Europe and equipped mobilising forces with an alternative to the ‘corrupted’ party politics and the ‘ineffective’ movement politics. Protesting against the authorities as a single unit, acting beyond classical political, religious and social boundaries constituted a repertoire of action appropriate for the political conditions, not only in the Arab countries, but in some western ones as well. The massive rally in the central square, as a phenomenon, which sets a direct political challenge for the authorities, became modular very quickly outside the boundaries of the Arab world. Puerta del Sol in Madrid and Syntagma Square in Athens were transformed to permanent sit-ins and rallying spots for all the protestors in the fashion of Tahrir Square. ‘OccupyWall Street’ or ‘Occupy London’ can also be viewed as a direct application of Tahrir Square’s lesson as well.

Tilly in his last great book about ‘Democracy’[2] concluded that the democratisation process derives from the longstanding struggle of the people, while the de-democratisation process is a result of the steep withdrawal of elites from the democratic game and rules. Indeed, what we can notice nowadays in many countries of the West is the sharp confinement of democratic rights in the name of financial stability. Greece is just an extreme example of what happens when policies are dictated to the local government from abroad with the national parliament being bypassed. On the other hand, it is obvious that the gains of the Arab revolutions are, until now, still at stake and the need for a sustainable massive struggle, in order for democratic rights and freedoms to be stabilised and broadened is more than clear.

Just as in Heraclitus logic ‘one can both descend and ascend the very same path’, the same applies in Tilly’s conclusion: That democratisation and de-democratisation are potential outcomes of the very same political process.[3] In this sense, democracy and dictatorship are not separated by any great walls, since nowadays we notice de-democratisation processes occurring in typically democratic regimes and democratisation processes in typically dictatorial regimes. Therefore, democracy bears a big stake and can never be considered as a secured acquisition.

RADICALISATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The democratisation process is a complex one not only in the Arab countries, but almost everywhere. The analysis of this process is something that exceeds the ambitions of this article. However, since the latter would have never been written if Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions had not occurred, I’m going to attempt to analyse the radicalisation process that took place on 14 January in Tunisia and 25 January in Egypt and turned two initially small demonstrations into key-revolutions for the democratic struggle all over the world. For this reason, I will set the issue in comparative perspective and I’ll attempt to recognise the causal mechanisms behind the radicalisation process following the theoretical and methodological framework that Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow and Doug Mc Adam introduced in the social movement research field.[4] But firstly lets focus on the empirical data.

Dhekra Haouashi, an activist who participated in the events of 14 January in Tunis, described them in a public statement[5] in the following way:

‘On January 14th a general strike had been arranged in Tunis. […] The city was empty. Police was absent. For the first time we weren’t surrounded by thousands of policemen. […] For the first time after December 17th there were TV cameras and we could give interviews to the journalists. […] 200 activists who had gathered from 7am started shouting slogans. ‘Work, Freedom, Dignity’, ‘Down with the DCR‘. […] People from the poor neighborhoods of Tunis started joining the movement. In a couple of hours 500-600 protesters had already gathered. We decided to march via Habib Bourguiba. We had nothing. Neither flags nor loudspeakers nor means to defend ourselves […]. In the first turn police blocked the street. We were wondering if the policemen would shoot at the crowd as they did in the past, but the presence of foreign media gave them little chance. We had no illusions, but it was difficult then to go back. […] We gathered once again in order to break the blockade. We achieve this hard but quickly. No one could stop us. Police attempted to disperse our demonstration. But in 10 minutes the number of protesters had been doubled and we were then about 1000 protestors in Habib Bourguiba. We were marching toward the Interior Ministry which was the symbol of the dictatorial regime and police oppression. […] Since we arrived […] we didn’t stop shouting our slogan ‘Ben Ali step down’. Hour after hour the crowd was increasing and we couldn’t believe it. Cops in civilian clothes were waiting in the side streets totally infuriated. At 1 pm we were 50.000 people from all the districts and closer cities demanding for the dictator to go. We had realised that it was over, so we were determined to stay until he leaves the country. The willingness for the sit-in was a given. At 2 pm the funeral of a martyr who was killed a day before was passing by that place. Then the police decided to attack without any warning. Protestors were so crammed that couldn’t breathe. The [violent"> reaction of the people, who were afraid that the police was shooting upon us, led to the death of one or more. A lot of tear gas thrown on our back pushed the crowd further. Tunisians are not experienced in demonstrating, so they started fleeing. However, they regrouped quickly. The repression of this demonstration included extreme violence. […] But the dictator had already fled the country and we could continue our struggle with much more hope’.

Ahmed Eid, one of the organisers of the mobilisations that led to the Revolution of 25 January in Egypt, informed us about that day in his interview.[6]

‘On January 25th we had organised just another protest. This took place on the occasion of the bombing act committed against a Christian church in Cairo. This event had a catalyst influence upon the people who participated in the protest events of 25th January […]. Police forces, which were afraid of a second islamist burst against Christians, had dispersed across all over the country to protect the big churches and were exhausted. So, in the first day of the revolution people filled the streets […]. Before we occupied the Square we had started demonstrating. Protesting on the streets was our goal. The occupation of the Square was a spontaneous act. This was incredible even for us. Many different groups had arranged protests in different places of the city, streets and squares. We couldn’t predict the kind of dynamics to emerge. We just let it free to develop. We were saying that, if 5.000 people gather in a square and depending on their willingness to push and crush the police lines, we will try to unify them. And that’s exactly what happened. The number of participants exceeded all expectations. Totally out of imagination. Thanks to the dynamics of this demonstration we crushed the police lines and marched towards Tahrir. […] Then we decided to encircle the Interior Ministry. […] Right there people started the back and forth with the police. During this battle both protestors and the police got exhausted. By the way, people sat down in the Square. There was no plan for occupation. It just happened. […] But everything contributed these days; the Tunisian revolution, the bombing act, the regime’s response, violence, everything. I repeat that the initial plan was about a small gathering and protest to the Interior Ministry. It was the massive and spontaneous participation of the people that led to the Revolution. Repression had the opposite effect than expected, so that the crowd pushing reached Tahrir Square. Then the police closed all the entrances of the Square. At the same time the flow of the people was continuing. […] Police was taken by surprise in front of such numbers of participants and it wasn’t reasonable on its part to use violence against this huge wave of people. […][The police"> thought they could trap them in the Square. But they couldn’t guess what would happen. The real violence started in the afternoon when protesters attempted to reach the Parliament. […] the police started throwing canisters of tear gas and water upon protesters. From this moment started the reaction, when a few people threw the first stones in order to protect themselves by the police’.

‘Everything contributed these days’. It’s obvious that the radicalisation process was an issue of many interrelated factors. In both cases a small mobilisation had been organised in conditions of polarisation between challengers and regime forces. Nothing more. The people simply tried to realise the cost of a potential mobilisation and the possible opportunities available to them. In this sense, the assessment of the threats and opportunities that lied ahead, with their inevitable meeting with the police forces, seems to constitute a crucial factor. In both cases the absence of police forces was considered as an opportunity to go ahead. The repression that followed sought to set the mobilisation cost higher than the cost of inaction. But at the same time, the increasing polarisation was reinforcing mobilisation. In other words, repression in conditions of interconnected mobilisation and polarisation processes has the opposite from the expected results. It’s the so called ‘repression paradox’.[7] The vicious circle created by the link between mobilisation, repression and polarisation puzzles police forces as well. The emerging dilemma is: ‘to break the vicious circle using more violence, but at the same time risking the legitimisation of the regime itself, or being more cautious, and leave free space to the protestors, risking, however, an escalation of the demonstrations?’ Non-escalation of violence may be considered as an opportunity by bystanders to join the mobilisation as well as to radicalise their demands and forms of action. Therefore, radicalisation constitutes the ambiguous outcome of an interlocked process which, in my opinion, functions as figure 1 suggests.

Radicalisation results from a similar process, even in democratic regimes, as I’ve already shown analysing the case of 2008 riots in Greece.[8] It can also be a more long-lasting process.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/563/Figure1.jpg

STRUGGLING THANKS TO A GROWING MOVEMENT SECTOR

Since democratisation is an ambiguous process we can’t predict the future of the Tunisian, the Egyptian or other Arab country’s revolution. However, we have already noticed that these revolutions ‘are continuing’, thanks to a growing movement sector. New political actors such as the youth entered the scene in a dynamic way, old ones such as parties and trade unions increase and radicalise their activity, new organisations emerge, coordination between different organisations, unions and parties advance, networking via new technologies expands the mobilising structures and makes them function more rapidly. ‘Democracy’ had become a ‘master frame’ through which different social groups can formulate their claims, new aspirations emerge especially among the youth, and the activated boundary between the democratic forces and the supporters of the old regime seems to facilitate the movement forces’ rhetoric. Even if the favorable international political opportunity that exists now disappears in the future, Revolution will probably continue thanks to its first and most important issue: A growing movement sector.

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NOTES

[1] Tilly Charles 2004: Social Movements 1768-2004. New York: Paradigm Publishers
[2] Tilly Charles 2007: Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press
[3] ibid
[4] Mc Adam, Doug, Tarrow, Sidney, Tilly Charles 2001: Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[5] Her statement took place on 10/5/2011 in Athens during a public discussion for the Tunisian Revolution
[6] The interview was taken in Tahrir Square on 28/11/2011 by B. Rongas, D. Papanikolopoulos, Th. Theodwrou and M. Papanikolopoulou
[7] Tarrow Sidney 1998: Power in movement. Cambridge University Press
[8] Papanikolopoulos Dimitris 2009: “The causal mechanisms behind the December 2008 insurgency in Greece”. Paper for the international conference “Rioting and violent protest in comparative perspective” held in Athens on 9-11 December 2009