Economic Poverty Agreements: How the poor are excluded from trade negotiations

On paper, negotiations for Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) allow for the involvement of a range of organisations that should to some extent ensure the voice of the poor are heard in the construction of the agreements. Richard Kamidza outlines how in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) the reality is far different. The process of negotiations has deliberately excluded the poorest in Africa though their structure, complexity and a general lack of political will to be inclusive. “Surely poor constituencies cannot dream for a positive EPA when the process totally excludes them,” writes Kamidza.

There are sixteen countries in the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) configuration that are preparing negotiations on the economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with the European Union (EU). The negotiations are focusing on six clusters: agriculture, development issues, fisheries, market access, services and trade-related issues. All EPA-related work at regional level is being coordinated by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), to which all ESA member-states are signatories. Other regional secretariats attend as observers. To facilitate preparations in the process, several structures were established but only the National Development Trade Policy Forum (NDTPF) and the Regional Negotiating Forum (RNF) are analyzed for the purpose of this discussion.

Who represents the poor constituencies?

In line with the Cotonou agreement, the ESA-EPA road map allows non-state actors (including the private sector, non-governmental organisations, the media, community based organisations, religious organisations and trade unions) to participate in the on-going EPA negotiations both at the national and regional levels. Civic bodies, since their work involves interacting with both policy-makers and grassroots communities, are assumed to represent the poor constituencies. Thus, engaging civic bodies implies involving and consulting poor-constituencies in the EPA process, a development that enables them to appreciate the dynamics associated with the process. Impliedly, the structures facilitate the participation of the poor in the on-going EPA negotiations. But, are the poor constituencies’ voices already influencing the structures?

What is the extent of the poor constituencies?

The ESA configuration is the poorest in Africa with some countries having between 60-80% of the people living below the poverty datum line and up to 80% unemployment. Twelve member-states are classified as least developing countries (LDCs), which also suffer from serious supply-side bottlenecks that impose equally serious limitations for locally produced commodities to compete favouably with the EU market despite the provision of duty free access under the “everything else but arms” (EBA) initiatives. Anecdotal evidence shows that the existence of EBA initiatives has nothing positive to show in terms of benefits accruing to countries. Even countries categorized as non-LDCs such as Zimbabwe are not only facing similar production constraints, but also massive de-industrialization and de-agriculturalisation as a result of both neo-liberal policy frameworks and irrational nationalistic policy agendas. Indeed, the rates of socio-economic and political indicators prevailing in some ESA member-states are at variant with the zeal to “fast-track” the EPAs process.

A significant number of countries are also classified as highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) meaning that the huge but growing external debt overhang is not only retarding economic growth and development of respective member-states, but has also become economically exhausting and unsustainable; politically destabilizing; and ethically unacceptable. The debt is denying member-states resources to improve the supply-side constraints, particularly human resources development at a time when poor socio-economic conditions and political instability in many states is causing massive brain drain to developed economies. Both EBA and HIPC initiatives assume the existence of a higher proportion of poor constituencies, which are also finding it difficult to cope with any emerging trade regime. Also, lack of political will by institutions and individuals coordinating the process to include poor constituencies has remained a challenge that seems to be allowed to continue - albeit some few months before the deadline for the conclusion of an EPA between the ESA configuration and EU.

ESA negotiating Structures and the State of Play

National Development Trade Policy Forum

Each ESA member-state has established the National Development Trade Policy Forum (NDTPF) whose main function is to develop national positions that will be subsequently tabled at the Regional Negotiating Forum (RNF). NDTPFs are all cluster-inclusive and/or multi-sectoral, and cut across all stakeholders in the country. They are supposed to ensure wider and deeper consultations or involvement of key stakeholders and citizens, including the poor constituencies in this process. Stakeholders at the national level are supposed to collectively come up with strategies, synergies and options leading to just and fair EPA outcomes for respective member-states. In this respect, stakeholders are supposed to participate in EPA-related national conferences, seminars and workshops organized to discuss proceedings, processes and findings of commissioned sustainable impact assessment (SIA) studies and cluster studies. Each NDTPF is expected to produce written progress reports for onward presentation to RNF meetings and submission to the COMESA secretariat for future references. Lastly, NDTPFs are expected to come up with both offensive and defensive cluster interests and positions which feed into regional preparation agendas.

However, the events to date indicate that NDTPFs lack wide and deep consultations or involvement of all stakeholders. It has been observed that participation in NDTPFs of some countries excludes those stakeholders who are perceived as critical of the prevailing governance and political systems and socio-economic conditions. This means that the limited democratic space constrains free participation of civic bodies in the process.

For instance in Zimbabwe, a sour relationship between civic bodies and government means that mostly regional civic bodies have been participating in this process. To date, no members of nationally-based civic bodies have been part of the government delegation attending RNF meetings. In other countries, the civic bodies are largely inactive and very weak, therefore unable to mount a serious engagement in NDTPFs activities. This means that wide and deep involvement of all stakeholders, particularly the poor constituencies, still remains one of the biggest challenges facing NDTPFs in their engagement in EPA negotiations. This also means the low mobilization of citizens and/or exclusion of the poor in this process. Further, this means weak networking and synergies of strategies among stakeholders. Ultimately, this leads to relatively weaker negotiable positions vis-à-vis the EC, and dangerous and unviable EPA outcomes that are incapable of assisting in transforming economies to the benefit of poor constituencies.

Due to deliberate exclusion of civic bodies from the process, the publicity of EPAs has remained largely unsatisfactory. Most EPA-related events and activities have gone without notice by the media at the level of both the NDTPFs and RNF. Chances are therefore that the citizenry, let alone poor constituencies, may fail to follow the process with the view to how to deal with the pitfalls of any agreement.

In addition, the COMESA secretariat seems to have failed to monitor and ensure that countries comply with their own rules and procedures of engagement in the EPA process. Indeed, failure to deposit reports make it impossible for interested stakeholders in the ESA configuration and beyond to review the process with the view to understand the dynamics at each NDTPF, and subsequently RNF negotiation process. Without publicity and close scrutiny, it becomes difficult to assess the level of NDTPFs’ accountability, transparency and the democratic process, let alone encompassing poor constituencies in the process.

Regional Negotiation Forum

The Regional Negotiating Forum (RNF) is a structure that brings together representatives from NDTPFs, four regional secretariats and a regional civic body; Brussels-based ambassadors, especially cluster lead spokespersons; and selected observers and consultants to deliberate progress and ultimately prepare EPA positions for the ESA configuration. Participation support at the RNF is given to two government negotiators, a representative of non-state actor in each ESA country, representative of the regional civic body, regional secretariat officials and invited observers, experts and consultants. All supported participants have speaking rights and status during the meeting.

However, given the complexity of the negotiations coupled with deficiencies in both technical and financial capacities to undertake EPA negotiations in most ESA member-states, the coordination becomes equally complex and technical, requiring an equally broad-based and sound technical depth. This unfortunately, has not been satisfactory, leading to instances where crucial documents ended-up being distributed during the onset of the meetings and deliberate omission of items from the programme that had earlier on been circulated. This has a negative impact on member-states contribution at the regional meetings. However, this is not entirely of COMESA’s making but also a function of too much congestion on the EPA calendar and limited technical advisory (It is only this year that the Chief Technical Advisor has been hired to assist in the process) coupled with other regional mandates requiring similar attention.

Some countries have been sending only two participants to the RNF meetings in spite the availability of resources which end-up being returned to the EU – the sponsor of the process. This raises the question, “whose problem is it?” as well as pointing to the state of governance systems that are guiding the process in respective member-states. This development further indicates weak status of NDTPFs in terms of consulting and involving widely and deeply all stakeholders. Other countries have failed to establish viable NDTPFs that are capable of generating offensive and defensive positions to be subsequently tabled at the RNF meetings. In this respect, a few countries have been bringing more delegates using their own resources to support the process, a development that is encouraging in terms of providing the necessary moral support to negotiators.

It is thus fair and just to allow more civic bodies, especially the social movements, to become part of governments’ delegations to RNF and other meetings. Only when this happens, will the crying voice still at the periphery of defining a long-term trade regime with the EU, become louder. This is more so given that the invitation extended to regional civic bodies in 2004 meant to bring the voice of poor constituencies into the process has been withdrawn. The purging means no invitations to future RNF meetings and no accessing of sustainable impact assessment (SIA) studies of member-states that are deposed at the regional secretariat. But, the major casualty of COMESA’s reaction remains the “crying voice” that is watching the unbalanced and heavily biased match from outside the pitch.

Given the above, it seems as though COMESA lacks the political will to assist in widening and deepening the level of involvement and consultations. It also suggests that the organization has assumed the role of monitoring intervention of critical voices in this process with the view to purge all those who happen to be critical of them.

From the table, many countries’ delegations consist mainly of government officials and to some extent private sector representatives. Only Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe have widened the size of their delegation to RNF by including officials from relevant ministries and departments. From the table Kenya too has brought more participants to all the RNF meetings including a member of parliament.

The Secretariat as at the beginning of 2005 reported that it had not received any written reports on the activities of NDTPFs. This means that all past presentations by delegations on the progress and constraints were/are verbal, a development that often mislead the process aiming at achieving positive EPA outcomes. As expected, no criticism has arisen from country presentations, and as it stands, it is difficult to review the process in future.

Conclusion

The above discussion clearly shows limitations to including poor constituencies in the process of negotiating an EPA with the EU. There is generally lack of political will to centrally involve and consult civic bodies regarding the on-going process. There is no political will to ensure availability of resources for mobilizing poor constituencies.

At the beginning of 2005, only five studies out of 16 countries were deposited with the regional secretariat. While the studies have been produced, no rigorous engagement of the findings has taken place with the view to translating the pitfalls to poor constituencies. This position is further worsened by limited space for civic bodies to participate in the process. It therefore tends to reason that the participation of civic bodies are constrained by imperatives on the ground such as limited democratic space, poor state-civic relationships and outright exclusion by coordinating institutions in the capitals and beyond. The “poor’s voice” continues to cry out, pleading with the technocrats that “ESA is not for sale”. Surely poor constituencies cannot dream for a positive EPA when the process totally excludes them.

* Richard Kamidza is Senior Researcher at the African Centre for Constructive of Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).

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