Southern Sudan’s Peace Agreement: A Realistic Chance for Human Rights?

Southern Sudan’s Peace Agreement: A Realistic Chance for Human Rights?
By Denise Lifton

Enormous hopes rested on the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the rebels Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) when they signed a historic comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in Naivasha, Kenya, on Sunday, 9 January 2004. If sustained, it will mark the end of a more than two decades of war and allowing Sudan’s people to return to a civilian lifestyle with the accompanying rights and freedoms.

Supported by the international community under the auspices of the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the agreement is the outcome of an intense process of negotiations between both warring parties that gathered momentum in 2004: The peace accord signed on 26 May 2004 between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA/M was followed by a comprehensive framework agreement, the Nairobi Declaration, on 5 June 2004. On 31 December 2004, the last two protocols for a peace deal were signed - a permanent ceasefire and the implementation modalities of the protocols. Sudan now embarks on its pre-interim period of governance before the six-year interim period leading to a referendum on the South’s secession officially begins.

However, through all the joyous proclamations of peace and stability by the GoS and the SPLA/M, it is by far from sure whether this will be the beginning of a new period in Sudan’s history where human rights are respected and protected. Although the peace agreement has been a fairly smooth process since 2002 once high level delegations from both sides were involved, the longevity of the war, its underlying causes and the mistrust still evident between the two sides continue to be an impediment towards how both sides view each other and others involved in the conflict. Shifting alliances and this deep mistrust of all parties continue to pervade the atmosphere in Sudan, generating a profound lack of confidence in governance institutions and the environment in which they operate, and it will have important implications in the way a future National Unity Government will operate.

Moreover, even the official end of the north-south conflict will not necessarily bring immediate peace as potential uprisings and conflicts in the west, east, in Unity State and Upper Nile and continuing intra and inter ethnic conflict could destabilise Sudan once again. The human rights situation in the Sudan, although improved over a number of years, has sharply declined with the onset of the conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan and the situation in Sudan still remains tense with a number of high and low intensity conflicts throughout the country. The consequences and implications of these conflicts upon the peace process are still an unknown factor, and there is a significant danger that they could jeopardise the peace and cause instability.

The forthcoming several months, after a comprehensive peace agreement has been signed, will impact deeply on the stability of the country. This will have enormous consequences and implications for the human rights culture of the country. All parties to the conflict have committed serious human rights abuses that have been well documented.

Human Rights Trampled in One of Africa’s Longest-Running Conflicts

Civil war has characterised Sudan for all but ten years (1972-1982) since its independence in 1956. Two decades of the conflict, since its resumption with the SPLM/A in 1983, has devastated the country rich in natural and human resources, and the most heinous human rights violations have been committed. As a direct result of the fighting between north and south two million have died, three to four million have been displaced, and several million more have had their livelihoods disrupted. Sudan has consistently fallen into the lower echelons of the human and poverty indexes, where it was rated 139 out of 177 in the Human Development Index (HDI), and ranked 116/175 in the Gender-related Development Index, which measures the same achievements as the HDI but also takes into account the inequality in achievement between men and women. However, when the indicators highlighted in the Baseline Survey for Southern Sudan are taken into account these figures in reality should be much lower. This directly impacts economic, social and cultural rights of all Sudanese people – for example, the adult illiteracy rate countrywide is 41.2%, where many students are denied obtaining either a primary or secondary education due to migration, conflict and lack of governmental financial support.

In the past, the Government of Sudan has come under severe international criticism for its human rights record from the international community. Civil and political rights have been harshly repressed and the right to development in Sudan has been seriously adversely affected as a consequence of the fighting, affecting access to even the most basic of services such as education and health for the majority. Inversely, this has often led to human rights concerns as a low priority, and human rights violations were often carried out in a climate of impunity. The consequence of this has been for the international community to directly deal with alleviating suffering and responding to humanitarian needs in the short term.

Recently, the human rights situation has fluctuated according to the political atmosphere in Sudan and the Government’s flexibility. Reports from human rights organisations have stated that the human rights situation has slightly improved over the years, with fewer violations occurring within the civil and political spheres, as restrictions have been eased. Yet, this year has seen a number of simmering conflicts come to the fore, reversing the gains made in the past. The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on Extra Judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions on her recent visit to Sudan was “disturbed and alarmed by the gravity of the human rights abuses perpetrated in the Sudan,” and also stressed “the question of accountability as a fundamental principle in addressing violations of human rights.” Human rights violations committed particularly in the context of armed conflict is a worrying trend where security forces and militia allied to the GoS act with impunity.

Due particularly to the Darfur crisis in Western Sudan the human rights situation has steadily worsened over the past year, including war-related human rights abuses, such as killing, abduction, rape, displacement and extra-judicial executions. Human rights activists and defenders and opposition members, especially those associated with Darfur, have been detained and routinely harassed and are often held incommunicado detention without charge or trial. The international community has only recently begun to focus on the conflict, ongoing for over 20 months, and has highlighted the complete lack of accountability of human rights in Sudan. As the Government has gained a higher negative international profile as a consequence it has adversely rebounded on the rest of the country and made it more difficult for human rights activists to operate freely.

Ever since the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Sudan on Human Rights was abruptly ended in April 2003 there has been no independent monitoring of the human rights situation in Sudan. After a tense session during the 60th Session of the Committee on Human Rights in Geneva, where Sudan successfully lobbied to avoid the re-introduction of a Special Rapporteur, an independent expert on the situation of human rights with a mandate to investigate human rights in Sudan was realised and made his first trip to Sudan in mid-August. The ensuing report back to the UN will ensure that human rights ‘benchmarks’ remains a presence on the government’s agenda and that the GoS continues to be accountable for its actions, whether in a conflict or non-conflict situation.

There has been no effective promotion or protection structures functioning in the country. Human rights monitoring and work continues to remain a sensitive issue, where strict controls regulate work by non-governmental organisations. The promotion and protection of human rights in the Sudan can take on a multiplicity of activities, but presently very few national activities are ongoing to systematically address human rights violations in the country. There are few national structures in place that effectively works on promotion and protection issues. Although, particularly since the Darfur crisis began, the Government has engaged more with international partners to discuss human rights issues and to improve the human rights situation, there are still structural weaknesses, particularly with regards to functioning government institutions dealing with human rights.

Regional Perspective

Conflict elsewhere in the country will continue to exacerbate instability. It is important that the north-south peace process cannot be seen in isolation to the rest of the country. Potential spoilers of peace are numerous, and must be dealt with effectively. Many of these conflicts and potential hotspots could be exacerbated, with huge humanitarian and human rights consequences. Unless these are immediately dealt with, with the participation of the international community, the north-south peace could be jeopardised with new human rights abuses emerging.

North Sudan (including west and east Sudan)

There has been a lack of democratic tradition in the north, largely as a result of the history of power and governance in Sudan. There is an absence of appropriate governance institutions within the present regime. The militarisation of life in Sudan has significantly eroded the capacity of the GoS to deliver on many basic services. Significant amounts of natural resources have been diverted to the war effort. The present government has kept a tight hold on power mainly through legislative directives, imposing restrictions on an independent civil society, and a lack of reform and accountability within itself. There is a strict form of self-censorship that surrounds civil society institutions, and recently the Government passed several laws further restricting their work, such as the Press and Publications Law.

The National Intelligence and Security Services continue to implement its campaign of attacking and restricting the media and freedom of expression in Sudan. The NSA, since 11 September 2004, has resumed their policy of pre-censorship, particularly focusing on news on Darfur or the opposition party controlled by Turabi, the Popular National Congress (PNC), by reviewing and ordering the removal of articles prior to printing. This is in conflict with the presidential decree, issued on 12 August 2003, on press freedom, which officially lifted the censorship on newspapers operating under the jurisdiction of the NSA. Violence against students by security forces also remains a common practice and has increased recently.

In the north the state security apparatus takes on a myriad of forms and acts with impunity. In addition to the regular police force and the Sudan People’s Armed Forces, there is an external security force, an internal security force, a militia called the Popular Defence Forces, and a number of other semi-autonomous forces. The issue of demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) will become crucial in sustaining the core provisions of the CPA. The Government has implemented strict and repressive legislation, for example the National Security Forces Act, which forms the legal basis of their actions, as well as allowing for incommunicado detention for periods of six to nine months, needs to be completely overhauled. The Criminal Procedures Act 1991 strengthens the powers of law enforcement agencies without judicial review.

In the last several months the political tensions in Sudan have increased dramatically. There have been several alleged attempted coup attempts against the regime, all of which failed, and seizure of a number of weapons around Khartoum. This had given the government the opportunity of further detaining opposition members, particularly from the Popular Congress. Other main human rights concerns include: lack of accountability and impunity, particularly by the security forces; lack of independence of the judiciary; executions, torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment such as amputations, arbitrary arrests and detentions, harassment of political opposition, students and NGOs, widespread displacement, restrictions on basic freedoms, including freedom of opinion, expression, association and movement.

The government has expressed its support for human rights in a variety of fora, most recently during the Human Rights session in Geneva. The lack of ratification of major human rights treaties such as the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the Convention to End all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) signifies the GoS’ abdication of responsibility towards human rights furthered by a lack of harmonisation of domestic law with international norms and standards. Women in Sudan continue to be marginalised and discriminated against through legislation and cultural traditions that deny them the right to equal opportunities in all spheres of society. Unless there is a concerted action by the international community to keep this issue alive and continue to pressure the government, it seems extremely unlikely that at the present time the government would ratify either CEDAW or CAT. What seems more feasible is to wait for a national unity government to be established and to push the ‘SPLM side’ of government.

The West/Darfur

The Darfur region in western Sudan has been labelled by the UN as the world’s worst humanitarian and human rights crisis, where Sudanese troops and allied-militia have carried out a ‘scorched earth policy’ and ‘repeated crimes against humanity’ with impunity. Many human rights organisations, the UN and members of the international community have catalogued and reported an array of human rights violations perpetuated mainly by the GoS and through its armed proxy, the Janjaweed, Arab-speaking militias.
At the time of writing, over one million people have been uprooted in the conflict, and some 200,000 are refugees in Chad. Systematic human rights violations continue to occur: people are unable to return safely to their homes and harvest and the region has been subject to a scorched earth campaign in which huge areas have been burned and depopulated, and villages have been torched systematically. Most of the civilians have been driven into camps and settlements outside the larger towns, which are surrounded by the Janjaweed who continue to kill, rape, and pillage with impunity. Human rights defenders and lawyers are also targets for the security forces.

The 8 April 2004 ceasefire has already been violated numerous times, and both parties have failed to honour its provisions, intensifying the conflict and suffering for the population. It is essential that adequate documentation and monitoring of violations of attacks on civilians or crimes being perpetrated must be undertake or the UN’s declaration that they amount to crimes against humanity will continue to be empty words and perpetrators of these violations will continue to act with impunity.

The Commission of Inquiry into Darfur has proved itself to be inept: The committees on rape are hampered by lack of qualified personnel and an unclear mandate as to how they should proceed to take action against those found to have committed rape. The eight OHCHR monitors have left to take up their positions. It is unclear, at this time, what the talks between the government and rebels in Nigeria will yield. A UN resolution in September, although quite weak, called for the possibility of sanctions on the oil industry and the expansion and extension of the African Union (AU) monitoring mission, which the GoS has accepted in principle. The new UN Security Council resolution of November demanded that the government, rebel forces and other armed groups cease all violence. The conflict is also taking on a wider regional dimension with implications for the Middle East, as many Arab countries are supporting Sudan in its position that it needs more time to control and disarm the militias.

The East/Bejaland

Eastern Sudan, as like Darfur, is one of the most neglected regions of the country with humanitarian and human rights consequences. The Beja areas have equally been marginalised and exploited without adequate representation in central government, but continue to escape international attention. The Beja people’s basic grievances have as yet to be addressed, and simmering conflict could implode if either the crisis in Darfur is not politically resolved or if the CPA does not bring much needed development to their area. Periodically throughout the year, the Beja Congress has warned that they will resume taking up arms if they continue to be excluded from the peace talks. Although the GoS did acknowledge the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) as a ‘political player’ because of its links with the SPLM, there has been no concerted action to resolve the issues of concern put forward either by the NDA or by the Beja Congress, nor to include them, as suggested by the NDA, in a broad-based forum representing all Sudanese political forces, in the peace talks.

The recent ongoing talks between the Government and the NDA in Cairo were postponed because of Ramadan. However, unless sensitive issues, such as a military presence in the East is resolved, the area will continue to experience tensions and instability. The lack of consensus within the NDA, particularly of the Eastern groups, will also affect the political discussions on the East. There have been recent reports of the deteriorating security situation within the area, and according to media reports the government has moved its troops along the border with Eritrea. Although instability in the East has its root causes in internal domestic matters, the conflict, like Darfur, has the potential to have widespreading ramifications for the whole of Sudan, affecting potentially the peace agreement between the GoS and the SPLM/A.

Unless the ceasefire agreement in Darfur holds, and a peace agreement is implemented, and the tensions in the east are pacified, the north-south conflict could be replaced by an east-west one. Many groups outside of the GoS-SPLM/A negotiations feel marginalised by the peace process, emphasising some of the causes that led them to conflict and that has highlighted the discrimination they have keenly felt in the past. Both parties need to commit themselves to including a peace settlement of the Darfur crisis into any comprehensive peace agreement, and the tensions that are felt in other regions of Sudan. The international community urgently needs to make more efforts to address these tensions.

Ongoing Insecurity in Southern Sudan

Instability still characterises much of Southern Sudan. The peace agreement does not encompass south-south fighting. Ethnic groups, such as the Nuer and the Dinka, continue to be involved in inter-ethnic conflict as well as intra-ethnic conflict, for example in May and June in Rumbek county and Aluakluak and Ngop payams and in Yirol county fighting had displaced an estimated 15,000 people between Dinka sections of Agar (Rumbek) and Atwot (Yirol) in Bahr el Ghazal.

Continuing clashes in the Upper Nile region, especially around Malakal, could also destabilise the south, where tens of thousands have been displaced in the Shilluk Kingdom region since early March. The fighting has already violated the peace agreement. The Civilian Monitoring Protection Team (CMPT) documented reports of villages between Malakal and Tonga along the Upper Nile that have been emptied and destroyed. Civilians within the Shilluk Kingdom are not being protected and it has been reported that the government-backed militias are pursuing the same scorched earth policy as in Darfur. Human rights abuses continue to be committed in this area.

The volatility of this region is highlighted by the continuous instability as militias formerly aligned to the GoS and the SPLM/A realign their interests. These shifting alliances will continue well up to, and possibly beyond, implementation of the CPA if the SPLM does not effectively engage with the various groups in an inclusive and participatory manner. The SPLM/A has preferred to conduct south-south reconciliation with various armed groups on a bilateral basis outside of the IGAD process. This is of some concern as continuing grievances over land, water rights and political and economic power will motivate potential spoilers to the peace. However, it is more indicative of problems in the leadership that continue to want to retain control over the political debate and its environment. Pressure will need to be applied to ensure that ‘hardliners’ within the Movement do not exert complete control over the process and sideline the more moderate wing.

The sustained lack of south-south reconciliation will have negative consequences for the stability of southern Sudan. These government-aligned militias control parts of the south, providing security around government-held garrison towns and particularly around the sensitive areas of the oilfields in Western Upper Nile. The role of the militias, how they are to be incorporated into the peace negotiations and governed needs to be fully discussed and monitored. Within the Security Framework Agreement, article 7 assumes the dismantling of all armed groups, yet it is sufficiently broad and vague in its implementation as to how this could be peacefully accomplished. It remains to be seen how the ceasefire and implementation modalities will address this issue. Part of the problem is also the proliferation of small arms in southern Sudan and demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) will be a major issue after the CPA and the adequacy of local authorities to deal with the violence, of giving impunity to the perpetrators and a lack of due process in the rule of law.

An additional source of insecurity in the south is the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which has been operating out of Eastern Equatoria, near the Ugandan border. The LRA has used southern Sudan as a base for incursions into northern Uganda, with the support of the government of Sudan. Since Kampala accused Khartoum of supporting the LRA, an agreement between the two countries under Operation Iron Fist, which allows Ugandan troops to hunt the LRA on Sudanese soil, has been extended. Although Khartoum has denied aiding the LRA, allegations continue of their support. Since support for the LRA from the GoS has dwindled, the LRA has taken to committing atrocities against the population and reconstruction efforts of southern Sudan for survival. LRA activity has currently disrupted villages in southern Sudan as they destroy, loot, kill and displace villages. The insecurity is having a profound impact on the security in southern Sudan, particularly around the areas of Juba and Jabelein, Lubanga-Tek, and Nisitu. Without engaging the LRA in peace talk, instability through its actions will continue to undermine peace within southern Sudan.

Outlook

Conflict in the north and southern disunity, plus control of the oilfields, targeting of civilians, a weak civil society, and widespread human rights abuses will all have to be resolved to ensure that there is a successful political transition through a democratisation process, including elections, protection of human rights, reconciliation with other groups and inclusiveness within the political process. Again, international support will be crucial to ensure that these issues are resolved and supported through mechanisms that uphold human rights and the rule of law.

Political Challenges of Establishing a Unity Government

For many years, the country has remained divided, and in the immediate short and medium term will continue to do so, but it will have to be prepared to make further steps over the forthcoming months, and years as stipulated in the Machakos Protocol, to tread a wary step in the direction of unity. It cannot be taken for granted that the peace agreement is going to permanently solve the north-south war, particularly now with the conflict in Darfur. It is interesting to note that both sides were brought together by pressure, and although the Nairobi Declaration commits both sides to peace, the security arrangements highlight how fragile the situation has become. Indeed it is very telling the motives of both parties when the SPLA/M chief and future vice president of Sudan, Dr. John Garang, highlighted the motives of both parties in an interview: “This peace agreement was reached, not necessarily because the parties wanted to, but because both parties were forced to … We negotiated an agreement, because we were forced to by a set of pressures. The cost of continuing the war was much higher for both sides than the cost of stopping the war, so we stopped the war.” The talks were successful because of unprecedented pressure by the international community on both parties, as well as the incentive of ‘peace benefits.’

It is laudable that both parties have stated their commitment to the core provisions within the CPA, yet it can not be underestimated that they will continue to gather and strengthen their own forces if there is a possibility that the peace collapses. The security arrangements will be crucial in this respect as the number of returnees, those in marginalized areas, and those in the south will continue to expect a sizeable SPLA force to guarantee their security.

Forming a unity government might possibly be one of the hardest provisions within the CPA to fulfil in terms of democratic principles and good governance. A history of bad governance in the north and a lack of tradition of governance from the south will mean that a unity government will initially struggle with the issues of participation, transparency and accountability if strong structures and institutions are not put in place immediately. The reality is that both north and south are completely diametrically opposed in the levels of development, infrastructure, and capacity so that it is almost necessary to have two completely different strategies and approaches. The north already has set structures in place for dealing with human rights; it has a functioning security service, judiciary and established state structures. Yet, these have over the past years been abused and weakened so that an elite centre can maintain power and control over the periphery - one of the causes of the many conflicts characterising Sudan at the moment. In the south, many structures and systems simply do not exist. Some of these will have to be ‘started from scratch’, as the SPLM turns itself into the governing authority in the south.

Post conflict Sudan must include the participation of all groups, including non-state actors. They should be able to fully partake in all sectors according to the mandate of the comprehensive peace agreement. This includes full participation in the debate on the future shaping of Sudan. Unless there is real and full participation of all groups, even those that had previously resorted to arms, it will be extremely easy once again for Sudan to re-enter into conflict. With the proliferation of small arms in the country, and in the East Africa region as a whole, and the continuing activity of those armed groups and militias that have been excluded from participating in the peace negotiations there is a real chance that Sudan could backslide into anarchy and civil war.

If, as the CPA protocols stipulate, Sudan must move towards a unity government, then these conflicts, of low and high intensity, must be dealt with as part of the problem and not as a separate issue. This must also involve the question of natural resources, specifically issues over oil, land and water. Control over oil has already exacerbated conflict in the Abyei region, one of the contested areas with a special status within the peace agreement. This conflict has led to numerous human rights violations, including forced displacement and as access to the areas remains difficult there continues to be a lack of human rights monitoring in the region. These questions, which also lie at the heart of the root causes of the conflict, need to be resolved immediately. The power and wealth sharing protocols specifies the establishment of certain commissions to provide on these areas of concern. The challenge will be to ensure proper implementation of these institutions that have only been vaguely described.

Building Safeguards for the Protection of Human Rights

The completion of the peace process does not mean that Sudan’s humanitarian and human rights problems will be overcome. There will also be new enormous obstacles within the country, such as the mass movement of the return of hundreds of thousands refugees from neighbouring countries and millions of internally displaced people (IDP) - moving mainly from the north to the south. It will become important that protection measures are established to ensure the safety and security of the population, that reconciliation mechanisms are supported, and that the rights of vulnerable people, particularly women, children, and the elderly are not violated with regard to their repatriation, rehabilitation and reintegration.

The South is going to need a huge investment in infrastructure and services as it tries to rehabilitate itself in peacetime. The South has been completely devastated by years of war. It is a huge and daunting task to start reconstruction in the region. There is little in terms of infrastructure, administrative and people capacity to start effectively functioning, let alone in terms of human rights and development. The lack of education, skills, infrastructure and institutions leaves the south in an extremely difficult situation for effective self-rule. The SPLM/A is a militarised autocratic entity, with little transparency in either the way it has regulated itself or in the civilian institutions it has tried to establish, and with even less success in managing to turn itself into a civilian administration. Good governance, rule of law and democractic principles will be essential to the success of any governing authority in the South and its ability to deliver effective services to the people.

There is no entrenched human rights culture in the Sudan. War and continuing instability has made fulfilling even the most basic fundamentals of human rights a difficult task. The promotion of human rights cannot be achieved if it is not respected and protected. This is an important element if Sudan is to fulfil the democratisation process that will begin with the pre-interim, and the six-year interim period, but should really begin immediately.
In many ways, when talking about human rights in the south, and what it means to southern Sudanese, very few know and understand that they have rights let alone its implications. Human rights has been consistently violated over the past several decades where growing up within a war situation for generations has attuned people to a militarised way of life where respect for rights is not acknowledged, featured and rarely upheld. Basic civil and political rights, for example rights to liberty and security, have not been upheld or respected, and many segments of the population have been discriminated against, particularly women, children and the elderly. Women continue to be marginalised and discriminated against, are subject to customary laws and are victims of sexual and gender-based violence. Girls are often excluded from participating in education. The judicial system operates on a skeletal staff with inadequate resources and infrastructure; and police and law enforcement personnel have a lack of training, skills and knowledge on administration of justice and human rights. Prisons are overcrowded, conditions are extremely poor, and there is no training for prison staff in basic principles.

Steps will need to be taken to ensure that a successful military transition in the south is undertaken. These will need to include disengaging the armed forces, maintaining a ceasefire and demilitarising the state apparatus. It will be extremely important that the international community and its partners are able to support, monitor, advise and fund programmes that focus on these issues, particularly for demobilisation, disarming, and reintegration of soldiers from both sides.

Both parties must be held accountable for past abuses in order that a lasting peace may be sustainable. The experience of other countries who have come out of civil war and/or armed conflict, or experienced gross human rights violations throughout their history, has shown that some sort of national reconciliation mechanism has done much to reconcile the nation with its past, as in South Africa and Sierra Leone, where truth and reconciliation commissions were established. It might not necessarily be the appropriate time for Sudan to be thinking of establishing some such sort of institution in the short term, but there will be a need for some mechanism as peace settles and an institution is needed that will be able to document and address their grievances as a means to move forward.

The establishment of a national human rights commission and an independent, impartial and credible judicial process must be established so that there is respect for the rule of law. If human rights are to be made a central tenet of any peace agreement, it is important that the Government of Unity (GoU) undertakes its responsibilities to uphold, respect and protect human rights in its entirety. This means that human rights is not merely seen as a token to placate the international community, but through the implementation of the protocols the GoU’s promise to its citizens of a stable, democratic and peaceful Sudan is realised.

Commitment needed by both sides will be huge in order to tackle the lack of accountable and transparent government structures within both the GoS and the SPLM that continues to hinder development in rule of law, democracy and good governance. In the South, the continuing militarisation of these institutions also compounds the difficulties of forming civilian administrations that will effectively work on behalf of the people. Reconstruction efforts will have to promote the full integration of north and south, particularly amongst Sudanese civil society organisations. It will have to establish, develop and build connections between the north and the south through networking, capacity building and strengthening of civil society organisations and institutions. Protection and promotion principles must be integrated into all policies and programmes in order to increase the respect for human rights countrywide. This should include capacity building for both governmental and non-governmental institutions to increase their skills and knowledge and to also incorporate understanding of international human rights standards.

Other issues that will need to be undertaken include: capacity for protection issues that is lacking in both institutions, with a lack of skilled human rights officials particularly in areas out of Khartoum and in the south; the need to create specific mechanisms on protection, including the establishment of a national human rights institution, ensuring its independence from the executive and the creation of its branches countrywide; the harmonisation of domestic legislation with international norms and standards, taking into regard many discriminating laws, particularly against women with regard to Shari’a, and for the implementation of those international treaties ratified and not promulgated into national legislation; and the establishment and implementation of an Interim National Constitution will be important considering that it will also reflect the principles of the south Sudan constitution.

Any lasting peace agreement must provide fully for the protection and promotion of human rights in all segments of Sudanese society. Human rights needs to be fully guaranteed for post-conflict Sudan including: the lifting of the state of emergency; the role and laws of the security forces; prohibition of all acts of torture; discrimination against women; freedom of expression; independence of the judiciary; freedom of movement; freedom of assembly and association; protection mechanisms, such as for IDPs; rights of the child; the right to development; and the ratification of CAT and CEDAW.

United Nations (UN) and donor funding within the short term has concentrated on alleviating the humanitarian needs of the population and is focusing in the long term mainly on development and infrastructural needs. The relationship between donors and partners will be extremely important, particularly in the following months after signature. Human rights, for many donors, have not been a strategic priority, particularly as many donors will continue to concentrate on the short-term humanitarian needs of the country. The challenge is now for the international community and ‘friends’ of Sudan to keep up the pressure to ensure that there is proper and adequate implementation of the peace agreement and human rights remains a central concern throughout. Reneging by either party to the CPA will have terrible consequences for the people of Sudan and proper provision must be made for a full and independent monitoring team on the peace agreement.

* Denise Lifton is a freelance consultant working on human rights in Africa. She is currently working in Sudan. She can be contacted on: [email][email protected]