Genocide and the history of violent expansionism
The 20th century had been termed the “century of genocides”. In 2004 the first of a series of these turned a hundred years. It reminded us of a history of mass violence directed against specifically defined population groups, which had to a certain extent its origins and roots in the violent expansion of European colonialism. The German empire played a particularly prominent (though by no means exclusive) role during this era of violently imposed foreign domination. 2005 reminds of another such event, when the mass killing in then “German East Africa” (the oppression of the so-called “Maji-Maji rebellion”) turns a century. It can be assumed that this dark chapter in the history of what is euphemistically called “North-South relations” is even less noticed in public debate than the first of its kind a year earlier.
One might assume that it would be part of an established common understanding that what started in early 1904 in the German colonial territory called South West Africa was by standards applicable today a genocide. This, at least, is the conclusion presented by the “Whitaker Report”, adopted as an official document by a United Nations body. It lists the German colonial war of 1904 to 1907 as the first genocide of the 20th century. The most striking phenomenon in dealing with the events a hundred years later is therefore, that in public perception as well as scholarly and political discourse the views still differ fundamentally.
For large parts of collective memory in Germany this chapter is either closed or even forgotten. In contrast to this widespread amnesia or indifference the trauma lives on among parts of the Namibian population. It keeps the generations of descendants to the victims in demand for recognition of and compensation for the crimes committed. As the selectivity of the (non) commemorations during 2004 showed, the legacy and its treatment remain a battlefield. It provided a forum for often uncompromising exchanges on how to come to terms with the past in the present.
In August 2002, the Herero Paramount Chief commented upon the private claims for reparations from the German government and a few German companies, which upon his instructionswere initiated at a US-American Court during late 2001. While doing so, he declared the land question in Namibia to be solely a Herero issue. A spokesperson for the Coordinating Committee for the First Official Commemoration of the Ovaherero Genocide stated two years later that genocide was in Namibia only committed towards the Herero.
Such monopolising claims are tantamount to blatant denial of the sacrifices made by other communities like the Nama. It also makes a mockery of the suffering of the Damara and San. To all these – today even more marginalized – groups this exclusion adds insult to injury and is certainly not conducive to concerted efforts of those to whom justice had been denied for generations. At the same time, it implicitly and ironically also undermines the legitimacy of the Herero case, which otherwise ought to be undisputed and beyond any doubt relevant for coming to terms with the past.
Members of the group tend to brush aside the concern expressed over such monopolisation of the victim status. Instead, accusations of racism and Eurocentrism come in handy to dismiss any discourse on how best an advocacy might be pursued in the interest of more than just one among those groups. The claims to genuine identity and corresponding victim status create an aura of exclusivity and consequently a we-they divide with the rest of the world. This competitive way of pursuing the case prevents any meaningful dialogue. The motives of those, who in such reductionist way seek the recognition so far denied to them, might be perfectly understandable. They want to pursue and achieve in their own view only historical justice. But this prevents wider coalitions and seems to happen at the expense of others, who remain outside of any public interest and are therefore denied recognition as victims.
The Namibian government did address the matter in a different but even less constructive perspective. It kept a demonstratively low profile on the general issue. No government-sponsored initiative took upon itself to prepare any coordinated event to commemorate the dark chapter (and by doing so flag the recognition of the primary resistance during these days as an early part of nation building).
The only official act honoured the centenary with the issuing of a special stamp on Independence Day on 21st March 2004. In the declared spirit of national reconciliation it did not single out any particular group. Instead, the motive chosen was a white dove. This symbolic vagueness denied victims any degree of visibility and confined them to absolute anonymity. At the same time, such evasive symbolism saved the descendants of the perpetrators from any confrontational challenge to deal with the legacy. Namibia’s government also explicitly distanced itself from the initiative by a group of Herero to seek reparations from Germany.
The President and other senior government officials did not follow an invitation to attend the ceremonies in Okahandja, which marked the hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the Herero war against German colonial occupation in January 2004. Hifikepunye Pohamba, successor to Sam Nujoma as Head of State, however, did attend the ceremony commemorating the battles in the Waterberg plateau area in mid-August 2004. It remains speculation to what extent this might have been necessitated by the fact that the German Minister for Economic Cooperation, representing the biggest single donor country was one of the main speakers. When the Herero gathered for their annual meeting end of August at the graves of their ancestors, government officials attended the commemoration of the beginning of the armed struggle by Swapo elsewhere. The parallel activities illustrated the contrasting traditions of resistance in a case, where – differently from neighbouring Zimbabwe – the first chimurenga related mainly to other local groups than the second one.
The Namibian government seemed to be almost in silent agreement with those among the German-speaking minority in Namibia and those representing the official position of the German government by treating the centenary almost as a non-issue. The German ambassador to Namibia on occasion of the commemoration ceremony in January 2004 (which in contrast to Namibian government officials he actually did attend) reiterated his government’s position by explaining: “It would not be justified to compensate one specific ethnic group for their suffering during the colonial times, as this could reinforce ethnic tensions and thus undermine the policy of national reconciliation which we fully support.” This sounds sensible but serves as a convenient excuse for no compensation of the descendants who suffered most from direct oppression, defeat and subsequent exploitation and subjugation through the German colonial authorities.
There would be an obvious justification for affirmative action related preferential treatment with regard to a redistribution of the land taken under German colonialism. It should benefit as a priority these communities, who were robbed of their land as a prelude and aftermath to the genocide. But the land issue is treated as if the historical connotations would not offer a direct frame of reference as to who should be entitled to claims and compensated accordingly. This benefits the government’s main clientele living in or coming from the densely populated former Owamboland (north of the zone of direct German occupation), but neither Herero nor Nama, Damara and least of all the San.
In what might be termed a pact among elites, the German government has chosen to opt for the more convenient avenue of playing along with such biased official Namibian policy. Germany’s Foreign Minister had stated as late as 2003 that no apology will be offered, which might be considered of relevance for compensation. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder during his first official visits to African countries in January 2004 – at a time when the genocide turned a century – skipped the former colony and thereby simply ignored the historical part of German-Namibian relations at the centre of the debate in 2004.
The German position took a surprising turn from the previous official denial during a year in which as a positive experience an unexpected number of local, regional and national NGO initiatives raised the issue in Germany by means of lectures, seminars, exhibitions and related public events and hence created some unofficial but visible discourse over the unfinished business.
The Minister for Economic Cooperation attended the ceremonies in August 2004 remembering the biggest military clashes between Herero and Germans taking place a hundred years earlier. In an emotional speech she admitted on behalf of her government guilt and remorse. She stated that the German colonial war a hundred years earlier would qualify from today’s perspective as genocide. Asked for an apology (the word did not appear in the text she read out), she expressed the understanding that her whole speech was an apology. This provoked harsh criticism back in Germany mainly by members of the opposition parties, who accused the Minister for risking an expensive bill for being carried away. There remains, however, so far a lack of visible subsequent consequences, which would indicate that this has resulted indeed in a direct change of policy towards the issues of compensation with any budgetary implications.
Interesting is the fact that the treatment of the historical issue (intentionally or not) remains confined to the colonial chapter. It avoids any references to the subsequent developments in Germany. After all, to reflect upon genocidal atrocities is more than dealing with guilt and remorse (though this in itself would be a perfectly legitimate and sufficient motive to do so). In the Namibian case, this links up with the more specifically German trajectory. The question is, if and to what extent the colonial genocide paved the way for the particular concept of final solution and extinction of the enemy, culminating in the war crimes and the holocaust in the 1940s.
In a colonial situation as it prevailed in Namibia in the early 20th century, the denial of human value to the “uncivilised natives” is predicated in the structurally racist set-up of colonialism. This is even more the case when the aim of colonial rule is not simply control and exploitation of the country, its resources and inhabitants, but rather, settlement by members of the colonising society. The inherent racism of settler colonialism has worked to lower the threshold of mass killings in appalling ways in many cases. The parole “exterminate the brutes” is a simple illustration of this. In Namibia, the ideology and strategy of the genocidal practices applied require us to explore the degree of a specifically German case within the wide range of colonial atrocities and mass violence elsewhere. As evidence shows, there existed continuities in accounts and novels read by a mass readership, in military practice as well as in the activities of specific persons, and in doctrines and routines of warfare that link strategic ideas of decisive battles to the concept of final solution and extinction of the enemy, which came into full effect under the Nazi regime.
Such an approach within a wider context implies the journey into the belly of the beast - “the horror”, as visualised by Mister Kurtz with his last words on his deathbed in Joseph Conrad’s novel “Heart of Darkness”. It was inspired at the end of the 19th century by the excessive atrocities of colonial oppression in the Congo. Such interrogation requires accepting in principle the possibility of a connecting line that might exist in the history of violent expansionism. It demands an exploration, if and to what extent there are more than simply accidental coincidences between the colonial genocide in then “German South West Africa” and the holocaust unfolding “back home” in Germany over thirty years later. Depending on the outcome of such explorations, we need to readjust not only our minds, but also our historical understanding. Maybe the potentially scary implications of such insights are a contributing factor to the fierce resistance among large parts of the German public, to (re) open the chapter and have another look.
More than this: If the Germans would have the courage and honesty to embark upon such an exploratory mission - what should then prevent other former colonial powers to deal with their past in a similar self-critical way? Maybe this dimension is another forceful factor which explains even more so than the possible monetary implications (in terms of reparations) at stake for the German public purse to accept such responsibilities.
There might well exist complicity among the powerful, supported by a fraternity of a core group of European states with a similarly dubious imperialist historical track record. Such complicity, unfortunately, is not met by determined solidarity among the wretched of the earth. As victims they ought to challenge the continued injustices by their concerted and unified efforts to counteract the ignorance and arrogance of those in power on such issues collectively, instead of falling prey (once again) to the old system of divide and rule.
* Dr. Henning Melber is Research Director at The Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala/Sweden and Vice-President of the European Network of Genocide Scholars (ENoGS) established at this Conference. This is a shorter and modified version of a presentation to the panel on “Genocide, Memory and Identity” at the Conference “Genocides: Forms, Causes and Consequences. The Namibian War (1904-08) in historical perspective” organised at the Haus der Kulturen in Berlin/Germany from 13 to 15 January 2005.
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