EAC: How new members will alter regional bloc

Recent news that the Republic of Somalia and newly independent South Sudan have applied to join the East African Community (EAC) has elicited uncharacteristically heated debate in mainstream and social media on the hitherto rather sedate and lacklustre dialogue on the region’s economic and political integration process.

Predictably, reactions include a rehash of conventional anti-integration rhetoric about the potential threat of increased insecurity, cross border crime and terrorism. The most virulent pessimists – often associated with the Tanzanian school – predict a more cataclysmic trajectory of regional instability and even possibly a breakout of war. The more sober observers, however, see an enhancement of the plus-side effects of increased trade volumes, market expansion and free movement facilitated by a resurgence of regional mega-infrastructure deals including the recent launch of a US$26 billion port, oil pipeline, rail, highway and fibre-optic regional infrastructure deal (LAPSSET) inaugurated by the presidents of Kenya and South Sudan and Ethiopia’s prime minister.

GAME-CHANGING SCENARIOS

The most interesting and more optimistic, though schizophrenic, analysis is rendered by veteran Ugandan journalist Charles Onyango-Obbo who cites three potentially game-changing scenarios in the region’s geopolitics: One is the likely shift of the region’s ‘centre of power’ from traditional states (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania) northwards as Ethiopia, the region’s military and economic hegemon, inches closer and eventually joins the EAC. Ethiopia’s entry into the EAC, it is argued, is just a matter of time considering the country’s military engagement in Somalia and its new ‘look south’ policy evidenced by the new infrastructure and energy deals with Kenya as well as security and development pacts with South Sudan and possibly Uganda solidify new relationships.

Second, it’s been argued that the major stumbling block to a more comprehensive deepening of regional integration in Africa as well as the EAC is its infrastructure deficit. This perception seems to be the motivating factor for those arguing for the scaling down of the EAC integration to the three ‘parent’ states (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania). Conversely, the expected and eventual stabilization of Somalia and the rapid progress of the Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor will undoubtedly intensify the pace, depth and geographic expansion of the EAC. Additionally, the presence of a large and commercially successful and highly diversified entrepreneurial Somali community in Kenya and Ethiopia (both native and diaspora), with established links with major trading posts in the region, will catapult already existing relations to a new level.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the politics and policies of integration will significantly shift from purely economic objectives to security imperatives. The East and Horn of Africa region bears classic characteristics of what has been termed a Regional Security Complex loosely defined as a group of states whose peace and security dynamics are so intertwined that they cannot be resolved independently of each other. The intricate nature, spread, impact and intensity of the myriad conflicts in this region ranging from the great lakes region, Uganda-Sudan-Central Africa Republic (CAR) triangle as well as the Horn of Africa, exemplify this complex. The fact that the DR Congo war of 1998-2003 came to be known as the ‘Great War of Africa’ that at its height involved no less than eight African states and about 25 armed groups further underlies the veracity of this regional complex.

The heavy military presence of Uganda, Burundi and later Kenya and perennial Ethiopian incursions into Somalia demonstrates how the nations in the region are responding to perceived common security threats and cooperating as a security block, despite the lack of a common Peace and Security Policy. The emerging importance of security in the region’s inter-state relations is underscored by the recent spike in military spending associated with the frontline states’ intervention in the Somali conflict. But the security focus in regional inter-state cooperation is not new as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has long transformed from a drought and disaster response initiative into a fully-fledged peace and security entity.

TOWARDS A REGIONAL SECURITY COMMUNITY

As theories of regionalism suggest, regions are constructed entities that emerge and evolve depending on perceived common interests. It could therefore be argued that peace and security is emerging as the most pressing concern in the region and may be the driver of the future direction of regional integration. In fact, this significant trend is already taking shape and a shift from economic integration to regional securitization is a foregone conclusion. This is happening despite, or perhaps precisely because of, the flurry of activity in oil drilling and press reports regarding new energy resource discoveries in the region. While proponents predict an economic boom, detractors already foresee negative scenarios of potential regional conflict associated with the resource curse theory.

No wonder then that the EAC is scrambling to catch up with this reality by fast-tracking the development of a Peace and Security Policy. According to its Deputy Secretary General responsible for political integration Beatrice Kiraso, the draft protocol on peace and security would need to go beyond traditional security concerns and address new security threats including cyber-crime, human trafficking, terrorism and, yes, piracy. However such a significant document that binds states towards mutual defence and the ceding of significant sovereignty powers to a supra-national entity is causing jitters in traditional laggard Tanzania. This doesn’t however mean that a regional bloc need necessarily be either an economic, security or even social community. These imperatives are not mutually exclusive as has been erroneously argued elsewhere, but are indeed often jointly necessary and mutually reinforcing.

All these rapid developments pose significant potential challenges if the region is not prepared politically, socially and economically. For starters, Tanzania’s alleged intransigence, isolationism and general obstructionism may lead to its further isolation in the inevitable jostling for influence and power with new players moving in. Tanzania’s dual membership in the South African Development Cooperation (SADC) regional bloc is also likely to diminish its influence in EAC decision-making as its commitment will be in doubt. It’s very well likely therefore that Tanzania will have to make a choice whether to fully embrace the EAC or adopt a partial position such as the UK has done in EU, since the prospect of ditching the EAC for the SADC is less likely.

For Somalia and South Sudan, membership in the EAC with a new security infrastructure will – as Rwanda’s president Kagame put it in a twitter response to a journalist’s question – have mutually beneficial results in helping stabilize their fragile internal politics. The security umbrella provided by a revamped and stronger EAC may act as a deterrent against Khartoum’s aggressive stance towards Juba, while neutralising Eritrea’s meddlesome policy towards Somalia. Ethiopia on the other hand would benefit significantly though access to a large regional market and will likely reap peace dividends in the resolution of long-running separatist tendencies in the Oromia and Ogaden regions in the south. As the largest and predictably the fastest growing regional economy, Ethiopia would be by far the regional hegemon, reaping unprecedented geopolitical gains (and responsibilities) such as Nigeria enjoys within ECOWAS.

PEER PRESSURE

By enhancing trade links, increased investment, access to regional education institutions, civil society interaction, political will and a common market, the post-conflict societies will have a better chance at faster and more sustainable transitions towards stability and development under a new security umbrella offering assurances against potential internal insurrections. Similarly, peer pressure akin to the NEPAD peer review mechanism would lead to the fostering of a democratic political culture through election monitoring, political party exchanges, civic education and general peer pressure towards accountable governance and civic responsibility.

Granted, these goals could be a long time coming. The EAC still suffers from significant institutional weakness, lack of political will and the absence of a shared common vision for its future integration trajectory. In light of the potential gains, this is the time to seize the immense opportunities offered by unprecedented strong economic indicators, the discovery of new energy resources, a positive investment climate, entry of new global actors such as China, and the first real chance to resolve the Somali conflict and advance nation building in South Sudan. Anything less, would be to squander a rare opportunity for the region to forge a new social, economic, political and civic architecture for the general well-being and welfare of all its peoples.

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* Josh Maiyo is a PhD researcher at the University of Leeds, UK and VU University Amsterdam.
* Please send comments to editor[at]pambazuka[dot]org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

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