The Garowe principles: a solution or a deepening of the Somali crisis?

A document referred to as the Garowe principles came out of the Somali national consultative constitutional conference held in Garowe city in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland on 21-23 December 2011. While many are skeptical of the potential implementation of this document and view the outcome of the Garowe conference as rehashing and recycling principles of the Embagathi conference, others question its legality from a constitutional stand point. So, is the unintended consequence the reinvention of yet another crisis, so as to follow again the devolutionary cycle that has been intrinsic in the Somali conflict, a sort of dé·jà vu Embagathi?

THE MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

In early December 2011, 280 members of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) voted to oust the speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden in a non-confidence vote, and within a week nominated an interim speaker. In the same week the office of The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) released a communiqué in which it acknowledged the TFP crisis, and within two days UNPOS hastily called for the Garowe conference to be held in the week of 21-23 December 2011 without addressing the TFP crisis.

Members of the Parliament advised the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) that it would be illegal to open discussions on components of the road map without first deliberating it in parliament and having it ratified after being voted on by MPs. They were told by the office of the PM that it would be voted on in parliament on 19 December 2011, the same day the office of the SRSG announced the Garowe conference.

From the perspective of the legislature, they argue that firstly it is illegal to begin the implementation of the road map without ratification by the TFP - and that this would amount to violation of the Transitional Charter. Secondly, they argue that the SRSG opted for the easy way out and sided with the former speaker, so the former speaker’s wishes converge with the exit strategy of UNPOS. In retrospect, instead of addressing the TFP crisis, the office of the SRSG committed an error in judgment with its facilitation of the Garowe conference, which in the views of many deepens the Somali crisis.
Moreover, the MPs contend that the SRSG was looking for an exit strategy as the donors are questioning the $60-million spent on the draft constitution - and what is better than asking the speaker to go along with the implementation of the road map illegally without its ratification by the TFP.

THE OUTCOME

Despite its questionable legitimacy, another problem associated with this conference is its questionable outcome. Compare the Garowe outcome of 2011 with the Embagathi agreement of 2004: in principle, the number of MPs are almost identical on both agreement, the election process remains the same and uses the 4.5 formula. There is no clear interpretation of how the 20 per cent quota assigned for female MPs will be allocated among clans and this further complicates the process.

With respect to the ratification of the draft constitution, it has not been widely shared with the Somali population and the committee of experts (CoE) only met once. Only four out of the nine member committee showed up, yet they are directed to hand over the draft constitution to the Independent Federal Constitution Commission (IFCC) no later than 15 May 2011.

Additionally, the draft will be heavily influenced by the National Democratic Institute, which is contracted out for the draft of the constitution as well as the salaries of the CoE. Already the MPs are questioning the impartiality of its country director Mohamed Abdirizak, who served as an advisor and chief of staff to the former president of Somalia Abdullahi Yusuf, who hails from Puntland.

While there is general consensus on ending the transition, it is the Garowe principles that will dictate the outcome and the shape of the new political dispensation after the end of the transition. A careful examination of the Garowe principles exhibits the following intrinsic deficiencies:

a) If the end of the transition was intended to replace the current state of affairs of the TFG system with a system of good governance, the Garowe principles failed to achieve that objective by injecting a flawed process whereby only the signatories of the Garowe principles are entrusted with the fate of Somalia; a draconian system of governance will be the end result of such flawed process.

b) The bicameral legislature, if adopted as per this principle, will contradict with the flawed process of selecting MPs based on the 4.5 formula, and thus will complicate the reconciliation process and may even open up old wounds. As bad as the 4.5 formula is, the addition of the upper chamber will also reflect on clan accommodation and thus will again inflate the numbers of the bicameral legislature to close to 400 MPs.

c) The Garowe principles, in the view of the majority of Somalis, is a joke and it is the SRSG who is pushing this process to leave a legacy of destruction. How else does one explain the notion of harmonising state and federal constitutions when Somaliland is not even at the table, a retreat that is only reminiscent to the night of long knives.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS.

* Please send comments to editor[at]pambazuka[dot]org or comment online at Pambazuka News.