DRC: Less state is not best state

Demonstrations took place this week in Kinsasha, capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo, over an announcement of a possible delay in planned 2005 elections. The threat of election delays comes after a turbulent 2004 in DRC politics. Last year ended with heightened tension in the east of the country with Rwanda threatening to pursue enemy forces into the DRC and fighting taking place for the control of several towns. Prof. Ernest Wamba dia Wamba answered some questions by email about what is happening in the DRC.

PZ: Last year ended with increased tension in the east of the country with reports indicating that Rwandan troops were operating in the DRC. What’s your reading of the situation?

EWDW: While information is not easily available, it does seem to be the case that the Interahamwe militants and ex-FR soldiers must have become more efficient. This means that they have continued to benefit from moral and/or material support from people in the DRC transition itself. It does reveal also the real problems of the functioning of the DRC transition.

At the signing of the peace accord, it was public knowledge what allies each participant had; it was known the RCD was an ally of Rwanda and that Rwanda was mostly concerned about the insecurity at its border with the DRC and the presence of the 'negative forces' that had to be disarmed. Despite the so-called Pretoria Memorandum of Understanding, there has not been any trust between parties at all. Within the DRC leadership, mistrust has been rampant. That situation makes it easy for all kinds of pursuits to take place. There is hardly a leadership around to make sure what may be agreed upon is actually carried out.

Since 1996, Rwandese troops have been in and out. Some deserters seem to have remained and are claimed to be around the mining zones (Walikali,etc.). Some advisers to RCD seem to have remained as well. Due to the hostility towards the 'Rwandophones' within the DRC and inside RCD, the process of army integration is not moving as it should be. This has created a division within the RCD former army; part of it, mostly composed of Tutsis or 'Rwandophones', is accused of having become mutineers. These seem to facilitate the 'infiltration' of Rwandese soldiers into the RDC. The DRC government suffers from division and inaction due to mistrust and antagonism of alliances. It appears more like there is no State at all. Both people and government expect the MONUC to handle the matter of the Interahamwe, etc.

PZ: How serious should the hostilities at the end of 2004 be taken and what are the implications for the transitional government in the DRC and peace in the Great Lakes region?

EWDW: It is serious in two ways. It happened just a few days after the signing of the Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration. One would have expected that the Declaration would have created a positive enough atmosphere to entice both countries to discuss, at the highest level, the matter and find a sustainable solution to it. It also happened when the DRC, running short of time, must accelerate the pace of preparation of the elections due by June 2005. This is why people felt that the conflict was restarted by people in both countries who are not favorable to the coming elections, to make sure these do not take place.

Rwanda and the DRC are neighbors. They have to find a way to live in peace together. Others should help them discuss among themselves and find a solution. Kagame and Kabila have to meet alone and come out with a solution.

PZ: The Great Lakes conflict involving Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi is reported to have resulted in three million deaths and more than two million refugees and internally displaced people. Somehow it seems that the DRC crisis has played second fiddle to other international and regional concerns. Why do you think this is?

EWDW: It is not the first time that tragedy in the Congo has not been seen as needing urgent treatment by official representation of the international community.

The position by the international community towards Congo has always been that of treating the country as a sick person that needs to be kept alive in the intensive care unit, but not to allow him to fully recover; this would make it difficult to control him. Punishments have always been administered to anyone Congolese who has agitated for real self-determination. Lumumba and his companions' bodies were dissolved in acid to make sure none would imitate or get inspired by their actions. Mulele's body was cut in pieces and pieces were put in a sack and thrown into the Congo river. Of course, this is so since Haitian slaves challenged the slavemasters in 1804.

The invisibility of the number of deaths and the atrocious way of dying, not projected on TV as much as was the genocide of Rwanda, helps the international community not to feel bad over those deaths. And our so-called leadership, that went as far as to celebrate the genius of King Leopold II in the Belgian Parliament, is so submissive that the international community does not feel pressurized enough to act.

The African community, always complaining of lack of resources, has been put aside, with the exception of South Africa, whose model of transition we are following. We are far from Mwalimu's proposal for the DRC; he wanted the international community to let Africa, this time, resolve the crisis in the DRC - as they badly resolved it in the 1960s. After his death, we are back to the model of the 1960s. The international community has not yet overcome its guilt over its failure to do anything about the genocide in Rwanda and seems to be very lenient towards Rwanda.

PZ: South Africa has played a role in the peace negotiations in the DRC but the process seems to keep on stumbling against the same obstacles. What does this say about the South African approach to establishing peace on the continent in relation not only to the DRC, but also their involvement in the Ivory Coast?

EWDW: There seems to be a real discrepancy between what the South African leadership affirms as values which have to guide Africa in handling conflicts and the so-called political realism, money and civil servants' appreciation of criterias of selection, profiles of people to be placed in leadership positions and relationships with superpowers.

I believe that the DRC crisis could have been resolved differently. There was no real concern for the profiles of people, no concern for knowledge of the political history of the country (due to tendencies of paternalism and exceptionalism). This led to thinking that what is good for South Africa must be good for the DRC. It looked like a quick solution to the crisis was more important than whether or not the solution was sustainable. We hope, on this continent, that there is going to be a way of making constant critical evaluations of conflict resolution experiences and use of the results to correct possible future mistakes. Repeating what went on in the Congo in the 1960s is an indication that there is no accumulation of experience and that no global learning is taking place. It is good that South Africa contributes to establishing peace. It should not just be repeating the same approach. Results in Ivory Coast will show whether we are advancing or not.

PZ: What action needs to be taken to move forward and secure human rights in the region?

EWDW: First of all, we need to have a State in the DRC and move away from this claim that less State (almost no State at all) is best State. Post-conflict situations need a real State capable of addressing real problems with great works mobilizing a great deal of the now unemployed society. This means that we have to have an army (which we have never had since independence, a Mobutu's personalized army is no national or Republican army at all); we need a real public administration (we have never had it since independence; with the sudden departure of Belgian civil servants, promotions without merit did not lead to a real public administration at all); we need to reconstruct the State as a Federal State for all and not a Party State trying to equate society with a Party. Once the DRC is properly governed, the State to State relations with the neighboring countries will improve. Mistrust would be addressed by the confidence that will be returned to the country. A power is not loved but respected. Neighbors should not be made to love the DRC but respect should follow the kind of good neighborliness relationship of cooperation that will develop. I think that it is in the interest of the region and Africa that State confidence be returned to the DRC. The other issues will be dealt with more positively after that.

PZ: Further comments?

EWDW: I think I have said what I had to say. I sometime feel that the incremental approach that dominates the international community's way of handling the issues is itself a problem. Sometimes we need bold moves to actually solve once and for all the problems. I do feel like countries coming together in a federation or confederation in the great lakes regions, may force them to address problems in a much more trustful way than now.

* Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba is a historian who is serving as a senator in the transitional senate of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He has taught at a number of universities including Harvard University and the University of Dar-es-Salaam.

* Please send comments to [email protected]