Paving the way for the next stage in China-Africa relations

An enduring image of the recent Forum for China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) ministerial held in Sharm El Sheik in early November was the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, responding to the accusations of neo-colonialism by Western journalists. His visible frustration at these persistent efforts to cast Chinese activities in Africa in a negative light captured the growing consternation felt by Chinese from all walks of life at these challenges to their aims and actions on the continent. For as the Premier said, ‘China is not the largest importer of Africa’s oil…(w)hy should China be singled out for criticism?’

Bolstering Wen Jiabao’s public declaration of Chinese good intentions is a raft of new initiatives that form the basis of the fourth ministerial between Chinese and African officials. Wrapped in the now familiar diplomatic language of ‘win-win’ and ‘mutual benefit’ – a lexicon which through constant use is tending more to obscure rather than to illuminate – the FOCAC provides scaffolding upon which the next stage of the relationship is to be realised. These include a US$10 billion package of concessional loans, commitments to raise African agricultural productivity, to reduce or eliminate tariff barriers for Africa’s poorest countries, build hospitals and schools, new or expanded training programmes to address human development, provisions for 100 clean energy projects and greater support for peace and security.

What is striking about the contents of the FOCAC declaration is the degree to which these initiatives reflect a growing and deliberately constructed convergence between African development needs and Chinese economic interests. For instance, in agriculture – a sector long recognised to be an area where Africa’s potential comparative advantages have remained under-invested and under-utilised – the Chinese propose to introduce new techniques, seed varieties and training programmes which are derived from their own experience of raising productivity amongst their farmers. To facilitate this process, the Chinese government is rolling out an additional ten agricultural training centres across the continent in countries like Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Senegal. Coupled to this are additional financial means – the aforementioned US$10 billion as well as existing sources like the China Africa Development Fund – aimed at providing financial support for commercial enterprises.. Raising Africa’s agricultural productivity will not only dramatically enhance the livelihoods of rural communities in Africa through improvements in income generation and employment, but it can address a growing problem of food security in China itself.

Another example is the targeting of Africa’s small and medium enterprises for development and growth through a special US$1 billion special fund. Moreover, signalling that they understand that a focus on the supply side is not enough to make real development gains, Beijing has agreed to scrap tariffs on 95% of all products from Africa’s less developed countries. This decision to open up China’s market to African commerce has the potential to, when linked with the support for African business, set off a virtuous chain of development. This redirecting of African capabilities towards the accessing the Chinese market could lay the foundation for a more balanced, long term trading relationship than has been the case so far. At the same time, it bears mentioning that it could end up like the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which gave preferential access to the American market in sectors like clothing that contributed to a surge not so much in African but rather Asian based investment. Africans will nevertheless have to be nimble investors to make the most out of what seems to be genuinely liberal terms on offer. Indeed, they may even find that they are competing with the growing Chinese communities within their midst who proven entrepreneurial acumen and understanding of the Chinese domestic market has fuelled China’s own economic transformation.

Cutting through the lofty conference rhetoric, it seems that many features of past Chinese practices remain intact at the same time that there are indications of alterations and innovations of prevailing approaches. Infrastructure continues to be seen as a crucial dimension in Chinese involvement in African development. The emphasis seems to be retained on project-based assistance, most if not all of which will be presumably be provided by Chinese firms and funded out of these expanded financial sources. Building more classrooms and health clinics will continue to be supplemented by an expansion of technical training programmes aimed at improving skills amongst Africans. Recognition that Chinese firms have not always conducted themselves well brought with it a renewed call for them to better integrate corporate social responsibility into their local business practices in Africa. A desire to improve aid efficiency and link Chinese action to meeting the Millennium Development Goals sounds remarkably like traditional donor concerns and reflects African input. Even a new focus on conditionalities has crept into the conference discussions, with a deliberate intonation of China’s commitment to avoiding ‘political conditionalities’ leaving it apparent that there are economic or financial conditions which either could or do operate. This latter distinction is not a surprising position for China to take, especially to ensure the maintenance and security of its widening range of investments across the continent.

What was left out of FOCAC is perhaps as significant as the content that made it to the final declaration. For instance, a few months ago there circulated the idea in Beijing that China would itself would draw upon its US$2.1 trillion dollars in foreign exchange reserves and sponsor a ‘Marshall Plan for Africa’. This notion, if it was ever taken seriously in policy making circles, surely fell victim to the twin pressures of the impact of the global financial crisis on China’s export-led economy and the accompanying domestic stimulus package. While much of the media attention was focused on what happened within the halls of the FOCAC ministerial and the press conferences, the FOCAC Business Forum met on the fringes of the event. Missing, however, was the once mooted inclusion of a parallel Chinese-African Civil Society Forum process (now taking place in Nairobi under Fahamu auspices).

Moreover, the growing diversity of Chinese actors in Africa – contrary to the presumptions of the notion of ‘China-Africa’ as two unitary entities – poses a dilemma in structuring and managing the relationship. Once shaped and led at the top by Beijing’s political elites at the top in conjunction with their African counterparts, the steady diffusion of economic power to semi-autonomous State Owned Enterprises, provincial authorities and a sometime rapacious profit-seeking private sector has introduced diversity of interests and practice that are as often at odds with Chinese foreign policy aims as they are contiguous to them. The actions of murky investment houses like the China International Fund which has sought to secure a huge stake in the mining sector from the illegal military regime in Guinea raises troubling questions about aspects of the long term impact of China’s role on the continent. Operating on the margins of respectability, these sort of organisations can damage the positive intentions on display at FOCAC IV in their unwavering pursuit of profit and wilful distain for African sensibilities (as was the case in Guinea, which was under censure by African regional organisations). In the Western context, the role of guardian of the underlying values which inform national foreign policies is partially played by a vibrant and active civil society operating both in the West and complemented by civil society partners in Africa. Unabashedly critical of the state and private capital – and undoubtedly the bane of authoritarian and, at times, democratic governments alike – these sometimes self-appointed ‘voices of the people’ nonetheless serve a tremendously important function in re-asserting the moral purpose of foreign policy actions. In Africa, China has seemingly exported many features of its own domestic setting (such as opaque business and financial practices) and this includes a weak civil society whose boundaries of action are circumscribed to varying degrees by the state. Whether the current situation, which places the burden of responsibility solely on the party leadership and bureaucracy to anticipate, manage and ameliorate the conduct of a plethora of Chinese actors in Africa, is sufficient remains to be seen.

Change and adaptability remain the hallmarks of China-Africa relations and, to the credit of the Chinese government whose willingness to revisit and revise specific initiatives in light of experience on the ground, give the FOCAC process a dynamism lacking in many other trans-regional initiatives. Bargaining with China, as most African diplomats and businessmen will testify, is not easy as the Chinese are acutely aware of their interests, how to promote them and insist on recognisable gains for any concessions made. China’s willingness to maintain its focus on building a long term economic relationship with the continent, despite the adverse global economic climate, makes such negotiations all the more important for Africa. But coming to terms with the diversity of Chinese actors and their narrower, and often self-serving, interests is a challenge to ensuring that this carefully constructed relationship stays on course.

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*Dr Chris Alden teaches and researches on foreign policy and the international politics of Africa at the University of the Witwatersrand and, currently, at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

* This article is based in part on an article published in ChinAfrica Magazine December 2009.