Political deadlock in Ethiopia: Charting a path forward

Political unrest has been widespread in Ethiopia since May elections that took the opposition close to securing a surprise victory over the ruling party. Last week, violence swept through the capital Addis Ababa as security forces cracked down on those participating in actions to protest the election result. Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem calls for calm on both sides.

Since the May general elections in Ethiopia the country has been gripped by conflict. The country is only slowly returning to normal after a week long stay away called by the opposition who believed that the government robbed it of victory through unfair means. Both in June soon after the elections and now, several people have been killed and many more imprisoned.

While elections are supposed to indicate where the wishes of the people reside and both winners and losers are expected to respect the results, it is not often that easy in situations where neither is prepared for the result. Sometimes defeat can sound like victory and sometimes victory can be interpreted as defeat if the cost is too high. Both scenarios are playing themselves out in Ethiopia. The opposition has reason to be jubilant because in spite of the fields not being level they gained victories - some of them highly symbolic - against the ruling EPRDF.

In Ethiopia it is clear that neither the ruling EPRDF nor the two main opposition alliances, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), were prepared for the results and the obligation that the results impose on them in a democratic setting.

For the first time since the EPRDF came into power 15 years ago it faced a more challenging and credible electoral opposition. It lost all the seats in the capital to the opposition and lost to the opposition in other regions in particular the Amhara region. Its immediate response was to see the result as a challenge to its authority. It was obvious that its political and security intelligence misinformed it about its popularity. It was clear to most observers that after 15 years the EPRDF has become vulnerable. As the likelihood of an armed overthrow of the regime has diminished even among the country's largest nationality, The Oromo (who have been the longest military opponents of the EPRDF), peaceful resistance and democratic opposition has grown.

As it happened to other post revolutionary regimes across Africa whether in Zimbabwe or Uganda, the longer the EPRDF stayed in power the less 'grateful' people became for its liberation struggle. Uganda is the more obvious parallel. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, like President Museveni before him, became a former revolutionary turned free-market reformer with new best friends in Washington, London, Brussels, and other patented capitals of what he would (before) have called, rightly, 'centres of imperialism'. Like other Clubbers in the now ageing 'New generation of African Leaders' Meles is a very fiercely intellectual leader who is able to stoutly articulate and defend his positions.

Again. like Uganda, Ethiopia is heavily dependent on aid but somehow the EPRDF until recent years managed to stave off Western intervention in its political affairs. A kind of dual mandate partnership (familiar to Ugandans) developed whereby Meles pursued neo-liberal economic policies of the IMF/World Bank and the dominant western powers gave him a huge discount on internal political matters.

But acceptance in the West also comes with its own conflicting demands and expectations. It is always the case that the more our leaders become popular abroad the less they are at home and the more complacent they become about their domestic constituency - hence they are ill-prepared to think of any possible defeat.

The opposition on the other hand - after overcoming initial timidity, lack of clarity or better alternative socio-economic policies - begin to unite in opposition. Some people will just want change for the sake of it. Younger generations also emerge who now take the gains of the past as their starting point - not the ceiling on what is possible. This is where former revolutionaries in power become reactionaries, taking political opposition to be treason, shooting demonstrators, jailing leaders of the opposition and generally punishing the people for not voting wisely (i.e. electing them in perpetuity).

The opposition too, having spent too long in opposition is often unprepared for its victories and reacts either too triumphantly or with selective de-legitimation. The former exaggerates how close they believe they have come to seizing the state house while the latter makes them to always query the result only in areas where they did not win.

A process of mutual demonisation ensues between an insecure government humbled by the polls - especially losing in the capital where the government is based - thereby becoming psychologically an occupying force. The opposition on the other hand suffers the delusion that its control of the centre and a few cities also mean that it is de facto government and is often tempted to behave so by unleashing 'people power' which is often met by a government show of power. This situation needs statesmanship and leadership to break the impasse. The tragedy for Ethiopia so far has been the absence of such vision. The government needs to accept that those who voted against it have neither committed any sin or crime while the opposition also have to accept that those in power are not from Mars but fellow Ethiopians with whom they have political differences. There cannot be meaningful dialogue if the government uses guns and prisons as its first weapon of choice and the opposition regards the government as illegitimate.

* Dr Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem is General-Secretary of the Pan African Movement, Kampala (Uganda) and Co-Director of Justice Africa

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