• Pupils from the Oprah Winfrey Leadership Academy for Girls will be sent for HIV/Aids testing with their parents' consent, said Oprah Winfrey at the opening of the school at Henley-on-Klip, Meyerton, on Tuesday (2 January 2007). The school for girls from disadvantaged backgrounds was officially opened by Winfrey at a star-studded event.

  • Assist National Societies and Federation Delegations in the region to develop and implement food security programming during the food insecurity operation in line within the four core areas of Disaster preparedness, Disaster response, Health & Care and Promotion of Humanitarian Values as defined in Strategy 2010.

  • Professor Issa Shivji is a legend in his own lifetime. He is one of the few veteran members of the leftist intelligentsia who has withstood all storms and remains firmly on the side of the people. He is truly a life long member of the ‘Africa will never, never surrender’ Club for whom ALUTA CONTINUA is not just a slogan, but a working motto. He retires from the University of Dar Es Salaam this year. He may be retired but he is certainly not tired. More importantly his colleagues, comrades, and several generations of students are not tired of him.

    It is not often that Africans, especially those of us on the left, say thank you to one of us. Often we reserve our best homage till they are no longer with us. We think it is a kind of bourgeois ostentation, vanity, or what they call ‘feferity’ (ie showmanship) to celebrate individual achievements because the struggle is all that matters. Individuals, no matter how much they have contributed to our struggles, are not supposed to matter.

    I have always had unease about this... It is the people that matter in the end but who are these people if not an aggregate of individuals?

    It is heartening that times are changing and we are beginning to celebrate our heroes and heroines while they are still alive. The Africa Research and Resource Forum this week in Nairobi has been holding a celebratory seminar alongside a series of public debates in honour of Shivji.

    One of the public lectures was entitled “Choosing leaders: The dilemmas of democracy in Africa and abroad”. It was held at the Kenya National Theatre close to the University of Nairobi and opposite the colonial edifice of the Norfolk hotel. Prominent African scholars participating in the seminar were on the panel chaired by Prof Peter Wanyande who is the Dean of the Faculty of Arts, University of Nairobi. The panelists included Prof Thandika Mkandawire; former Director of the Dakar based CODESRIA and Head of the UNRISD in Geneva: John Oyoo of the Africa Institute of South Africa; Prof Haroub Othman of the University of Dar; and Professor Mahmood Mamdani.

    Thandika opened up the discussion with a Brecthian quote suggesting that in Africa the challenge of democracy may not be about the way to choose our leaders but how they choose their peoples. He was not downplaying the importance of the formal processes of free and fair elections, or rule of law and associated freedoms, instead of drawing attention to the mystification of formalities that lead to people confusing the process with the end itself. This has created a situation in many countries where people vote without choosing or become ‘choice-less voters’.

    Just being chosen in an election is not enough. There are consequences for the chosen one. One of these is the obligation to be accountable to the voters. This is an area where democracy is still facing numerous challenges in Africa and elsewhere. How do we hold our chosen leaders accountable in between elections? How do we prevent them from becoming elective dictators and self-serving lots who only care for themselves? This is very important in Kenya where the MPs are among the best paid in the world. During this week President Kibaki had to turn down a salary increase awarded by the parliament that would have seen him earning more than President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair.

    Even in the so-called ‘advanced democracies’ where institutions are more developed and there are countervailing centres of power, checks and balances, accountability is difficult to enforce. For instance Tony Blair went to war even though an overwhelming majority of British voters did not support the unjust war.

    In Africa, thanks to the IMF and World Bank and their fellow travellers in the neo-liberal orthodoxy of the moment, accountability has now become accounting. Yet according to Thandika, it was African scholars who first suggested to the IMF/World Bank, in a now forgotten pioneering dialogue with African scholars, that governance was a central issue for the continent. This was in the 80s when the Bank and its egg-head economists believed that only structural adjustment mattered. They produced a two-volume report which was quickly forgotten but they were to pick up on ‘good governance’ later as a mantra. In Washington terms, good governance is government without politics, a dictatorship of experts in the name of technocracy.

    Thandika advised that African scholars should examine our societies more in terms of how they are shaped, and who is shaping them, in order to understand our politics and the political behaviour of the masses. By looking at ourselves we can better understand the sociology and ideology that determines the consciousness of the African voter, and why this voter is susceptible to class, ethnic, religious, and other forms of manipulation.

    Finally, he suggested that there is a cyclical turn-around in African politics that he estimated to be between 30-40 years, during which the same political elite have been dominant (whether in or outside of government) waiting to be government. He sees the next few years as the period during which a new cycle will begin. He challenged the younger scholars and political activists to seize the opportunity to reshape Africa.

    I am not quite sure about this cycle of Thandika’s because there is another problem that I see with some of our political leaders especially the so-called ‘New Leaders’. They are a special class that has known no other role other than leading. Last job: Leader. Present job: Leader. Future expectation: Leader. They do not know ‘followership’.

    John Oyoo spoke after Thandika. He observed that in the independence period there was a more unified elite with the common aim of riding the continent of colonialism. Many of the politicians were intellectuals and many intellectuals were politically involved. However in the post-colonial phase, intra-elite conflicts led to military coups which decimated the intellectual class and devastated state and society. Intellectuals became either opponents of the khaki boys or their stooges and hirelings.

    The Cold War also took its toll on our intellectuals and politicians who became cold warriors for the east or the west. By the late 1970s and throughout the 80s, Africa had become prostate and formed an experimental ground for all kinds of half-baked ideas of development from outside, principally through the hegemony of the IMF /World Bank and their dubious Washington Consensus.

    The IMF and World Bank did not want thinkers who would challenge their dubious assumptions and arrogance. The military or one party dictator did not want any criticism of their misrule. Between both of these, our once promising and flourishing intellectual centres became deserts and development thinking and planning became externalized.

    Haroub concentrated on his familiar themes of the essential difference between visionary and non-visionary leaders. At independence, many of the leaders, regardless of their ideological leaning, were visionary, charismatic and beloved by their peoples and they derived their legitimacy from the people.

    However the unity between the leaders and the masses soon fizzled out in many countries as class differences began to emerge and consolidate. The progressives of the nationalist period soon became the conservatives in power, unwilling to set their own people free. Resistance to their tyranny developed.

    Some countries like Tanzania under Nyerere managed to retain popular legitimacy largely due to the personal discipline, humane and humble leadership of the Mwalimu.

    He concluded by observing that leaders do not emerge from the heavens but need to be developed organically from among the various social forces in any society: political parties, mass movements, factories, industries, workshops, production sites, farms, villages, etc.

    The final speaker was Mamdani. He lived up to his well-deserved reputation as one of the most engaging intellectuals of this continent. As usual he turned the topic upside down, preferring not to focus on individual leaders per se but first the structural basis of the relationship of power, and secondly the kinds of individual leaders they produce.

    In the past few years it has become very difficult (or maybe impossible) to discuss anything with Mamdani without coming back to ‘Citizenship and Subject’, his seminal book that still remains very thought provoking. It is still provoking Mamdani himself.

    He began by postulating that, in general, countries that have gone through colonialism are susceptible to group violence especially civil war. A cursory look at the history of India, the USA and Africa will confirm the point. Mamdani thinks this is largely because of the struggle for the expansion of the rights of citizens who live in these colonial states. They are about citizenship since citizenship defines who belongs, who has a right to belong, who is to include and who is to be excluded.

    Colonialism distorted peoples’ ways of life and imposed new identities, regimented those that were previously converging and in many cases offered different sets of rights to different peoples in the same political community. At independence the leaders did not inherit a country with one citizenship and one people but a myriad of political communities in one state with different grades of rights enforced through colonially constructed customs and traditions, natives and subjects. What the colonialists used to maintain their power was soon adapted and adopted by the new elites with devastating consequences.

    He contrasted Nigeria and Tanzania. While Nigeria carries on with the colonial divisions albeit through new forms of tribalisation (state of origin instead of tribe, federal character instead of ethnic character), Tanzania completely changed the colonial basis of citizenship and succeeded in creating a nation which Nigeria has not been able to do in spite of all the riches.

    While identifying the colonial roots of the problems Mamdani was clear that the responsibility for changing them and righting these wrongs are ours, not anybody else’s.

    On the role of individuals, he posed a number of questions: How do we find a saint in politics? Why should we be looking up to those in power to help us make them accountable to us?

    They are rhetorical questions for which he provided his own answers. It is not the leaders who will voluntarily render themselves accountable. Rather, we have to mobilize socially and politically throughout society not to accept lack of accountability in our public and private lives. We must struggle to broaden the political space for the fullest participation of all members of our political communities without discrimination. We also have to make politics about the social questions that affect the majority of our peoples rather than the political ambitions of the individual elite.

    It was a very good forum and a worthy testimony to Issa Shivji as one of the most important of our intellectual leaders. The turn out was great and quite refreshing to find so many young people in attendance.

    But I am always left frustrated whenever there is a discussion about leadership in Africa. The comments, questions and answers session of this panel discussion had all the elements that frustrate me.

    One, the discussion of leadership is often too narrow and limited to politicians. We do not include ourselves and our role or inaction and how this impacts on the socio-economic and political lives of our peoples. Invariably we blame others and are content to ignore our own culpability. These leaders did not emerge from space; they grew from amongst us and are kept in power in part by our collaboration or indifference.

    Two, Mamdani asked why we want saints in politics. The same question has to be asked about our intellectuals. Why do we expect them to be prophets or messiahs? They are part and parcel of our society, with their contradictions, and they have to make choices to be part of the solution or part of the problem.

    Three, we need to look beyond our political class and politicians for the failures of leadership on this continent. Are our universities better run? Are our NGOS better run? Are we running our homes democratically? How many NGOs, including the human rights ones that make so much noise about political leaders and state abuse, can claim that they practice what they preach?

    The dilemma of democracy is not just about the leaders. It is about us as a whole and about creating a democratic culture that tolerates difference, manages diversity and respects the right of everyone of us whether as children and parents, old and young, women and men, bosses and workers.

    • Dr Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem is General-Secretary of the Pan African Movement, Kampala (Uganda) and Co-Director of Justice Africa

    • Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

  • Fear of stigmatisation in Angola is keeping people living with HIV/AIDS in hiding. Caregivers are more than willing to help but are having a hard time finding patients to take care of. "People prefer to keep silent and to die in silence," Ambrósio Cabral, coordinator of Angola's Red Cross HIV/AIDS programme, told IRIN/PlusNews.

  • The European Union has criticised a ruling by a Libyan court sentencing to death five nurses and a doctor for infecting more than 400 children with the HIV virus at a hospital. Johannes Laitenberger, an EU spokesman, said they had yet not decided whether to take steps against Libya, but said he "did not rule anything out."

  • The poor nutrition often experienced by HIV-positive Zambians on antiretroviral [ARV] drug treatment is nullifying the benefits of the medicine, health experts are warning. "Whenever I take my ARVs without eating anything, I begin to feel dizzy and sometimes I even vomit - I generally feel very weak in my body; I have to be in bed for some time unless I took the drugs after eating," Elizabeth Mukwendi, a resident in the capital, Lusaka, one of thousands on ARVs, told IRIN.

  • Zimbabwe's deteriorating health services have made room for a thriving parallel market for drugs, many of them counterfeit, warn concerned health professionals. The sale of genuine as well as fake medicines on the streets was "big, booming business," said Dr Paul Chimedza, the president of the Zimbabwe Medical Association (ZIMA).

  • The successful candidate will support the expatriate medical programme manager and 2 national staff primary care advisors and midwife, who form the medical field team. The role involves supervision of the health structures, on site training at the health centres, planning of formal training and report writing.

  • The RH manager will act as a focal point for RH services within the IRC South Darfur Program providing technical support to the health program. She/he will be responsible for implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the CRHC project in South Darfur. The RH Manager will identify gaps in services and take the necessary steps to address those gaps.

  • HIV prevention has "seen two breakthroughs this month" in data indicating that male circumcision might reduce a man's risk of HIV infection, as well as the publication of a study that found "AIDS and malaria feed on each other with disastrous effects," a New York Times editorial says. HIV transmission occurs most easily when a person has high viral load.

  • Last week, US President Bush hosted a White House summit on malaria. "We know exactly what it takes to treat and prevent the disease," Mr. Bush said, referring to insecticide-treated bed nets and other simple measures. "The only question is whether we have the will to act." The day before the malaria summit, the question of will was raised again by the announcement of an AIDS breakthrough.

  • Cultural practices in Namibia are hampering the "ABC" HIV-prevention strategy - which stands for abstinence until marriage, be faithful and use condoms -members of the Women's Leadership Centre in Windhoek, Namibia, said. According to The Namibian/AllAfrica.com, dry sex, female genital cutting, initiation ceremonies for women that involve sex and "unorthodox treatment often administered by traditional healers" are practiced in Namibia.

  • Uganda's HIV/AIDS control efforts over the next five years will require between $800 million and $1 billion, the director-general of the country's AIDS Commission, said Wednesday (20 December 2006) at the closure of the National Strategic Plan joint review in Kampala. According to recent research, within the next five years, more than one million people living in Uganda will become HIV-positive and 500,000 will die of AIDS-related illnesses.

  • Economic, political and security cooperation between China and Africa has grown exponentially in the last decade, presenting new opportunities and challenges for Africa. The need for Africans to understand China, and its motives for the enhanced engagement with Africa over the last decade, is now greater than ever before, writes Ndubisi Obiorah.

    The rapidly evolving relationship between China and Africa is reflected in the evolution of African perceptions of China and its motives for engagement with Africa. For decades during the Cold War, the primary perception of China in much of Africa was as an ally against colonialism, neo-imperialism and Western domination, especially amongst left-wing circles. China was the alternate source to the Soviet Union of political, diplomatic and military assistance for African liberation movements. Post-liberation governments however often had to contend with Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence as well as the vexed question of Taiwan. Chinese aid, particularly scholarships, were welcomed across Africa. In the eyes of many Africans, the Tan-Zam railway project established China’s profile as a friend and ally against Western neo-colonialism and the apartheid regime in South Africa. Chinese success in building a railway pooh-poohed by ‘Africa hands’ in the West was a turning point in Sino-African relations and led to wider recognition in Africa of China's growing industrial and technological prowess.

    From the 1950s, Chinese businesspeople from Hong Kong and Taiwan as well the overseas Chinese diaspora in South-East Asia established trading ties with African counterparts. Taiwan and Hong Kong were widely known across Africa by the early 1970s as sources for cheap imports of textiles and consumer goods although often of dubious quality. In particular, traders from southeastern Nigeria established elaborate trade networks with Hong Kong and Taiwan manufacturers and traders as well as with overseas Chinese businesses in southeast Asia. The increased popularity of kung fu movies and the establishment of schools of martial arts in major African cities led to relatively greater awareness of China among ordinary Africans - although often with distorted perceptions of Chinese history and culture.

    Virtually in tandem with the shift in China's focus in its relations with Africa from ideology to trade, the dominant image of China in Africa by the 1990s had changed from ideological ally against colonialism, apartheid and Western domination to business partner and emerging economic colossus. The Chinese doctor or technical aid worker traded places with the Chinese entrepreneur or state corporation. The impact on Africa of China's trade with Africa and the wider world as well as the activities of Chinese businesses operating in Africa elicits diverse perceptions from local populations which deserve extensive and careful study as well as nuanced analysis. It is immensely difficult to attempt to describe popular perceptions in Africa of Chinese business or of China itself with a tolerable degree of accuracy because this is a relatively new area of scholarly inquiry and reliable information beyond anecdotal sources is hard to come by.

    Perceptions among Africa's political leadership and intelligentsia of the prospects and implications of China-African engagement warrant further research and measured analysis. China's offer of trade and aid without apparent political or humanitarian conditionalities is apparently much appreciated by some of Africa's politicians (French 20/11/05).

    It is noteworthy however that perceptions of China among

    Africa's political leaders go beyond appreciation for 'no-strings' aid and trade. China as 'alternative' political and economic model to Western prescriptions appears to be a pervasive optic among African politicians, intellectuals, civil society and media. While the end of the Cold War brought welcome changes including the end of proxy wars fought on Africa's soil and the liberation of Namibia and South Africa, the unipolar world characterized by Western dominance that followed has been the source of much discomfort for many African intellectuals and political leaders. In this light, China's emergence as a major axis of global power is often welcomed among African intellectuals who hope that it may herald a return to global multi-polarity in which milieu Africa and the developing countries will have a greater role on the global stage than they currently do.

    A Chinese model?

    In a nuanced perspective on China, the senior leader of the Nigerian legislature, Senate President Ken Nnamani, in a welcome address entitled "China: A Partner and Example of Development and Democracy" during President Hu's April visit to Nigeria, describes China's 'outstanding (economic) performance exclusive of western democracy' as "the paradox of development and democracy".

    Nnamani’s comments highlight the increasingly common perception in Africa of China as an alternate political and economic model to the Washington Consensus. Since the mid-1980s, many African countries have been compelled to adopt a series of 'Structural Adjustment', 'Economic Recovery' and 'Poverty Reduction' programmes often under pressure from Western donors and international financial institutions. From the early 1990s, demands by Western donors that African governments adopt economic reforms prescribed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have often been 'bundled' with so-called 'conditionalities' usually consisting of demands for 'political reforms' such as political liberalization, ending of one-party regimes, respect for human rights etc. Environmental advocacy groups in Western countries often pressure their governments to demand environmental audits and impact assessments before funding new infrastructure and industrial projects in Africa.

    When African post-colonial governments began moving towards one-party states and 'African socialism' in the 1960s, they often proffered the rationale that Western models of democracy were unsuited to Africa's material conditions and to its history and cultures. Through the 1970s and 1980s, the debate raged in Africa as to whether Western political and economic models could be transported to non-Western societies, whether capitalism or Soviet-style socialism was the better model for Africa or whether African states could craft a 'Third Way' to nirvana. The end of the Cold War and the apparent triumph of the Washington Consensus led to a temporary cessation of the debate partly due to the disillusionment and intellectual exhaustion of the African Left. When donor conditionalities were introduced, some African governments vigorously resisted the political conditionalities and argued that Western democracy was unsuited to Africa's needs and would fuel ethnic conflict and instability but their dissent was increasingly muted as aid flows dried up.

    Through the 1990s, it appeared that the debate had been settled for good and that most Africans, at least implicitly, accepted the thesis that political liberalization and structural adjustment would lead to economic recovery in the short term and sustainable development in the long term. By the turn of the millennium, virtually no African government openly questioned the Washington Consensus or suggested 'African alternatives'.

    China's emergence as a major economic power in the 1990s despite not being a democracy or adopting economic policies typically recommended by the IFIs has become a source of great interest for both Africa's rulers and ruled. For some among Africa's contemporary rulers, China is living proof of 'successful' alternatives to Western political and economic models. The semi-colonial Western domination of pre-revolutionary China is often cited as being analogous to Western colonialism in Africa in the early-mid 20th century while China's status as a developing country in the 1950s through the 1990s is also cited as co-terminous with Africa's post-colonial experience. For many, China represents hope that another world is possible in which bread comes before the freedom to vote.

    Given the democratic reversals experienced in much of Africa from the late 1990s onwards, there is a distinct possibility that some authoritarian regimes in Africa will seek to utilize China's economic success to rationalize avoiding further political liberalization and genuine democratization. Human rights advocates and democratic actors in Africa may increasingly find their traditional arguments that respect for human rights and political liberalization will inexorably lead to economic success challenged by some African governments pointing to China as the poster-child for development sans democracy. A mid-term prognosis could be some African governments invoking the 'China paradigm' to justify the adoption of state-led economic policies coupled with intensified political repression.

    Virtually by stealth, the old debate about appropriate paths to Africa's development has been re-ignited by China's emergence as a major global power. The implications of this debate for advancing human rights and democracy in Africa are critical. A failure to re-establish the primacy and legitimacy of liberal democracy and strong human rights protections among Africa's intellectuals, media and civil society as the most appropriate path for Africa's development may ultimately lead to popular disillusionment with Western-inspired political and economic prescriptions that are perceived as unable to put bread in the mouths of hungry infants while communist China becomes the workshop of the world. More important than the desires of some African governments to return to political illiberality is the danger of resurgence in the old, anti-Western, anti-democratic tendency among Africa's intellectuals, boosted by China's apparent success.

    It is increasingly likely that a central challenge for civil society in Africa in the next few years will be an effort to prevent democracy reversal especially an 'intellectual rollback' to the 1970s. It may become necessary to re-establish or re-validate across Africa the legitimacy of democracy and human rights per se and also as the most appropriate and effective path to Africa's development. Africa's human rights advocates may be well served in this effort by projections that India may eventually surpass China's economic progress, thanks at least in part, to a freer political and intellectual culture. As the largest democracy in the world with long standing ties to Africa, India's economic progress in the last decade especially the exponential growth of its ICT industries could serve as an 'alternate' model to China.

    A human rights perspective

    While China's rapidly expanding engagement in Africa is enthusiastically welcomed by African governments and some African intellectuals, China's relations with Africa's governments is often perceived among human rights NGOs and Western commentators as increasingly problematic for governance and human rights in Africa. China's increasing presence in Africa has generated a flurry of Western media reportage and commentary, often with graphic headlines, the prevailing note of which is that Chinese trade, political and security cooperation may enable repressive regimes in Africa to avoid even the relatively limited constraints on their conduct imposed by Western donor conditionalities. Elements in Africa's civil society are concerned about the potential implications of China's relationship with African governments for the advancement of human rights and democracy in Africa.

    China-Africa security cooperation is particularly problematic. Chinese-made weapons are often cheaper than Western equivalents and China does not usually impose political, human rights or humanitarian conditions in its arms sales.

    The Nigerian government is increasingly turning to China for weapons to deal with the worsening insurgency in the oil-rich Niger Delta. The Nigerian air force purchased 12 Chinese-made versions of the upgraded Mig 21 jet fighter; the navy has ordered patrol boats to secure the swamps and creeks of the Niger Delta. Nigerian military officials have made clear that they will increasingly turn to China for weapons to quell the revolt in the Niger Delta which traditional Western suppliers appear reluctant to provide.

    In particular, China's role in the Sudan crisis, where it has supported a military regime accused of perpetrating or at the very least encouraging ethnic cleansing has cast a disturbing light on Chinese engagement in Africa (Alden 2005). China bought 50 percent of Sudan's oil exports in 2005, which presently accounts for 5 percent of China's oil needs (Pan 2006). China is accused of blocking or diluting UN Security Council efforts to effectively address the Sudanese government’s role in the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region.

    Human rights concerns about China's renewed engagement in Africa must of necessity extend beyond China-Africa inter-governmental relations. Indeed, it may be argued that in the near future, the role of the Chinese private sector in Africa may come to acquire as great a significance, if not greater, than that of the Chinese government or its state-owned enterprises in Africa. Some Chinese companies operating in Africa have been accused by NGOs of violating employment and environmental rights in the communities where they operate.

    NGOs in Nigeria have accused the Chinese logging company WEMPCO of discharged untreated effluents into the Cross River in southeastern Nigeria, thereby damaging the health and livelihoods of local fisher folk. The company is also accused of colluding with local officials and law enforcement to suppress protests by the local community.

    Western commentators contend that China’s lack of domestic political criticism frees its government and companies in their business endeavours in Africa from “reputational risks” and other pressures that Western companies operating in Africa are routinely exposed to. Whereas shareholders of Western companies may be cautious about investing in state-led energy projects in African countries which rely on a brutally-enforced stability, such issues have little visibility to the Chinese public (Melville and Owen 2005). This presents significant challenges for human rights advocates in Africa.

    A common African response?

    An effective common African response at the governmental level appears unlikely for quite a while to come due to the structural weaknesses of Africa’s regional organization, the African Union. China effectively deals with Africa on its own terms via the China-Africa Cooperation Forum which is convened by China. The AU, which should lead Africa’s engagement with China, is enfeebled by the language and culture divides which still plague Africa’s regional politics.

    A common African response is more likely at the civil society level where there is often a mutuality of concerns about human rights, democracy, labour and trade issues. Enhanced Africa-wide networking to develop common frameworks for responding to human rights and governance issues arising from China’s role in Africa is imperative.

    What can African civil society do?

    Civil society in Africa is increasingly concerned with the role of China in Africa especially the Chinese government’s relations with repressive regimes in Sudan and Zimbabwe. As China becomes a major weapons supplier to Africa's governments and Chinese energy and mining companies take up substantial stake in resource extraction in Africa, these concerns can only grow.

    China's enhanced presence in Africa is primarily driven by economic considerations; efforts to develop policy levers to prompt more constructive Chinese engagement in Africa will have to proceed from China's economic interests. Accordingly, African civil society cannot adopt the conventional 'naming-and-shaming' tactics that have served it well in addressing human rights abuses thus far; 'naming-and-shaming' tactics can however be adapted to deal with Chinese companies operating globally.

    As a starting point, China studies in African universities and research institutions should be encouraged by African governments, private sector and civil society. In this respect, the pioneering introduction of Chinese language studies at the Nnamdi Azikiwe University in Nigeria and the University of Stellenbosch in South Africa are particularly noteworthy developments which should be replicated elsewhere in Africa.

    African civil society should bring pressure through the African Union for a parallel civil society forum inclusive of business, labour and consumer groups to be instituted at the biennial meetings of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum. The parallel Civil Society Forum will bring together non-governmental organisations from China and Africa to enhance people-to-people relations, exchange of ideas and perspectives and to lobby their respective governments to address the Social Dimension of China-Africa relations.

    African civil society should take advantage of Western concerns about China’s expanding role in Africa through ‘coalitions of interest’ with Western governments in raising concerns about governance and human rights in African countries where the Chinese government is deeply engaged with repressive regimes.

    African NGOs can also work with Western NGO colleagues to mobilize threats of mass boycotts of Chinese-made consumer goods to protest China's arms exports to repressive governments in Africa.

    The potential of violence directed at Chinese businesses and nationals in Africa by rebel movements who regard China as an ally of the local repressive regime is likely to compel China to re-examine its security cooperation with African governments. It may be argued that an 'all-comers-served' approach to security cooperation with African governments may not continue for much longer without significant cost to China.

    African civil society should seek to highlight to the Chinese government that its activities in Africa cannot be entirely risk-free in the absence of peace and stability which cannot be secured in the absence of democracy and human rights. In particular, African NGOs can also highlight to the Chinese government that unrestrained exports of light arms exacerbate conflicts in Africa and worsen trafficking in small arms which may well end up used against Chinese companies and nationals operating in Africa. In the Beijing Declaration issued at the first China-Africa Co-operation Forum in October 2000, the Chinese government committed itself along with African governments to strengthen their co-operation in stopping the illegal production, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons in Africa. African NGOs can and should take China up on this voluntarily accepted commitment.

    While the Chinese government may not have to pay much regard to domestic public opinion, the Chinese government is historically very sensitive about its international image. China’s abstention on a Security Council vote on Darfur in early 2006 should be cause for some guarded optimism. This suggests that China is not totally oblivious of potential harm to its global reputation if it came to be perceived as the principal patron and protector of Africa's tyrants.

    After an initial phase of snapping up resource extraction concessions, it is well nigh conceivable that China will be compelled by instability and conflict in Africa to realize that its long term economic interests are best served by promoting peace in Africa and that this is most likely to come about by encouraging representative government in Africa rather than supporting dictators. As Chinese investors move beyond resource extraction to investments of a long-term nature, they will increasingly mount pressure on their government to avoid actions or policies likely to exacerbate instability or conflict.

    In the long term, it is conceivable that greater internal political liberalization within China will also result in less appetite for supporting repressive regimes in Africa.

    • Ndubisi Obiorah studied international law and human rights at Harvard and Essex. He has been a visiting fellow and researcher at Harvard University, the National Endowment for Democracy and Human Rights Watch. He has served as a consultant to USAID and the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERRIGHTS), London. He is presently director of the Centre for Law and Social Action (CLASA) in Lagos, Nigeria. CLASA, an independent, non-profit policy centre, brings together scholars and activists for inter-disciplinary collaboration in research and advocacy on governance, human development and social policy. [email][email protected]

    • This is a shortened version of an article by Ndubisi Obiorah. The full version, including references, will be available in a forthcoming book to be published in January by Fahamu and called ‘African perspectives on China in Africa’. The full articles will also be made available as .PDF files on the Pambazuka News website.

    • Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

  • Mpho is a 24 year old lesbian identified woman who was raped last October and as a result is now HIV+. She discovered she was positive in April this year and started on ARVs in August because her CD4 count was very low at 90. Like many women in a similar position in South Africa, Mpho is struggling not only with additional medical complications such as diabetes and thyroid problems but the side affect of the drugs, the stigma and having to find the sheer mental will to get through each day. In this interview she talks about how being raped and contracting HIV has impacted on her life. She also discusses her dreams for the future of being a photo journalist and living her life.

  • Malawi, one of the world's poorest countries, is losing up to US$26 million for every nurse who leaves the country in search of greener pastures, according to a new research paper. "Better salaries and good working conditions are among the contributing factors for these nurses' migration."

  • The Swazi government expressed cautious optimism after a survey found that 39.2 percent of women visiting antenatal clinics tested positive for HIV, indicating that the infection rate was dropping. Medical data from pregnant women is used as a barometer of HIV/AIDS prevalence among the country's about one million people and although the figure was above the 38.6 percent recorded in 2002, it was down from the 42.6 percent reached in 2004.

  • HIV/ AIDS is a complex problem posing social, political, medical and technological challenges to humankind today, both in those countries known to be most affected and those that are less affected.

    The article by Salma Maoulidi (www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/38636) among other things, highlights issues of access to anti-retroviral drugs for treatment of opportunistic infections among HIV infected persons. Much as she would give a thumbs up to the local pharmaceutical company which is championing local production and distribution of ARVs, it should be borne in mind that the East African Treaty on Common market is weak and rather powerless in the face of the World Trade Organisation.

    Drugs are controlled by patents, and are a big business employing a huge number of people in powerful multinational companies who basically have business interests in mind. The public health approach to business is something they would not embrace. Concepts of corporate social responsibility have a long way to go before they enter the minds of multinational drug companies, which also happen to be in the forefront in manufacture and distribution of life saving drugs, including ARV’s. Therefore concerted efforts at a regional level need to take account of the WTO trade rules and regulations which are not in favour of East Africans suffering from AIDS related illnesses.

    On the social front Maoulidi has challenged the patriarchal system which has increased women’s vulnerability to AIDS. There have been efforts by civil society in Tanzania to try to redress this situation, although surely it might take time but I believe their efforts are not futile. I would rather advise that such changes should begin at household level in the way we raise our children. In this way they will learn to respect their gender differences, and this attitude might be continued in their day-to-day lives and further in their sexual relations.

    Lastly, I would advise readers to consult the UNESCO guidelines on the use of language related to HIV/AIDS. There are a number of new concepts that have been suggested in place of those we commonly use.

  • Scientists have created an online global map of communities at high risk of malaria, which could prove a valuable tool for policymakers targeting resources to fight the disease. The map links data collected by population surveys to Google Earth's online map of the world designed using satellite photographs.

  • For an HIV/AIDS breakthrough to happen in Tanzania, a radical approach to tackling HIV/AIDS and its impact is needed, writes Salma Maoulidi, who asks “How can any progress be made in the HIV/AIDS battle if current strategies are superficial and isolated?"

    It is over two decades since the first AIDS patient was diagnosed in Tanzania. In response, a number of measures were devised and adopted by the government to respond to the pandemic. These measures reflect the progress in official understanding and attitudes about the disease. Initial responses were comprised mainly of health measures designed to address curative aspects of the disease. Then, denial about HIV/AIDS, even in official quarters, hampered more effective responses to the disease.

    The rise of associations of people with or affected by HIV/AIDS, parallel to existing responses, spearheaded psycho-social and policy responses. This brought about two major benefits in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Foremost, it “outed” the disease enabling HIV/AIDS activists to focus more deliberately on addressing stigma, a major barrier in addressing the pandemic at the personal and institutional level. Similarly, concerted advocacy by HIV/AIDS activists brought the disease out of a medical isolation where it was viewed purely in health terms, to the level of considering non-medical dimensions.

    The progression from National AIDS Programmes to an AIDS Commission in the late nineties heralded the multi-sectoral approach currently adopted.

    For the most part, HIV/AIDS associations have confined their responses to the impact on the individual and community. Overwhelmingly, their response is service oriented e.g. provision of home based care; nutrition programmes; provision of legal services; widow or orphan care; and HIV/AIDS support groups something that hinders their ability to focus on more strategic concerns related to HIV/AIDS. Only a small number of associations mix advocacy with service provision. Accordingly, while Tanzania in the mid nineties declared HIV/AIDS a national calamity, few organizations have built upon this opportunity to advance HIV/AIDS advocacy efforts in a meaningful manner.

    Instead, what is new in existing and upcoming HIV/AIDS initiatives is the location; or the gender and youth focus.

    HIV/AIDS organizations, mainly veteran associations that have introduced policy advocacy initiatives in their programming, require capacity in translating this in practical policy results and interventions. For example, some HIV/AIDS organizations are pressurizing the government to make ARVs accessible to People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). While the government receives due attention in taking measures to make this a reality, little attention is given to the role of pharmaceuticals in facilitating treatment options. Surely, other than an official commitment in principle to facilitate treatment, there is very little the government can do, in practical terms, to provide ARVs on a mass scale.

    This, however, is something local pharmaceuticals can and should be obliged to do. And a few have risen to the challenge, leading discussions with the government under various trade agreements like the East African Community Treaty on Common Markets. Local pharmaceutical companies like the Tanzania Pharmaceutical Industries (TPI), not HIV/AIDS associations, are challenging the monopoly of foreign companies in the production and distribution of ARVs. They capitalize on their geographical location to build a case for ARV production more suited to local populations and at more affordable rates. An added benefit to their proposal is the prospect of creating jobs for local the population. Certainly this development presents an opportunity for partnership between the HIV/AIDS community and the business community that includes aspects of HIV/AIDS advocacy and corporate social responsibility yet to be explored. However, it is a sector HIV/AIDS activist are noticeably absent and silent from.

    Equally important is the need for more strategic responses vis á vis the HIV/AIDS pandemic, not only by the government but also by community institutions. The policy and legal framework focuses on “formalized” aspects of discrimination against PLWHA or those affected by HIV/AIDS. Thus due attention is given to the employer-employee relationships; access to health care; and to a smaller extent the question of legal services to PLWHA and their families. These measures, however, fall short of infusing the radical spice to significantly impact PLWHA or their families since they fail to address the primary cause of unhindered HIV/AIDS transmission: the traditional interpretation of the family institution and the unequal relationship between parties in the family union.

    Indeed, transmission patterns in Africa, Tanzania included, are largely heterosexual.The majority of those affected or infected with the HIV/AIDS virus are married men and women - not sex workers and not single women or homosexuals. This is important to consider as it dispels a major stereotype of HIV/AIDS victims and transmission of the virus.

    It was this breakthrough that enabled HIV/AIDS researchers in the west to begin expanding their investigation of the disease and its transmission beyond the homosexual community or intravenous drug users. The fact that HIV/AIDS in Africa and Asia is transmitted mainly through heterosexual contact debunked the Sodom and Gomorrah theory which confined the problem to a particular group in the society considered immoral to be dispelled.

    What is interesting is that in spite of this knowledge, most institutions representative of patriarchal authority lack the will to redress this situation. For example, they fail to focus on the unequal relationship between man and wife that allows the man unfettered sexual access, thereby compromising the health and life of his spouse. Many times this is done with the full endorsement of public and legal institutions under the rubric of preserving the religious or cultural order. In effect, the interest is rather in preserving the status quo rather than guaranteeing equal protection and treatment to both spouses even when this is required by the constitutional order.

    Indeed, women the world over, and particularly in Africa, are vulnerable to HIV transmission not only from their partners but also when performing reproductive functions e.g. during childbirth or taking care of family members infected with the disease. Yet, we are yet to have legal mechanisms that address this aspect of their vulnerability. If anything, there is resistance and denial about what is at issue in empowering women in exercising greater control over their bodies and lives.

    Additionally, whereas the individual is sanctified under most religions, and cultures recognize ungendered interpretations impose limits to the exercise of individual authority when it relates to the female sex, confirming the continued discrimination against women in public and private spheres: Under the constitutional and civil orders, men and women have equal rights by virtue of their citizenship. In practice, however, women continue to be considered second-class citizens and consistently denied the protection of the law due to any citizen of a nation state. Widows with HIV/AIDS are doubly punished: they are recklessly infected with the virus and then dispossessed of jointly acquired property from the investments made to their families. In most cases, the law requires that they be looked after by their children or in-laws, even those they brought up!

    This is a moral aspect that is yet to be addressed.A recent High Court decision on the inheritance status of widows raises serious questions about the willingness of key public sectors to transform our thinking beyond the cultural rubric, one that is parochial and unsuitable to present realities. In the case of Elizabeth Stephen and another vs. the Attorney General (Miscellaneous Civil Cause no. 82 of 2005) High Court Justice Mihayo dismissed an application lodged by the applicants, two widows, requesting the court to uphold their constitutional and civic rights by declaring discriminatory customary laws and provisions that continue to deny women property rights as unconstitutional. The judges declined to do so, fearing opening up a Pandora’s Box of legal challenges to the practices of about 120 tribes following the same path. Interestingly, while Tanzania gained her independence four decades ago, the legal fraternity represented by these justices seems oblivious to this fact. They choose instead to invoke and apply a reasoning based on a colonial reference, one that reflects a narrow appreciation of African culture as being homogenous and static not dynamic.

    In my long legal and activist carrier I know of very few families, affected or not with HI/AIDS, being provided for by the “guardian” as required by courts or some religious orders. In fact, cases of maladministration of family property, whether by self appointed guardians or those appointed by the court or clan, abound with many families being impoverished by greedy relatives with no effective recourse to oblige performance or restitution of the plundered property. Importantly, in this day and age, what is the logic of requiring a blood relation who may be a stranger to the family to assume responsibility of family affairs he has little competence in or will to execute? Does the experience of the female spouse who for years looked after the family count for nothing? This is a clear case of de facto discrimination and should be termed as such.

    Undeniably, significant progress has been made with in responses to the pandemic. In this respect, the introduction of a policy and legal framework on HIV/AIDS in Tanzania provides a wider focus on addressing existing and potential challenges related to HIV/AIDS, though presently more attention is given to issues of labour discrimination and treatment options reflecting present, not strategic concerns. Until now the war against HIV/AIDS is defined in militaristic terms: strategies to combat HIV/AIDS; bracing for a national calamity; fighting the scourge etc. We are yet to define it in human terms not only in so far as the health or economic implications but also in so far as the political implications to a class that is vulnerable to the infection.

    How can concerted efforts against HIV/AIDS succeed if, at its outset and at the most fundamental level, the effort is not collective? How can transmission be curbed when one party is unsuspecting and not empowered to suppress transmission? How can any progress be made in the HIV/AIDS battle if, current strategies are superficial and isolated? Recognizing women’s bodily integrity and full agency in the family are important ingredients in transforming the HIV/AIDS menace. It is in this regard that I call for a radical response in tackling HIV/AIDS and its impact. I believe rather than viewing HIV/AIDS solely in a negative light, it offers us immense possibilities to re-define social relations and values a new, in ways that are more suited to our present realities and experiences.

    • Salma Maoulidi, Executive Director of Sahiba?Sisters Foundation, a women’s development network based in Tanzania.
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