zimbabwe: reforms needed before election re-run

Zimbabwe’s Post-Election Era: Civil Society Perspectives

1. The 2002 Presidential Election – a determination of Zimbabwe’s Electorate?
2. EISA’s Election Observer Mission to Zimbabwe 2002 – A Summation

***The views expressed herein are those of the authors and can therefore in no way be taken to reflect the official opinion of the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA)***
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1. The 2002 Presidential Election – a determination of Zimbabwe’s Electorate?
By Ms Rindai Chipfunde, National Coordinator, Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) ([email protected]). Parts of this article are excerpts from the ZESN Presidential Elections 2002 report, a full version of which can be read at www.zesn.org.zw.)

Introduction

The 2002 Zimbabwean Presidential Election was without doubt the most highly contested, if not the most violent, since Zimbabwe’s Independence Election of 1980. The election also had the longest campaign period, beginning soon after the June 2000 Parliamentary Election. The 2002 election attracted regional and international attention, and was characterised by structured and organised political violence and intimidation.

The Human Rights NGO Forum reported that between 1 January and 14 April 2002, 54 deaths occurred from politically motivated violence. Other acts of violence reported included 945 cases of torture, 214 kidnappings, 229 cases of intimidation or threats, 143 cases of unlawful detention, 29 disappearances, 99 cases of unlawful arrests, five cases of rape, 48 school closures and about 1000 confiscations of identity documents.

The reports also noted the establishment of camps and bases where militia youths supporting the ruling party were based, and on voting days, the setting of these camps near polling stations. This resulted in intimidation of the voters before they voted and also led to the detention of observers in torture camps.

Legal and Regulatory Framework

The government fast-tracked draconian legislation through Parliament, in some instances in an unconstitutional and unorthodox manner. The purpose of the legislation was to subvert any democratic processes within Zimbabwe and to curtail the free operation, not only of opposition parties, but also of civil society, during the elections. The controversial legislation included the Broadcasting Services Act, the General Laws Amendment Act (GLAA), the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and amendments to the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act, and the Electoral Act. The GLAA was struck down by the Supreme Court on the grounds that it had been unconstitutionally passed by Parliament, throwing the whole electoral framework into disarray.

When civil society, including the MDC, turned to the courts to challenge some of the legislation as being ultra vires the Constitution of Zimbabwe, statutory instruments under the Electoral Act were used to reinstate the provisions of some of the legislation.

Thus the legislation, combined with the already flawed constitutional framework, ensured that the election would run in an environment that made it impossible to have a free and fair election by any existing standards.

The legislation put in place the following:

Regulations limiting the accompanying of ballot boxes to counting centres by electoral officials, monitors, party agents excluding independent domestic observers compromised transparency of the electoral process. The enactment of the very restrictive and oppressive Public Order and Security Act (POSA). The latter curtailed all civil and political rights, and frustrated attempts by opposition parties to campaign freely. Whilst Robert Mugabe held about 50 rallies countrywide, the MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai managed less than ten rallies and many others were cancelled. The act also curtailed free movement, not only of members of the public but also of NGO civic educators. The powers of the police to ban meetings were used to frustrate NGO voter education programmes. The GLAA restricted voter education to the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) and political parties, denying the electorate the opportunity to receive independent education. The GLAA also restricted election monitoring to civil servants, while the SADC norms and standards recommend the appointment of independent monitors from civil society. As a result the GLAA reduced NGO election monitors to the status of election observers, who had to be invited to act as such by the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. The names of 12 500 Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) members and affiliates, who had prior monitoring experience under the auspices of the ESC, were submitted, but only a paltry 420 people were invited to be observers, thus compromising the monitoring and observation effort.

The Media

There was unequal access to the state-controlled media, which favoured the ruling Zanu-PF and failed to give sufficient or impartial coverage of the opposition. For example, the Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe (MMPZ) notes that 94% of election coverage on ZBC was favourable to the ruling Zanu-PF whilst the 4% for the MDC was derogatory and biased.

The Registrar-General of Elections, the Electoral Supervisory Commission and the Election Directorate

These bodies run the elections and their lack of co-ordination led to a failure by the office of the Registrar-General to adhere to a court ruling to the effect that local council elections in Harare and Chitungwiza should be held before the Presidential Election. Issues that arose include:

· The tripartite and dual elections in Harare and Chitungwiza confused the electorate, which faced the simultaneous holding of council, mayoral and presidential elections. This was worsened by the failure of the electoral bodies to provide correct, sufficient and timely voter education;
· The extension of polling by one day in Harare and Chitungwiza, which the High Court granted following an application by the MDC was ineffective, as polling only began at 11am and closed at 7pm, with many people still in the queues;
· The refusal to publish the voters’ roll or otherwise make it available to the electorate reduced the transparency of the process;
· There was a general lack of information on the whole electoral process made available to the electorate, not only by the Registrar-General but also by the ESC, particularly regarding the locations of polling stations and how to vote in dual and tripartite elections for Chitungwiza and Harare respectively;
· The restrictive voter registration process and inadequate voter education disenfranchised voters;
· Postal voting facilities were only made available to members of the armed forces, diplomatic staff and electoral officials only;
· The postal voting was unmonitored by independent observers and it is not known how many postal ballots were cast;
· There was secret registration of voters beyond the 27 January 2002 deadline and the subsequent retrospective extension of the deadline to 3 March 2002;
· The Registrar-General’s office worked on a supplementary roll up to the polling period;
· There was lack of transparency in the compilation and correction of the voters’ roll by the Registrar-General’s office;
· Extra ballot papers were printed. The production of ballot papers and other voting materials was not monitored by political parties, NGOs or independent observers; and
· Observers and journalists had restricted entry to counting centres.

Polling Stations

The following was observed with regards to polling stations:

· The reduction in their number in the urban areas, which are perceived to be strongholds of the opposition MDC;
· There was no publicity on the final number and locations of polling stations until two days before the elections;
· The late announcement of major increases in the numbers of rural polling stations and decreases in urban polling stations jeopardised the deployment plans of domestic observer groups and some political party agents.

Observers

· Invitation of domestic and international observers was selective;
· Local observers were denied access to polling stations as a result of being unaccredited;
· Most local observers deployed by ZESN and its members were harassed with beatings, torture, arrest and detention, and confiscation of their monitoring tools and identity cards; and
· International observers were attacked and beaten; for example the South African observer mission was attacked in Chinhoyi.

Opposition Polling Agents

· A significant number of polling agents for the opposition, in particular the MDC’s, were attacked whilst on their way to their polling stations and thus were not present during voting, leading to fears of massive rigging; and
· Some MDC polling agents were beaten, detained and killed during the election.

Election Results and the Voters’ Roll

· A tense and suspicious atmosphere prevailed during the announcing of election results, as the number of registered voters, spoilt papers and turned-away voters in each constituency was not given;
· The figures provided by ZESN observers, the ESC and those announced by the Registrar-General did not tally; and
· Immediately prior to and following the announcement of the results, police were deployed and mounted roadblocks nation-wide, whilst in some areas, such as Chitungwiza, illegal curfews were imposed.

The ZESN’S Assessment

The 2002 Presidential Election was characterised by violence, intimidation, draconian legislation, the disenfranchising of voters through the flawed registration process, the partiality of the election officials, the breakdown of the rule of law and the disputed election results. It can be observed from the above that the 2002 elections violated the SADC Parliamentary Forum’s norms and standards for free and fair elections as adopted by all members of SADC. As a result, the will of the Zimbabwean electorate was not expressed in a transparent, free and fair environment. Because of this assessment ZESN recommends that there should be an audit of the election results, and depending on the findings, a re-run should be considered. This should be done after an agreed transitional period, during which constitutional and electoral reforms, conducive to holding a free and fair election, are put in place.

Post-Election Period

Worldwide condemnations of the election result characterised the end of the controversial Zimbabwe Presidential Election in 2002. The violence, political intolerance, intimidation and killings by Zanu-PF supporters, the war veterans and the youth militia, continued even after the disputed Zanu-PF victory.

Internal Assessment of the Poll

The immediate assessment within Zimbabwe was, of course, divided:

Civil Society

Almost all civil society groups unanimously called the election not free and fair. The organisations cited not only the violence, but also the gross irregularities and human rights violations, as reasons to dispute the election results. The Women’s Coalition and the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition went further and rejected the outcome. The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in its statement questioned the legitimacy of the president and unequivocally said his re-election was due to a flawed constitutional framework that enabled ZANU-PF to rig the process.

Political Parties

President Mugabe’s main rival, Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC, rejected the election result and called Mr Mugabe’s win illegitimate. He further said ‘We have been cheated of the right to freely and democratically elect the president of our choice’. Zanu-PF celebrated President Mugabe’s victory and he was inaugurated on 17 March 2002. Information Minister Jonathan Moyo said ‘It is a wonderful result for Zimbabwe and Africans, a reaffirmation of African dignity and independence…’.

Regional and International Assessment

The Commonwealth Observer Group, along with the Norwegian, Ghanaian, and SADC Parliamentary Forum observer teams, strongly condemned the election saying it was held in a climate of fear and was not free and fair. Observers from the Nigerian, South African and Namibian governments called the elections free and fair. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) reported that ‘in general the election was transparent, credible, free and fair’. It was, however, the Commonwealth Observer Group’s assessment which led to the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth for a year from 19 March 2002. A troika comprising the Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, the South African President Thabo Mbeki and the Australian Prime Minister John Howard, made the recommendation after consideration of the Commonwealth Observer Mission’s report. The report noted the following:

· There was a high level of politically motivated violence and intimidation;
· Zanu-PF’s paramilitary youth group was largely responsible for this intimidation;
· There were restrictions on independent local observers;
· There was lack of transparency in the registration process;
· The numbers of polling stations in the urban areas were reduced;
· Many voters in Harare and Chitungwiza were unable to vote because the process was very slow; and
· Limitations on freedom of speech and movement hampered the oppositions’ campaign.

Political Violence and the General Situation in the Country

As Zimbabweans awaited the election results, the security forces were put on high alert and police set up roadblocks on the main roads to the capital, Harare. Soldiers and police officers were placed in strategic MDC offices around the country. A day after the election results a young security guard was killed at a farm outside Marondera by a group of war veterans who were living on the farm. The white farmer was grievously assaulted. The pre-election violence, intimidation and harassment resurfaced after only two days of respite. As predicted, acts of retribution by Zanu-PF continue to occur on a daily basis.

As part of nation-wide exercise to punish those who voted for Morgan Tsvangirai, members of the army allegedly beat to death three MDC supporters in Chipinge South on 16 March. In Norton, another post-election victim was a white farmer killed by those occupying the farm. Reports of Zanu-PF going on the rampage in the tourist town of Victoria Falls were recorded and published in the national independent newspaper, the Daily News. In Bulawayo on 13 March, the Daily News’ offices were destroyed and vendors harassed by ruling party supporters. Selective punishment and lack of protection of citizens by the police continues in the post-election period. The general atmosphere in the country is tense and the cloud of fear evident.

Continued Implementation of Draconian Legislation

Zimbabwe witnessed the implementation of the dreaded Public Order Security Act (POSA) on a day-to-day basis. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) had its general council meeting disrupted by the police on 14 March; POSA was used to declare the meeting political and hence illegal. In response to this interference the ZCTU called for a mass stay-away of all the workers from 20 to 22 March 2002. The strike was declared illegal by the police and received a mixed reaction from the public. Many turned up for work and a few shops that were closed later re-opened. The NCA called for a demonstration on 6 April 2002. This demonstration was declared illegal under POSA, and resulted in over 400 arrests and beatings of NCA activists.

International and Internal Pressure

President Mugabe is under pressure from the international community, particularly donor countries, to form a government of national unity with his main rival, the MDC. In his inaugural speech, Mugabe seemed to be on a track of national reconciliation and it remains to be seen what will happen regarding this issue, as the MDC leader and Mugabe’s real rival, Morgan Tsvangirai (and two of his top officials) have been formally charged with high treason, for allegedly plotting to assassinate the president. The MDC has said it is gathering evidence to prove that the election was rigged and will then decide on whether to take the matter to court or resolve it politically. It eventually filed a court challenge against the results, on 12 April 2002.

As already noted, in March 2002, Zimbabwe was suspended from membership of the Commonwealth for one year.

Government of National Unity

Reconciliation talks between Zanu-PF and the MDC were recently initiated by South African President, Thabo Mbeki and Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo. According to most analysts, the main consideration of the two presidents was the success of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Zimbabwe is a litmus test for NEPAD’s success, which allows for African leaders to monitor each other, in order to ensure the restoration of good governance and state legitimacy in any country that has departed from international norms. In Zimbabwe, there was mixed feelings about the talks, with many opposition supporters against them, concerned that the MDC would be absorbed by Zanu-PF as happened to ZAPU with the 1987 Unity Accord. In mid May Zanu-PF suspended the discussions until the court’s ruling on the MDC challenge to the election result.

The Way Forward

Whilst it is important to continue discussing the flawed Presidential Elections, it is more helpful to discuss the post-election agenda. Professor Masipula Sithole, a political analyst, summed it up by calling for an electoral law that will level the playfield when a re-run or an early new election takes place, pointing out that otherwise the same scenario would prevail. He went on to say Zimbabweans need to normalise life and rid themselves of the trauma of political violence. Accordingly, he is against the national unity initiative of South Africa and Nigeria, as participation in it would be legitimising the illegitimate, unless it is preceded by a free and fair election.

The constitutional and legal framework was heavily used by Zanu-PF to win the election and the MDC court case uses constitutional and legal issues as a basis for challenge. A re-run even, under the auspices of the United Nations or the Commonwealth, cannot guarantee free and fair elections. Hence, it is necessary to have the re-run only after an agreed transitional period, during which constitutional and electoral reforms, conducive to holding a free and fair election, are put in place.

Civil society organisations need to come together and map the way forward, given the following challenges in Zimbabwe:
· A hostile operating environment, the land question, human rights issues;
· Lack of understanding by non-Zimbabweans of the land issue, and civil society oganisations’ stress not on its importance, but on how it is done;
· An atmosphere of ‘divide and rule’, militarisation of state institutions, and polarisation in civil society organisations, churches and trade unions;
· Divisions along racial lines in the Commonwealth; and
· The need to strengthen networks and address the issues of:
· Restrictions, beatings and intimidation of teachers perceived to be MDC supporters, lack of food aid, politicisation of aid from the end of May, displacement of families, rapes; and
· The outcome of the MDC’s court challenge, and how it will be accepted.

Conclusion

It is uncertain what the future holds for Zimbabwe. Although most people discuss politics more freely than in the past, and whilst a significant number of Zimbabweans have expressed concern with the election result, there are no indications of how and where this discontent will be channelled. There are adjourned MDC-Zanu-PF talks about a government of national unity, and ‘smart sanctions’ as issues remain unresolved.

However, civil society organisations are agreed that before a re-run there should be constitutional and electoral reforms, or at a minimum, pre-conditions conducive for holding a free and fair election.

It is pertinent as well that Zimbabwean civil society organisations re-look at themselves, put in place sophisticated strategies to cope with the threats to restrict NGOs so they can continue with normal daily activities and cope with the arrests of activists, journalists and lawyers.

It is important to follow up on recommendations to improve the electoral environment. This will not be an easy task, the more so since the trend during the pre-election period was to make that environment very uneven and hostile. Also, credible threats are being made to the effect that the government will seek to further control and curtail the activities of organisations operating in the democracy and governance spheres.

There is a need to explore creative avenues to scale-up civic and democracy education, which had been severely stifled during the pre-election period. It is important for civil society organisations to discuss and put in place survival strategies against threats to NGOs, and arrests and intimidation of human rights defenders. More emphasis is needed on programmes targeting the rural areas.

It is imperative that we improve our links with regional and other international sister civic organisations and electoral institutions for networking, lobbying and capacity building. This is particularly important since the ruling party and the government have pursued a fairly aggressive public relations exercise in the region, continentally and beyond. It is therefore clear that we should concentrate most of our efforts within the SADC region, in the African continent and on the Commonwealth.

Zimbabwean civil society organisations should look to the forthcoming local government elections in the rural and urban areas, scheduled for 2002 and 2003 respectively. It is imperative that we are fully prepared to meet this challenge. Given the difficulties and challenges we experienced during the recent presidential election, we will need to draw lessons on what role we could effectively play, in particular in relation to election observation and voter education.

Finally, attention should be given to the economic and social rights issues in relation to food and the HIV/AIDS crisis. The politicisation of food distribution and food for work programmes are issues directly linked to governance issues and which should not be treated in isolation. Issues of democracy and good governance should be linked to the process of distribution of drought relief and resources from the AIDS levy. For example, Zimbabweans should guard against discriminatory and non-transparent policies, in particular the victimisation of people who may be perceived to have voted for the ‘wrong’ candidate.

2. EISA’s Election Observer Mission to Zimbabwe 2002 – A Delegate’s Perceptions
By Mr Tefo Raditapole, Member of Delegation: EISA Election Observer Mission to Zimbabwe March, 2002.

The EISA Observer Mission (the ‘mission’) arrived in Harare on 27 February 2002, a delegation of forty members. Two or three teams were deployed in each province, but due to reasons beyond the Mission’s control, could only deploy to the provinces from 6 March, a late start in terms of substantial election observation. Accordingly, it was not able to comment on the pre-election phase, but only on the election days, from 9 to 11 March.

The Mission observed that generally, throughout Zimbabwe, with the exception of Harare and Chitungwisa, the election was carried out smoothly and with minimum disruption. Shortcomings in Harare and Chitungwisa, as well as the violent conduct of the police at various polling stations in those areas, were pointed out. Regretfully, the Mission had to relay allegations of violence received from various parts of the country, including an incident observed by one of its own teams.

It is critically important to note that, on the whole, the teams observed very peaceful and orderly election proceedings in most of the provinces. The polling stations opened and closed on time and both MDC and ZANU-PF party agents were present at all polling stations visited by the teams. The party agents stayed at the polling stations overnight and never let the ballot boxes out of their sight. The agents also accompanied the ballot boxes from the polling stations to the various counting stations.

The verification exercise carried out by the electoral officials was transparent and exemplary in many instances. During the exercise at Gutu South in Masvingo province, a Presiding Officer of one of the polling stations reported that a person who was not qualified to vote, managed to cast a ballot. The Presiding Officer, however, noted the serial number of the ballot and furnished it to the Constituency Registrar who was presiding over the verification exercise. Before the ballots were reconciled, the Constituency Registrar instructed the counters to look for the ballot bearing that serial number. They found the invalid ballot, put it aside, and only then started counting the ballots. In other instances where the count did not tally with ballot book stubs, counting was repeated until the reconciliation was in order.

A number of observer missions were deployed throughout Masvingo province, including a team from Norway. Many were stationed at the Flamboyant Hotel in the town centre. The various observer teams met a few times to discuss, amongst other things, how best to spread ourselves in the provinces so as to cover as much ground as possible. At these meetings, most teams reported that they had not come across anything untoward. However, the Norwegians were particularly agitated about various reports they were receiving about incidents of intimidation and violence. This was surprising at the time, having observed in the same area and not seen or heard anything of that nature despite being on the road from dusk till dawn daily.

The EISA delegation was very perturbed by the information coming from other observer missions and engaged them about the reports concerning violence and intimidation. They indicated that they discovered this information through questioning members of the public and from reports made to them. They confirmed that they did not verify any of the information they received and conceded that these were matters that had to be ‘investigated’. This failure to verify stories led to misleading and false reports forming the basis of conclusions made by the observers concerned. If this was the modus operandi of other observer missions who ‘observed’ violence and intimidation then it comes as no surprise that they classified the election phase not free and fair.

Below are two incidents cited that highlight the danger of observers who had decided to report incidents of violence and intimidation, without verifying reports they receive or hearing the versions of the alleged perpetrators.

The first incident relates to a report made by a member of an observer mission to the first meeting of observer missions at the Flamboyant Hotel. It was said that a shop belonging to an MDC member had been stoned and an MDC office burnt in the Gutu South constituency. The EISA delegation followed up this report by going to the local police station the next day. The police confirmed the report about the shop. They, however, indicated that there was no MDC office in the area and that the building that was burnt was a hut belonging to ZANU-PF member.

Another incident relates to a report concerning the verification exercise in Gutu South. The observer missions were very concerned about the ‘atmosphere of violence and intimidation’ in the area. It was rumoured that a report had been received on 9 March that, at a certain polling station, polling officials and an MDC party agent were chased away by people who were apparently ZANU-PF supporters. On probing further, it was discovered that the observer missions had been to the same station the day after the alleged incident and found everything in order. Even the MDC agent who was there did not mention anything about being chased away the previous day. It is worth noting that at the time the delegations visited the station, EISA Mission colleagues had received information that the report was a fabrication, yet somehow the other Missions did not dismiss it as such but took that subsequent information as further evidence of violence and intimidation

The extent to which misleading reports about political violence and intimidation in Zimbabwe is existed was exemplified by the recent media reports regarding a woman who was allegedly beheaded in front of her children because she supported the MDC. This was reported throughout the world as fact. It has subsequently been discovered that the story is false.

Having said the above, it must be stressed that the EISA Observer Mission held no brief for the ruling party in Zimbabwe. The following summation merely lays a basis for the stance taken by the EISA Observer Mission in the midst of media hysteria about the political situation there. Long before the actual election took place, there was a view promoted by the media that if President Mugabe lost the election, then it was free and fair, but if he won then it was not free and fair. It appears observers were expected to fall in line with this sentiment despite what was actually seen on the ground over the election day period. Had the EISA Observer Mission done so, it would have been dishonest in the extreme. In this regard, it must be reiterated that the EISA Mission commented on the election phase only, and not a pre- or post election phase.

In conclusion, those who predicted President Mugabe would lose the election, failed to appreciate the impact on the population of his land reform programme, whatever its merits or demerits. According to official figures, approximately 260 000 families were resettled in terms of the programme. A hypothetical number of five voting adults per family gives a total of over a 1 250 000 potential voters who would probably have voted for the person who ‘gave’ them land. Against this, the MDC publicly condemned the government’s programme. The probabilities are overwhelming that those who had already benefited from the programme, as well as those who hoped to benefit, did not vote for the MDC. The discrepancies that must have occurred in Harare and Chitungwiza would probably not have affected the overall result, in which there was a difference of over 400 000 votes.

In an election where the major contestants were so polarised, it is expected that skirmishes break out here and there, and that reports of violence and intimidation and court challenges of one sort or another are received. The limited number of, and scale of incidents, justified declaring the election phase in its totality as being free and fair. In other words, the election phase the EISA Election Observer Mission observed was legitimate.

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