• "Africa didn't really shine here," South African finance minister Trevor Manuel told a press conference in snowy Davos, Switzerland, at the World Economic Forum last week. "There is a complete dearth of panels on Africa."

    Nevertheless, in any five-star hotel gathering of powerbrokers, backslapping is crucial, no matter how artificial the camaraderie. Here is how former Johannesburg Star newspaper editor Peter Sullivan witlessly described the Davos experience for Sunday Independent readers this week:

    "The SA contingent worked hard to get investment but partied equally hard: a real 'jol' was had by all with great jiving from Kader Asmal, Trevor Manuel and Alec Irwin (sic), while Bertie Lubner and his wife boogied the night away. We also drank a few bottles of KWV's best red." (Too many, apparently, to subsequently spell trade minister Erwin's name correctly.)

    Sullivan regaled with stories of meeting "the beautiful Queen Rania of Jordan", Bill Gates and Bill Clinton. But as one shrewd journalist - not the social-climber Sullivan - reported on January 28, "Among the many snubs Africa received here was the decision by former US president Bill Clinton to cancel his presence at a press conference on Africa today to discuss the New Partnership for Africa's Development. Forum officials said Clinton did not give reasons for not attending."

    The ingratitude!

    Recall that over the previous eighteen months, Thabo Mbeki, Manuel and Erwin had either hosted, chaired or played a crucial backroom role on globalisation's equivalent of a big-five hunting safari - mainly for the benefit of the Davos club:

    * At the World Conference Against Racism in Durban, Mbeki shot down NGOs and African leaders who argued in favour of reparations for slavery/colonialism/apartheid.

    * Ten weeks later at the World Trade Organisation's Doha ministerial summit, Erwin split his continent's delegation to prevent a Seattle-style denial of consensus by African trade ministers, in the process promoting multinational corporate interests.

    * Then, at the UN's Financing for Development conference in Monterrey, Mexico last March, Manuel was summit co-chair and endorsed the World Bank and IMF "Washington Consensus", relegating debt relief to the status of a dead duck.

    * A few months later, at the Kananaskis, Canada Summit of the G8 powers, a grovelling Mbeki departed with a handful of peanuts for his hungry and now badly wounded African elephant - and yet, against all evidence to the contrary, declared that the meeting "signifies the end of the epoch of colonialism and neo-colonialism".

    * Finally, at Johannesburg's World Summit on Sustainable Development, Mbeki undermined standard UN democratic procedure, advanced the privatisation of nature, and did virtually nothing to genuinely address the plight of the world's majority.

    A little sympathy from the world's ruling class for Pretoria's men in kneepads would surely have been in order - even if just the face-saving sort, for the cameras, as is normally the case.

    So let's leave the grey-monied set in favour of a hot, sunny, colourful place crowded with ordinary grassroots activists who took the world's problems rather more seriously last week. In Porto Alegre, Brazil, the World Social Forum attracted 100,000 leftist delegates from across the globe who insisted, "Another World is Possible!"

    Here at least, South Africa - especially Soweto campaigners for free electricity, water, medicines, education and housing - shone as brightly as a house reconnected late at night thanks to Operation Khanyisa.

    Several times in Porto Alegre, I witnessed the passion with which former Soweto city councillor Trevor Ngwane addressed the crowds, moving the agenda from basic human rights, to continent-wide organising in the year-old Africa Social Forum, to his widely-applauded declaration that the World Bank must now be defunded and decommissioned.

    "Weakening the power of Washington is our main challenge," Ngwane announced, "especially now that Bush is in heat after Middle Eastern oil, and because the IMF and World Bank show they will not reform."

    Moreover, the World Social Forum has spawned a variety of localised social forums of labour, women, environmentalists, community militants, church activists, and youth. In conjunction with the African Social Forum which met last month in Addis Ababa, Ngwane has been mandated to help get a Southern African Social Forum off the ground.

    Decentralisation will help avoid, as Canadian author Naomi Klein warns, domination by the new "big men" of the left: Brazilian president Lula Inacio da Silva and embattled Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez. Crucial for a coming generation of bottom-up social forums, says Klein, is the chance to replant Porto Alegre's most radical seeds: "The ideas flying around included neighbourhood councils, participatory budgets, stronger city governments, land reform and co-operative farming - a vision of politicised communities that could be networked internationally to resist further assaults from the IMF, the World Bank and World Trade Organisation."

    Icy Davos and friendly Porto Alegre will clash again - as elites marginalise Africa through intensified globalisation and as social forums break out across Africa uniting to demand, as Asian intellectual Walden Bello suggests, economic "deglobalisation". Which forum philosophy will prevail?

    On two previous occasions, South Africa's famous two Trevors - Manuel and Ngwane - have seen their respective teams square off. Once, during an April 2000 clash covered by SABC's Special Assignment ("Two Trevors go to Washington"), Manuel chaired the World Bank board of governors for two days while Ngwane taught 30,000 protesters outside to toyi-toyi.

    And again last August, when Manuel was negotiating some meaningless treaty or other at the Sandton Convention Centre, Ngwane and 20,000+ demonstrators marched over from Alexandra to demand that the elites pack up and end their charade.

    With the world's environmental and developmental crises worsening ever more rapidly, lubricated by petro-warrior George Bush, can any conclusion be reached about the latest confrontation? Perhaps only this: one Trevor was cold and lonely fighting a battle he can never win; the other was flush with the warmth of solidarity, basking in the resurgence of a humanistic but uncompromising international left.

    * Patrick Bond teaches at Wits University and recently authored ‘Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, Development and Social Protest’, published by University of Natal Press. This article was due to appear in the Sowetan newspaper on February 7.

    * Send comments on this editorial for publication in the Letters and Comments section of Pambazuka News to

  • Patrick Bond | Governance

    If the Washington Consensus was the ideology of the late 20th century, can ecological economics and a genuine recognition of market failure for most of the earth's human inhabitants inform heads of state negotiating a grand deal in Johannesburg? If so, they will have to change direction rather dramatically.

    Tagged under Governance

  • At the same time the Treatment Action Campaign (Tac) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) were holding a massive people's conference in Durban to fight HIV/Aids last week, Thabo Mbeki begged for increased commitments for Africa from G-8 leaders in Kananaskis, Canada.

    Included amongst those commitments is the UN Global Fund, which according to Kofi Annan should logically reach $10 billion annually to meet Third World demands for inexpensive medicine, more health workers and improved facilities. But the Fund has received less than a tenth of that money, after George W. Bush denied a congressional allocation of $700 million in May.

    Mbeki's search for aid, debt relief and investment resulted in "recycled peanuts," according to informed commentators. Mbeki and other African leaders were reduced to expressing "satisfaction" over their 90-minute appearance before Bush and his Northern cronies, which is a rhetorical measure of power imbalances and global inequity.

    Mbeki's New Partnership for Africa's Development was bound to attract scepticism, particularly insofar as its corporate-friendly tone and content compels venal government elites across the continent to make themselves attractive for new investment.

    Energised activists from the Tac/Cosatu conference will now have to raise the opposite question: how Africa-friendly are multinational corporations, particularly when so many African workers are HIV+, and when the leading corporations turn their back on anti-retroviral treatments?

    Done properly, treatments would potentially transform the disease from inexorably fatal into a chronic illness such as diabetes, as has happened in much of the wealthier West.

    But thanks to unemployment above 40%--if one counts those who have given up
    trying to find a job under prevailing conditions-international and local firms are faced with a terrible option: replace sick workers with desperate, unemployed people instead of providing them treatment.

    Perhaps the ethical challenge was expressed most eloquently by financier George Soros, who was asked about treating HIV+ South Africans by an SABC journalist in April. He answered, `I think to provide treatment to the bulk of the people is just not feasible. I think to provide treatment for instance to qualified workers actually saves money, actually saves money for companies.'

    The interviewer responded, `Aren't you uncomfortable to talk in a way that is a kind of death sentence to those who we can't afford to treat?' Replied Soros, `I think the cost of providing actual treatment to everyone at the present... I don't think it's realistic. It's not achievable.'

    In a more systematic way, the same conclusion was reached after a year of study at Africa's largest company, Anglo American Corporation. Anglo has 160,000 employees, of whom 21% are HIV+. After the pharmaceutical industry withdrew its lawsuit against Pretoria's potential use of imported generic drugs in April 2001, the company announced it would provide anti-retroviral medicines to its workforce, which meant literally tens of thousands of lives could be saved in the short term.

    In June 2001, the Financial Times reported that`treatment of [Anglo's]employees with anti-retrovirals can be cheaper than the costs incurred by leaving them untreated.' In August, Anglo's vice president for medicine, Brian Brink, announced a strategy which 'involved offering wellness programmes, including access to anti-retroviral treatment.'

    According to one press report, `The company believed that the cost of its programmes would eventually be outweighed by the benefits it received in gradual gains in productivity, [Brink] concluded. Although it was indeed a risky strategy, it was the only one Anglo could pursue in the face of such
    human suffering.'

    Then last October, Anglo simply retracted its promise, once cost-benefit analysis showed that 146,000 of those workers just weren't worth saving. According to the FT, Brink `said the company's 14,000 senior staff would receive anti-retroviral treatment as part of their medical insurance, but that the provision of drug treatment for lower income employees was too expensive.'

    Brink explained the criteria for the fatal analysis: '[Anti-retrovirals]could save on absenteeism and improved productivity. The saving you achieve can be substantial, but we really don't know how it will stack up. We feel that the cost will be greater than the saving.'

    His callous feeling became official policy a few months ago. As the Wall Street Journal recorded on April 16, `In a controversial move that could have wide ramifications for how companies in poor countries handle Aids, mining giant Anglo American PLC has put on hold a feasibility study to provide Aids drugs to its African work force, according to people familiar with the situation. When it disclosed its plans for the study a year ago, Anglo garnered wide praise because it was one of the first major corporations to reveal measures aimed at treating Aids cases among its rank-and-file African employees.'

    A month later, South Africa's most eloquent pro-corporate commentator, Ken Owen, defended the merits of Anglo's policy in a Business Day column: `I am sceptical about most doomsday economic scenarios generated by the Aids epidemic... For the rest of this decade, at least, the lost workers will be quite readily replaceable from the millions of unemployed, and society will adjust in a myriad of ways to labour shortages. For example, a million domestic workers constitute a reserve pool of labour that can be drawn into
    industry.'

    Where does this display of corporate arrogance-bordering on culpable homicide--leave the treatment-activist movement? Will the April 2001 victory over Big Pharma and the expected Constitutional Court ruling against Mbeki on access to drugs for pregnant HIV-positive women allow HIV/Aids activists to turn, with their labour and other international solidarity allies, against capital?

    The answer may lie in changing the terms of costs and benefits, by making firms socially liable-even if merely through old-fashioned protest--for killing their workers through malign medical-insurance neglect. With Anglo attempting to shine at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in August, opportunities abound for global humiliation of the genocidal tendencies at these mega-wealthy multinational corporations.

    (Wits University political economy professor Patrick Bond is editor of 'Fanon's Warning', a new book critical of Nepad, published by Africa World Press and the Alternative Information and Development Centre.)

  • Patrick Bond | Governance

    Thabo Mbeki is seen as Africa's most legitimate, self-confident and fundamentally pro-Western leader. If anyone can shake down the World Bank in Washington for debt cancellation, or the WTO in Geneva for trade concessions, it's the primary architect of the miracle transition in recently-liberated South Africa.

    Africa needs enormous concessions, thanks to what Mbeki has termed "global apartheid" and what Washington/Geneva technocrats prefer to laud as the "Washington Consensus"--or just "globalisation." Africa generates nearly 30% more exports today than in 1980, yet their value has crashed by more than 40% because of falling terms of trade.

    Likewise, Sub-Saharan Africa's foreign debt rose from US$60 billion to US$206 bn over the same period notwithstanding 1980s-90s debt repayments of US$229 bn, thanks to the tyranny of compound interest rates and the near-universal failure of intervening structural adjustment programmes. Over the past three years alone, debt repayment by Sub-Saharan African countries was US$16 billion greater than incoming new loans.

    Can Africa's leaders finally, vigorously campaign against such extreme uneven world capitalist development? Should we draw hope from a "New Partnership for Africa's Development" ("Nepad"), launched in Abuja, Nigeria by several African heads of state on October 23? And first of all, what background should we have about the Nepad process?

    From the late 1990s, Mbeki embarked upon an "African Renaissance" branding exercise with poignant poetics. The contentless form was somewhat remedied in the secretive Millennial Africa Recovery Programme (with the acronym "Map"), whose powerpoint skeleton was unveiled to select elites in 2000, during Mbeki's meetings with Bill Clinton in May, the Okinawa G-8 in July, the UN Millennium Summit in September, and a subsequent European Union gathering in Portugal.

    The skeleton was fleshed out in November 2000 with the assistance of several economists. It was immediately endorsed during a special South African visit by World Bank president James Wolfensohn "at an undisclosed location," due presumably to fears of the disruptive civil-society protests which had soured a Johannesburg trip by new IMF czar Horst Koehler a few months earlier.

    Thanks to work by a co-author of South Africa's own disastrous 1996 homegrown structural adjustment programme (Stephen Gelb), the content of the 60-page working document was becoming clearer: more privatisation, especially of infrastructure (no matter its profound failure as a strategy, especially in South Africa); more multi-party elections (typically, though, between variants of neoliberal parties, as in the US) as a veil for the lack of thorough-going participatory democracy; grand visions of a developmental kickstart via ICT (hopelessly unrealistic considering the lack of simple reliable electricity across the continent); more trade with the North; and a self-mandate for peace-keeping (which South Africa has subsequently taken for its soldiers stationed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi).

    In short, Mbeki dreamed of more globalisation, not less.

    By this stage, he had managed to sign on as partners two additional rulers from the crucial West and North regions of the continent: Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Olusegun Obasanjo from Nigeria. Unfortunately, both continued to face mass popular protests and widespread civil/military/religious bloodshed at home, diminishing their utility as model African leaders.

    Later, to his credit, Obasanjo led a surprise revolt against Mbeki's capitulation to Northern pressure at the World Conference Against Racism in September 2001, when he helped generate a split between EU and African countries over reparations due the continent for slavery and colonialism. Tellingly, even loose talk of such reparations cannot be found in the Mbeki's document, and the South African host delegation was furious at Obasanjo's outburst because it nearly scuppered a final conference resolution.

    But that incident aside, 2001 has been a successful year for selling Nepad. Another pro-Western ruler, Tanzania's Benjamin Mkapa, joined the New Africa leadership group in January 2001. Mkapa's government suffers a dreadful recent human rights record, but he and Mbeki gave the world's leading capitalists and state elites a briefing in Davos, Switzerland, which was very poorly-attended. A few days later, an effort was made in Mali to sell West Africans to the plan, with on-the-spot cheerleading by Wolfensohn and Koehler.

    Then, the July 2001 inaugural meeting of the African Union in Lusaka provided the opportunity for a continent-wide leadership endorsement, once Mbeki's plan was merged with the "Omega Plan"--offered by the neoliberal Senegalese president, Abdoulaye Wade--to become the New African Initiative. For a few months until late October, observers termed Mbeki's initiative "the Nai."

    The Genoa G-8 summit offered soothing encouragement. With 300,000 protesters outside the conference accusing the world's main political leaders of running a destructive, elitist club, Mbeki was a useful adornment. Likewise, Mbeki's October visits to Japan and Brussels confirmed his elite popularity, perhaps because there was no apparent demand for formal monetary commitments at this stage.

    A recent surge of enthusiasm from Johannesburg corporations, Washington multilateral banks, and European capitals deserves much more consideration than I have space for here, particularly given the geopolitical give-and-take associated with George W. Bush's "anti-terror" coalition-building. But to sum up the ideological partnership that Mbeki proposes, consider the way that the 1980s-90s recolonisation of African economic policy is explained on the website version of Nepad:

    "The structural adjustment programmes provided only a partial solution. They promoted reforms that tended to remove serious price distortions, but gave inadequate attention to the provision of social services. As a consequence, only a few countries managed to achieve sustainable higher growth under these programmes."

    Slippery, this line of analysis, and worth unpacking briefly, to conclude, for one test of robust analysis is to pose the opposite premise, and to see whether the subsequent hypotheses are worth exploring:

    --What if structural adjustment represented not "a partial solution" but instead, reflecting local and global power shifts, a profound defeat for genuine African nationalists, workers, peasants, women, children, manufacturing industry and the environment?

    --What if "promoting reforms" really amounted to the IMF and World Bank imposing their cookie-cutter neoliberal policies on desperately disempowered African societies, without any reference to democratic processes, resistance or diverse local conditions?

    --What if the removal of "serious price distortions" really meant the repeal of exchange controls (hence allowing massive capital flight), subsidy cuts (hence pushing masses of people below the poverty line), and lowered import tariffs (hence causing widespread deindustrialisation)?

    --What if "inadequate attention to the provision of social services" in reality meant the opposite: excessive attention to applying neoliberalism not just to the macroeconomy, but also to health, education, water and other crucial state services?

    --And what if the form of IMF/Bank attention included insistence upon greater cost recovery, higher user-fees, lower budgetary allocations, privatisation, and even the disconnection of supplies to those too poor to afford them, hence leading to the unnecessary deaths of millions of people?

    If these hypotheses are reasonable, and if the logical implication is to proceed no further with structural adjustment, then a central task of Nepad must be to slip around such arguments without reference to their relevance. By doing so, Nepad fits right into the globalisers' modified neoliberal project, which now insists even more incongruously that economic integration solves poverty.

    Apparently, the notion that South Africa might "naai"--translated from Afrikaans as "totally screw over"--the rest of Africa through Mbeki's New, Almost-African Initiative led those gathered at Abuja to revise the name. Still, cheeky commentators are already observing that if prounced "kneepad," the document signifies its merits as the cushion African leaders will need, as they stoop and grovel for more handouts.

    But that would be unfair, for Nepad is worth reading even if merely as an ambitious attempt to bring a spirit of "engagement" by at least three African leaders to a world economy which is still totally screwing over Africa. True, like all top-down policy formulations, Nepad reeks of technicism--a scent which could dissipate partially if exposed to the fires of popular debate, protest and participation. But that would risk the transformation of Nepad into a partnership with Africans themselves. And Mbeki's AIDS interventions provide enough evidence of his intentions to keep millions of Africans alive, much less in partnership.

    The alternative to Nepad begins with African activists building up networks within and between diverse social movements, visionary trade unions, Jubilee chapters, women's organisations, environmental groups and the progressive intelligentsia. These are already taking seed across the continent via anti-neoliberal protests and longer-term strategic work (e.g., in this subregion, the Southern African Peoples Solidarity Network, at and across the continent flowing from the Dakar 2000 process to promote an African People's Consensus instead of a Map/Nai/Nepad).

    A recent precedent for rejection and reformulation was the World Bank's Global Development Gateway, which was repelled in March by creative South/ern African civil society groups, and which instead initiated the Africa Pulse information community. That kind of African partnership, based on a human-rights culture, a decommodification strategy and durable cross-border alliances, is far superior to Pretoria's new gambit.

    Indeed, Nepad belongs with many of South Africa's other regional economic strategies: deindustrialising neighbours because of relectance to give the same duty-free preferences to SADC imports that even the apartheid regime had offered; imposing EU and US free-trade regimes on unwilling neighbours; demanding debt repayments from impoverished Mozambique for loans that resettled dissident rightwing Afrikaner farmers and that rebuilt electricity lines which were destroyed by apartheid destabilisation; kicking out 15,000 Zimbabwean farmworkers with no compensation; or treating informal economic migrants like meat for dogs (not merely in extremist SA Police Service training exercises but on a day-to-day basis at the Department of Home Affairs).

    To expand this sort of subimperialist project via a warmed-over Washington Consensus, Nepad, means that Mbeki is content merely polishing, not abolishing, global apartheid.

    Patrick Bond's new book is Against Global Apartheid: South Africa meets the World Bank, IMF and International Finance (University of Cape Town Press). Ordering information from [email][email protected]

    Tagged under Governance South Africa