The wearing of the headscarf and hijab by Muslim women is increasingly becoming a contentious issue in the West. Halima Zouhar provides some historical context to the headscarf and opinions on why young Muslim women are choosing to cover their heads.

One of the most polemical themes associated with Islam is the status of women. Women are regarded as subaltern beings, deprived of rights, and subservient to men. And the symbol of a woman’s submission is the headscarf. But in fact, the headscarf is becoming more visible these days in this part of the world than it is in the Arab world or in the West. And most surprisingly, it has acquired great ‘popularity’ amongst young women, even those educated and in touch with Western civilisation. What are the reasons driving these women to publicly display their religious affiliation? What does the scarf symbolise? Are these young women searching for an identity? This article analyses these questions.

The removal of the traditional headscarf is relatively recent for the Muslim woman, dating back to the colonial and postcolonial eras. The headscarf did not used to carry the religious dimension currently accorded to it. Although introduced by Islam in the 7th century , it was anyway part of a Muslim woman’s traditional dress. Therefore the question of whether or not it symbolised the subordination of woman did not arise.

The scarf began to be defined as a symbol of the submission of Muslim women during the colonial period. Then, the colonial power, considering itself superior and endowed with a civilising mission to bear on a primitive, backward and archaic population, held it up as a symbol of resistance. The unveiling ceremony in Algiers in 1958 is extremely relevant here:

'13 May 1958, Algiers, the place du Gouvernement: Muslim women climbed on to a podium to burn their veils. The stakes of this staged gesture were measured: the colonial authorities required that Muslim women broke ranks with the struggles of their own people.'

Unveiling the Muslim woman of her headscarf was one of the coloniser’s great challenges: a means of validating his superiority and civilising mission that consisted of the ‘emancipation’ of the Muslim woman, whilst at the same time elevating the model of the Western lifestyle, which the indigenous population was supposed to assimilate. As Edward Said has pointed out, the colonial education system played a major role in assimilation:

'For Barrès, the essence of France is most visible in French schools; thus he says of a school in Alexandria: "it’s charming to see these little oriental girls welcoming and reproducing so vividly the imagination and the melody of the French Isle".'

This influence bore fruit, given that it educated an elite, which knew how to defend, and still defends, the interests of the West in the Arab countries. That elite has retained the Western model as a reference point well after independence, simultaneously disdaining and disregarding the Arab-Muslim tradition, perceived to be a disruptive and restraining force in the process of social evolution and the emancipation of women.

'Two factors render the triumph of orientalism even more evident. In so far as it is possible to generalise, contemporary culture in the Middle East tends to follow European and American models. When Taha Hussein said in 1936 that modern Arab culture was European and not oriental, he was merely putting on record the identity of the natural Egyptian elite of which he was a distinguished member. Likewise today he belongs to the same Arab cultural elite, even though the powerful current of anti-imperialist ideas from the Third World that gripped the region from the early 1950s has blunted the Western edge of the dominant culture.'

Generally during the post colonial period, Arab and Muslim women witnessed their being torn between two different cultural models: one, which fascinated; the other, the heritage of a strong tradition. In this context, there was little real knowledge about the Muslim religion, nor of the status of the Muslim woman at the centre of this religion.

It was not until the next generation of their daughters, that today’s young women, who faced with both the fascination of their parents for Western culture and the scorn attached by the West to Islam, have launched themselves into a quest to understand their religion, and simultaneously their identity, which is a mixture of influences, Eastern nor Western.

From this point on, wearing the Muslim headscarf has proliferated amongst young women: it does not signify the rejection of Western civilisation and a return to tradition, as in many aspects, tradition and religion diverge. Rather, Islam represents a balanced perspective for young people seeking to affirm their identity. The headscarf may represent a challenge to a society wishing to see in the woman wearing it subservience and regression. But this cliché does not correspond to contemporary reality. For in most cases, it is the woman making her own decision, choosing nevertheless to lead an active and independent life. In short, these women are adopting the emancipated lifestyle so revered by the West, whilst at the same time living with the precepts of Islam.

* Halima Zouhar is a post-graduate student at the University of Granada in Spain.

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

This piece was originally written in French and translated by Stephanie Kitchen.

A study by the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) Zambia reports on local communities' perspectives of the impact of poverty reduction programmes. Overall, it concludes that PRSP implementation in Zambia, whilst successful in some areas, has in general been weak.

FEATURES: Kameelah Rasheed gives a personal experience of wearing the hijab
COMMENT AND ANALYSIS:
- Beyond the hijab in East Africa by Aaliyah Bilal
- Islamic headscarf: Halima Zouhar asks if it's choice or submission
- Joseph Yav Katshung discusses sovereignty and citizens rights in Sudan
- Samir Amin examines possibilities for popular struggle within the World Social Forum
LETTERS:
- Mariam Yansane reports from Guinea
- CODESRIA calls for solidarity with the people of Guinea
- Post-election violence in the DRC
- Akina Mama Wa Afrika gets a new head
- Response to the article 'Cultural paradigm for Liberia’s reconstruction'
- Response to 'Misrepresentation of Africa'
PAN-AFRICAN POSTCARD: Tajudeen reports on the Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative
BLOGGING AFRICA: West African blogs
BOOKS & ARTS: FESPACO 2007, review of the HIV/Aids programme in the LGBTI community, poem by Khadija Heeger

CONFLICT AND EMERGENCIES: Powerful cyclone hits flood-ravaged Mozambique
HUMAN RIGHTS: Egypt government raids Islamist opposition
WOMEN AND GENDER: 2006 Gender Gap Report published
REFUGEES AND FORCED MIGRATION: 1000 Ethiopian refugees expelled from Kenya
ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE: Lesotho’s ruling party wins elections
DEVELOPMENT: Niger Delta: Of ‘Terrorists’ and Freedom Fighters
CORRUPTION: Rich nations prodded for ‘illegitimate lending’
HEALTH AND HIV/AIDS: Small organizations lost in funding maze
EDUCATION: Uganda gets free secondary education
ENVIRONMENT: UN calls for ban on High-Sulphur fuels in Kenya
LGBTI: Ugandan bishop warns Christians on homosexuality
MEDIA AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: Egyptian blogger jailed
INTERNET AND TECHNOLOGY: Beaming books via satellite
NEWS FORM THE DIASPORA: Interview with Aristide
PLUS: Fundraising and Useful Resources; Courses, Seminars and Workshops and Jobs

* Pambazuka News now has a Del.icio.us page, where you can view the various websites that we visit to keep our fingers on the pulse of Africa! Visit

The ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) has won the 2007 elections after it grabbed more than half of the 120 seats in Lesotho's parliament, warding off a strong challenge from a new opposition.

A UN agency on environment has recommended phasing out of high sulphur diesel in Kenya to reduce air pollution. The United Nations Environment Programme (Unep) Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles (PCFV) says use of high sulphur diesel is contributing to environmental degradation.

'The concern is not my oppression, but the inaccessibility of hijabi bodies and a general discomfort with those who have no problems with visible signs of cultural and religious difference', writes Kameelah Janan Rasheed in recounting her personal experience of wearing the hijab.

I have spun myself into a web of non-stop, albeit non-linear, intertextual journeys and discursive shadow boxing matches towards a coherent narrative about hijab. I feared that in writing about hijab that my thoughts would be so reminiscent of previous works, that my narrative would be surrendered to the museum of embalmed anachronisms and clichés. This fear kept me running as far as my short legs could carry me away from the oppression versus liberation paradigm, and hiding in a dark corner away from self-hating confessionals about the ugliness of Islam.

I am not interested in proving to anyone that I am in fact liberated or that by wearing hijab in America I am engaging in a radical feminist act. Just as I gave up the task of proving my blackness or womanhood years ago to those who were skeptical of my 'credentials', I do not plan to spend time here validating my humanity or agency. Such a task is a distraction. The task here is not to shuck n'jive or discursively gyrate towards a presentation of hijab and myself that will grant me entrance into the feminist or 'mainstream' community. I do not want to spend time convincing people that in fact my hijab is not surgically attached to my scalp.

Nor, do I want to spend energy arguing that there is not a tracker embedded in my hijab that screeches a pronounced 'haraam, haraam' when there is too great of a distance between the said hijab and my head. The task here is to share stories that if nothing else will illustrate that self-elected liberators who are convinced of my oppression are doing more to oppress me than my hijab ever could by fixing me in conceptual incarcerations. In telling me that as a hijabi, I can only represent and ever be seen as the epitome of oppression - the atavistic aberration, then you have succeeded in reifying the patriarchal structures you pretend to despise. You have held me hostage in your imagination and my only key to freedom is to surrender and corroborate your assumptions of my subjugation.

If I tell you that I am comfortable as a hijabi, and do not feel the least restricted, why do you still feel the need to speak down to me as if I am a child? Why do you feel the need to convince that I am living in a matrix where I have managed to confuse liberation with oppression? The question has never been so much 'is Kameelah oppressed'? because when this question is asked I do not believe that there is a genuine concern for my wellbeing. The question has always been twofold: 'Why do you feel it to be your right to tell me how I should live my life? And: 'Why do you even care?' My experiences, that are mine and not to be generalised for other hijabis, have illustrated that the concern is not my oppression, but the inaccessibility of hijabi bodies and a general discomfort with those who have no problems with visible signs of cultural and religious difference.

My childhood and adulthood, neither of which are completed life stages, were full of paradox and alienation as I attempted to navigate what seemed to be rough uncharted territory of a nerdy short black Muslim girl suspended in time and spaces that just could not 'figure me out'. I am the daughter of two black working-class Muslim reverts. I grew up in a small city in northern California where you could count the number of Muslims on one hand. Because being starred at and having rude comments directed at me is a sadistic task I rather enjoy, I then spent four years at a private Catholic school where I was not only one of very few black students, I wandered about as the only Muslim student. Thinking it could not get worst then being called a suicide bomber, or Osama bin Laden's wife, I embarked on another four-year journey at a private liberal arts institution where the number of Muslim students was heartbreaking. While most comments at this institution were reserved for private discussions, the college experience as well as my time in Johannesburg, South Africa provide an opportunity to understand what literally annoyed people about my hijab.

While in Yeoville, a hybrid inner-city/suburb of Johannesburg, I was approached by a man who was intent on liberating me from not only my gender oppression, but from my racial confusion. Apparently, 'I am not free' in hijab and Islam is not an African religion.

I had committed not only the ultimate sin of embracing a faith that 'forced' me to be modest; I had chosen a faith that had no roots in Africa. Let's not bother with the contrary historical facts, as that is the least of our concerns. What I found of the utmost importance in this monologue (yes, because I was unable to get a word in edgeways) was that he conceptualised my channels of freedom via the ritualistic removal of my hijab and his penetration or sexual conquest. I never knew that my freedom toolbox included a penis and an instruction guide - I will keep this in mind.

As he continued to speak in a series of poorly phrased insults, I realised that this was no longer about gender oppression or black authenticity; it was about the politics of accessibility to certain bodies. He repeated almost in a hypnotic fashion, 'I cannot see you…I cannot see your essence'. In wearing hijab, it was his argument that I was making myself inaccessible to men, and particularly to him. Choosing to place myself off the radar was not a choice I could exercise. In fact, I was required to make myself available and accessible to his gaze as well as the gaze of other men.

Thus, the crime I had committed was not one of accepting my subjugation as a Muslim woman and 'confused African woman', but of refusing to situate myself in his myopic discourse of liberation that ultimately puts me at his mercy. If I was mistaken in this assumption, it was further validated by a number of men in Johannesburg and in America who have told me similar tales of my inaccessibility, as a reason why I should not wear hijab. They started with a narrative of genuine concern for my oppression and devolved into a shallow desire for a free pass to accessibility. It was not always about what was said, but the delivery of these diatribes. In many of these situations, these men used aggressive and paternalistic tones. They attempted to silence me by raising their voices. They worked to discredit my line of defense by telling me I did not know enough. Most of all they were surprised that I was able to put together a sentence and to give as good as I was given.

It was a reminder that the covering of my head is not a covering of my mind or my mouth. Now, my mama taught me that in a conversation that I need to speak up irrespective of the genitalia I assume the other person to possess. My dad taught me to do it with tact. I think that while I am better at the former than the latter, it was a necessary lesson. For me, this battle over hijab editorialised by patriarchal not feminist discourses has never been about my liberation or the liberation of Fatima or whatever common Muslimah name you choose to insert here. Really, can men and institutions that consider me less intelligent and inept be that concerned about the death of patriarchy? This battle has always been about the accessibility of certain bodies and a neurotic discomfort with difference. If I can be convinced or forced to unveil and assimilate my discourse and lifestyle someone else can feel comfort. Someone will assume greater access to my body. However, for someone else to feel comfort when they look at me, and secure greater dominion over me, some part of me has to be sacrificed.

I cannot make any conclusive remarks about hijab generally or in my personal experiences. What I can say is that as these discourses about my oppression reach a nauseous height and hegemonic preoccupation in numerous imaginations, I will continue to write. I will not write to prove my liberation, but write to assert my right to exist as I choose without harassment, intimidation and ridicule. People often say, 'well, if you don't want to be singled-out then just don't wear hijab'. I guess while I am at it, I should lighten my brown skin to reach a more appeasing colour? Or give my hips back to mama. Assimilation is not an option. The reality is that, yes, I wear hijab and no, I do not need your approval. While I do not need your approval, I would not mind a little respect.

* Kameelah Rasheed is a Fulbright scholar at Wits University in Johannesburg South Africa. She also blogs at

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

'After all it’s only a piece of cloth.' Aaliyah Bilal discusses the complexities of the Hijab in East Africa with particular reference to Zanzibar.

'Sitara kubwa kuvaa Vazu refu miguuni Msiige bila nija… Nguo ziteremsheni Yapungue maasia…'

'Wear a full covering, for your protection, A long garment, to the feet, Do not imitate without morality, Lower your garments so that there may be less rebellion…'

Sheik Amri Abedi, the first black mayor of Dar es Salaam and close advisor to Julius Nyerere, published the poem 'Nduo Ziteremsheni' (Lower your garments) for political as well as aesthetic reasons. As a missionary of the Ahmadiyya movement and a statesman, Abedi was perturbed by the westernisation of women’s dress in Tanganyika and sought to redress this 'rebellion against God' with the release of the book Diwani in 1963. The quoted passage is a small portion of a much longer poem included in this volume. While it addresses the women of Tanganyika in general, Abedi takes issue with Muslim women in particular, going so far as to call those who wear western attire 'evil'.

However inaccessible the medium, the content of poems such as 'Nduo Ziteremsheni' reveal something essential about Swahili women’s experiences with a truth that resonates on all levels of society today as much as it did when it was written - women’s bodies are contested sites where upon society negotiates meanings. In Muslim communities, the hijab is central to this phenomenon. All of these factors, as they are played out in East Africa, take on a special quality in light of the increased adherence of women throughout the region to this form of Islamic dress: a fact that Amri Abedi would be proud to know.

The Zanzibari experience provides a rich study of the phenomenon, made more interesting by how drastically the culture of dress has changed in recent history. The revolutionary period of the 1960s was a time when traditional social mores were being challenged by Zanzibari youth on a grand scale. They protested Islamic cultural hegemony by wearing western style clothes. They watched western films despite condemnation by Muslim clerics. The reality one confronts today is starkly contrasted to this example. Whereas it was common to see young women in short skirts and other non-Islamic clothes during the1960s, today a jaunt through the streets of Stone Town exposes the almost universal compliance of women to hijab.

The reassertion of rigid Islamic dress codes in contemporary Zanzibar has not yet been the subject of any published scholarly analysis. A glimpse into Zanzibari transnational and local politics provides clues into why this may be taking place. Historical linkages between Tanzania and the peninsular Arab states, aided recently with the building of Islamic mosques and schools throughout the country, have made the island susceptible to ideological movements from outside. A significant dimension of this reassertion is also related to the course of party politics. The portrayal of the Civic United Front by the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (revolutionary state party) as a party of Muslim extremists, coupled with the widely condemned violence against the CUF constituents in the wake of the elections has put many Muslims in Zanzibar on the defensive. In light of these realities, the strengthened adherence to conservative Islamic dress makes sense.

Zanzibar represents an extreme case, but it possesses all of the major thematic characteristics at play in variety of East African contexts. The circumstances of women in southern Sudan, Kenya, and on the Tanzanian mainland attest that the entire region is undergoing a wave of islamisation. In all of these contexts, there is convincing evidence that politics plays a significant role in the increased use of hijab. Concerns arise, however, when we become overly reliant on political analyses to understand such gendered and religious subjects. Given the marginal position that Muslim women continue to play on the political stage, analyses that begin and end within the confines of a political framework yield a consistently damning message - Muslim women are oppressed by hijab.

While it is part of a cosmopolitan sensibility to question and condemn any subversion of women’s rights, one must ask if the attachment of African communities to Islam and symbols such as hijab really constitute such an outcome. In a discussion of women and hijab in East Africa, we should turn our attention to a different kind of evidence. What we find beyond the lens of a top-down political analysis illustrates how a nexus of factors hinder as well as help Muslim women.

However clear the connections are between the social status of women and Muslim practice, Islam is hardly alone as a marginalising force in the lives of East African women. Unfortunately, these women also contend with forms of patriarchy that are endemic to African societies at a rudimentary level. The threat of rape, mistreatment, or being outcast on the grounds of sexual impropriety cooperate with currents of islamisation in ways that endorse hijab. In contexts where donning hijab diffuses unwanted attention from men— although the practice underlines the patriarchal structures that make it necessary—the immediate needs of women encourage a favorable depiction of its use.

The contemporary discourse has become overly comfortable with the portrayal of Islam as a force that opposes modernity. What is most troubling is that these ideas are perpetuated in the face of substantial evidence to the contrary. The East Africa is home to a number of locales wherein processes of modernisation and islamisation work in tandem. In Kenyan costal towns, when confronted with an increase in drug use as a result of increased prosperity, the reassertion of an Islamic identity becomes a tool through which those communities resist the spread of substance abuse among their youth. A similar story comes to us from eastern Sudan where the migrant workers to Saudi Arabia, once they return home, implement Islamic structures in their communities that, in effect, cause a rise in school attendance among Muslim girls. While this is linked with an increased use of the hijab in both contexts, the overall effects are advantageous to women.

Another interpretive cleavage that is consistently ignored in discussions of women and hijab is the issue of a woman’s devotion to her perceived God. There is a tendency, especially in the context of a global Islamic revival, to short circuit all contemporary discussions of hijab to the political forces that are deemed to have triggered their appearance. The plausibility of these factors cannot blind us to the likelihood that at least some women cover for pious reasons.

Hijab is a word that turns heads and sells books, but it is a pretty empty subject on its own. After all, it is only a piece of cloth. Furthermore, any inquiry into the positive or negatives of its use does not end in answers, but exposes greater complexities. The story underneath the practice is more interesting. The idea that an increased adherence to hijab references the subversion of women’s agency within systems of Islamic jurisprudence seems to be the salient issue. In this regard, it is the personal jihad of Muslim women everywhere to create spaces within Islam where they act as subjects and not objects of Islamic discourse—a field that remains the guarded terrain of men like Sheik Amri Abedi.

In contrast to other parts of the Muslim world, there is some cause for optimism in the case of East Africa. One of the encouraging developments in African societies today shows women growing more powerful in their communities. Muslim women in East Africa, it is hoped, will begin to experience greater changes in their religious communities as they themselves play more visible roles in shaping the circumstances through which people come to Islam.

* Aaliyah Bilal is a masters student at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

The Sudanese government of Omar al Beshir continues to decline to cooperate with the Human Rights Council. This article argues that this defiance has implications for the concept of sovereignty and intervention when states are victimising their own citizens.

Sudanese President Omar al-Beshir on Friday rejected a UN peace force for Darfur and said he would not grant visas to UN rights monitors who want to visit the strife-torn region. He also said that the Geneva-based UN Human Rights Council, led by Nobel peace laureate and anti-landmines campaigner Jody Williams, would not be allowed to travel to Darfur because its members were biased.

While the international community is looking for ways to prevent further human rights abuses in Africa, especially in Darfur, the government of Sudan has declined to cooperate with the Human Rights Council by refusing to issue the necessary visas for the High-Level Mission to carry out its work inside the country in fulfilment of its mandate. Indeed, on the final day of an Africa-France summit gathering in the Riviera resort of Cannes, Sudanese President Omar al-Beshir justified that decision during a news conference, in the following terms: 'There are members of that delegation who in our view are not impartial therefore it is difficult to say that they will be honest and reflect reality.'

This refusal blatantly breaches the Council’s decision to establish the mission, which was adopted by consensus following intense consultations that included the participation of representatives of the Sudanese government. Under Decision S-4/101, adopted on 13 December 2006, the Human Rights Council established a High-Level Mission to assess the human rights situation in Darfur and the needs of Sudan in that regard. The Council asked the Mission to report to its fourth session, which will start on 12 March 2007.

This development is shocking, considering that such statements and decisions come from the head of an African state where at least 200,000 people have been killed and more than 2,500,000 displaced since 2003 as a result of fighting. Despite repeated pledges to stop the violence, the Sudanese government has utterly failed to do so and political negotiations have stalled. Reasonably, one can argue that the collective shame and regret expressed over the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and the commitment of African states to the promotion and protection of 'human rights, the rule of law and good governance' on the continent as principles and objectives of the African Union have had little or no impact on the gross violations of human rights and mass killings committed with impunity in Darfur.

This case reflects a widely-held view of sovereignty: that allows governments to do essentially what they want within their own national borders. It should provide sufficient cause for a more serious and pragmatic assessment of the practicality of the principles of state sovereignty and intervention. In fact, having experienced genocide in Rwanda more than twelve years ago, what should the world do when a large number of people are victims of violence originating from within their own country?

Weak, failing, failed, and poverty-stricken states often use notional borders to preserve the fiction of effective sovereignty. This is certainly true in the case of Sudan and sets the context in which any discussion of intervention on the continent should be placed. Khartoum’s government is invoking sovereignty, firstly, as a veil to hide its brutal campaign against civilians; and secondly, as a shield to fend off calls for international action to protect its victims. While respect for the sovereignty of Sudan must be upheld as a core principle of international law, general principles of international law and the AU Constitutive Act itself provide for inherent limitations on the exercise of this principle, inter alia, where what is at stake is the protection of citizens from exposure to grave and massive violations of human rights in the absence of the willingness or ability of the state to protect. Therefore, Sudan should be taught that sovereignty, properly defined, is not a defence against demands for redress of breaches or gross violations of fundamental human rights.

The deteriorating situation in Darfur demonstrates how urgent it is for African leaders and the international community to move the debate of sovereignty versus intervention beyond semantics and to reach a consensus on when a defence of 'state sovereignty' is patently unacceptable.

* Joseph Yav Katshung is a human rights lawyer from Congo.

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Samir Amin examines the processes and impacts of the World Social Forum and considers whether it is after all a useful forum for popular struggles.

The undeniable success of the World Social Forums (and of the national and regional forums), from their first edition (Porto Allegre 2001) to their seventh (Nairobi 2007) shows that the formula met a real objective need, felt by many militants and movements engaged in their struggles against neo-liberalism and the aggression, including military aggression, of imperialism. In these struggles, movements and militants have much renewed their forms of organisation and active intervention in society.

Yes, the dominant political culture of the left had been marked in the 19th and 20th centuries by practices based on the hierarchical vertical organisation of parties, trade unions and associations. In the circumstances of the period the movements they stimulated – radical and reformist social transformations, revolutions, national liberations – transformed the world, in a direction generally favourable to the working classes. Nevertheless the limits and contradictions specific to these forms of action appeared strongly from the 1980-1990 period. The democratic deficiency of these forms, going as far as the self proclamation of 'vanguards' armed with 'scientific' knowledge and the 'exclusive effective' strategy, are at the root of later disappointments: reforms and revolutions brought to power regimes of which the least that can be said is that they frequently badly kept their promises, often degenerate, sometimes in criminal directions. These failures made possible the return to the offensive of dominant capital and imperialism as from the 1980-1990 period.

The moment of euphoria of capital and imperialism – which went onto the offensive under the banner of neo-liberalism and globalisation – was short lived, 1990-1995. Very quickly the working classes entered the struggle to resist this offensive.

Yes, in general, this first wave of struggle placed itself on the ground of retaliation to the offensive in all its multi-dimensionality: resistance to economic neo-liberalism, to the dismantling of social benefits, to police repression, to the military aggressions of the US and its allies. The chain of these grounds of resistance is continuous, and according to the local circumstances, struggles are deployed mainly on the grounds of the immediate challenge with which people are confronted. In this sense the demand for market regulation, the promotion of women’s rights, the defence of the environment, the defence of public services, for democracy, armed resistance to the aggression of the US and its allies in the Middle East (Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon) are in-dissociable from each other.

In these resistance struggles the peoples have innovated. Many of the old political forces of the organised left remained aloof from these first struggles, timid in face of the aggression, sometimes won over to the liberal and imperialist options. The movement was initiated by the 'new forces', sometimes almost 'spontaneously'. In their deployment, these forces promoted the fundamental principle of democratic practice : refusing the vertical hierarchy, promoting the horizontal forms of cooperation in action. This advance of democratic consciousness must be considered as progress of 'civilization'. To the extent that it is reflected in the social forums, these must therefore be considered as perfectly 'useful' for the development of the struggles in progress.

The resistance struggles have recorded indisputable victories. They have initiated the defeat of the offensive of capital and imperialism. The US project to control the planet militarily, which is necessary to guarantee the 'success' of the globalisation in place, the 'preventive' wars conducted to ensure its effectiveness (invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, occupation of Palestine, aggression against Lebanon) have already visibly held in check the political project of imperialism. The so-called neo-liberal economic and social project, designed to provide a strong and stable base for the accumulation of capital – ensuring the maximum rate of profit at any price – is, in the opinion of the very authorities who are its authors (World Bank, IMF, WTO, European Union), incapable of imposing its conditions. It is 'falling apart': the Doha round of the WTO round is in an impasse, the IMF in financial collapse. The menace of a sudden economic and financial crisis is on the agenda.

The challenge to which the struggling peoples are confronted is entirely situated in the answer they give to the question asked here, in the terms so forcefully expressed by François Houtart, moving up from the collective consciousness of the challenges to the construction of the active social agents of the transformation.

Obviously this challenge concerns, well beyond the forums, the peoples themselves. To what extent does the collective consciousness find its expression in such forums? It is certainly present in unequal degrees of maturity, as always in history, depending on the moments, the places and the movements concerned.
But beyond this, do the forums contribute to the necessary advance of consciousness, to the construction of agents of transformation? To which extent this collective consciousness is reflected within the social forums? We will attempt to reply to this question further on.

Progress is and will be difficult. Because it implies (i) the radicalisation of the struggles and (ii) their convergence in diversity (to use the formula of the World Forum for Alternatives) in joint action plans, which imply a strategic political vision, the definition of immediate and more distant objectives (the 'perspective' which defines the alternative). The radicalisation of the struggles is not the radicalisation of the rhetoric of their words, but their articulation to the alternative project which they propose to substitute for the systems of social power in place: constructing social hegemonies (class alliances and compromises) imposing themselves as alternatives to the social hegemonies in power (those of the alliances dominated by capital, imperialism and the local comprador classes in its service). Beyond a wave of 'coordination' of struggles (or even simply exchanges of views) which does not enable their dispersion to be transcended (and thereby their weakness), convergence can only be the product of a 'politicisation' (in the positive sense of the term) of the fragmented movements. 'Non-political civil society', an ideology imported straight from the US, which continues to wreak devastation, is fighting against this demand.

Convergence in diversity and radicalisation of struggles will find their expression in the unavoidable construction of stages allowing (i) advances in democratisation (conceived as an endless process and not as a 'blueprint', supplied by the model of western representative political democracy) associated with (and not dissociated from) social progress, and (ii), the affirmation of the sovereignty of states, nations and peoples, imposing forms of globalisation which are negotiated and not unilaterally imposed by capital and imperialism. These definitions of the content of the alternative construction are certainly not accepted by all.

Some believe that democracy (multi-party system and elections), be it dissociated from the social question (subject to the working of the market), is better than nothing. However the peoples of Asia and Africa do not appear on the whole inclined to fight for this form of democracy dissociated from social progress (and even in fact associated at the present moment with social regression). They often prefer to rally para-religious/ethnic movements which have very little democracy about them. It may be regretted, but it would be better to ask the question why. Democracy can be neither exported (by Europe) nor imposed (by the US). It can only be the product of the conquest by the peoples of the South through their struggles for social progress, as was (and is) the case in Europe.

The very mention of nation, national independence or sovereignty makes some people’s skin crawl. Sovereignism is almost always qualified as a vice of the past. The nation is to be thrown into the rubbish bin, moreover globalisation has already made it obsolete. This thesis which is popular among the European middle classes finds no echo in the South, nor in the US, nor Japan.

Transformation in stages does not exclude the affirmation of the prospect in the long term. For some, including the author of these lines, this transformation is that of the socialism of the 21st century; others refuse socialism, for them it is henceforth definitively polluted by its practice in the last century. But all the same, even if the principle of convergence is accepted, its implementation will be difficult. Because it is a case of reconciling (i)the advances in democratic practice acquired in and by the struggles (having to abandon the nostalgia for movements commanded by the 'vanguards') (ii)the requirements of unity in action, modest or ambitious depending on the local (national) situations.

The principle of necessary convergence is not accepted by all. Certain so-called autonomist currents, more or less inspired by post-modernist formulations, reject it. The movements they inspire must be respected for what they are, a frontline struggle. Some go as far as maintaining that the movement, although it is dispersed, is constructing the alternative by itself, going as far as claiming that the 'individual subject' is already on the way to becoming the agent of the transformation (the theoretical vision of Negri). However many powerful mass movements engaged in great struggles do not adhere to this theory. It can also be thought that organisations inherited from the past – political parties, trade unions, and so on – are capable of transforming themselves in the direction of the required democratic practice. The thinkers of the autonomist currents affirm they are able to change the world without taking power. History will tell if this is possible, or an illusion.

In any case, whether it is in big organisations or small ones, the conflict opposes the logic of struggle (which insists on its needs) to the logic of organisation (which insists on the interests put into play by the leaderships in place or waiting to seize the leadership, the participation in the dominant power in place, and thereby encourages 'opportunism').

Convergence cannot be constructed at the world or regional levels if it is not first put in place on the national levels because these define and manage the concrete challenges. It is at these levels that the swing in the social and political balance of power in favour of the working classes will or will not occur. The regional and world levels may reflect national advances, no doubt facilitate them (or at least not hinder them), but hardly more.

Advances in the directions opening the way to the construction of the alternative are taking place at the moment in Latin America, in contrast to their absence, or near absence, elsewhere, in Europe, Asia and Africa. These advances, in Brazil, in Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and their visible possible coming success elsewhere – Mexico, Peru, Nicaragua – are precisely the product of the rationalisation of movements having reached the level of an effective critical mass, and their political convergence. These are revolutionary advances in the sense that they initiated the swing in the balance of social and political forces in favour of the working classes. Their success is due to their real practical answer associating the democracy of the management of the movements and the political focusing of their projects, overcoming the dispersion which dominates elsewhere.

Who could deny that the state powers that these advances have produced pose problems; that they risk getting bogged down under the pressure of external constraints and those of the local privileged classes? For all that, should the possibility that these changes (in power!), which open for the mass movements, be spurned? These powers will allow other advances, based on the association (and not on the dissociation) of the affirmation of national independence (vis-à-vis the US), of democratisation and social progress.

Elsewhere the image of reality, despite the struggles, is less promising. In Europe the priority given to the construction of the European Union encourages a slide towards social liberalism, the illusions being kept alive by the rhetoric of the third way, and of capitalism with a human face. Will the 'movement' succeed on its own in overcoming these handicaps? Personally I strongly doubt it and think that decisive changes in the orientation of the political power is a precondition, in particular the break with atlanticism (NATO is the enemy of the peoples of Europe). Others don’t think so. In Eastern Europe, fast on the way to becoming, in its real relations with Germany and Western Europe, the analogue to what was (and still is) Latin America in its relations with the USA, illusions are even greater.

In Asia and Africa we are seeing excesses which we qualify as culturalist and which feed the illusion of supposedly civilizational projects based on para-religious or ethnic gatherings. Here the talk of cultural diversity often comes to the help of this retreat into impasses. This talk is, moreover perfectly tolerated (even encouraged) by the capitalist and imperialist power.

It is necessary to know more at this point – how progressives have asserted themselves in Latin America, to know more about the reasons for the relative stagnation of the movements elsewhere, about their decline or defeat in certain cases. That should be the essential direction for numerous debates, in the forums and elsewhere. The world forums are meeting places and poorly equipped to provide an adequate framework for deepening these debates. The national and regional forums are or could be more suitable.

The proposals drawn up in the Bamako Appeal in January 2006 answered the call to give more importance to deepening the debates of this nature. They are only proposals and not imposed decisions. These were naturally refused on principle both by the extreme autonomist currents and by the mass of apolitical NGOs. But they are making their way elsewhere.

The World Social Forum Charter in no way forbids initiatives of the Bamako type, and the Bamako Appeal was moreover endorsed by Movements’ Assemblies . Nevertheless, this initiative irritated the WSF Secretariat. Why? Perhaps because it does not basically share the proposals contained in this appeal. Should we conclude from this that the secretariat aligned itself with apolitical NGOs (and perhaps the extreme autonomist currents) to close the forum to other currents of action? Who would deny that the document in question – drawn up by 200 participants in one day and a night – points out inadequacies, even contradictions. Should its drafters furthermore be accused of intellectual arrogance, of outmoded vanguardist attitudes, even of dangerous political motives? It would be necessary to show that the extremist autonomist currents produce nothing which is not the spontaneous, eloquent and coherent product of the direct expression of the masses, that the intellectuals who formulate the theses of these currents do not exist. It would be necessary to show that the apolitical NGOs do not hold views which, in fact, have an obvious political sense, in making their own the rhetoric of the system institutions: reduction of poverty, good governance and exacerbated culturalism.

The world forums have a history and a prehistory. They did not appear suddenly without preparation. François Houtart, Bernard Cassen and others have recalled the essential stages of this history, from the anti- Davos in Davos (1999) and other initiatives. The object of this paper is not to propose an assessment of their deployment over the last seven years. Even if one thinks that their success is certain and their impact real (which is our case); nevertheless emphasis must be put not on self-congratulation but on the weaknesses.

The authorities responsible for the actual management of the forums are various (secretariat, international council, leadership of the principal movements and NGOs represented). They are the focuses of power, by definition, as always, and it would be naïve to ignore it. Their often dominant concern is self assessment with respect to internal performance criteria, often of a very banal nature (quantity of participants, number, perhaps quality of the debates, direct material questions of organisation). The real criterion of assessment is external to the forums: do they contribute to facilitating the progress (rather than the stagnation, even the decline) of the struggles? It would be desirable that this dimension of the challenge find a greater echo in the assemblies and meetings organised by these authorities..

Taking the criticism a little further we venture to say that the world forums suffer from a growing imbalance in the presence of their participants. The forums, which are very costly in money and intellectual work, attract more NGOs (sometimes of course devoted to the support of the struggles) endowed with staff and financial means – those of the North, but also, in brutal terms, those of their Southern clientele – than the major movements in conflict. Hundreds of thousands of peasants engaged in fierce struggles, whole peoples confronting the machine guns and bombs of the imperialist occupier, sometimes make their voice heard here and there in a workshop. But many other organisations, sometimes insignificant in the scope of their action, dispose of workshops to make their propaganda. Let us speak frankly: some of these organisations are part of the system constituting safety valves rather than being part of the alternative. These failings of the world forums are also seen in the national forums. But here the immediate proximity of the forces in conflict with the existing order favours, at least potentially, the overcoming of the failings mentioned here.

The reconstruction of a front of countries and peoples from the South is one of the basic conditions for the emergence of another world, one not based on imperialist domination. Without in any way underestimating the importance of the transformations of all types which have originated in the societies of the North in the past and present, up to now these have remained harnessed to the imperialist wagon. One should therefore not be surprised that the great global transformations have originated in the revolt of the peoples of the peripheries, from the Russian revolution (the 'weak link' of the period) to the Chinese revolution and the non -aligned front (Bandung) which, for a moment, obliged imperialism to 'adjust itself' to demands which conflicted with the course of its expansion. This page, that of Bandung and of the Tri-continental (1955-1980), of a multi-polar globalisation, has been turned.

Since the conditions of globalisation in place preclude a remaking of Bandung, the current ruling classes of the countries of the South are trying to join this globalisation, which they sometimes hope to be able to change in their favour, but which they are not fighting. They divide into two groups of 'countries': those which have a national project (the nature of which – essentially capitalist but nuanced by concessions or their absence in favour of the working classes, but nevertheless in open or muted conflict with the imperialist strategies – may be discussed case by case), such as China or the emerging countries of Asia or Latin America; and those which have no project and agree to adjust unilaterally to the demands of the imperialist deployment (in this case they have compradore ruling classes). Variable geometry alliances are in the process of being constituted between the states (the governments), the emergence of which was seen within the WTO. The possibilities which these rapprochements can open up for the working class movements must not be disdained, but examined with open eyes.

Is a front of the peoples of the South, going well beyond the rapprochements between ruling classes, possible? The construction of this front remains difficult, handicapped as it is by the culturalist excesses here referred to, and by the confrontations they entail between peoples of the South (on pseudo-religious or pseudo-ethnic grounds). It would be less problematic if and to the extent that the states having a project would – under the pressure of their populations – evolve in a more resolutely anti-imperialist direction.

That implies that their projects free themselves from the rut of the illusion that resolutely and exclusively 'national capitalist' powers are in a position to influence imperialist globalisation in their favour and to enable their countries to become active agents of imperialist globalisation, participating in the fashioning of the global system, and not unilaterally adjusting to it. These illusions are still great and strengthened by nationalist rhetoric as well as that which encourages the emerging countries in the process of 'catching up' developed by the institutions in the service of imperialism. But to the extent that the facts refute these illusions, new popular and anti imperialist national blocks will be able to clear the way and facilitate the internationalism of peoples. It must be hoped that the progressive forces of the North will understand it and support it.

In conclusion it should be said that the future of the forums depends less on what happens within them than what develops elsewhere, in the peoples struggles and in the evolution of the geo-strategy of states. This does not lead to any pessimism about the forums, but it leads to modesty in assessing their achievements. In parallel then (and not in conflict) with the continuation of the forums militant actions, other forms of intervention are necessary, allowing the deepening of the debates and joint actions.

Since its creation in 1997, the World Forum for Alternatives has been engaged on this path. It is a network of numerous 'think-tanks' directly articulating social and political forces struggling against the system. It attempts to stimulate working groups (and not only exchanges of view) perhaps facilitating joint action fronts. For information: groups of trade unionists ('rebuilding the united labour front'), of peasants’ movements (imposing access to the land for the benefit of all peasants), of non-aligned political forces on the global policies of capital and imperialism, working on questions of international law or the reform of the United Nations system and the economic management systems of globalisation.

Many other national, regional and global networks are deploying praiseworthy efforts in comparable directions. We will not list them at length, but simply recall – as examples - what ATTAC represents in France, or the work of 'Focus on Global South', ARENA and so many others. It would be highly desirable, in the perspective of strengthening the effectiveness of the forums, that a greater presence of these programmes be reflected in the forums.

* Samir Amin is an Egyptian political thinker and is a director of the in Dakar, Senegal. He has written more than 30 books including Imperialism & Unequal Development, Specters of Capitalism: A Critique of Current Intellectual Fashions, Obsolescent Capitalism: Contemporary Politics and Global Disorder and The Liberal Virus. His memoirs were published in October 2006.

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Great piece by Selome Araya. I would like to reproduce it on my website which I will be launching at the end of the month. How can I go about it? Secondly, if I want my pieces to appear on your website, how can I go about it, if it is a possibility?

Editor's reply: You are free to reproduce content from Pambazuka News provided that you always include the source of the article (Pambazuka News) and the URL of the article (in this case:

Two UN agencies have pledged to help poor countries tackle climate change and improve their environmental management skills. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Environment Programme (Unep) cemented a bond between fighting poverty and protecting the environment by launching a joint Poverty and Environment Facility in Nairobi.

I applaud Mr. Bropleh's article because it hits on the point that in order for us – Liberians - to move forward, we must learn about our past, come to terms with our failures and incorporate the experience of our nation into our vision for the future to make it a unifying national vision.

King Baudouin Foundation (KBF) international conference is a prelude to the "Global Forum on Migration & Development" and seeks to identify diaspora/migrant organizations dealing with south-south & north-south international migration. For further information contact: [email][email protected], or visit the website: www.afford-uk.org

I would like also to communicate to you what has been happening in the province of Kongo Central (Bas-Congo). On 31 January, the police fired at a house presumed to be the one to house Ne Muanda Nsemi, leader of the Bundu dia Kongo. He had already called for a ville morte (people to stay home) for 1 February. He was not in the house as he had returned to Kinshasa for the funeral of his sister. Between 1-3 February 2007, in most of the cities of the province, people marched to protest the rampant corruption over the elections of Senators and Governors.

Our country is divided between a minority that has become rich due to being close to the treasury and the large majority that is over impoverished. The minority in the elections have been buying everything. The Presidential guards fired on the marchers. The causalities are now put at 750 dead, many wounded and many have been arrested. The official number is put at 87 dead. The MONUC, that apparently participated also, puts it at 134 dead. Since then, the president has said nothing. One of his advisers has said that the president having received the Bakongo notables of his obedience, why should he speak again? The UNSG has asked for an enquiry into the massacre. A rocket was used, at Moanda, to attack a BDK church where women and children went hiding. Those arrested are not being given a due process trial. An attorney, at Mbanza Ngungu, has suggested to try them in jails to avoid publicity! There is a plan, we are told, to kill the leader of BDK. Please do whatever you can to expose what is happening.

A new report by ICT Africa! explores the impact of ICT on private sector development, and how ICT can contribute to a vibrant SME sector and economic growth in the context of developing economies. The countries covered included Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Cameroonian blogger, reports on one of the most gruelling races in the world – the Mount Cameroon Race of Hope. The post includes a variety of photos from the race.

'600 athletes from about 12 countries will gather in the town of Buea at the foot of Mount Cameroon, West Africa's tallest mountain. for one of the most gruelling but least known extreme sports events in the world; the Mount Cameroon Race of Hope.'

Gambian blogger, Home of the Mandinmores, comments on the Gambian President’s statement that he can cure HIV/AIDS and on US presidential hopeful Barack Obama.

'Will Barack Obama make it to the white house? I dunno. However the fact that despite the odds he is trying to make it there embodies the American ideals so eloquently spelt out in the declaration of independence thus: “that all men are created equal and endowed by their creator with inalienable rights”. It is true that for most of its history America hasn’t lived up to this creed and white men have been more equal than all others. Having said that I still believe Obama’s candidacy embodies the ideals behind the American dream: that regardless of race, color, creed, gender or class, anyone can aspire to, and become anything they want to be provided they are willing to work hard for it. That is the appeal of Obama’s candidacy to most of us.'

Everyone is jumping on the Obama bandwagon in one way or the other. I saw a TV interview on You Tube where his “blackness” was being discussed in terms of him being not Black but African which is rather a strange racial differentiation as I thought they were the same thing.

R. E. Ekossa’s Blog comments on Chinua Achebe’s famous Joseph Conrad essay which leads to her reflecting on her relationship with people from the West and she asks the question (in terms of racism) 'who is bad for me?'

'...is it the ones who would be deeply distressed if you suggested that they were racist, but whose lack of curiosity about your world makes them, at best, unwitting co-perpetrators in the crimes that are committed against your people? Do these well-intentioned, law-abiding people who give generously to charities, who dutifully pay the taxes to sustain the governments that allow greedy multinationals to exploit us while claiming to bring development to us - as we are primitive and undeveloped - bear some of the blame for our sorrows? At what point does ignorance become culpable? At what point does it become difficult for me to deal with people who have the time and resources to learn about things, and whose refusal or lack of interest in learning causes them to take decisions that cost lives in places that they neither know nor really care about? When does a person’s lack of knowledge or curiosity about where his coffee or the cotton in his shirt is farmed become dangerous self-absorption, at least from my viewpoint?'

Nigerian blogger, African Shirts posts on the speaking and usage of the English language, something which Achebe has discussed many times and which he touches on in the Conrad essay. Nkem uses the BBC Hardtalk interview with Nigerian Presidential hopeful Orij Kalu and his “butchering” of the English language.

'What seems to have emerged from people's reaction to the Kalu interview is a disdain for English, or the ability to express one's self in English. English isn't Kalu's first language, so he should be allowed to butcher it the way he did - or so goes the thinking. I had two problems with the interview. First, he couldn't express himself, and second, even if he could, he had nothing to express. It wasn't about accent, because if it was, 99% of Nigerians would fall short of whatever glorious standard people imagine I've set.'

The issue of language is a political issue in a country such as Nigeria that has at least 250 languages, so how does one communicate without having a universal language that stands outside of the country. You cannot get 140 million people speaking 250 languages to agree to use one of those as the Lingua Franca of the nation and I have to agree with Nkem’s conclusion.

'People in Nigeria forget that English is not just a colonial imposition, but is the egg that binds Nigeria together. I cannot think of anything else Nigerians have in common. The arbitrary colonial borders do not bring Nigeria together, as there are still vastly varying customs, languages, landscapes, an inexhaustible list of differences. This is Nigeria: a vast piece of land, around which Lord Lugard and his people drew a line, and then asked all the people within that line to speak English. It's the story of Africa, and now we have to deal with it.'

Musings of a Naijaman also comments on Nigeria’s forthcoming elections. This time it is the anti-corruption agency (EFCC) who have submitted a list of “corrupt candidates”.

'Meanwhile in Nigeria, the farce continues - The anti-corruption agency EFCC has now submitted its arbitrary list of "corrupt candidates" to the electoral commission, after a kangaroo panel is set up to vet the list. And just in case the electoral commissioners are in any doubt about how seriously to take it, two of them are arrested by (you guessed it) the EFCC. By using the anti-corruption agency in this cavalier blackmailing way, Obasanjo seems set to do more damage to democracy and the cause of anti-corruption than he realizes. It would all be laughable if not for the fact that at the end of the day, human lives are at stake.'

Black Looks has an expose of US interests in Nigeria and a request made to her by contractors for the US Marine Corp to undertake research on the Ijaw people of the Niger Delta. Black Looks comments on this and a recent report by the Center for International Policy on the 'converging interests of the US and Nigerian governments'.

'Clearly the Nigerian Government is planning on working with the US military in the Niger Delta - whether this will continue in a low profile advisory capacity or escalate into something more is not clear. But the US Marines / US Government are not going to carry out their own research into the region unless they are going to use the information to pursue a specific set of agendas presumably with the knowledge of the present Nigerian regime.'

* Sokari Ekine produces the blog Black Looks, www.blacklooks.org and is Online News Editor of Pambazuka News.

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

We are pleased to announce that Ms Solome Nakaweesi Kimbugwe took office as of 15 February 2007 and will be based at our HQ in Kampala, Uganda.

We are very pleased with this appointment as Solome brings with her unique skills and experience which will be a tremendous asset to AMwA and its future development. We are proud to recruit Solome who is an alumni of the African Women’s Leadership Institute (AWLI), and thus bears testimony to AMwA’s investment in women’s leadership development. Following the AWLI in 2003, she rose through the ranks to head her organisation the Uganda Women’s Network (UWONET). During her tenure as Coordinator, UWONET has grown as an institution and has become an effective voice for women’s rights in Uganda. With her experience, skills and energy, Solome is ready to take on the challenge of heading AMwA, an international organisation.

With the establishment of the Africa Command (Africom) slated for 2008, the Pentagon is becoming as important a player as the State Department in as far as relations between the US and Africa. This latest move, the details of which are not yet clear, but could involve increased US troop deployments and bases, should be raising more eyebrows than it already has on the continent. This especially so since Africa was previously well covered between the European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and the Pacific Command (PACOM).

A worrying aspect to this latest development is that it has received bi-partisan support in Washington. – As Sen. Russ Feingold (D), chair of the Senate committee on Africa puts it, "An Africa Command would help the U.S. military focus on a continent that is essential to our national security…An Africa Command is vital to strengthening our relations with African nations and preventing them from becoming staging grounds for attacks against the U.S. or our allies." This would mark a shift towards increased militarization of the US approach to Africa.

Africom covers countries that have strategic interests for the US in Africa. Nigeria is an obvious choice to fall under the umbrella of Africom as a major supplier of oil to the US. The other countries covered by AFRICOM are Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Morocco. All these countries have indicated some links between internal dissent and Al-Qaeda activity.

The recent events in Somalia involving both the US and Ethiopia have raised interesting questions about the global war on terror, such as the origin of the intelligence reports citing presence of Al-Qaeda, which led to US intervention.

Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq provide valuable lessons about the lasting internal effects of ill-considered external intervention. The latest involvement in Somalia portends to a worrying trend of baiting US intervention by alluding to the presence of Al-Qaeda linked groups. Nigeria, Chad, Algeria and Mauritania are dealing with internal tensions that could be further worsened by US involvement. The potential impact of Africom on democracy in Africa is significant.

In a paper published by the Center or International Policy, Paul Lubeck et al point to the contradictory and flawed reasoning behind seeking to bolster security in Africa as an alternative source of petroleum to replace over-reliance on the Middle-East which is an increasingly unstable supply. The nature of US involvement through Africom could seed the very same tensions and instability that the US is eager to avoid in the Middle East.

The Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) involves bolstering of continental militaries ostensibly to enable them better deal with “terrorist” activity in their territories. Given the continent’s bad history of militarism and the use of force against citizens, the implications for the future of democracy and civilian rule may be further jeopardized.

Further Reading:
Center for International Policy

The Guardian – US Moves in on Africa
http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,2009098,00.html

US State Department

Unite States' special envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios said in Washington DC recently that southern Sudan’s leaders were struggling to implement good governance practices, and that there appeared to be substance to allegations that some donor funds that had been allocated to development in the region had been misappropriated.

With presidential elections looming, many in Senegal are concerned that the country’s largely peaceful history at the polls is about to be shattered. So far no one has been killed or suffered major injuries ahead of the 25 February vote.