Corruption is making inroads in Namibia, according to an international report released in Germany. According to Transparency International (TI), a civil society organisation which aims to fight corruption globally, Namibia has dropped eight places - to 55 - on an international corruption index this year, a ranking it shares with the South American country of Costa Rica.

The Zimbabwe government is planning fresh home demolitions, reports ZimOnline. The government in May last year and weeks after controversially winning a key general election, ordered the police and army to demolish thousands of backyard cottages, shantytowns and informal business kiosks, in a campaign President Robert Mugabe said was necessary to smash crime and to restore the beauty of Zimbabwe’s cities.

With continued human rights abuses, crumbling social services and economic freefall, many Guineans were incredulous after a senior European Union humanitarian official said he was “very favourably impressed” with the governments efforts at reform to win back aid. ''With each passing day we face more difficulties," said Mamaissata Camara who lives in the capital, Conakry.

This paper explores the historical precedents to BEE in South Africa, its origins, and its points of contact with the experience of 'empowerment' in Malaysia. The authors review the different steps taken by the South African government in promoting empowerment over the past 12 years, together with some of outcomes to date.

Twenty dollars seems a meagre amount, but it has brought an end to backbreaking toil and food insecurity for many of Lesotho's elderly. Two years ago the government of the small landlocked country started a pension system for citizens over the age of 70. Today, more than 76, 000 people are receiving a monthly pension of approximately 20 dollars. Whereas such steps in Southern Africa are frequently taken at the behest of donors or the international financial institutions, Lesotho's government introduced the grant in order to address worsening poverty among the elderly.

Environmental campaigners have welcomed a decision by the World Bank to debar German-based Lahmeyer International for bribing officials to win contracts for Africa's largest inter-basin water transfer scheme, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP).

The World Bank on Tuesday approved a delayed $80 million loan to support Kenya's education sector, following stepped-up measures to guard against corruption and ensure resources are properly used, officials said. The approval of the new project is the first since the World Bank delayed $265 million in aid to Kenya, including $100 million in loans for health programs, due to corruption concerns.

In a recent edition of the New Internationalist, Ike Oguine writes: "Not too long ago Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni was considered a model of leadership in and for Africa. It was a Museveni-led liberation army which finally brought to an end the chaos and violence which followed the collapse of Idi Amin’s nightmarish dictatorship. His National Resistance Army simultaneously fought a military and political campaign. Even while engaged in military struggle it tried to set up elected, local representative committees in rural areas."

Kameelahwrites - KameelahWritew (http://kameelahwrites.blogspot.com/2006/11/mandela-say-it-aint-so-are-y…) comments on the tributes made by South African President, Thabo Mbeki and former president Nelson Mandela on the death of PW Botha, who she describes as the “defiant face of apartheid”. She writes:

“Mandela has been at the center of attention for quite some time as a greater leader and example of progressive nation building tactics, but when he goes on to lead the tribute to Botha, I began to get worried. There is forgiveness of folks who do wrong and apologize and then there is leading a tribute to a man who clung onto white-control, never apologized and never acknowledged his wrong. Then there is the forgiveness of a man, which is conflated with the forgiveness of apartheid - a problematic and hasty conclusion. There is forgiveness, then there is praising your colonizers, slave owner and the man who put his foot in your neck. Botha died without ever apologizing or ever acknowledging his wrong. Apparently, his wife Barbara believes that her husband had been ‘terribly misunderstood’ and that South Africans would come to realize what they had lost.”

My response is this sounds more like appeasement and an insult to all those who suffered and died under the rule of Botha but then when did our leaders ever care about the opinions of the people they are elected to serve?

For more comments on PW Botha see South Africa (http://www.southafrica.to/history/Apartheid/PW_Botha/PW_Botha.htm)

Zimbabwean blogger, Dumisani's Blog - Dumisani's Blog (http://dumisani.tigblog.org/post/60139) is frustrated over the reports in the mainstream US media on the death of PW Botha. It seems revisionism is at work on all fronts from the South African leadership to the US media. Expect the same when Ariel Sharon finally gives up the ghost, but as Dumisani comments lets see how they cover the death of Robert Mugabe?

"So PW Botha, one of the worst leaders of an African country EVER died last night. It's interesting how the NY Times gives this extra long obituary, but doesn't even paint him in the negative light that he deserves. The whole thing tastes like a cucumber. Plain and bland. This guy, who was responsible for one of Africa's most brutal regimes EVER gets this, as an obituary? He is not even referred to as a racist in this article. Not once. In fact, the WORD ‘racist’ comes up once to refer to ‘racist policies’. When people like Idi Amin died, I bet their obituaries didn't read this rosy. When other African 'dictators' died, there are articles of good riddance to bad rubbish. This guy was a dictator. Let's call a spade a spade. He was a horrible, cold, mean, racist, unrepentant brutal dictator who led one of Africa's worst governments ever.”

Chippla’s Weblog - Chippla's Weblog (http://chippla.blogspot.com/2006/11/china-africa-summit.html) reports on the China-Africa summit held in Beijing and attended by most African leaders in what Chippla’s describes as “probably the largest gathering of African leaders outside the UN”. (I would hope more would attend AU summits?)

“China's interest in Africa is, without a doubt, greatly linked to the latter's huge pool of natural resources, much of which remain untapped. And with rapid development and modernization occurring across China, there is an increasing need for raw materials to continue fuelling such development. African leaders in a position of strength (those who govern nations rich in resources of interest to China) must negotiate sensibly. The need to gradually curtail the export of raw materials and focus on the processing or conversion of such materials before export has become all too obvious. Non knowledge-based societies would simply be unable to compete favourably in today's fast-changing world.”

The summit is evidence that China’s move into Africa is to be an all pervasive one that will include all aspects of commerce and industry and one also has to wonder how much influence the Chinese will have on respecting national governments and issues of human rights.

Timbuktu Chronicles - Timbuktu Chronicles (http://timbuktuchronicles.blogspot.com/2006/11/urban-agriculture.html) reports on the advantages of “urban agriculture” as a way of alleviating household expenses, of obtaining small extra income from sale or bartering of foodstuffs and recycling waste in the form of fertilizers.

“The practice is thus component of any strategy for poverty alleviation. Urban agriculture can also benefit the urban environment in profound ways. Large cities produce vast amounts of wastewater and organic waste, whose disposal is often a problem. By using waste as a productive resource, however, urban agriculture can help reduce the pressure on municipal waste disposal systems. Further, these natural fertilizers reduce the need for chemical additives, which in turn prevents groundwater contamination. Moreover, while agribusiness uses ten to 15 calories of petroleum energy to deliver one calorie of food energy, urban agriculture uses between one and three calories to do the same…”

The practice of urban agriculture has been part of Zimbabwean urban life for many years and has recently been introduced and encouraged in South Africa. I am sure other African countries are also involved in this practice. However with government support such as through publicising the advantages and providing seedlings, the practice could become far more widespread, particularly amongst the very poor who would benefit in terms of cost and diet.

The Voice of Somaliland Diaspora - The Voice of Somaliland Diaspora-Ottawa (http://waridaad.blogspot.com/2006/11/obstacles-on-way-to-international…) publishes an interview with “New School New York” and Dustin Dehez on the “Obstacles On the Way to International Recognition for Somaliland”. Dehez asks what is the most important point from the perspective of the international community?

“I see two major concerns: firstly international recognition could be quoted as a precedent for state secession by other independence-movements throughout the continent. Secondly, but with less impact: Recognition could spark violence between the South and Somaliland and thus creating regional instability.

Talking to Western foreign policy makers there is one clear question nearly every diplomat puts forward: Who would have an interest in recognition? Clearly most of them do not think that recognition is a necessity for the country’s development in the first place. Secondly, the benefit/impact that recognition would have: a strong signal to Muslim states in the Middle East that democratic transition would be appreciated by the West – is not yet in all minds.

Furthermore the reluctance to recognise Somaliland in order to avoid a precedent might change within the next five years, when the Sudanese in Southern Sudan will vote on their independence. If they vote in support of independence international politicians might recognise Somaliland in what they see as a shortly open window for change in the Horn of Africa.”

Miss Mabrouk of Egypt - Ms Mabrouk of Egypt (http://missmabrouk.blogspot.com/2006/11/low-iq-and-curse-of-africa.html) comments on a report by the London School of Economics which said that “African states were poor and suffered chronic ill-health because their populations were less intelligent than people in richer countries.” Once again there is a return to the whole issue of IQ and race. Ms Mabrouk asks two questions which relate to poverty and diet. It is these that need to be addressed rather than questioning intelligence based on race and as she says can you really measure intelligence and what does it matter anyway – to who does it matter?

1)What effect does poverty have on intelligence over generations? In richer countries, researchers are now pointing to how low nutrition diets and in particular bad fats are directly affecting how brain cells are connecting to each other. Good food = many connections = fast working brain. Bad food = few connections = slow thinking.

2) Does IQ really matter? In other words, is it an adequate method for measuring intelligence?

Black Looks - Black Looks (http://www.blacklooks.org/2006/10/access_to_arvs.html) comments that having access to Anti Retrovirals (ARVs) in South Africa by all sections of the community does not in itself mean that Black women will receive equal health care even if they have private medical care. She reports on a specific case which provides an excellent example of racism that exists in the provision and treatment of HIV/AIDS patients.

“However Neidhardt points to one aspect of the discussion around HIV/AIDS that is absent. How race is played out in South African society and how this influences the fight against HIV/AIDS…how white supremacy still impacts the struggle against HIV/AIDS, how it orders relationships between people, countries and institutions. It is as if we are violating some unwritten code of conduct, especially in this country if we want to speak aloud that racist thinking is still entrenched in the psyche of all South Africans. Perhaps we think we are disrespecting the new democracy if we speak the reality that racism still does dictate for us who is and who is not worthy of the basic human and economic rights, care and dignity that are outlined so eloquently in the 1996 Constitution.”

* Sokari Ekine produces the blog Black Looks,

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Through his writing, Rafael Marques de Morais has exposed the corruption of the Angolan government, the tragic impact that diamond extraction has on the lives of local populations and the abuses committed by the industry’s private security companies. The speech he gave when accepting the Civil Courage Prize can be veiwed at this link.

FEATURE: In the second of a three part series, Ike Okonta analyses how MEND has transformed the image of Niger Delta communities from hapless victims to an assertive political bloc.
COMMENT AND ANALYSIS:
- Rafael Marques argues that Angola is undergoing a process of commercialization as a substitute to democratization.
- Emman Ozoemena wonders if there are lessons to be learnt from the American experience in managing an open political field.
LETTERS: Readers respond to recent articles.
PAN AFRICAN POSTCARD: Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem bids farewell to Dr Wanjiru Kihoro.
WORLD SOCIAL FORUM: Registration announcement
CONFLICT AND EMERGENCIES: Links to news on Sudan, Somalia, Cote d'Ivoire and Uganda
HUMAN RIGHTS: Zim government intensifies crackdown on dissent
WOMEN AND GENDER: Women in the new millennium
REFUGEES AND FORCED MIGRATION: Q/A: Internally displaced people
ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE: From votes to security
DEVELOPMENT: Development indicators improve in Africa
CORRUPTION: Corrupting the fight against corruption
HEALTH AND HIV/AIDS: AIDS campaign induces behaviour change
EDUCATION: School fees and HIV/AIDS
RACISM AND XENOPHOBIA: Xenophobia and the East African federation
ENVIRONMENT: Programmes to combat climate change
LAND AND LAND RIGHTS: San communal lands contested
MEDIA AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MONUC press preview
NEWS FROM THE DIASPORA: The return of the bell curve
INTERNET AND TECHNOLOGY: UNICEF launches online Swahili game to boost HIV prevention
PLUS: e-Newsletters and Mailings Lists; Fundraising and Useful Resources; Courses, Seminars and Workshops; Jobs.

This week, four Scottish oil workers returned to Britain after being seized from an Exxon Mobil compound in the Niger Delta by gunmen seeking a £21m ransom. Earlier this year, local militants stormed a Royal Dutch Shell facility, prompting the oil giant to pull out hundreds of workers and close down wells. Ike Okonta looks at the structure and origins of one of the militias based in the area. He argues that the MEND militia is not an organisation in the formal sense of the word, but an idea, underlying the slew of youth movements that began to proliferate in the Niger Delta in the late 1980s. This article is the second part of a three-part series. The first article, entitled ‘Niger Delta, Behind The Mask’ ( was published last week.

The first thing that strikes you on meeting members of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) militia is the ease with which they move about in Warri metropolis, and also in the creek villages, indicating clearly that they are amongst people who not only identify with their cause but also go out of their way to offer them protection and safe havens during attacks by Nigerian soldiers. However, their movements are constrained by the ever-prowling soldiers.

The second thing you notice is that the militants, or the ones elected by the others to respond to your questions, are articulate, well-educated, and conversant with latest political developments in Nigeria and other parts of the world. The introductory encounter took place in a hotel room in Warri. The author had sent word in advance that he would be arriving that Thursday afternoon, and would like to interview one or two leaders of MEND. His courier, a local journalist, said he would try to arrange the interview, but that he was not giving any firm promises as getting hold of MEND leaders would be dependent on the level of Nigerian military presence in Warri that week.

MEND leaders are constantly on the move, extremely cautious, and do not take telephone calls personally, aware of the fact that the soldiers hunting for them have electronic devices capable of pinpointing mobile phone signals with accuracy. The author was in luck. He arrived in Warri when the peace process, initiated by FNDIC leaders, Oronto Douglas, the lawyer and environmental activist, and other Ijaw leaders, was still plodding on, and the Obasanjo government appeared willing to restrain the soldiers for the negotiations to be concluded. A knock sounded on the door of his hotel room and he opened the door. A young man, casually dressed in blue jeans and shirt sleeves stood there smiling.

‘Are you the MEND leader?’ the author asked, surprised. The media images beamed out to the world by the local subsidiaries of the international news wires always depicts MEND fighters as muscular masked men, clutching Kalashnikovs and adopting belligerent postures, as though ready to fire at the slightest provocation.

‘But exactly what do you understand by MEND?’ he countered. ‘There is no such thing as MEND. What I do know is that there are armed youth in the creeks who say they have had enough of the oil companies’ double standards, and are determined to put to an end the exploitation of their people by Shell, Chevron and the Federal Government.’[1]

MEND is not an ‘organisation’ in the formal sense of the word. It is an idea, a general principle underlying the slew of communal, civic and youth movements that began to proliferate in the Niger Delta, and particularly in the Ijaw-speaking areas, in the wake of General Babangida’s failed adjustment policies in the late 1980s.

The country had been run by a succession of authoritarian and corrupt governments since the end of the civil war in 1970, the tragic apogee of which was the Babangida junta. The ensuing economic hardships, the government’s apparent inability to address this crisis, and its refusal to provide a civic and political framework in which oppressed citizens could air their grievances and seek remedy began to encourage a drift towards religious, ethnic, and irredentist organisations. The Ken Saro-Wiwa inspired Movement of the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), which emerged in 1990, and the Ijaw National Congress, born in Port Harcourt a year later, have their genesis in this turbulent economic and political milieu.

These organisations pursued such civic goals as the end to military rule and the return of democratic civilian government, the creation of new states in ethnic minority areas, and an increase in their share of oil receipts. They utilised non-violent protest marches, advocacy in the mass media, petitions addressed to the government, and awareness-building seminars to press their case. However, as economic conditions worsened country-wide and election results were annulled by Babangida in mid 1993, a wave of anger and desperation began to spread among youth in such cities as Lagos, Kaduna, Kano, Enugu, Port Harcourt, Ibadan, Warri and Onitsha.

Militant youth organisations such as Odua Peoples Congress (OPC), Arewa Peoples Congress (APC) and Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) emerged in this period. These were communal organisations that drew their membership from the Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo ethnic groups respectively. OPC and MASSOB wanted dissolution of the Federation, which they said should be replaced with new independent countries based in the various ethnic groups. APC, on the other hand, called for perpetuation of the status quo, but under Hausa political and military leadership. The youth militias began to arm themselves. Clashes with the Nigerian military, and also amongst themselves, became a staple of Nigerian public life from 1994 onwards. General Sani Abacha had toppled the interim government Babangida had installed before he quit in November 1993, thrown Moshood Abiola, winner of the June 1993 presidential elections into jail, and unleashed a wave of terror targeted at journalists, democracy activists, and the youth militias challenging his right to rule.

Political developments in the Ijaw territory followed a slightly different trajectory. The group had not benefited from the various state creation exercises embarked upon by the government in the 1980s and early 1990s. The INC was at the forefront of the agitation to correct what it perceived as a ‘gross injustice.’ It argued that the Ijaw were deliberately dispersed in several coastal states where they constituted an oppressed minority, and that it was only fair that they be brought together in two or three homogenous states. Even so, it was not making any headway.

Skirmishes between Ijaw youth and the oil companies operating in the western delta had begun in the late 1980s, the former complaining that they had not been offered employment in the very industry on their doorstep, and which, to make it worse, was destroying their rivers and farmlands. Ijaw elders and community leaders had mediated, and the process of this mediation gave birth to new youth-led civic groups. Prominent among these were Movement for the Survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSSIEND) and Movement for Reparations to Ogbia (MORETO). Ogbia is an Ijaw clan in the central delta, and from which Oronto Douglas hailed.

The creation of new local government councils in the Warri area by the government in 1997 provided the trigger for the militarization of youth groups in the area. Three prominent ethnic groups occupy Warri metropolis and its hinterland, extending into the creeks. The Itsekiri are perceived to be small but politically dominant. The other two are the Ijaw and Urhobo. There have been squabbles turning on ownership of land, and the rents to be derived there from, among all three groups since the 1920s. But these were usually peaceful affairs, fought out in the law courts.

But the lethal cocktail of economic deprivation, military dictatorship, and worsening environmental crisis in the western delta, which reached explosive heights in the 1990s, ensured that when the next round of land tussles arrived, the entire city would go up in flames. This was exactly what happened in 1997 when the military governor announced the creation of a new local government council with headquarters in an Ijaw village, and then rescinded the decision the following day and moved it to an Itsekiri village. Ijaw youth accused Itsekiri elites of having pressured the government to relocate the seat of the new council to their area. The latter countered that the entire Warri territory belonged to the Itsekiri but that even so they had had no hand in the governor’s decision. Youth from both groups quickly entered the fray.

There was a stampede to arm on both sides. Events quickly degenerated into ethnic massacres and counter-massacres.

The proliferation of small arms in the Warri area inevitably fed into oil bunkering, an illicit activity which had been practiced for decades in the high seas by powerful government officials in collaboration with oil workers.

Fringe elements in these militarised youth groups were to find ‘work’ here, helping the illegal oil barons to tap into pipelines to siphon crude oil and which was then taken to waiting ships. With the return of electoral politics in 1999, politicians in the Niger Delta also recruited from these armed elements to intimidate their political opponents and rig the vote. The oil companies also offered these youth ‘protection work’ in their facilities, arming them with lethal weapons in a cynical move to divide emergent and politically assertive youth organisations that were beginning to emerge. The Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), a new influential organisation founded by Oronto Douglas, Asume Osuoka and others in 1998, had united youth all over Ijaw land in a peaceful but powerful opposition to the exploitative activities of the oil companies and the Federal Government in the region. The famous Kaiama Declaration, a document adopted by youth from several Ijaw clans and spelling out their grievances and how they might be addressed, was the brainchild of the IYC leadership.

It is important to note that it was a small minority that drifted into oil bunkering and protection ‘services’ for the corrupt politicians and oil companies. The overwhelming majority of Ijaw youth remained solidly under the control of the civic and communal organisations they themselves had founded, even after they had come under brutal attack from government soldiers in such towns as Kaiama and Odi in 1998 and 1999 respectively. However, the IYC was to subsequently split into factions following a leadership crisis. Asari Dokubo, one its leaders, went on to establish the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), declaring that the peaceful methods of the IYC had not been effective and that what the new civilian government headed by President Obasanjo would heed was militant action. Even so, the bulk of the remaining IYC members continued on the path of non-violent political action.

In the morning of 15 February 2006, government helicopter gun ships attacked the Ijaw village of Okerenkoko in the western delta. Okerenkoko is a part of Gbaramatu, an Ijaw clan in the western delta. Government officials alleged that Okerenkoko and neighbouring villages were the epicentre of the illegal oil bunkering activities President Obasanjo had resolved to stamp out, and that Federal troops had been instructed to ‘deal with’ the Ijaw youth participating in the activity. The gun ships returned again on 17th and 18th February, flattening houses and huts and killing several innocent people. [2]

Enraged youth all over Ijawland vowed revenge. It was this bloody incident that triggered the birth of the MEND militia.

MEND and its methods

Although the Okerenkoko attack provided the immediate impetus for the coalescing of several militant strains in the decades-old Ijaw struggle for self-determination into MEND, the movement can be said to have taken several years, dating from Isaac Boro’s short-lived ‘revolution’ in February 1966, to finally come into its own.

The founding core of MEND’s membership is derived from the Gbaramatu clan which was in the eye of the storm in the 1997 local government crisis, and then subsequently bore the brunt of the helicopter gun ship attack of February 2006. Even so, this thesis holds true only to the extent that MEND is viewed as a formal organisation with a clearly delineated membership structure and chain of command. But as already stated, MEND is not so much an ‘organisation’ but an idea which many civic, communal, and political groups, each with its own local specificity and grievances, have bought into.

Resentment at the activities of the government and the oil companies run deep in all Ijaw clans in the eastern, central and western parts of the delta. An intricate maze of creeks links these clans all the way from Port Harcourt in the east to Warri in the west. The explosion of mobile telephony and internet services in Nigeria since 1999 has ensured that communication and coordination between armed units can be effected within minutes. These features are at the heart of the coalescing of disparate but united social concerns to birth MEND.

MEND’s strength and military successes so far lie in four key factors:

First, it has successfully tapped into the fifty-year old Ijaw quest for social and environmental justice in the Niger Delta. There is no village in the Niger Delta where MEND sympathisers do not exist. Consequently, the movement operates in extremely friendly and cooperative terrain, able to mount lightning attacks and then melt into the hamlets undetected.

Second, MEND is a loose coalition of armed militants, guided by a collegiate leadership. This leadership does not in any way constrain the ability of the various units to take their own decisions and mount military attacks independent of the others. The units plan their attacks separately, but are able to coordinate with other units in joint expeditions when necessary. Consequently they are active in all parts of the delta, adopting hit and run tactics and making it difficult for Federal troops to box them into a particular area and launch a massive attack.

Third, MEND militants fight in familiar territory, having fished and farmed in the maze of creeks, marshes, and mangrove swamps that constitutes the Niger Delta since childhood. The Nigerian army and Navy have superior hardware, but they often lose their way in the creeks when they mount attacks or give chase to the militants, rendering them impotent or worse, vulnerable to counter-attack. Several soldiers and naval ratings have lost their lives in this manner.

Fourth, MEND is an astute manipulator of the mass media, and has ensured that its case against the government and the oil companies has been clearly and eloquently made in newspapers and television networks in Nigeria and world-wide. Its case has been helped by the tragic events of 1990-1995 in the Ogoni area, during which period Shell officials worked actively with the Abacha junta to unleash mayhem and mass murder on the people, culminating in the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni eight on 10 November 1995. Journalists and environmental activists in Nigeria, Western Europe and North America who participated in the Ogoni struggle have enthusiastically taken up MEND’s case, even as they urge the militants to put down their guns and return to the path of peaceful dialogue pioneered by the IYC in 1998.

Hostages as weapon

MEND’s weapon of choice is the kidnapping of foreign oil workers. The calculation here is simple. The Nigerian government is notorious for its cavalier attitude when the lives of its citizens are at stake. But other countries, particularly the United States, France, United Kingdom and Italy which have massive oil installations in the Niger Delta in which their citizens operate, usually cry out in loud protest when the latter are taken hostage. Foreign workers are thus the militants’ favourite targets. MEND’s most spectacular hostage taking was carried out at Shell’s Forcados oil terminal in February 2006. Militants grabbed nine expatriate workers employed by Willbros, an engineering firm in contract to Shell, and spirited them away in a speedboat. Following several weeks of complex negotiations between the militants, Ijaw leaders, the Obasanjo government, the oil companies and the American and British governments, the last three of the hostages (several had been released previously) were set free on 27 March. [3]

It is significant that since MEND began to take hostages early in the year, none have been harmed. Government officials have sought to represent this aspect of MEND’s activities as racketeering, claiming that the militants usually extort ransom from the hostages and the government before the former are released. While it is true that there are fringe elements in the Niger Delta who have embraced hostage-taking as a lucrative commercial venture, they are not to be confused with MEND militants. The objective of the latter is fundamentally political: to focus the attention of Western governments and the world media on the Niger Delta when they grab these hostages, and to exploit the blaze of publicity thus generated to announce their grievances and demands of the Nigerian government.

It is, however, in attacks on Shell facilities that MEND militants have displayed absolutely no restraint, an indication of their deep anger at the company’s callous treatment of the Ijaw and the other ethnic groups in the Niger Delta since it began to produce oil in the region in 1956. Shell officials participated in military attacks on delta communities all through the 1980s and 1990s. In my interviews with several of the militants last August, they reeled off the names of the towns and villages that had tasted Shell’s guns: Iko, Umuechem, Ogoni, Nembe, Kaima, Odi…It was a very long list.[4]

MEND’s attack on the Forcados oil-loading platform was as audacious as it was crippling. The oil company was forced to suspend production of 19 per cent of its daily production. The company’s Cawthorne Channel flow station and Odidi II flow station were also destroyed. Pipelines all over the delta were blown apart, and Shell workers threatened with slow and painful death.

ChevronTexaco, Elf and ENI did not escape MEND’s attention. Their facilities also came under attack, and their staff routinely abducted. At the height of MEND’s military assaults in April, a quarter of Nigeria’s oil production had been shut down, and Shell’s giant off shore Bonga oil field, although protected by naval ships and gun boats, was also considered a potential MEND target. Dr Edmund Daukoru, a former Shell employee and since 2003 President Obasanjo’s Minister in charge of petroleum, was so worried that he hurried to Washington D.C. to confer with Sam Bordman, the US energy secretary, on ways and means of taking the MEND ‘problem’ on hand.

In response to what they deemed to be an imminent invasion by special forces from the United States, MEND, Asari Dokubo’s NDPVF and Martyrs Brigade and Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta (CMND), two new groups that subsequently emerged to complement the formers’ militant activities, announced the formation of a ‘Joint Revolutionary Council’ and pledged that they would deploy newly acquired heat-seeking rockets to attack and disable Shell’s offshore Bonga Oil Field. Given that they had successfully attacked several offshore oil facilities in the past, this announcement triggered panic in the international market. Combined with already tight supplies elsewhere, particularly in the Middle East where oil production has significantly reduced in the volatile Iraq-Iran corridor, spot prices surged towards the roof, hitting $72 per barrel.

MEND’s press statements are not only calculated to create maximum panic in the international oil markets. They are also designed to leverage the concerns of the giant US and European financial companies that have invested heavily in Gulf of Guinea’s burgeoning oil and gas industry, with the Niger Delta as its epicentre, to pile pressure on the Nigerian government. Leading the pack are Merrill Lynch, Societe Generale, Bank of America Securities, Credit Suissie First Boston, Morgan Stanley, UBS Investments, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, and Lehman Brothers. It is significant that these financial behemoths, who together have invested an estimated $15 billion in the Nigerian oil and gas industry (this does not include direct investments by oil companies and related industries) held meetings with Nigerian government officials in November 2005 when confidential reports by American embassy officials in Abuja indicated that the Obasanjo government was speedily losing control of the delta to emergent youth militias.

MEND’s shock tactics yielded dividends initially. Chevron and Shell officials had backed military attacks on local communities all through the 1990s, insisting that their business interests obliged them to offer logistical and financial support to Nigerian troops in their ‘legitimate’ effort to protect the delta oil fields from ‘miscreants.’ But as attacks on its facilities in the western delta accelerated in 2003-2004, resulting in the killing of company workers (three Nigerians, two Americans and their guards), shutting down 140,000 barrels of daily production, and hitting a peak in April 2006, Chevron executives in California began to rethink their martial policy, and subsequently made the unprecedented statement that the company was not in support of military solutions in efforts to restore peace in the Niger Delta.

They also quickly unfurled a ‘new’ Global Memorandum of Understanding, which they promised would tackle development problems in the impoverished communities with renewed vigour. Fred Nelson, head of Chevron’s West Africa operations, told journalists in early June that ‘brute force does not work in the long term. Our strategy is dialogue with the communities to solve their problems. If we can solve their problems the security issue will go away.’[5] MEND’S spokes persons claimed this new pacific posture as a victory.

The militia has also carefully positioned itself to derive maximum mileage from the activities of other militant groups that although not as well-organised and politically coherent, nevertheless share similar grievances and regularly mount their own military attacks on oil company facilities and government troops. These fringe groups have a bewildering array of names, and forge alliances and coalitions as quickly as they dissolve them. Prominent are South-South Liberation Movement (SSLM), Movement for the Sovereign State of the Niger Delta (MSSND), DE Gbam, Niger Delta Vigilante, and Meninbutus, among others. Some of these groups stem from student cults that came into their own with the return of electoral politics in the late 1990s. Politicians in Rivers, Delta and Bayelsa state were quick to press them into service to leverage votes at gunpoint, a trend which subsequently spiralled into oil-bunkering ‘services,’ intimidation of fellow students in universities and other higher institutions all over the Niger Delta, and local community clashes in such areas as Ogoni, Okrika, and Kalabari.

MEND spokespersons regularly deplore the activities of these cults when they veer away from the explicitly political objective of advancing the cause of self-determination and equitable sharing of oil receipts, but are also quick to spring to their defence when soldiers and riot police attack them unjustly.

On July 1, the MEND-led Joint Revolutionary Council issued an ultimatum to President Obasanjo to hand over to it the Rivers State Commissioner of Police for ‘fair trial.’ The police had attacked and killed three Ijaw youth in Abonema town in the eastern delta who they subsequently claimed were cult members involved in raiding of commercial banks in Port Harcourt. MEND rejected this claim, insisting that the slain youth were Ijaw patriots who had ‘fallen in the field of battle.’ Four days after the expiration of the ultimatum, militants struck in the remote oil facility area of Sangana, and in a display of professionalism and bravado, abducted four naval ratings.

MEND’s military exploits have not dented the offensive capabilities of Nigeria’s armed forces. But they have demoralised the troops, and also forced local journalists and other public commentators to begin to ask questions regarding the combat-readiness and overall effectiveness of the Army and Navy.

Most importantly, MEND has transformed the image of the Ijaw, and indeed the entire local communities of the Niger Delta, from the hapless and quiescent victims popularised in the press, ever on the receiving end of atrocities deployed by the government and the oil companies, to an increasingly organised and assertive political bloc, able to hit back at their molesters.

• Dr Ike Okonta is a research fellow in contemporary African politics at the University of Oxford. He is co-author of Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights and Oil, Verso, New York, 2003.

• Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

References

[1] Ike Okonta, Interview with Mr X (not real name), one of the leaders of MEND, Warri, 17th August 2006
[2] See FNDIC, Pathway to the Council, handbook published by the FNDIC, July 2006. See also Constitutionality of the Ijaw Struggle, handbook published by the FNDIC, Warri, December 2005 for Oboko Bello’s version of events leading to the emergence of the Warri local government crisis of 1997. It is to be noted that Itsekiri leaders also have their own version of these events, diametrically opposed to Bello’s.
[3] Associated Press, ‘Nigerian Militants Release Last Hostages,’ 27 March, 2006.
[4] Ike Okonta, interview with Mr X and two other MEND militants, August 2006.
[5] Nigeria Today, ‘Chevron Against Use of force in the Niger Delta,’ 12 May, 2006.

The civil war in Angola ended in 2002. In this speech, given at Harvard University, Rafael Marques argues that the peace agreement signed in April 2002 has failed to promote democratic values or engage citizens in public affairs. Elections that the government promised the people since 1999 have not materialized. Instead, Angola is undergoing a process of commercialization as a substitute to democratization, writes Marques.

It is a privilege for me to be here at Harvard, a center of intellectual and scientific excellence. I am here simply as a student to have a conversation and share some ideas about Angola.

I am also in the US to learn from you about the merits of an open-minded and uncompromised debate about democracy, international relations and solidarity.

Currently, preparations are being made for the registration of voters in Angola, as a major leap forward towards the holding of elections in 2007, 2008 or 2009. There have been hints of elections ever since 1999.

These elections would be the second ever held in the country. The only other ones, the 1992 general elections, led to war breaking out again.

What is at stake at the moment is whether holding elections could be a measure of democratization for Angola or not? That is the first of several questions to be asked.

After a devastating 27-year conflict, a military peace deal signed in April 2002 has not been fostering the promotion of democratic values in society and engaging citizens in public affairs. Angola has been described as a “state without citizens.” Despite recent promises of increased transparency, accountability and democratization, little has yet been accomplished to bridge the gap between the rulers and the ruled. The underlying causes of this situation are many and interlinked. Political power is highly centralized and some would argue that historically this power was further consolidated through the control of resource flows by three institutions – the Presidency, the National Bank and SONANGOL, the national oil company.

The reality is of opportunity, but for whom? For those who hold power and sway, it means dividends from the privatization of the state, according to the hierarchy in the regime. For outsiders, it means a rush to promote their economic interests, cut new deals or explore new market opportunities.

This prompts the second question. What does the present situation mean for the majority of Angolans? Put in a different way, is the country just open for business or is there some scope for democracy as well?

What are the prospects of change, defining a new future for Angola? This is the third question I shall try to elaborate on as part of this conversation.

Electoral Democracy

The first indication of democracy in the country would be the establishment of checks and balances in the state institutions, as well as their openness to public scrutiny. This is essential for the process of nation-building,

To demonstrate the absurd contradictions of the system, justice is still administered through the former colonial Portuguese Penal Code of 1886. Portugal itself has reformed the Penal Code a number of times since then.

Many of the state institutions have not been altered to fit the new political system. For instance, the office of the Attorney-General is still governed by a one-party Marxist-Leninist law (cf Law 5/90, of 5 April) to safeguard not democracy but the “socialist legality”. This office is, by law, under the presidency and the President of the Republic gives direct instructions to the Attorney-General, which must be complied with in accordance with article 5, clause 2, of law 5/90.

Unfortunately, this situation, which is unconstitutional, cannot be challenged in court. The Constitutional Court, which is required to safeguard the Constitution, has not been established since 1992. Three members of the Constitutional Court are supposed to be elected by a two-thirds majority of Members of Parliament(article 135, clause 1b). The ruling MPLA does not have such a two-thirds majority and has found it risky to bring up the issue because it might wake up the opposition.

So far, the judges of the Supreme Court, appointed by the President of the Republic, perform the duties of the Constitutional Court in violation of the Constitution. The vice-president of the Supreme Court, Mr. Caetano de Sousa, is also currently the head of the National Electoral Commission, appointed by the President of the Republic.

On July 22, 2005, the Supreme Court decided that the President has been performing interim duties since 1992, the year he failed to win in the polls. Back then the second round of the presidential elections never took place because war broke out again. As such, none of his periods as President count. So, after 25 uninterrupted years in power, he can run again for three more consecutive periods.

Another important aspect to take into account is the effectively subordinate role of the National Electoral Commission, which also includes opposition members, in relation to the Inter-Ministerial Commission for Elections, all of whose members come from the MPLA government.

And why does the opposition not rally behind the issue? As I speak, the 220 parliamentarians, whose constitutional mandates expired 10 years ago, are lavishing upon themselves luxury cars of their own choice from a special budget of over US$16.5 million which they granted to themselves.

Moreover, some of the main opposition parties represented in Parliament, like UNITA, PRS and PLD, also hold ministerial portfolios in the government and the due privileges. That’s how the patronage system works. The political opposition becomes part of the problem and not of the solution.

Along with the control of the judicial power by the political powers comes control of the State media, which comprises the only radio and TV broadcasters with national coverage and the only daily newspaper in the country. The Minister of Information, from the MPLA, also heads the National Radio of Angola. I worked for the state media, and I can say from experience that there was more room for some innocuous criticism 12 years ago than there is today. These media outlets only reproduce the orders of the political establishment.

The six privately owned weekly newspapers, as critical as they are, remain ineffective in expressing the thoughts and wishes of the majority. They circulate almost exclusively in the capital, Luanda, at an average price of US$2.50 for a 24-page tabloid, which is too expensive for the average citizen. Altogether these papers only print up to 25,000 copies per week, while there are over four million people living in the capital alone.

Both the judiciary and the media are fundamental to the exercise of democracy, one by upholding the rule of the law and the other to serve as a vehicle for freedom of expression. But they are, in fact, instruments of partisanship.

Moreover, the regime has produced a state class, in which figures of the ruling MPLA accumulate wealth rapidly by robbing the state coffers. That’s how the President’s family, without a record of labour, has amassed a vast fortune and is a major shareholder in the telecommunications, banking, mining and other most profitable enterprises. Other high-ranking families of the regime are also entitled to such fortunes.

These brief examples illustrate that the time of peace is being used neither for serious institutional reform nor to establish a proper transitional platform to a fully fledged democracy. To put it simply, there are no functioning institutions for the formal democratic participation of citizens.

How can elections change this state of affairs? The absence of a transitional mechanism, to mitigate abuses of power, leaves little room for peaceful change and risks a showdown between the government and the people for lack of alternative and buffer institutions.

The Power of Oil

Any change will put at risk not just the ruling party, but the business interests of the state class, who are the partners for foreign governments and enterprises in oil, diamonds, construction, etc. Foreign interests fight for privileged access to the state class.

The interests of the Presidential family in remaining in power, to safeguard their business interests, coincide, for instance, with the US policy to ensure stability and safeguard a continuous flow of Angolan oil into the US. By 2007, Angola’s oil output is forecast to surpass 2 million barrels a day and continue to increase until 2010.

The international view of Angola has been narrowed down to business interests. Angola is undergoing a process of commercialization as a substitute to democratization.

International pressure has mainly been self-serving and the call for good governance has focused more on issues of transparency and an improved climate for foreign investment than on poverty alleviation and democratization. Countries with a strategic interest in Angolan oil, especially China, have been willing to provide Angola with concessional, oil-backed loans, which carry no conditions on improved governance.

In the past, the US led Western countries in fomenting guerrilla warfare in the country in the name of a global fight against communism while, at the same time, allowing Cuban soldiers to guard Chevron oil facilities. Then it switched sides to annihilate the guerrillas in the name of helping to achieve peace and democracy.

Such international leverage in the country’s affairs has robbed the people of external solidarity in the fight for change. Reality shows that it is all about access to the country’s natural resources and profitable dealings. In 2005 Angola could boast the highest rate of growth in Gross Domestic Product in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) area (if not all of Africa), according to IMF figures. In stark contrast, Angola has some of the worst poverty levels in Africa. Last year Angola was ranked 160 out of 177 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index. According to the statistics, 67% of the population lives below the poverty line. Of those living in rural areas, 90% are estimated to live below the poverty line. Illiteracy and infant and maternal mortality rates are very high. The shares of the government budget allocated to health (4.4% in 2006) and education (3.8%) are lower than average in the SADC area and have declined steadily since 2004. In general, there has been a bias against spending on initiatives to improve broad-based primary education and primary health care.

In principle, elections will not provide people with alternative choices because the political opposition is either incorporated into the system, tamed or too marginal to have the resources and the ability to make itself known to a wider audience. This explains why the pressure for elections from civic organizations and society at large has gone quiet.

Thus the holding of elections will by no means be a measure for democracy. The regime has already prepared itself for an eventual alternative, which it calls an agenda of national consensus. From time to time, when pressure mounts, it takes it out of its pocket to lure people into an idea of broad dialogue to give a new direction to the country.

For there to be a space for democracy, Angolans have to find a more balanced and sustainable way of dealing with the openness to foreign investors, which is used as an international public relations tool to re-legitimize the regime and dodge the pressing need for dialogue on the country’s situation.

We must be forceful in explaining that one issue must not obscure the other. We must have them both, and democracy should be a priority to establish the rule of law that turns the institutions of state into the safe keepers of transparency, fair competition and greater safety for foreign investments. Currently, businesses have to rely on powerful individuals for protection, but sooner or later this will come to an end.

Prospects of Change

As a citizen, I always wonder why my political leaders always prefer to take the most difficult and treacherous routes of war, violence, corruption and denial to govern the country?

My country is drifting towards a political dead end. The growing detachment between the rulers and the ruled, in the formation of the state class, can only lead to profound resentment and an unpredictable outcome.

Dialogue and compassion are not new ideas, but that’s what Angolans have always needed most from their rulers, and been denied.

There must be the political will by the regime to open up and allow the establishment of a “state of citizens” as the best option to avoid the perils of anarchy, for its own good and because time is running out.

Thank you to the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program and its co-sponsors. And thanks to the Northcote Parkinson Fund for sponsoring my trip here as part of the Civil Courage Prize.

• Rafael Marques de Morais, an Angolan journalist and a human rights activist, is the winner of the 2006 Civil Courage Prize.

• Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Elections are due to be held in Nigeria in April 2007. Emman Ozoemena points out that as the elections get closer, “it is important to note that there is need for key actors to learn how to manage contestations for power in such a way as to ensure that the nation comes out of this season unscathed as one indivisible entity that cares for the poor and excluded in our society.”

For those who can hear very well, the drumbeat signaling the 2007 election is increasing in tempo each passing day. The signs of impending elections, usually characterised by electioneering campaigns and political activities are in the air across the country. For most citizens, the ubiquitous posters of aspirants, media appearances, and visits to communities by vote-seeking politicians are indicators for the approaching elections. Just like the hoofbeats of horses in war times, the harder the noise, the more obvious it is to see that it is yet another election year.

In the midst of all this, some die-hard pessimists and non-tough minded optimists (and if you may merchants of crises) are busy inventing webs and spins that cast doubts over the possibility of elections next year. Some months ago, new fears crept into the nation’s political circles under different euphemisms. They were crafted by professionals who know how to stalk fear in the system.

Just after the third term imbroglio failed the Interim National Government (ING), a hoax surfaced on the nation’s political scene. Like any political currency, speculations trailed this hoax while denials and counter-denials followed. What made it rather curious was that the alleged purveyors of the ING option were men not given to idle talk. Take Dr. Chukwuemeka Ezeife, for instance. He was associated with the ING idea. He is a serious minded fellow, though he later vehemently denied being involved with the ING option. I believe no progressive politician would ever fall for such an inane thought as ING. Then enter Chief Sunny Okogwu, the avid public commentator. He was also reported to have canvassed for the ING idea in media reports. Aside from the two, swarms of voices joined in the debate for desirability or otherwise of ING in Nigeria.

But then, just like a well orchestrated drama, the focus shifted to the imbroglio in the Presidency leading to PTDFgate. This further polarized the polity into three identifiable camps namely ‘President Obasanjo Supporters’, ‘Vice President Atiku Supporters’ and the ‘Obasanjo-Atiku Must Resign Campaigners’. The EFFC Report that followed PTDFgate jolted the political landscape with every politician “taking cover” for his life as Mallam Nuhu Ribadu led an anti-graft commission, releasing damming score cards on public officials whom we elected to keep public trust.

Finally, we have the current impeachment spree that now looms over some states. Chief executives and the lawmakers are slugging it out with the Judiciary waiting in the wings to either remain the unbiased arbiter or be consumed in the ambition of its members to climb to the exalted seat of acting Chief Judge without due process. There is a daily increase in the number of political actors, NGOs and campaign organizations who have reportedly made their positions on the issue public.

But, then we should ask; what is at the heart of the issue? What do the people of Nigeria want? Does the posturing of the political class and/or the power elite represent the heartbeat of the citizens? Are there verifiable indicators that Nigerians are ready for elections in 2007? Are members of the political class laying booby traps to truncate the process? The fear being expressed by many is that if care is not taken, the ghosts responsible for failure of the nation’s electoral process in the past may be back to foist on us once again the “never-ending transition programme”.

It is important for us to ask ourselves where we want to be six months into our journey to democracy. This question is becoming a stark reality given the events of the past weeks, which have stirred up the collective indignation the citizens. What expectations would the 2007 elections deliver for the electorate? The questions are endless. As we review the emerging scenarios in the country, it is important to know that there is no choice facing the country other than for us to make up our minds that it is the process of democracy in action.

A similar situation happened in the United States of America between 1963 and 1973 - “the decade of tensions” in American history, similar to the civil war year during the 19th century. Owing to the unfortunate assassination of President John F. Kennedy in May 1963, Vice President Lyndon Johnson took over as President for the remainder of Kennedy’s term. When the term ended in 1964, Johnson contested as the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate and won the election. The United States Constitution allowed him to run for two terms of four years each in his own right. So though Johnson was eligible to run again in 1968 presidential election, within the ruling party, the Democratic Party there was an intractable internal crises. Some wanted the President to seek re-election, while others thought otherwise. The camps within the party were divided amongst supporters of Johnson and his ardent opponent Senator Eugene McCarthy, who decided to put up strong resistance to the president’s dream for a second term.

As power elites within the party impressed on President Johnson to break his silence on the re-election bid, he responded in an unprecedented way by backing down on his ambition for a second term. Instead, he lined up behind another candidate for the top job, the brother of JFK, Senator Robert Kennedy. With this development, Robert and McCarthy had to slug it out at the Democratic Party’s convention in 1968. But then Robert Kennedy, was assassinated in Los Angles by a young Syrian Immigrant, Sirhan Sirhan while on a victory party after the California primaries. The Johnson camp reached out and produced another candidate, Hubert Humphrey, the vice president at the time.

The Democratic Party lost the 1968 election to Richard Nixon, the Republican Party candidate. Nixon had previously lost the presidential election to President J.F Kennedy in 1959 in a narrow victory. Most historiographers have rightly described this period as the “season of tempest” in American history.

Are there lessons to learn from the American experience in managing an open political field? For those who take time to study democratic movements one thing that stands out is that election years in which an incumbent president is not seeking re-election, are usually tension soaked.

For the purpose of this treatise, we must explain the “Open Field Phenomenon”. This is when an election year involving the incumbent president or president who has served out his or her term and who is therefore barred by the constitution from running in another election. When attempts to amend the 1999 Constitution failed on May 16, the presidency of Nigeria technically speaking became open beginning from May 27 2006. Naturally, this created a scenario where contenders for the Presidential race worked hard selling their programmes and manifestos to Nigerians. The political firmament was filled with new tensions arising from struggles for space by a legion of aspirants. This could be rightly described as politics of succession.

Nigeria is standing at a critical stage in her political development. The outcome of the 2007 elections will impact greatly on the nation’s ability to develop a democratic culture. The army of aspirants at the national and state levels aspiring to run for elections are indicative of renewed interest and faith in the system by the people, and a strong indication that democracy is on course in Nigeria. The incumbent president and 58% of current governors are not candidates for the elections. Fresh hands are taking part in the contest.

Add to this that the number of aspirant state governors have considerably increased from the number in the 1999 and 2003 elections. With the expanded space, do we assume that aspirants now have more platforms to run from, or do we assume that they would want to operate largely from the point of aligning themselves with the winning political party? There is the temptation to ask why most aspirants want to run on tickets of the ruling party. The bandwagon effect of “join the winning party” is a common phenomenon which demands our attention.

We are then posed with the challenge of how to resolve the internal crisis and leadership tussle in the parties. The ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the opposition parties are all factionalized and crisis-ridden. How this impacts on the polity ahead of 2007 is open to conjecture. Even the newly registered political parties, which their leaders initially were operating as private estates, are not exempt from internal bickering.

There is no doubt that political parties in Nigeria operate poor internal governance mechanisms. The leadership exercise power arbitrarily, excluding members on key decisions. This is one area that requires serious work by the political class and the electorates, if we want democracy to grow in the country. Party leaderships must be accountable to their members if democracy will be deepened in Nigeria. Without mincing words, most parties were built on faulty foundations with no binding principles and ideology. This type of hollow politics concomitantly translates into what we have today, politics driven by desire for power, not issue driven politics that seek to either provide leadership or alternative and credible opposition. If anyone dared conduct a survey on the nation’s political class on the core ideology of governance, chances are that the result would be zero.

What emerges in the media is that most aspirants are yet to come to terms with what constitutes campaign issues, especially around development and the core expectations of the people. It was funny hearing some aspirants to the presidency simply muttering the trite cliché: “If elected I shall continue with Mr. President’s economic reform agenda”. I chuckled listening to a front runner presidential aspirant saying that he intends to be committed to President Obasanjo’s economic reform agenda, as if the Reform Agenda is a magic wand that would sway votes to his side.

As we get closer to the 2007 elections, it is important to note that there is a need for key actors to learn how to manage contestations for power in such a way as to ensure that the nation comes out of this season unscathed, and as one indivisible entity that cares for the poor and excluded in our society. There are several lessons to learn from the US political history of the late 1960s as we approach 2007 elections.

• Emman Ozoemena, a Public Policy Analyst is based in Abuja. He can be reached on [email][email protected]

• Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

What Reverend Mmoja Ajabu misses in his letter () to the editor is that Government Ministers in Zimbabwe have publicly said that the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe are a non-event. The West is imposing sanctions so that ZANU [PF] governs the people of Zimbawe democratically. I am sure in the end democracy will prevail in Zimbabwe.The reverend should also know that ZANU [PF] blames the MDC for sanctions in order to divert the people of Zimbabwe from the real issues.

The article, ‘Madonna and David’( is a comprehensive discussion of social issues raised by an inter-continental adoption. There are value judgments made in the press and across the internet about the relative moral worth of the materialistic Western culture the boy will be raised in, versus the simpler and mythically uncorrupted lifestyle of the indigenous African. So long as these arguments remain at the level of "talking heads", there is probably no reason for concern. However, one assumes that Madonna will share the responsibility for caring for the child with nannies and tutors who might not be so discerning. I'd feel terrible sadness for a child who was taught to yearn for a romanticized paradise were he ever to dare to complain about London traffic noise or Washington politics.

First of all, I would like to thank you for the good job that you are doing, which a lot of people appreciate and find useful. The Somali Human Rights Action (SHRA), which I am the chairman of, is a grassroots organization working in the central regions of the country, particularly the Hiran Region and the capital city of Somalia, Mogadishu. The SHRA is a non-political and non-profit making organisation.

As much as we appreciate your efforts to highlight what is going on in Somalia, we feel that you are not talking much about the actual situation on the ground. Further, it seems as if most of your articles do not consider the history of Somalia when analysing the political situation.

We believe that there are very important historical factors that are necessary to include in the analysis of the political situation in Somalia. In addition, we believe that it is important to communicate these factors to the world.

In closing, I would like to caution you that the situation in Somalia may spread to other African countries, or the entire Horn of Africa.

Keep up the good work!

Editors reply: Thank you for your kind words. We would welcome articles from you or those you work with who might help overcome some of these limitations.

The Government should put in place a system to prosecute individuals who misuse Universal Primary Education (UPE) funds, development partners said yesterday. USAID deputy mission director Elzadia washington said although the Government had recognised education as productive for the future of Ugandans, the sector suffered from corruption, including ghost teachers and pupils.

After the formal greetings and a string of political and international organisation figures lining up to express their good intentions towards communication for development, the World Congress on the Communication for Development (WCCD) really got started with a session explaining what the goals of the congress were.

Bwinja Bwinja points his digital camera at a ripped election poster of presidential hopeful Jean-Pierre Bemba and snaps away. The 12-year-old boy's camera has given him a special role in the Democratic Republic of Congo's historic election. At night he sleeps with his 10 brothers and sisters in a freight container and an old bus burned and caked in lava from a 2002 eruption of the nearby Niyarongo volcano in this eastern Congolese city.