The FDC in Uganda has pleaded with the government to stop its functionaries from harassing witnesses who have sworn affidavits supporting Dr Kizza Besigye's petition against President Museveni's re-election. "Our witnesses particularly the soldiers, are being terrorised and hunted. Those who have sworn affidavits are being harassed yet they are also Ugandans and voters," FDC spokesperson Mr Wafula Oguttu told journalists yesterday at the party's head office in Najjanankumbi, Kampala. "We have chosen legal ways of fighting our political wars and government should not deny us that chance," Oguttu pleaded. "Let witnesses present their side and let government challenge them."

The European Union has issued its final report on last May's elections in Ethiopia. According to the report, the 2005 parliamentary elections were the most competitive elections Ethiopia had experienced, with an unprecedented high voter turnout. However, it said, while the pre-election period saw largely orderly manner, the counting and aggregation process were marred by irregular practices, confusion and lack of transparency. The report noted that subsequent complaints and appeals mechanisms did not provide an effective remedy. The human rights situation rapidly deteriorated in the post-election day period when dozens of citizens were killed by the police and thousands were arrested, it said.

The World Bank has approved US$120.6 million (Sh8.68 billion) aid to Kenya under its trade and transport facilitation project. The project will fund implementation of the East African Community Customs Union and provide institutional backing for transport. Finance ministry Permanent Secretary Joseph Kinyua said the funding, approved last month, would make it cheaper for businesses to operate in the country through improved transport network and simpler customs procedures. Kenya got the lion's share of the US$184 million World Bank's kitty for the three East African countries, with Uganda receiving US$26.4 million and Tanzania US$37 million.

Daggers are drawn ahead of the state reopening of parliament after a five-month recess, one of the longest in Kenya's history. Cabinet ministers and government-friendly MPs dug in to do battle with an opposition that has sworn to scuttle the state agenda in the house. Parliament is deeply divided over corruption - specifically, the Sh7 billion twin Anglo Leasing scandals - the stalled Constitution review, the raid on the Standard Group and presence of alleged mercenaries in the country.

Kenya's former ethics permanent secretary John Githongo now says there is more on the Anglo Leasing scandal that is yet to be revealed. "It's not over. It's just starting. Right now about 30 per cent has come out," Mr Githongo said of the mega-corruption scandal that has shaken the Narc Government to its very core, forcing the resignation of two Cabinet ministers. He made the revelation during an interview with The New York Times, which was published on Saturday. In a separate interview with The Guardian, Githongo called on the UK authorities to launch a full investigation into a number of British businessmen, whose multi-million dollar contracts are at the centre of Kenya's latest corruption scandal.

In anticipation of the Paris Club’s upcoming “celebration” of its 50th birthday, the US-based network “New Rules for Global Finance” has called on Nigeria’s President Obasanjo and the African Union to support a change of venue for Paris Club negotiations. Put simply, future Paris Club debt negotiations should take place in the debtor country, say New Rules. This will help reorder the negotiating balance between debtor and creditor.

A second “Decade for Education in Africa” is to be launched in 2006 to push forward the momentum of Education for All on the continent. “I hope that this Decade will allow us to make considerable progress in education, especially pan-African education,” says Alpha Oumar Konaré, Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union. As a prelude to this Decade, education and culture were high on the agenda for the African Heads of State participating in the 6th African Union Summit in Khartoum, Sudan on 23-24 January.

Nearly 1,000 Egyptian judges held a half-hour silent protest Friday (March 17) to demonstrate for full judicial independence and against the government's order to interrogate six of their colleagues who criticized recent elections. The justices, wearing the red and green sashes of their profession, gathered outside their professional association, the Judges' Club, in downtown Cairo ahead of an extraordinary general assembly to discuss their grievances.

A Press Statement by Transparency International has lauded recent moves taken by President Biya to combat embezzlement. The global civil society organisation that is leading the fight against corruption, Transparency International (TI) has qualified recent moves to combat corruption in Cameroon as the steps that will "deter future cases of illicit enrichment in the country".

FEATURE: The Ethiopian government needs to tune into the voice of its people
COMMENT AND ANALYSIS:
- Misogynists take to the African blogosphere
- Crunching the numbers from the Ugandan elections result
- Peace in Southern Sudan: What’s changed for women?
- Families wait to bury loved ones three months after Cairo refugee massacre
LETTERS: On China, Islam and women’s rights
PAN-AFRICAN POSTCARD: A Meeting is underway in Beirut to review the Global Call to Action Against Poverty
BLOGGING AFRICA: Our weekly review of the African blogosphere
CONFLICT AND EMERGENCIES: Chad foils coup plot
HUMAN RIGHTS: Sudan court unable to try Darfur suspects
WOMEN AND GENDER: The battle for political representation in Kenya
REFUGEES AND FORCED MIGRATION: UNHCR to seek private support?
ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE: Pressure mounts on Kibaki’s government to resign
DEVELOPMENT: World Bank pulls out of privatisation in Uganda
CORRUPTION: The scam of offshore looting
HEALTH AND HIV/AIDS: Incentives proposed for drugs needed by poor nations
ENVIRONMENT: World Bank admits failures in forest protection
MEDIA AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: Ugandan government threatens free press
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If democracy is only about contestation between political parties then the elite consensus that the recent election constitutes further maturation into a free, fair and peaceful democracy is largely valid. But if democracy is understood to include the right to express dissent outside of electoral participation, and if the freedom and fairness of electoral processes is understood to require free political activity outside of party politics, then there are less grounds for optimism, begins this article from the website of the Centre for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

On Friday 30, December 2005, Egyptian security police brutally broke up a three-month sit-in protest being held by Sudanese refugees in Cairo, killing 30. As detailed in an October 2005 Pambazuka News article (http://www.pambazuka.org/index.php?id=29957) the refugees were protesting against their appalling conditions and the constant abuse of their rights and had camped out near the Cairo office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), demanding protection from forced repatriation and protection of vulnerable groups. Three months after the massacre, writes Barbara E. Harrell-Bond, families of the dead are still waiting to bury their loved ones.

What is happening with the bodies of those who were killed in the 30 December 2005 violent expulsion of the three-month peaceful protest aimed at the UN High Commission for Refugees in front of their Cairo offices at the Mustafa Mahmoud Park? To date, there is no evidence of any of the 29 families having lost a loved one, being successful in receiving the body from the government morgue authorities to complete the burial, either in Cairo or back in Sudan. The bodies are slowly decomposing in the central government morgue while distraught family members struggle to obtain some sense of closure in order to move forward in their grieving process.

There were understandable delays in identifying bodies and conducting autopsies. Then, because of rumours among the refugees of organ ‘snatching’, the Sudan government and the SPLM demanded they be allowed to conduct their own investigation. But there has been no public account of their findings. Still the bodies have not been released. For those yet looking for loved ones, they are no longer allowed to enter the morgue, but are shown pictures of bodies yet unidentified.

Mr. Phillip Dominic is the maternal uncle and primary relative of one of the deceased, Colletta Pashikfofe. Her relatives, a mother and brother, want her body to be buried in the Sudan. However, Colletta’s body remains in the morgue after a series of grisly experiences.

Phillip obtained funds from an Egyptian to pay the plane ticket and to have an undertaker preserve the body and prepare it for transport in a sealed casket. He accessed all the necessary documents:

- A death certificate (with no cause of death listed).
- A letter of permission from the Ministry of Health to transport the body to Sudan and confirming Phillip’s authorization as the closest living relative in Cairo to receive the body.
- A letter from the Foreign Affairs Ministry sent from Khartoum via the Sudanese Embassy in Cairo providing permission for Colletta’s body to enter Sudan.
- A document from the Ministry of Justice to confirm again that Phillip is the legal guardian of Colletta’s body and confirming that he officially took possession of the body Friday the 3rd of Feb. 2006.

He was on the way to the airport on that day with the undertaker and Colletta’s body when he was contacted by Mohamed Darwish, a 3 star police officer/general from the Zenhom station just across from the morgue. He was told that he must return immediately with Colletta’s body to the Zenhom morgue and that this order had been received “from above”. He returned as instructed at which point Mohamed Darwish signed the body back into the morgue, essentially putting a “hold” on the body, apparently preventing Phillip from receiving it again.

Phillip at this point went to the Sudanese Embassy requesting assistance and eventually went back to Zenhom on the 9th and 10th February along with the undertaker. He was told by morgue authorities that he had to go to the Interior Ministry in order to obtain a letter to have the hold released. He was also told to go to the police at Zenhom and discuss the matter directly with Darwish, who originally placed the hold.

He did so, only to find no one available, apparently due to a football match. He was told by the airlines that the ticket he purchased would expire so he was hoping to resolve the matter. He has been told by morgue authorities that he should try to convince the airline to extend the ticket until Sunday 12 February and that perhaps the matter would be resolved on the Saturday.

Phillip has been back to the morgue, to the UNHCR, and to the Sudanese Embassy on an almost daily basis since mid February. He had to change the details on his authorization letter from the Sudanese Embassy, which he did successfully, after initially having difficulties. He had to obtain a letter from UNHCR which he eventually did. However, his tireless efforts to receive Coletta’s body for transport back to Sudan, even to bury locally, appear not to have yielded any positive results.

The morgue authorities/police posted at the morgue, reportedly stated on 26 February that he could not receive the body for transport back to Sudan because they had not received authorization to release the bodies “from a higher authority”.

Phillip decided (as several other family members have now done), that he had been through enough and that, despite other family member’s wishes to the contrary, he would bury Coletta’s body locally. He assumed that morgue authorities would release the body immediately once he agreed to this. Instead they reportedly told him that he must obtain confirmation from religious figures that he would have a ceremony and burial locally. He did so with church officials confirming his intent to morgue authorities. Following this the authorities again replied that they were sorry but they did not have the authorization required to release Coletta’s body to him, even for local burial.

Phillip tried to participate in a prayer gathering at the morgue for the deceased, however, they were not allowed to gather, with police apparently fearing potential violence. Although the details are unique, in many ways it is representative of similar troubles that other families have also faced during this difficult process of attempting to bury their loved ones since 30th December 2005.

UPDATE: Per my conversations with a few of the family members, and other second hand reports, I understand that funerals did take place over at least 2 days last week, starting mid week. Apparently 8 bodies were buried initially and another 6 the next day. Additional funerals may have taken place over the weekend that I am not aware of.

Apparently representatives from both the Sudanese Embassy and Egyptian Government accompanied the bodies from the Zenholm morgue to graveside in order to ensure that there were no detours to have secondary medical opinions on cause of death (as some family members had requested originally). To date, only death certificates with the section on cause of death left blank have been issued to the families.

Some family members asked the Sudanese and Egyptian officials whose decision it was to prevent the bodies from returning to Sudan, as the government officials from the Sudanese Embassy have been apparently telling the family members that it is the decision of the Egyptian Government. However the Egyptian Government officials have apparently been telling the family members that it was the decision of the Sudanese Government. In response to such questions in the presence of representatives from both governments, the family members were apparently told to stop asking questions least they not be allowed to bury their loved ones at all.

It appears that many of the bodies still have not been buried. Phillip has not yet buried Colletta, but plans to try to do so by Tuesday of this week. Almost all of the family members whom I am in contact with have now collected their 5,700 LE from CARITAS. Average local funeral costs are apparently in the range of 300-500, with the remaining funds being seen as "compensation" for what the families have endured (no matter how grossly inadequate).

* This article was compiled from reports from AMERA-Egypt, a refugee legal aid NGO, operating as a branch of the AMERA UK Charity. Barbara E. Harrell-Bond is distinguished Visiting Professor, Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Programme, American University in Cairo.

Democracy in Uganda is not set up for fair participation, or even for equality, argues Dickson Ogolla. He says political statistics are not the only confusing things in Uganda; it is a place where most numbers don’t always make sense to everyone.

Ugandans went to the polls three weeks ago, the country’s first multiparty election since President Yoweri Museveni came to power at the head of a guerrilla army in January 1986. They were, however, the country’s third general elections, the previous two having been held under a “no party” system, in which political parties were severely restricted, and not allowed to field candidates or run on a partisan platform.

In the end, Museveni won with 59 per cent of the vote. His main challenger, Dr Kizza Besigye, got 37 per cent, while Ssebaana Kizito managed 1.5 percent. Independent candidate Abed Bwanika got 0.9 per cent and Miria Obote, former President Milton Obote’s widow, who became the country’s first female presidential candidate, scraped 0.8 per cent.

For an external observer interested in more than just who the winner would be, the bigger story about the latest election in Uganda is elsewhere. First, for a country that has a population growth rate of 3.4 per cent per year, the least one would expect is a similar growth in the population of those who want to participate in electing her government. Instead, the Uganda voter register has shrunk by 350,000 voters since the 2001 general election, to 10.4 million.

The shrinking can be explained, but not the lack of growth. In 2001 there were allegations of ghost voters. Indeed, the electoral register was cleaned, so the number of voters on the roll came down. So while this gives us an explanation of the shrinkage of the register, it does not shed any light on why it has remained stagnant. Statistically, the voter roll should have grown by at least 17 per cent, meaning there should have been 12.5 million registered voters. The point is that even before the February 23 election, 2 million people had been disenfranchised, and the burden of representation multiplied. The turn-out of 7 million, or 68.6 per cent, of the registered voters further implies that another 3 million people did not participate.

The problem, however, seems to run much deeper. Democracy in Uganda is not set up for fair participation, or even for equality; it’s heavily weighted. One in every five voters comes from four districts - Kampala, Wakiso, Masaka and Mukono, all in the central region. But the average vote per polling station in these four districts is way below the national average, thus a measure of central tendency does not even begin to describe the lack of even spread of the vote. The skew is obvious and worrying. Ideally, each polling station should reflect the national average.

The total votes of all the four districts is much higher than all the votes from the northern region. With this kind of situation, who needs the north? It is instructive that that’s where Besigye beat Museveni with a wide margin.

An even more interesting statistic is that the number of registered voters in Uganda is not much different from that of Kenya, yet Kenya has on the minimum 6 million more people than Uganda - Kenya’s population is about 33 million compared to Uganda’s 27 million (UN, 2005). The age distribution is the same in both countries, with 55 per cent falling below 18 years, the voting age.

Is it that that there are underage or ghost voters in Uganda’s register? Is it that Kenyans are less interested in registering to vote, and Ugandans are far more zealous? Such is the internal contradiction of Uganda’s statistical politics, and it partly explains why the Electoral Commission could, when it was announcing results, confidently state at one point that with 80 per cent of the constituencies counted only 55 per cent of the votes were in, and Museveni had 63 per cent of these votes. At that point, an independent tally centre at The Monitor, which was subsequently banned, was showing a close race: 52 per cent for Museveni and 45 per cent for Besigye.

All this begs the question of whether the elections were rigged. It depends on who you ask. All the independent media were in agreement that they would be rigged even if the only evidence they adduced was that of alleged previous rigging in 2001.

In the end, the Daily Monitor independent tally centre had Museveni winning with a smaller margin - 51.6 per cent, versus Besigye’s 45.6 per cent. These were interim and inconclusive results since the government security forces closed down the centre and intimidated everybody else into not announcing anything other than the results being given by the Electoral Commission. Of course there was the usual vote buying, voter intimidation and outright vote theft in some polling stations. All these under the glare of international press and election observers.

It is amazing how a strong force of 40,000 election monitors - one for every 25 voters, and two per presiding officer - could not do much, with the sole exception of DemGroup, a consortium of local Ugandan NGOs. Otherwise, the Commonwealth and European Union were quick to make their call. Their verdict? The elections were generally peaceful.

Political statistics are not the only confusing things in Uganda. It is a place where most numbers don’t always make sense to everyone. One of Museveni’s “success” stories is his government’s success in reversing the march of HIV/Aids. The Aids infection rates are allegedly down from nearly 30 per cent (in the early nineties) to 6 per cent. However, the only scientific measure of safe sex - fertility rates - has gone up from 4.7 to 6.1 per cent. This means people are having more unprotected sex yet infection rates are coming down! Either the numbers are lying or there is a secret somewhere.

The other statistical puzzle is the economy. With GDP growth rates averaging 6 per cent per year for the past 20 years, Uganda is nowhere near achieving any meaningful development. This is little wonder, because a closer look reveals a big economic lie. In the past 20 years, the economy has failed to generate any real production either in agriculture or in manufacturing. Investment in infrastructure has not been sustained and the road network has almost collapsed. Now the country is plagued by load shedding (power rationing). Power generation at Jinja is down from 350mw to 140mw, a 60 per cent reduction. Because industrial demand wasn’t at significantly high levels, the country never felt the need to diversify from over-reliance on hydropower as its single source for energy. With Lake Victoria water levels plunging dramatically, it now faces a crisis for which it doesn’t have a quick solution.

Until about four years ago, Uganda was billed as one of Africa’s “economic success” stories by Western donors. A closer look reveals a more mixed picture. The economy is composed of 31.1 per cent agriculture, 22.2 per cent industry and 46.9 per cent services. Agriculture also employs 82 per cent of the country’s labour. What the numbers don’t tell you is that agriculture is largely subsistence and for food security.

Industry is mostly food processing (sugar and brewing), and a large proportion of those in what is described as “service” are either selling beer or riding boda boda (moped taxis). Those involved in real production are few and the service sector is merely a vehicle of transfer earnings. The large size of the service sector also means that income inequities are extremely high.

Today, just over 38 per cent of Ugandans live below the poverty line, up from 35 per cent in the ‘90s. The lowest 10 per cent of the population have only 4 per cent share of the household income, and the highest 10 per cent have almost a quarter of the household income share. No official figures are available on unemployment; just as well. Urban unemployment is estimated at over 60 per cent while underemployment or disguised unemployment stalks the rural folk.

So don’t swoon by high-sounding statistics. The GDP growth rate (9 per cent), the inflation rate (9.7 per cent) and so forth. You are better of remembering that the public debt stands at two thirds of the GDP!

The one success story most people seem to agree on is Universal Primary Education (UPE). This has worked, increasing the number of children enrolled in schools by millions. Those enrolled by end of 2004 stood at 7.3 million, up from 6.8 million in 2001. The number of primary school teachers has also increased to 10,876 from 9,187 in the same period. What does this mean for the quality of primary education? The pupil-teacher ratio is down to 50 from 54, the pupil-classroom ratio is also down to 79 from 90, but has quality improved? The gross and net primary school intake ratios (initial enrolment vs retention) have plummeted (down 24 per cent and 21 per cent respectively). Perhaps household poverty is causing huge drop-out rates, thus making the teacher and classroom ratios look good.

The UPE success, however, has created a new headache. What happens post UPE? Only 9.5 per cent of those who enroll for primary education get to secondary education. Post-primary education has become naturally too expensive, what with very high demand and no expansion on physical facilities. The result is a very expansive and privatised post-primary education.

In the meantime, with that problem unresolved, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) is proposing Universal Secondary Education from 2008. Besigye’s Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) and others have no proposal. In terms of broad education reform, there is no policy debate in Uganda although everyone acknowledges the difficulties.

So with shrinking democracy and an economy that flatters to deceive, what choices did Ugandans have in the just-concluded elections? Statistically, five: NRM’s President Yoweri Museneveni, FDC’s Dr Kizza Besigye, Democratic Party’s Mr Sebaana Kizito, Uganda People’s Congress’ Mrs Miria Obote and an independent, Mr Abed Bwanika. However, the contest was for all intents and purposes down to two candidates - the present NRM leader Museveni, and a former NRM ideologue and minister Besigye.

The once strong historical parties DP and UPC had no chance, precisely because of their controversial history, and because parties were largely banned in Uganda from 1986, until last year. The important thing is that there was no debate on these major issues. The campaign got stuck on nasty personal attacks.

There being no philosophical or ideological differences presented to voters, the people were forced to choose between change and continuity. While they were sure that Museveni stood for what he stated - continuity, it was not very clear whether Besigye could deliver what he was promising - change. It became easier to trust in continuity than to hope for change. The live broadcast presidential debates (ignored by both of the front runners) exposed the contest as that of reformers in a situation where radical change was required. Perhaps that is why Museveni won; Ugandans are biding their time instead of gambling.

If there were any lessons, perhaps the biggest was that a political party must never confuse its objectives. One should not romance with democracy when in pursuit for power, even within the law. This was the difference between the Movement and FDC (with a coterie of democracy activists) — Museveni saw democracy as a means, everybody else thought it was an end.

* Dickson Ogolla is Nation Media Group’s research manager. He witnessed the election. Email: [email][email protected] This article first appeared in Africa Insight, an initiative of the Nation Media Group’s Africa Media Network

* Please send comments to [email protected]

As bomb blasts rip through Addis Ababa and opposition leaders stand trial for treason, Kasahun Woldemariam charts the rise of the Ethiopian state, providing background to the turbulent May 2005 election period and the subsequent regime crackdown. The government of Meles Zenawi, he writes, needs to tune in its listening devices to the voices of the people rather than appeasing and appealing to external forces.

Since 1991, Ethiopians have gone to the polls three times (in 1995, 2000, and 2005) to cast their ballots. The three elections were never perfect by any measure, but given the communication, political, and other constraints, they were instrumental in providing the basis for evaluating the performance of elected public officials and whether they remained true to their campaign platforms and promises. The 2005 multiparty elections, particularly, challenged the commitment of the ruling coalition and opposition parties to democracy and peaceful resolution of conflict.

The question then becomes whether Ethiopian political leaders were genuinely committed to the rule of law and multiparty politics. Did the ruling elites that came to power after the collapse of the military regime of Mengistu Haile-Mariam (1974-1991) essentially open the political marketplace to ride the post-Cold War current? What are the long-term implications of the behaviors and actions of the political leaders? What lessons could other Africans draw from the Ethiopian experience?

This article presents a critical and condensed overview of the political history of Ethiopia with emphasis on the prominence of internal legitimacy for the survival and continuity of a political system. This is followed by a detailed account and analysis of multiparty election outcomes and the implication of post-2005 election allegations and counter-allegations of electoral fraud and the imprisonment of opposition party leaders on eroding public confidence in the political process as well as in government. It then makes a brief summary of the main points of the article and concludes with a few policy-oriented remarks.

Contemporary Political Developments in Ethiopia

The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s fundamentally shifted the African political landscape. By the early 1990s, almost every African authoritarian ruler jumped on the bandwagon and became carried away by the conveyer belts of political and market liberalism.

The case of Ethiopia is unique in many respects. The departure of Mengistu left a political vacuum and opened an unprecedented opportunity for the declaration of Eritrea as an independent state. Numerous political parties also emerged. Many among these demanded secession while a few others looked to meet the separatist claims without causing the disintegration of the country into unstable and unviable ethnic Bantustans. The 1990/91 London negotiation, chaired by the former United States Assistant Secretary of State, Herman Cohen, was an attempt to engage the various contending political parties in a negotiation and to figure out strategies to reestablish peace and security in Ethiopia. Among the delegates were representatives from the military government, the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), and other nationalist and secessionist party members.

At the London Summit, it was decided that the TPLF would replace the outgoing military regime, and Eritrea would be declared independent from the oppressive regime of Ethiopia. Initially, the TPLF did not camouflage its separatist tendencies within the rubrics of national integration, nation-building, and all the other politically and diplomatically appealing aphorisms. Indeed, beginning in the mid-1980s, the Front had expanded its spheres of guerrilla warfare to other provinces, especially to the predominantly “Amhara” provinces of western Ethiopia. Even there, the Front held its banner and continued to depend on the peoples’ willingness and kindness to shelter, feed, and fight alongside with the party’s armed wings. What is interesting is that the TPLF leadership believed and mobilized its Tigray dominated guerrilla groups to fight against the allegedly Amhara dominated central government of Ethiopia.

Since the late 1970s, the TPLF had sought to make practical the Leninist rhetoric of the rights of minority groups to self-determination, including and up to secession. Yet, as the military regime begun to crumble, the TPLF leadership abandoned its separatist fervor in favor of the gains that come with ruling greater Ethiopia, as opposed to forming an independent state with questionable viability.

How did the TPLF transform itself from a disintegrative, separatist, force to an arguably integrative, unionist, party? The various ethnic groups had to be brought into an overarching framework. The grand coalition, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), was established to avoid the possible disintegration of Ethiopia into unstable states. At the same time, the establishment of the grand coalition was ostensibly designed to protect the interests and rights of minority ethnic groups and to ensure that they would not be short-changed in the interest of national unity. These polarized tensions among the various groups created the opportunity for the TPLF leadership to skillfully maneuver themselves to the peak of the political hierarchy.

From the outset, there was really no genuine commitment to making the outcome of multiparty elections unpredictable and, as a result, the playing field in the political marketplace has been biased in favor of the grand coalition, the EPRDF. The EPRDF is not a constellation of equals; rather it is established to elevate the politically and demographically minority party, the TPLF, to the summit of the highly hierarchical grand coalition party.

If political power translates into economic power or vice-versa, then the Tigray ethnic group in Tigray (northern Ethiopia) must have been having a field day since the rise of the former secessionist party to power. For instance, the current Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, comes from one of the demographically minority ethnic groups in Ethiopia, the Tigray ethnic group. This ethnic group represents approximately 6% of the population of Ethiopia and, yet, a disproportionate number of cabinet posts and other key government posts are controlled by individuals from members of the Tigray ethnic group.

But it is not ethnicity, rather it is loyalty to the status quo, the continued domination of power by one party, that determines whether or not one qualifies for appointment as a high-ranking official. Therefore, some observes who over-emphasize the role of ethnicity in the allocation of political power and economic resources need to ask themselves why a significant number of internally displaced, homeless, and beggars in Addis Ababa are from the Tigray ethnic group and why there is developmental and public and private sector investment differentials within the Tigray regional state such as between Adwa and Mekele.

The EPRDF comprises a number of parties, including the ANDM, ADP, GPDF, OPDO, South Ethiopia Peoples’ Democratic Front (SEPDF), and TPLF. Since the EPRDF is a mechanism for centralized control of power and since the majority member parties of the grand coalition are not expressions of the wishes and desires of the people, the central government’s development policies and priorities are reflections of the interests and visions of the party that has settled at the top of the organizational hierarchy. Essentially, public funds for investment in education, health, and physical infrastructure, as well as setting the criteria for central government budget allocation for reconstruction and rehabilitation are authoritatively determined.

Having created an unholy alliance among parties which mushroomed after the collapse of the military regime, the EPRDF won the 1995 parliamentary elections overwhelmingly and secured a position to dictate the country’s social and economic policies. Interestingly, even though the grand coalition maintained its dominant position, after the 2000 elections, the leaders of the ruling coalition were irritated by the loss of an additional 2% of the parliament seats to loyal opposition parties.

To be sure, the 12% or so total occupancy of the federal parliament by members of the opposition parties has done more than anyone had expected. The ways in which they stood against a concrete political wall is not only fascinating but, more importantly, it is a testament of their commitment to play by the rules and to ensure that the voice of the voiceless is heard loud and clear. In spite of intimidation, harassment, imprisonment, and extrajudicial assassination, opposition party leaders continue to rise to the occasion.

To the extent that the rise of elective dictatorship in Ethiopia is not substantiated, then one is justified to ask why the government allowed opposition party members to remain increasingly outspoken against the government’s position. First, given the growing public disenchantment against public officials’ complacency towards the conditions of the majority, keeping opposition parties in some irrelevant corner of the legislative process gives the illusion that the regime may gradually democratize.

Secondly, disputing the notion of authoritarian regime under the illusion of democracy, some take the view that if anything else the current regime is much better than the patently and unpretentiously authoritarian military regime of Mengistu Haile-Mariam, which soaked its hands with thousands of innocent civilians’ blood. They go on to insist that the holding of elected officials in prison with or without charges may violate their constitutional rights of immunity from prosecution, but they did not disappear mysteriously, which would have been the case during the iron-clod rule of Mengistu. But banning opposition parties from participating in elections and the subsequent ceremonial debate at the parliament floor would definitely upset the ruling party’s alternative sources of legitimacy and financial support - the West - especially the Americans and the Britons. Keeping opposition party members hanging in a political limbo, without conceding any meaningful political space, would be striking more than two birds in one stone.

The 2005 Elections and Subsequent Political Crises

For the leadership of the grand coalition, a slight dwindling in the absolute ownership of the political space signaled the erosion of legislative and executive power away from the center of gravity - the Minister’s office. Five years later, the regime reached a tipping point both in terms of availing its true characteristics and the decline in the internal legitimacy of the state. The 2005 elections and the ways in which the opposition parties organized themselves were remarkable on many counts.

By early 2003, it was evident that the 2005 parliamentary elections would be different from the previous two elections. On a number of occasions, leaders of opposition parties held talks on how best to prepare for the 2005 parliamentary elections. Even though the EPRDF was more a symbolic and loose alliance than anything else, it nonetheless brought together the various political parties, continued to serve as an essential political instrument of domination and marginalization, and facilitated the conditions for the rise of the TPLF to the pinnacle of power. Combining historical lessons of the liberation struggle and the formation of the grand coalition and its impact on the inequitable distribution of power, four opposition parties were able to forge a strategic alliance and form the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD).

The May 2005 parliamentary elections evolved as if opposition parties launched a surprise attack on the ruling coalition, testing its tolerance to adversarial views and commitment to stepping aside gracefully. It certainly tipped the balance of power in favor of opposition parties and significantly eroded the confidence of the public in the electoral process. Despite persistent intimidations, imprisonment of candidates as well as delays in the delivery of election material to and early closures of polling stations, opposition parties were able to exert pressure on the ruling coalition to play by its own rules of the political game, or face the consequences of grossly diluting its image before the international community.

The CUD achieved a landslide victory at the capital city, which came with a reward of 23 parliamentary seats. This was a politically significant win for the country as a whole and for opposition parties in particular. Many observers noted that the opposition were leading the ruling coalition party by a measurable margin, but prior to the conclusion of the elections the government declared that it had won the majority vote.

Opposition parties quickly discredited the government’s claim and called for a recounting of the votes and rerunning of elections in disputed areas. Except perhaps for the African Union and the Carter Center, election observers from the European Union, Scandinavian nations, and others held the view that the elections were not free and fair. It was generally riddled with voter intimidation and numerous impediments against supporters of opposition parties, and backed the oppositions’ allegation of fraud. The European Union proposed that the best outcome for the country and the parties in dispute would be to hold dialogue and mediation and develop a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of political conflict. This proposal never materialized, and by mid-November 2005 the opposition called for a five-day strike.

Subsequently, security forces went on a rampage, killing at least forty, wounding hundreds, and arresting over 2000 civilians. Twenty-four members of the opposition party are presently standing trial on charges of treason and coup. Some of the victims of the political violence were children who had nothing to do with the elections or the strike.

Because of gross human rights violations by the Ethiopian government, the World Bank cancelled its aid to the Ethiopian government and, instead, fund civil society organizations based in Ethiopia. The European Union also cancelled its aid to the Ethiopian government, making the combined $375 million withholding of foreign aid one of the largest since the current regime came to power in 1991. With very little or no indignity, the government reacted to the cancellation of foreign aid by claiming that Ethiopia hardly relied on foreign aid and that the survival and continuity of the state has always been and will always depend on the will of the people. Hypocrisy aside, when the World Bank and Western allies of African governments suspend foreign aid, you know that there is something seriously wrong with how ordinary citizens are treated by the state.

Irrespective of the weaknesses that may exist and the apparent restrictions it faces, the Ethiopian free press was the only means of policing the state. The problem of scarcity of information resources is compounded as one moves out of the capital city into regional state capitals and rural areas. In their daily interactions and formation of mutual understanding around an issue, Ethiopians transcend ethno-linguistic, religious, and class boundaries which have been put up as barriers to collective mass mobilization against the ruling elites. Thanks to the resilience of traditional values and extended family networks, each resident of the capital city remains in touch with his/her roots from the rural areas and, given their comparatively greater access to the mass media, the citizens of Addis Ababa are the information links of rural Ethiopia within the country and beyond. Given the existence of a relatively improved communication network in the capital city, it is also much easier to mobilize residents of the city in support of a platform or to express dissent against an incumbent regime. And, since each resident of the city comes from diverse backgrounds, news and activities originating in Addis Ababa easily spreads to other regions as well. Therefore, winning Addis Ababa was not only politically significant but it was also strategically important.

Concluding Remarks

What has occurred in Ethiopia since the May 2005 parliamentary elections is a manifestation of hypocrisy at its best. Sheer arrogance and the flexing of military muscle on an unarmed civilian population never quite worked for the repressive regime of Mengistu Haile-Mariam. If the military regime stood firmly against domestic and regional rivals and made measurable progress in the provision of public goods, then why did the regime suddenly collapse? To put it simply, it lost the confidence of the general public, which worsened by the ushering in of a new international political climate.

This point cannot be overemphasized, and restoring public confidence in government should be taken as an important component of building democracy and bringing about economic development. Furthermore, unless one rejects the value of history and the unique experiences of Ethiopians, the current ruling elites did not introduce Ethiopians to the idea of “government by the people,” call it democracy or elective dictatorship. Even so, as Wole Soyinka noted, past contribution to society should not inhibit future progress.

Therefore, contemporary African leaders, especially Ethiopians, need not go far to the West or the East to draw lessons on public administration, building the capacity of the state to deliver public goods, and bringing about sustainable development and enduring democracy. The most reliable source of state legitimacy is one that emanates internally and crosses over linguistic, ethnic, class, religious boundaries. That is, a regime’s continuity and effectiveness lies in its ability to achieve internal legitimacy by tuning in its listening devices to the voices of the people rather than appeasing and appealing to external forces. Alternatively, a state that seeks to restore public confidence and derives its legitimacy from the people also contributes to regional peace and security and is one less troubled spot for the international community to worry about.

Imprisonment of opposition party members, journalists, and civilians without a warrant clearly illustrates that the executive branch of the regime is acting and behaving above the law. In a political system where no one is policing the state, where ballots no longer serve as sticks and carrots, and where parliamentary elections are meaningless processions to the polling station, then the regime is nothing but an “elective dictatorship” and a constellation of opportunist elites.

The first step in restoring public confidence in government would be to release and engage in a genuine dialogue with opposition party leaders. Such dialogue could be best facilitated by Ethiopian elders, Ethiopian religious leaders with no political affiliation to any of the parties, and by government representatives who have nothing to lose or gain from the outcome of the dialogue and mediation.

At the end of the day, the political leaders from all sides must come to terms with the fact that there is a limit to blind loyalty and that the time for critical citizenship is never too late.

* Kasahun Woldemariam received his Ph.D. in African Studies from Howard University and numerous awards, including research and teaching fellowships from the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa; the Institute for the Study of World Politics, Washington, DC; and Howard University. He has written articles, including "Investment-Friendly Image of Africa," "The Real Power of Ballots," and "NEPAD Needs NGOs to Work." His forthcoming book examines "Social Capital" from an African Perspective."

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The Security Council has welcomed the decision of the African Union (AU) to support, in principle, the transition of the AU peacekeeping mission in the strife-torn Darfur region of Sudan to a United Nations operation. "The Security Council commended the African Union for the successful deployment of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and AMIS' role in reducing large-scale organized violence in Darfur," Council President César Mayoral of Argentina told the press after the body was briefed by Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hédi Annabi.

The United Nations Security Council has decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) for one month, to allow recently revived border talks between the two countries a chance to break a volatile deadlock. Through a resolution adopted unanimously by the 15-member body, the Council also reiterated its demands that Eritrea end its restrictions on UNMEE operations and that Ethiopia abide by decisions of the commission designated to demark a permanent border between the two countries.
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* Border marking will resume

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Uganda's divestiture programmes have suffered a setback after the World Bank declined to extend its technical support to the Privatisation Unit. The Bank cites political interference, lack of transparency and the sluggish pace of disposal of public assets as the reasons for its decision. The World Bank said last month it would not extend the facility, which lapsed at the end of 2005. The Privatisation Unit officials say they may not be able to finance the areas the World Bank has been funding at international level, but add that they can seek local funding alternatives.

The European Union has defended the on-going Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiations with 16 east and southern African countries. EU head of delegation to Kenya, Eric Van der Linden, has urged African policy makers to view the talks as a trade and development tool. "The EPAs are the only means of maintaining the long standing relationship with the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries dating back to the Lome conventions," Van der Linden told negotiators from the region meeting in Nairobi. Under the Lome Convention, 79 former colonies of major European countries enjoy preferential access to the EU market.

Kenya could be heading for a political climate similar to that in the early nineties should the opposition make good its threat to force early elections in the wake of commando-style attacks on the Standard Group, East Africa's oldest media organisation. Leading lights of the Orange Democratic Movement, which organised demonstrations in support of the media last Tuesday, are confident that there will be no going back until the government calls for early elections before the scheduled date of 2007.