Firoze Manji, Your article is informing: truth spoken. Too often we don't know our history therefore we don't recognize its changing forms.

Increasing use of biotechnology in the forestry sector has led the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to call for an international framework to assess the safety of genetically modified (GM) trees before they are commercialised. By genetically modifying trees, researchers hope to improve the quantity and quality of wood they produce, and to give the trees resistance to insects, diseases and herbicides. Both the timber and paper industries could benefit from such research, says the FAO. It warns, however, against rushing to commercialise GM trees before conducting environmental risk assessments according to protocols agreed upon nationally and internationally.

In its final declaration, the ACP Council (21-22 June 2005) calls for the establishment of development benchmarks to ensure that trade liberalisation works in favour of sustainable human development. This follows the Cape Town declaration, unanimously adopted by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in March 2002. APRODEV, in cooperation with ICTSD has taken this challenge seriously and has published a report on the question of what a benchmarking approach could look like, identifying three dimensions of the EPA negotiations: market access and free trade, policy space for competitive and equitable policies, and additional development resources. The paper emphasises the need for a non-partisan monitoring mechanism, and proposes to base a review mechanism or monitoring system on development benchmarks using four steps.

In the year 2000 alone, sub-Saharan Africa lost nearly US$45 dollars per person thanks to trade liberalisation, while aid per person was less than half the loss from liberalisation, according to a Christian Aid briefing paper that argues that in real terms, the aid received by Africa has simply offset the losess sustained as a result of the trade conditions attached to aid packages. It argues that these losses dwarf the US$40 billion worth of debt relief agreed at the recent meeting of G7 finance ministers. The paper uses data from econometric study to demonstrate the negative effects of trade liberalisation, and to show what might have happened, had trade not been liberalised.

The more oil a country produces the more debt it tends to generate, while the more dependent on oil exports a country is, the deeper in debt it tends to be, according to a report from Oil Change International. The report recommends that OECD countries should end Northern governmental subsidies for new oil projects in the South as such projects have not historically provided energy for the poor, and are proven to be associated with increases in poverty, conflict, and debt, and to increase the risk to the poorest from climate change.

The findings from this Institute for Democracy in South Africa study explore budget transparency from the ordinary citizen's perspective. It sheds some light on information required to engage meaningfully with budgetary and other decisions involving public resources from the ordinary citizen's perspective. In this regard, the study evaluates mechanisms promoting good governance accross nine African countries (Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia) and identifies the main weaknesses of the budget process.

Liberia's transitional government said on Friday it had drafted a counter strategy for improving financial transparency and attracting economic aid that rejects donor proposals for placing foreign experts in key departments as watchdogs against corruption and embezzlement. The document would be reviewed by foreign ministers of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and donor representatives at a meeting in the Niger capital Niamey on Tuesday with the aim of eventually submitting it to the UN Security Council, government spokesman William Allen told IRIN. The donor proposals, a copy of which IRIN obtained last month, sparked an outcry from Liberian politicians, who complained that they would severely undercut the country's sovereignty.

The African Union's mandated peer review body said on Friday it had halted activities in Kenya after the government blocked it from operating after a row over finances and the public's role in the process. Grace Akumu, head of the Kenyan chapter of the AU's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), said the authorities blocked the group from accessing its offices in Nairobi, because it was questioning how the government was spending cash meant for the review. The APRM operates under the Kenyan ministry for planning and national development, which refused to comment when contacted.

Raymond W. Baker's latest book, "Capitalism's Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System'" (John Wiley & Sons, 448 pages, $27.95), argues that disrupting the flow of ill- gotten loot is more important for Africa than canceling debt, boosting aid and stepping up trade, however worthy those goals are. Western countries sink roughly $50 billion in foreign aid into poorer countries each year, he says, then take back 10 times that amount - $500 billion a year - by laundering dirty money fleeing those lands.

If the G–8 is to respond effectively to poverty in Africa, it must address Africa’s vulnerability to climate change, and discard the "business as usual" method of choosing and building energy projects, says the International Rivers Network. G–8 funding should prioritize access to renewable and clean, modern energy services while reducing African energy vulnerabilities to a changing climate. G–8 funding should prioritize projects that are identified through participative and informed processes and meet identified energy needs.

The Peace Tax Seven are a group of seven taxpaying UK citizens who want to make a positive contribution to society by paying their tax in full. They object in conscience to paying others to kill on their behalf, but current tax policy forces them to do just that. Each have tried to direct their income taxes to be used for peaceful and non-military purposes. Citizens from around the world can support the cause by signing a petition.

September 23rd to 25th 2005, the weekend of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's annual meetings, holds great importance for millions around the world. This year, the Mobilization for Global Justice, a Washington DC-based activist group, will join our allies in the global South, Europe, and the U.S. as well as with those in the anti-war community to demand an end to the international system that uses economic and military might to extract resources and serve corporate interests.

The purpose of this course is to ensure that planners and managers from different kinds of organisations and project teams are exposed to and engage with a wide range of participatory planning tools and methods, which could be applied at a national, provincial, district and local levels of society.

Abuja Treaty: The 1991 Abuja Treaty established the African Economic Community, outlining six stages for achieving a single monetary zone for Africa. (Source: www.brook.edu)

Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA): The United States initiated AGOA was signed into law on May 18, 2000. It offers incentives for African countries to open their economies and build free markets. (Source: http://www.agoa.gov/)

African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States: Refers to the 79 member states that form this grouping. Visit http://www.acpsec.org/en/acp_states.htm for a full listing.

Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the agricultural policy of the EU. It is a highly regulated agricultural trade regime, designed to prevent cheaper imported products flooding EU markets. (Source: www.epawatch.net)

Cotonou Agreement: This refers to an agreement between members of the ACP and The European Community, signed in Cotonou On 23 June 2000. It is an international agreement between 78 ACP countries and the 25 countries of the European Union (EU). It consists of comprehensive provisions, dealing with aid, trade and political relations. (Source: www.epawatch.net)

Doha round of the WTO: The Doha round of World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations aims to lower barriers to trade around the world. Talks have been hung over a divide between the rich countries and developing countries. Agricultural subsidies are the most significant issue upon which agreement has been hardest to negotiate. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org)

Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): There are two schools of thought on EPAs. The EU largely sees EPAs as a free trade area agreement involving the elimination of import duties, inclusion of all economic sectors and that will include agreements on trade in services and trade related areas. ACP governments believe that if EPAs are to support the economic development of their economies and contribute to the elimination of poverty they must include measures to promote the structural transformation of ACP economies. (Source: www.epawatch.net)

European Union (EU): The EU is a union of 25 European countries. It was established in 1992 by the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty). A key activity of the EU is the establishment and administration of a common single market, consisting of a customs union, a single currency a Common Agricultural Policy and a Common Fisheries Policy. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org)

Everything But Arms (EBA): On September 20th 2000, the European Commission announced the adoption of a plan to introduce duty free access to the EU market for all exports “originating” in least developed countries, with the exception of arms”. The existence of EBA is important in relation to EPAs as it raises the question of what interest do least developed countries have in negotiating a reciprocal preferential trade agreement with the EU given that they already have a non-reciprocal arrangement? (Source: www.epawatch.net)

Free Trade Area (FTA): An area in which member states eliminate tariffs among themselves but maintain individual tariff schedules on imports from non-member countries. (Source: http://www.eu-ldc.org)

Least Developed Countries (LDC): The category of LDCs is a social/economic classification status applied to around 50 countries around the world. The UN defines LDCs based on 3 criteria, with a country needing to meet all three to be considered an LDC. One of the criteria is based on a three-year average estimate of the gross national income (GNI) per capita, where income is under $750. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org)

Lomé Convention: The Lomé Convention is a treaty that regulated trade between the EU and ACP countries between 1975 and 2000. Established in 1975 in Lomé, Togo, the treaty preserved some of the preferential access rights of members of the Commonwealth of Nations to the United Kingdom market on its entry into the Union. It was renewed in 1979, 1985, 1989, and 2000 before being succeeded by the Cotonou Agreement. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org)

Non-reciprocity: This refers to trade preferences which are extended by one country or group of countries to another country or group of countries without any obligation being placed on the second group of countries to grant trade preferences to the first group of countries. A key difference between existing arrangements and EPAs is that EPAs will be reciprocal preferential trade agreements. (Source: www.epawatch.net)

Singapore Issues: The "Singapore issues" refer to four working groups set up during the WTO Ministerial Conference of 1996 in Singapore, namely investment protection, competition policy, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation. Disagreements between largely developed and developing economies prevented a resolution in these issues, despite repeated attempts to revisit them, notably during the 2003 Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico, whereby no progress was made. (http://en.wikipedia.org)

Special and Differential Treatment: Refers to the argument of developing countries that special circumstances require specific consideration and trade restrictions can be legitimate and appropriate instruments for development purposes. (Source: www.soutchcentre.org)

Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), negotiated in the 1986-94 Uruguay Round, introduced intellectual property rules into the multilateral trading system for the first time. Trips is controversial especially when it comes to access to medicines, where patents have led to higher drug prices. (Source: http://www.wto.org)

World Trade Organisation: The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international body whose purpose is to promote free trade by persuading countries to abolish import tariffs and other barriers. Based in Geneva, the WTO was set up in 1995, replacing another international organisation known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt). (Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk)

Websites for more information:

http://www.epawatch.net
http://www.econewsafrica.org/
http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/
http://www.acpsec.org/
http://www.europaworld.org/
http://www.igtn.org/
http://www.twnafrica.org/
http://www.seatini.org/
http://www.aprodev.net/
http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/
http://www.tradecraft.org/
http://www.focusweb.org/
http://www.twnside.org.sg/
http://www.wto.org/

Far from being a development tool, Demba Moussa Dembele argues that Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) seek to take control of the continent’s resources and undermine its drive toward autonomous economic and social development. The result would be the transformation of Africa into a playground of multinational corporations. Trade and Africa’s ‘integration’ into the global economy must not be allowed to take place on terms dictated by Europe, Dembele concludes.

In February 2000, the new framework agreement, signed between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Union (EU), marked a major departure from previous agreements in that it opened the door to a profound transformation of the relationships between the two groups. Arguing that the new international trade environment requires that both parties comply with the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the EU has compelled its ACP partners to engage in separate free trade zones, dubbed 'economic partnership agreements' (EPAs), whose fundamental aim is to remove the trade preferences granted to ACP countries and establish reciprocity in trade relations:

Negotiations of the economic partnership agreements shall aim notably at establishing the timetable for the progressive removal of barriers to trade between the Parties, in accordance with the relevant WTO rules. (EU 2000, Article 37-7).

However, the EU insists that the partnership agreements will be negotiated only with countries which feel that their economies are able to sustain competition from European products. All the other non-least developed countries (LDCs) that do not fall within this category would be granted some undefined 'alternative possibilities'. The necessity to bring the ACP/EU relationships into compliance with the WTO framework stems from the belief that it would be almost impossible to get a waiver for an indefinite period for maintaining the trade preferences granted to ACP countries. In fact, the EU claims that under WTO rules, these preferences are both discriminatory – applying only to ACP countries rather than all LDCs – and non-reciprocal – European exports are not granted similar preferences in ACP markets.

Apart from the need to comply with the WTO provisions, the economic partnership agreements are intended to achieve two other objectives. One of them is the necessity to maintain the 'special relationship' established between Europe and the ACP countries. From the EU perspective, the necessity to comply with the rules of the new international trade framework does not mean giving up all the benefits associated with decades of special trade and financial relationships with ACP countries. According to the dominant view, Europe has invested too much in these countries to let others undermine the close relationships that have been nurtured over decades.

The other objective assigned to the EPAs is to make the economic partnership more 'efficient'. The concern with efficiency stems from what Europe perceives as a 'poor' performance of the Lomé Convention. The EU's own studies, corroborated by several other studies, indicate that ACP countries’ share in the EU market has consistently shrunk over the years to the benefit of other developing countries in Asia and Latin America. The reasons for this 'poor' performance are both internal and external to ACP countries. The internal constraints are weak supply conditions, a limited awareness of Lomé preferences, the lack of well-functioning trade channels, and so forth. Among the external constraints are the stringent rules of origin imposed by the EU, which require an added value of between 50% and 60% of ACP exports to Europe, and complicated and cumbersome trade procedures. To these constraints, one may add numerous non-tariff barriers, such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures and transportation costs that are a real handicap for small or medium-sized exporters, particularly those in landlocked countries.

In addition, the Lomé mechanism has not helped export diversification in African countries, but contributed to reinforcing their trade dependence on the European Union, which is estimated at more than 45%. In the light of this, the European Union tends to draw the conclusion that trade preferences granted to ACP countries have been a waste and have had little impact on the development of ACP countries.

But despite their emphasis on trade liberalisation and reciprocity, the EU insists that the EPAs will promote 'integration' and stimulate 'economic development' on the continent. For this to be the case there would need to be a fundamental reorientation of the EPAs, to transform them into a development-enhancing scheme, as spelt out below.

Non-reciprocity in trade liberalisation

Article 53-1 of the Cotonou Agreement stipulates that: 'Economic and trade co-operation shall be based on a true, strengthened and strategic partnership.'

If that is really the case and if the EU is sincere in adhering to these principles, then, it should accept that the huge asymmetry that exists between the two economies should prevent the establishment of a free trade zone between African and European countries. In other words, the EU should give up its intention to impose reciprocity in trade relations. It is said that the EPAs seek to go beyond what is allowed under the WTO rules, such as special and differential treatment as well as non-reciprocity which have been integrated into the WTO since the Punta del Este Declaration. Even the Commission for Africa, established by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, has challenged the free trade stance of the EPAs, to such an extent that it seems to have alarmed Peter Mandelson, the EU trade commissioner.

Indeed, given the asymmetry between African and European economies and the huge subsidies the latter enjoy, any reciprocity in trade liberalisation, as implied by the economic partnership agreements, would deal a major blow to Africa’s development prospects. It would mean not only more unemployment and poverty on a larger scale, but worst of all, the total collapse of the agricultural sector in sub-Saharan Africa, which in turn would aggravate the food crisis on the continent. It is widely acknowledged that trade liberalisation has already entailed huge losses to African countries. It has been estimated that the combination of deteriorating terms of trade and the trade restrictions introduced by developed countries has led to an average annual loss of $60 billion for Africa, about four times the amount of development 'assistance' to the continent. Admittedly, sub-Saharan Africa has suffered disproportionately from trade losses over the last 25 years. In particular, the costly protectionist European agricultural policies are undermining the objective of 'poverty reduction' in sub-Saharan Africa, one of the other objectives that the EU claims to pursue in Africa.

Findings reported by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2004) confirm that trade liberalisation has aggravated the economic and social conditions of the least developed countries, most of which (34) are in Africa. These findings are consistent with the analysis made in 1997 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which made the following observation, based on a number of case studies around the world:

In the real world, distinct from the imaginary world of free-trade proponents, the survival in agricultural product markets depends less on the policy of comparative advantage than on the comparative access to subsidies. To liberalize local food markets in the face of such an unequal competition is not a policy aimed at improving efficiency, but a recipe for the destruction of livelihood on a large scale. (UNDP 1997: 86)

This observation and those by other UN agencies must convince the EU that reciprocity in trade liberalisation with Africa would be a recipe for disaster. Indeed, agricultural policies left to the free play of market forces, combined with the continued subsidising of developed countries’ high-cost production, have led to the collapse of commodity prices in world markets and contributed to a low level of investments in productive capacity in Africa. Therefore, unless European agricultural policies are dismantled or substantially reformed, to take into account the interests of African countries, the latter must insist that agriculture be kept outside of any negotiations with the EU, while they reserve the right to protect key sectors of their domestic economies. Thus, it can be argued that reciprocity in granting trade preferences should not be based on a theoretical timetable proposed or decided on by the EU. Rather, it should be linked to tangible achievements by African economies in being able to sustain competition from European products.

No to TRIPS

If the EU is really committed to promoting 'a true … partnership' and establishing 'a strategic partnership' with Africa, it should help African countries take full advantage of all the WTO provisions that allow them to protect their economies under certain conditions. The EU should not be forcing them to forgo those provisions, or to go beyond what is allowed under the WTO framework. The compliance with some of the WTO key provisions would represent a major threat to African economies. For instance, the continent’s industrial policy would be particularly hurt if African countries were forced to comply with some of the most basic WTO provisions such as the trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS). The following paragraph in the Cotonou Agreement clearly indicates the EU's determination to force ACP countries to abide by these provisions:

Without prejudice to the positions of the Parties in multilateral negotiations, the Parties recognise the need to ensure an adequate and effective level of protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights, and other rights covered by TRIPS.
(EU 2000: 40, Article 46-1).

If there are not profound modifications to these provisions, complying with TRIPS would compel African countries to enact laws designed to protect the intellectual property rights of European multinationals for 20 years, even for essential drugs. In effect, these provisions protect intellectual property through patent arrangements that exclude third party use, offering for sale, selling or importing of such products for a minimum of 20 years. This would make it impossible to produce generic copies for at least 20 years. This policy would strengthen developed countries’ technological monopoly and deprive African countries of the opportunity to catch up through adapting technology and producing generic copies of drugs, which was possible before the WTO provisions entered into force in 1995.

Even worse, African countries would be required to enact laws to protect patented products, including those owned by companies in the EU that patent plants and products found in developing countries. In other words, Western multinational corporations operating from the EU can freely patent products found in African countries and get protection from these countries’ governments! This is unacceptable. Thus, development-oriented EPAs should support the call for a comprehensive review of some WTO provisions that are detrimental to developing countries and for an extension of the transition period for these countries. In particular, the EU should support African countries in calling for a profound transformation of TRIPS to limit the threat to Africa’s industrialisation, technological progress and food sovereignty.

Indeed, these provisions have been called into question by developing countries and even by some institutions within the United Nations system. For instance, UNCTAD has made some recommendations to that effect. One recommendation is for a comprehensive reassessment of the links between property rights and development. Another is to extend the transition period to allow more time for developing countries’ industries to adapt. The third recommendation is to allow developing countries to use compulsory licensing to ensure technology transfer and meet public health concerns. These recommendations apply more specifically to African countries, given their extreme economic vulnerability. Therefore, the EU should take into consideration those recommendations and change its view of the EPAs, not as a trade-enhancing tool, but as a development-oriented instrument.

Taking into account the real costs of the EPAs

The EU tends to minimise the costs of the EPAs to African economies even if it says that it has put in place mechanisms aimed at compensating for the transition costs incurred by African countries. However, the real costs of that transition cannot be estimated. First of all, a free trade zone means full reciprocity when it comes to granting trade preferences, which means a complete removal of all quantitative and tariff barriers between African and European countries. In other words, African industries would be exposed to competition from European products. One important implication is that infant African industries would be deprived of the minimum protection they need, which would result in the collapse of many national industries that would not be able to sustain competition with European companies. This would have dire consequences in terms of lost income, higher unemployment and an increase in the level of poverty.

On the other hand, the removal of tariff barriers would entail heavy financial losses for the state as a result of lower revenues from import duties. Since in many African countries’ more than 20% of their budget revenues depend on import duties and more than 50% on primary export revenues, those countries would lose up to 50% of their revenues, because a free trade agreement with the EU would abolish or drastically bring down tariffs on European imports. All this would lead to a further sacrifice of the social sector, because financial compensation from the EU is not likely to match the magnitude of the losses incurred by these states.

In addition, a free trade agreement implies not only a free flow of goods and services, but also a free flow of capital, which means that European multinationals would have a legal basis for freely investing and selling in many African countries. The economic partnership agreement would give fiscal privileges to European investors and protect their investments. The free movement of capital would result in a free and unlimited repatriation of profits. The free flow of capital could aggravate capital flight from Africa and foster short-term capital movements that would be harmful to Africa’s development, as the East Asian case demonstrated a few years ago. All this would exacerbate the financial problems experienced by African countries.

To limit these losses and help African countries overcome some of the most intractable obstacles to development, any development-oriented economic partnership agreement must be linked to unconditional debt cancellation for all African countries, to a rise in official development assistance (ODA) and to the repatriation of stolen wealth. In addition, the EU could provide incentives to stimulate foreign direct investments (FDIs) that are compatible with African countries’ development needs and priorities.

Keep the Singapore issues out of the EPAs

In connection with the above, the Singapore issues must be kept out of the EPAs. These issues include competition policy, government procurement, investment policy and trade facilitation. They had been one of the principal subjects of contention in Cancun, when African and other developing countries rejected discussion of these issues within the WTO framework, leading to the collapse of the meeting. The EU is trying to use the EPAs to force these issues on African countries. This would deal an even greater blow to the continent’s development prospects. Joseph Stiglitz (2004) has stated that acceptance of these issues by developing countries would certainly 'stop the process of development'. Even the British government has asked for the issues to be removed from the negotiations unless the ACP countries feel ready to discuss them.

Accordingly, EPAs that envisage making a contribution to Africa’s development must remove the Singapore issues from the negotiations until general consensus is reached among African and other developing countries. Indeed, the inclusion of the Singapore issues would compel African countries to comply with trade-related investment measures (TRIMS), which would deal another big blow to a regional industrial policy, since it would mean granting 'national treatment' status to European investors and allowing them to invest in any area of their choice. Worst of all, it would mean adapting African economic and social policies to the needs of these investors, since they would be allowed to sue host countries for any losses they might suffer as a result of domestic economic and social polices. These provisions are similar to those embodied in the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which was strongly opposed by African and other developing countries. For individual African countries, as well as for the continent as a whole, this would spell the end of any chance of industrialisation for the foreseeable future. Indeed, the provisions for support and protection of investments, contained in the current post-Lomé IV Agreement, are far more extensive and stringent than those found in previous Lomé Conventions. An illustration is given by Article 78-3 of the agreement, which indicates:

The Parties also agree to introduce, within the economic partnership agreements, and while respecting the respective competencies of the Community and its Member States, general principles on protection and promotion of investments, which will endorse the best results agreed in the competent international fora or bilaterally. (EU 2000: 61)

According to critics, these 'general principles' do not contain any mechanisms to ensure investors’ responsibility for their labour force or the host country’s national development. Nor do they include mechanisms that ensure a clear relationship between investments, poverty reduction and sustainable development. Worst of all, these provisions have no mechanisms for allowing ACP countries to control the flow of portfolio capital, which is the most speculative part of foreign capital for developing countries. It is precisely the absence of such mechanisms that led to the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, with its devastating economic and social consequences.

Without such mechanisms, the free flow of capital that would accompany a free trade agreement with the EU would devastate African economies as a result of speculative short-term investments. A development-oriented partnership agreement must therefore aim at promoting long-term and stable investments in productive sectors, in infrastructure, in telecommunications and human resources development. It must also recognise African countries’ right to restore capital controls and set performance criteria for foreign investors in terms of technology transfer, job creation, etc, to meet the objectives of their economic and social development.

Provide genuine support for economic integration

A development-oriented partnership agreement should encourage real economic integration, at both regional and continental levels. This means that it should avoid imposing different trade arrangements within regional economic communities (RECs). But such a risk is associated with the current EPAs, which are dividing African countries into LDCs and non-LDCs. By offering some undefined 'preferences' to LDCs, the EU knows that selfish and narrow 'national' interests may override regional solidarity and compliance with the Abuja Treaty and Africa’s interests as a whole. Therefore, some countries may be tempted to sign separate agreements with the EU for short-term gains at the expense of the long-term interests of their regions or the continent.

Another risk of split lies in the possibility that European countries may attempt to establish closer relationships with some more 'developed' countries, such as South Africa, Nigeria and others, the so-called 'emerging markets', at the expense of the other countries, while nominally encouraging the process of integration. Indeed, by giving a free ride to market forces, the EU may seek to develop closer economic ties with countries presenting better opportunities for its industries and investors. This would lead to a two-level economic partnership and expose African countries to great risks of implosion, if they were to opt for different trading arrangements as proposed by the EU.

But the adoption of two or more trade regimes in the same regional bloc would violate the provisions of the Abuja Treaty, since the African Economic Community (AEC) is a supranational community. This would be even more incomprehensible for countries which already have a common external tariff for third countries. In addition, if there were several trade regimes, it would be almost impossible to control the flows of goods and services between countries of the region, a fact which was underlined by the EU's own study. Thus, African countries must insist that any economic partnership agreement with Europe must be compatible with the provisions of the Abuja Treaty, since it requires the regional economic communities to:

…make [their policies] compatible with those of continental integration and align their statutory instruments such as their Treaties and Protocols to the provisions of the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community. (AEC, 1997).

From this perspective, any economic partnership agreement must contribute to strengthening the region’s economic integration and accelerating the process toward building the African Economic Community. Therefore, if the EU is committed to promoting and strengthening regional integration, it should clearly demonstrate its willingness to invest in African countries’ productive sectors, in infrastructures, in human resource development, in promoting cross-border investments in order to improve supply conditions and strengthen the continent’s production base. To demonstrate this commitment, the EU should allow African countries to complete their integration process before engaging them in any discussions about any kind of economic partnership agreement. It was indicated that the SADC, which is the most advanced example of integration in sub-Saharan Africa, would complete its integration only by 2010 or 2012. Therefore, a genuine commitment to African integration should allow this process to run its full course.

Conclusion

Most observers argue that if the proposed economic partnership agreements between the EU and African countries remained in their original form and if they were implemented they would represent a fatal blow not only to Africa’s economic integration but also to its development prospects for the foreseeable future. These agreements risk dealing a fatal blow to the production model of integration adopted by the Abuja Treaty (1991), which was a major departure from the previous models followed by African countries. Several critics have argued that integration in sub-Saharan Africa cannot be conceived of as a trade-enhancing instrument, but as a development tool, that is, as a comprehensive approach to the continent’s complex economic and social problems. From that perspective, its first and foremost priority should be to develop a strong production base in order to meet the continent’s basic needs in food production, in industrial products, in technology, in employment, in human resource development, etc. This conception is embodied in the Abuja Treaty, which laid the foundations for the AEC. Since the signing of this treaty, all African economic communities have adopted the production model.

It is clear from this analysis that a free trade agreement with an African regional grouping – which would not be compatible with the treaty – would only serve the EU's interests at the expense of the continent’s drive toward building the AEC. Development-oriented EPAs must be compatible with the priorities defined by the integration process in Africa. For instance, any free trade agreement with the EU must be compatible with African countries’ own trade liberalisation scheme, while keeping sensitive areas vital to their economies out of the negotiations.

But Europe has little interest in strengthening Africa’s productive capacity. On the contrary, its fundamental aim is to perpetuate the current trading relations with African countries, whereby Africa remains a market for its products and a source of cheap commodities and labour. One could argue that the proposed EPAs are a response to the US-sponsored Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The EPAs and AGOA would in all likelihood transform Africa into an arena of confrontation between Western multinationals, which have been taking over assets in strategic sectors in Africa as a result of the liberalisation and privatisation imposed on African countries by the IMF and the World Bank. In reality, neither the EPAs nor AGOA would bring 'development' to Africa. Quite the contrary, both seek to take control of the continent’s resources and undermine its drive toward autonomous economic and social development. AGOA violates Africa’s sovereignty and overlooks Africa’s priorities. In short, AGOA aims to 'integrate' Africa into the world economy on 'America’s terms' (South Centre, 1999). So will the proposed economic partnership agreements. But Africa’s 'integration' into the world economy must be on its own terms, and not on America’s or Europe’s.

* Demba Moussa Dembele is Director of the African Forum on Alternatives
Dakar (Senegal)

* Please send comments to

REFERENCES

African Economic Community (AEC) (1997) 'The main conclusions and decisions of the first summit of the African Economic Community', AEC Newsletter 1 (4)

European Union (EU) (2000), The Cotonou Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the European Community and its Member States. Brussels: European Union

South Centre (1999) Lopsided Rules of North-South Engagement: The African Growth and Opportunity Act. Geneva: South Centre

Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2004) An Agenda for the Development Round of Trade Negotiations in the Aftermath of Cancun. London: Commonwealth Secretariat

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2004) The Least Developed Countries Report 2004. New York and Geneva: United Nations

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1997) The Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press

Current EPA negotiations must be stopped, says Liz Dodd. These trade negotiations contain little for ACP countries and could actually increase poverty in some of the poorest countries in the world. Dodd explains that the EU is making grossly unfair demands over EPAs and is forcing controversial 'new' issues through the back door. EPAs are further undermining regional integration.

The Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states speak out

At a meeting in London organised by Traidcraft in June, Kenyan Trade Minister Dr Kituyi issued a strong challenge on economic partnership agreements (EPAs). He called on the European Union (EU) to revisit their negotiating mandate in order to ‘whittle out’ mercantilist interests such as the demand for reciprocal trade.

Dr Kituyi made his bold challenge in the presence of the UK’s trade minister, Ian Pearson MP, just days ahead of the UK taking up the presidency of the EU. Addressing an audience of parliamentarians, ambassadors and journalists, Dr Kituyi said if the EPA negotiations require greater concessions than those at the WTO, then ‘to make poverty history, we will also have to make EPAs history’.

On trade liberalisation more broadly, Dr Kituyi commented that, ‘lowering your tariff guard to your neighbours is like inoculation, but if you open up to the EU that’s a full dose of the virus.’ He described the devastating effects of liberalisation on African economies and referred to the ‘lost generation’ of the 1990s who have been denied an education. Dr Kituyi’s challenge came hard on the heels of a strong statement on the negotiations issued by the Africa Union trade ministers at their Cairo conference. In particular the statement reiterated the position that the so-called ‘Singapore issues’ should remain outside the EPA negotiations.

Just days later the ACP Council of Ministers expressed ‘grave concern’ that the negotiations had not proceeded in a satisfactory manner and had failed to start addressing most issues of interest and concern to the ACP. The statement also highlighted the disconnect between what EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson was saying in public and what his negotiators were actually doing in the negotiating sessions. The ministers reinforced Dr Kituyi’s request that the EU rethink their negotiating directives to take on board ACP concerns.

A catalogue of disappointments

This flurry of statements is clear evidence that ACP governments are getting increasingly tired of the EU saying one thing and then doing another on EPAs. The EU talk about EPAs as instruments for development, but then refuse to listen to what ACP governments want. The EU are unhappy that ACP countries’ own development plans and priorities do not include giving the EU preferential access for their markets in return for nothing. The frustration of ACP governments is understandable. At every turn in the talks, the ACP’s legitimate concerns and positions appear to be put on the back burner.

This process began way back at the start of discussions when ACP countries did not want to negotiate EPAs, but the EU insisted that they were necessary to comply with WTO rules. Effectively the ACP were being given no choice. For some ACP countries the only alternative to an EPA on offer would see their market access to Europe slashed.

So the ACP agreed – reluctantly - with the proviso that WTO rules might be changed to be more flexible and that alternatives would be provided for those countries that felt they were not in a position to sign up to a free-trade EPA.

So far, the ACP has received no support from the EU on either of these key issues. Similarly at the end of the first phase of the talks, the ACP side wanted a binding agreement on issues that were critically important to them – such as additional resources to compensate for the adjustment costs involved in EPAs. The EU refused to agree.

Most recently the UK government came out with a position paper on the EPA negotiations, raising some concerns and questions. They were promptly disciplined by the European Commission (EC), who in a letter sent to all the EC delegations in ACP countries called the UK position ‘a major and unwelcome shift … Some recommendations move well away from agreed EU positions.’ The letter went on to say that ‘Peter Mandelson is taking up our concerns and will press for a revised UK line.’

Given the weight of this evidence the ACP are justified in questioning the negotiating faith of the EU.

EPAs: pro development or a hidden menace?

The EU want to sell EPAs as good for development. And they seem determined to drag ACP countries through the process. But the ACP are not playing ball in quite the way the EU would like.

And there are good reasons for the ACP’s fears:

The EU is making grossly unfair demands

Despite the fact that the poorest countries (least developed countries, or LDCs) do not have to open their economies as part of the WTO talks, they are being asked to do so as part of EPAs. At the moment 39 of the 77 ACP countries are classified as least developed. Under EPAs, it will be very difficult for them to prevent cheap, subsidised EU goods flooding their markets and putting local farmers and small-scale manufacturers out of business.

The EU is forcing controversial ‘new issues’ through the back door

Following resistance from developing countries and campaigning by NGOs around the world, three of the highly controversial ‘new issues’ (investment, competition and transparency in public procurement) are now off the WTO agenda. But they are being pushed through the ‘back door’ of EPAs. In some areas the EU is pushing for EPAs to go much further on these issues than was ever demanded at the WTO.

EPAs are undermining regional integration

EPAs should contribute to the process of regional integration between ACP countries. But in negotiations so far the opposite is happening. EPAs put the poorest countries in an impossible dilemma: should they continue with their ‘non-reciprocal’ duty-free, quota-free access into the European market, but leave their regional grouping or should they open up to the EU and stick with their regional partners? The problem is that whilst the poorest have nothing to gain from EPAs, their slightly less poor neighbours (non-LDCs) have a great deal to lose.

Take East Africa. The East African Community includes Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The countries are committed to working together and are in the process of establishing a customs union and a joint currency. They have already set up an East African Parliament. But with EPAs comes a big problem. Uganda and Tanzania are LDCs, Kenya is not. As LDCs, Uganda and Tanzania already have duty-free and quota-free access into the EU market under the Everything But Arms agreement. Uganda and Tanzania have nothing to gain from an EPA. But if they refuse to negotiate, while Kenya goes ahead, how will they stop EU goods entering their markets via Kenya and the customs union? If EPAs are supposed to support and strengthen regional integration – why has it put East Africa in this impossible situation?

Impact fears

There are serious concerns about the impact that EPAs will have on poor and vulnerable groups in ACP countries:

- Company closures and job losses. As European goods begin to enter ACP countries without facing any tariffs, local businesses will be unable to cope with the competition and will be forced out of business. This is likely to be particularly damaging in the agricultural sector where ACP countries are most dependent and where the EU gives the most support to its own producers.

- Glass ceiling. ACP countries are not just concerned about losing out to European competition in the goods they already produce. Because European manufactured goods will be entering African countries without paying any trade taxes, they may be cheaper. For small businesses struggling to add more value to their products by moving into new industries such as manufacturing or food processing this will be a real blow, potentially consigning countries to remain simply exporters of raw materials and basic goods. This would be deeply damaging to national development plans in ACP countries.

- Loss of vital government revenue. Many ACP countries rely heavily on the money they get from levying customs taxes for their normal expenditure. Opening up to the EU will reduce that revenue base and will mean less money for social expenditure. For example, there are estimates that between 25% and 30% of all Namibian government revenue was derived from this type of trade tax between 1990 and 1996.
What would this mean for a country like Kenya?

- The loss of tax revenue will make it harder for the government to implement new plans to help micro enterprises.

- Unfair competition from European goods still heavily supported by the EU under the Common Agricultural Policy could devastate Kenya’s dairy and cereals sectors – both are made up of thousands of small farmers.

- Kenya’s ability to diversify and develop an advantage in value-added areas could also be undermined. The sector most at risk here is the textiles and garments industry.

- The Kenyan government has plans to keep a portion of government contracts for micro-enterprises. EPAs could mean they are no longer allowed to do this.

A call to action

EPA negotiations so far contain little for ACP countries, and could actually increase poverty in some of the poorest countries in the world. European groups are stepping up the pressure on EPAs in direct response to a call from our ACP civil society partners.

Traidcraft along with partners from across the UK and Europe are calling for the European Union member states to wake up to the threat of EPAs and immediately:
- Stop the current negotiations
- Remove the demand for the opening up of reciprocal trade and for new issues from their negotiating mandate
- Work with the ACP to reform WTO rules
- Work urgently to investigate alternatives that leave ACP countries better – not worse – off, as was promised in the Cotonou Agreement

For more information visit: or www.stopepa.org

* Liz Dodd works for Traidcraft in the UK.

* Please send comments to [email protected]

EPAs mark a historic turning point in the history of trade agreements. But, writes Charles Abugre, any new trade agreement must help ACP countries to improve and diversify what they produce and export. This will require a radical rewrite of EPAs as they currently stand.

EPAs are historic trade agreements. They will have an unprecedented impact on the development of some of the world’s poorest countries. They mark a radical shift in the relationship between these countries and their most important partner for aid and trade – the European Union. Previously characterised by preferential market access and aid for building trade capacity, this 'partnership' will oblige ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries to sign up to free trade agreements with the EU in order to maintain the market access on which producers and traders have come to depend and in order to benefit from the development assistance package that is tied to 'economic partnership agreements'. Christian Aid recognises the danger of this approach. If carried out in their current form, EPAs will undermine the development potential of many of the world’s poorest countries by exposing poor producers and traders to unequal competition and by tying the hands of governments to use trade policy selectively to support their agricultural and industrial development.

As the deadlines for the 6th ministerial conference of the World Trade Organisation in Hong Kong become more pressing, the attention of civil society is potentially diverted and the negotiating capacity of ACP countries is increasingly stretched. It is therefore important that the criticality of EPAs is not forgotten, not least because the two sets of negotiations are inextricably linked.

The discussions underway in the Rules Negotiating Group on regional trade agreements (RTAs) will establish the framework for EPAs. The call of the African Union to shift the timetable of EPA negotiations to let these basic rules be in place before substantive negotiations start is a logical one (African Union 2005). Currently ACP countries are trying to hit a moving target, or worse are trying to shoe-horn EPAs to fit flawed rules that were not designed for RTAs between developed and developing countries. WTO talks will also establish the baseline for EPAs. It is impossible to know what is the value of offers on market access until these talks are completed. It is also impossible to know what the impact will be of a new WTO deal on preference erosion – a critical issue for ACP countries, and one that the EU has committed to address under the Cotonou Agreement and as part of the Doha agenda.

Under EPAs, some of the world's poorest countries are being asked to open up their markets to products from Europe. The likely results are not hard to imagine. With their diverse range of products and muscle in the marketplace, European producers can outstrip ACP rivals in their domestic markets. European producers have enjoyed decades of subsidies, support and protection from their governments and have built strong, competitive industries. ACP countries – whose problem is not only that they cannot sell enough, but that they cannot produce enough – have not. They stand not only to lose existing markets, but also the potential to develop new ones.

According to the rhetoric, EPAs are designed for poverty reduction and to ensure the ACP's integration into the world market. After decades of structural adjustment, the majority of ACP countries are already integrated into international trade – it is the nature of this integration that is the problem. Since colonial times, ACP countries have been locked into feeding the European market with raw commodities and are often locked out when they try to export processed or value-added products.

Any new trade agreement between ACP countries and Europe must help them to improve and diversify what they produce and export. EPAs that focus on locking in an inexorable reduction in tariffs, and their eventual elimination, will not achieve this. No country has developed without the flexibility to raise as well as lower tariffs selectively to protect and encourage development of new industries.

In a recent report, Christian Aid exposed the already disastrous impact of enforced trade liberalisation on poor producers and looked ahead to the likely effects of further lowering tariffs in three African countries (Christian Aid 2005).
In Ghana and Senegal, the enforced lowering of import tariffs on products such as tomato paste and chicken parts has been followed by a deluge of products sold at cut-throat prices from Europe. These often undercut local goods, causing factories that add value to local produce to close down. This leads to great hardship in poor, rural communities where people's livelihoods rely on selling surplus food.

In Mozambique, liberalisation resulting from EPAs would open up a thriving milling industry to more cheaply produced wheat-flour from Europe. This would not only mean job losses in the milling industry, but would have a knock-on effect among the small but growing number of Mozambican farmers who produce wheat.

The studies show that not only is liberalisation often a harmful policy for poor people, but it will 'cap' development and leave countries dependent on the same narrow range of primary commodities.

EPAs are also threatening existing but fragile regional groupings among ACP countries. African countries in particular have long considered regional integration an important development strategy. It is both a means to overcome the limitations of small markets and an opportunity to pool resources for infrastructure and major production projects. But regional integration will not be advanced enough to kick-start growth by the time the EU expects African countries to start opening up markets to EU imports. This will mean that advantages accrue to the EU as the common and dominant partner in these trade arrangements. Opportunities to develop industries in goods that can be traded regionally will be lost.

EPAs are poorly designed to promote regional integration, regardless of timing. Least developed countries (LDCs) and non-LDCs have different incentives to sign up to EPAs, since LDCs benefit from the Everything But Arms initiative beyond 2007. The integrity of two long-standing African regional groupings – COMESA and SADC – is under threat because member governments of both groupings now have to choose under which they will negotiate a new trade deal with the EU.

Putting development first will require a radical rewriting of EPAs. EPAs provide potential advantages over preferential schemes as they enable the ACP to negotiate continued and improved access to EU markets that is legally secure. They are also attached to development assistance to enhance regional integration, to address supply-side constraints to production and to help cope with the costs of adjustment caused by trade reforms. Neither of these features of EPAs should be used to leverage commitments to liberalise. Instead, the EC must work with the ACP to ensure that development does indeed come first, and that ACP country governments are able to use trade policy flexibly to enable this to happen.

Progress towards this goal can be made in Hong Kong, if countries support measures to make effective special and differential treatment an integral part of WTO rules governing regional trade agreements.

* Charles Abugre is currently the head of policy and advocacy at Christian Aid. He has been a development activist in Ghana and many parts of Africa and Asia

* Please send comments to [email protected]

References

African Union (2005) 'Ministerial declaration on EPA negotiations', June

Christian Aid (2005) For Richer or Poorer: transforming economic partnership agreements between Europe and Africa. London: Christian Aid

Patrick Burnett and Firoze Manji

Why should anyone be interested in the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) currently being negotiated between the European Union (EU) and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries?

Behind the herd of acronyms, obscure economic jargon and polite euphemisms, lies a pernicious programme that threatens to subjugate the economies of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries to the needs of European capital. Schatan once wrote of world debt that ‘In a political dimension [this has meant] a true territorial conquest of the South by the North, without any apparent military conflict ... but in the name of the sacrosanct concepts of ‘development’ and ‘interdependence’.’[1] Those word resonate equally with respect to EPAs.

With little public profile and fanfare, EPA negotiations have been underway since September 2002 and must be completed by the end of 2006. In their purest form EPAs would essentially be free trade agreements that would comply with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. They would involve the elimination of import duties and taxes, and exclude no economic sector from the coverage of the free trade area and include agreements on trade in services and trade related areas.

Behind the use of positive-sounding words like “partnership” and “development”, critics contend that the EU – the most important trading partner of ACP countries – has little interest in a trade partnership that would support and strengthen the integration process in Africa. Rather, it is merely hammering home a brutal free trade regime through EPAs whereby ACP countries remain a market for European products and a source of cheap raw materials and labour.

Fears are that an unfettered focus on free trade without taking into account the essentially unequal relationship between the more developed EU and less developed ACP countries would result in more inequalities, not less. The Stop EPA campaign notes: “The overwhelming emphasis on liberalisation in the EPA negotiations proves that these negotiations are about expanding Europe's access to ACP markets, rather than about ACP countries’ development.” ACP countries would have to suffer the consequences of this drive for profit. Fragile markets would be flooded with cheaper European goods and the resulting knock-on effect would lead to higher unemployment and subsequent social decline.

EPAs would impact on every area of life in ACP countries. As the authors of articles in this edition of Pambazuka News make clear, EPAs in their current form would be catastrophic for the development of ACP countries. They would result not in development, but underdevelopment; not in partnership but in domination; not in integration but in fragmentation. Put bluntly, the looting would continue.

This special issue is dedicated to raising public awareness of the real nature of EPAs and to raise consciousness of what our governments are doing in our name

[1] J Schatan. World Debt: Who is to Pay? Zed Books, London 1987.

Articles in this edition

1. Economic Partnership Agreements and putting development first

EPAs mark a historic turning point in the history of trade agreements. But, writes Charles Abugre, any new trade agreement must help ACP countries to improve and diversify what they produce and export. This will require a radical rewrite of EPAs as they currently stand.

2. Economic Partnership Agreements or Broken Partnerships? The Case of West Africa

The language might be the same but the divide between what the European Union and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries want from Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) is huge, explains Bibiane Mbaye. The EU has largely bulldozed its way through the negotiations so far. “Not only has not a single commitment in favour of an agreement benefiting development been made by the EC, but additionally, the EC is actually using the EPAs to obtain what it has not been able to obtain multilaterally,” writes Mbaye.

3. Growing resistance to EPAs

Current EPA negotiations must be stopped, says Liz Dodd. These trade negotiations contain little for ACP countries and could actually increase poverty in some of the poorest countries in the world. Dodd explains that the EU is making grossly unfair demands over EPAs and is forcing controversial 'new' issues through the back door. EPAs are further undermining regional integration.

4. Learning the rules: The WTO and EPAs

EPA negotiations have been underway since September 2002 and must be completed by the end of 2006. On 25 July 2005, at a meeting of the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) Negotiating Group on Rules, WTO members will debate the introduction of flexibilities and special treatment for developing countries into rules governing regional trade agreements (RTAs). This is a crucial area for the ACP group of countries with regards negotiations over EPAs, writes Christina Weller.

5. Meeting Africa’s human development needs and the failure of EPAs

Far from being a development tool, Demba Moussa Dembele argues that Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) seek to take control of the continent’s resources and undermine its drive toward autonomous economic and social development. The result would be the transformation of Africa into a playground of multinational corporations. Trade and Africa’s ‘integration’ into the global economy must not be allowed to take place on terms dictated by Europe, Dembele concludes.

6. Negotiating a fair deal: Are trade agreements with the EU beneficial to women?

Gender issues are conspicuous by their absence from the 'hard' areas of EPA negotiations, such as trade and regional cooperation. In order to estimate the likely impact of future trade agreements on poor women and men, a more systematic approach to trade policy negotiations and to capacity building in ACP countries is required, writes Karin Ulmer.

7. Predictions for the economic partnership agreements negotiations: EU=1, ACP=0

Richard Kamidza is not optimistic about the outcome of EPAs, arguing that they will ultimately undermine Africa’s economies. Kamidza explains that negotiations are taking place in the context of a skewed relationship between Africa and Europe that already hinders development prospects. This means that the EU is unlikely to face strong opposition to its desire to fast track EPA negotiations.

8. Trade terms: A guide to EPAs

AND...Subscriber letters on the G8 and Pan-African Postcard. Subscribers please note that Pambazuka News will return to its usual format from next week.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: Pambazuka News would like to extend our thanks to Christian Aid, who supported the production of this edition.

The interview with Prof Issa Shivji is in many respects straight outright which, is what I think, lacks within the African leadership as they dine and wine around diplomatic polemics while the ordinary people suffer from the outcome of indecision by its leadership. The comment by Prof Shivji sends strong signals that Africans are intelligent and know exactly where problems emanate: "….It is African leaders who like poodles dance to the tune; the African people in their villages have little time to engage in such dances." Might I add that not only do villagers not have time but will not be given the chance to meet, let alone to attend to some of the arenas when Africa is openly sold to the G8 markets and mortgaged.

Basically the Professor was making a comment on the hopes Africa may entertain, if any, on the forthcoming G8 summit in Scotland. The title under which it appeared in Pambazuka News was as given above and adopted by me for this critique. The title of this brief expose is therefore to the credit of the Pambazuka editor.

What really could come out of the G8 summit which African leaders can keep hoping about without learning to look unto themselves and their peoples? Again, I find the comment of Prof Shivji quite intriguing if not a ridicule to African leadership: "Isn't it a cruel irony that a leader of a country that followed Bush into destroying a developing country (Iraq) and that has increased its arms sales to Africa fourfold in the last four years should be spearheading the fight against African poverty. If this is not cynicism, what is it?"

The Professor eludes Africa's leadership problem to lack of vision and failure to distinguish between the devil and his messenger which ultimately always ends up with the same mission, which is, aid with unbearable interest rates and strict conditions which cripple efficiency. Coupled with rampant growth in unethical accounting practices that beset African political governance, the G8 is never willing to provide expertise to help put packages to fruition and induct their African counterparts to carry on with continuity. It also could be argued in contrast that the G8 would not dare do anything like continuity assurance for fear that they may be labeled with the same brand that is historically remembered as imperialism.

If for over two decades the imperial empire was able to show cases of shining independent former colonies which they had supervised that may put most of the vocal African voices to silence. The G8 suffers from the same problems she accuses African leadership of - 'talk without action' because of corruption. The G8 s corruption is of being very imperialistic in nature and behaviour, finding joy in babying a child for ever and not allowing him/her to grow into maturity to take her/his own decisions. While it is true that leadership has ordinarily become corrupt on the African continent, the G8 unless otherwise, should design financial assistance packages based on partnership rather than on a slave-master plan which yokes someone into everlasting debt because the repayments plus interest rates are far too high.

But why though, does African political leadership spend more money on guns and why too does the G8 partnership not impose sanctions on the sale of ams to less developed nations who are recipients of development loans? If the G8 are able to address limitation of arms manufacture by those countries and companies, why not talk of tying the world into a similar protocol on buying of arms by the less developed; so that resources are spent on humanitarian and infrastructure for democratic development? As a practical business man I have found that the G8 work favourable terms among themselves, while adopting different protocols that cripple African capacity to deliver.

Having been colonial masters of Africa, many in the G8 owe Africa much and should either play ball straight or just stop covering by arranging another ploy to watch Africa go deeper into debt and the crisis of failing to feed herself. I believe that the propensity for corruption has grown as an emulation of world leadership who have manipulated situations to fit their economic gains.

I suppose the honest position is to say to Africa, you will not get better from getting loans but will improve from your will power to control and use efficiently the little you have and bargain for bigger gains on an efficiently managed economy.

I was reading the topic of tsunami in Zimbabwe with a great sympathy to my friends in Zimbabwe. It appears to me that the land reform we have been hearing of is in havoc'. The people who were supposed to be allocated land are all in an urban area doing illegal dealings etc etc...At this point of time I think Africans should stand up and say dictatura proliata no more - what we need may be dictatura economica'.