As President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga sought to pave way for the resettlement of internal refugees in the Rift Valley, local MPs were opposed to the approach. The MPs, who have stated their position clearly in and outside Parliament, are against what they call a “superficial” solution to the problem without addressing the underlying causes.

Kenya's rival leaders have embarked on a joint tour of the areas of the country worst affected by violence which followed their battle over disputed elections.
Mwai Kibaki, the president, and Raila Odinga, Kenya’s prime minister, urged ethnic reconciliation as they visited areas in the Rift Valley on Thursday.

We are citizens drawn from different groupings of grassroot Kenyans meeting under the umbrella of Bunge La Mwananchi. We want to state that the ongoing celebration of the grand coalition is wholly a political class affair that the ordinary Kenyan has no part in. The grand coalition government has concentrated on rewarding regional balance among the political elite without any social balance amongst Kenyans.

Addressing the issue of resettling the tens of thousands of people displaced in post-election violence will be the first significant test of Kenya's new coalition government. It is no surprise that a quarter of the members of Kenya's new super-sized cabinet are from the Rift Valley - the area worst affected by the post-election violence.

During the Kenya Elections 2007 and after, amateur and professional photographers alike captured powerful scenes of the campaigning, voting and ensuing violence and destruction. The exhibition tells this story through over 150 compelling images, presenting an opportunity for us all to remember and reflect. Exhibition runs Monday to Friday 9am -5pm and on Saturdays 10am-4pm. Closes 10th May 2008.

Equality Now, an international human rights organization dedicated to ending violence and discrimination against women globally, is seeking to recruit a Program Officer, who will assist the Nairobi Office Director with program work and specifically in the areas of managing a fund for grassroots activism to end female genital mutilation (FGM), helping draft and publish Awaken, a semi-annual newsletter that addresses FGM, and research and campaign related to the legal defense of adolescent girls in Africa.

Kenya swore in a power-sharing government on Thursday to soothe fury over a disputed election that plunged the East African country into a bloody crisis. "Our people are now in the process of reconciliation," President Mwai Kibaki said at the ceremony, nearly four months after the December 27 poll that triggered what was arguably Kenya's darkest moment in its post-independence history. "We can and must bring the cycle of violence to an end."

Still in its nascent stages, the Kenya National Social Protection Plan is an ambitious government project that proposes far-reaching policies and actions for the poor and vulnerable that will enhance their capacity to cope with poverty and equip them to better manage risks and shocks. The process begun in early 2007.

With the gradual return of peace across Kenya, the AMREF clinic in the heart of the sprawling Kibera slums has in February recorded an over 400% increase in patient numbers over the previous month as patients can now freely access the facility. Patients trooping to the Kibera Community Based Health Centre are on the rise as calm returns to the Nairobi city slum that was severely ravaged by the post-election violence that erupted across the country.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/364/47414rape.jpg

Following Ann Jones' "The War against Women in Africa" and Marie Claire Faray-kele's "D R Congo: Women – Violence in war and in peace" [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/362/47407onion.jpg Nderitu argues that development, security and human rights should be the priorities in Kenya post conflict reconstruction; and not creating a bloated cabinet under the guise of power-sharing

It’s official. We have a grossly overpaid cabinet of 40, the largest ever in East Africa. The 34- 44- 40 cabinet debate in Kenya is an ominous pointer to what our politicians consider priorities; positions and not needs. Yet our needs are the embers which opportunely stoked ignite into conflict. Kofi Annan argued as UN Secretary General in 2005 that we cannot enjoy development without security, security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights and that unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed. This are needs, not positions. He repeated this statement when he came to Nairobi to mediate. What does this statement have to do with our post conflict priorities? Let us use a human rights education training method on analysis, the conflict onion to understand what he meant. To do so we have to peel the onion together.

Experience teaches us that in peaceful situations people relate and act on the basis of their actual needs (what we have to have). The lack of basic access to must have needs lays the basis for the presence of structural violence characterised by resentment which does not necessarily translate into open conflict. As instability rises, people coalesce around collective interests (what we want) rather than needs. With the escalation of the conflict people then withdraw to certain positions (what we say that we want). The positions we then demand at this point and as apart of conditions for peace deals have their roots in the dynamics of the conflict but have little to do with actual needs.

In Kenya, the needs are the core of our onion, the first ring of the onion the interests and the outer ring of the onion the positions. Let’s peel the outer ring. What are the politicians saying that we want? Positions in Government for all parties because it’s the only way to for everyone to benefit and guarantee peace. Let’s peel the second ring - But what are our interests? What do we want? Equality and non-discrimination on all fronts especially ethnicity, disability, gender and equitable access to resources, participation and inclusion, accountability and the rule of Law. The interests are in their totality human rights based approach to development principles.

LET’S NOW TAKE THE CORE OF THE ONION APART. WHAT MUST WE HAVE?

We urgently need roads in good conditions; to markets for our produce, to a hospital with medicine, to a school with teachers and books, to a water point. We need security. We need leaders we can speak to who will listen just as we do as they address political rallies and religious gatherings. We need the IDP‘s resettled, MP’s salaries reduced and our taxes manageable, we must have an end to impunity and a Truth and Justice and Reconciliation Commission. We must have support for arts and sports and debunk the myth that education is the only way out of poverty for our youth. Sportsmen like Catherine Ndereva, Paul Tergat and musicians like Tony Nyandundo did not hone their skills in examination rooms. We need to afford maize and wheat flour, to get direct benefits for the cane and coffee farmer. We must have our textile industry back on its feet again. We need opportunities for the neglected North Eastern Province. We must have massive land education initiatives similar to the HIV-AIDs campaigns at the community and policy level. We need well remunerated Doctors, nurses, University lecturers and law enforcement officers. We need jobs for our youths.

Peeling onions is a tear shedding business so let’s ask the loaded question; to what extent is the creation of a bloated cabinet based on prioritising of positions truly suited to promoting Kenyans needs and interests? Numbers do not mean delivery of services to meet our needs. Kenya’s post conflict reconstruction will be founded on the basis of solutions to needs and well-understood interests, not political positions.Granted; conflicts do undergo transformations that have nothing to do with the original reasons such as the need for self protection, revenge or the economic or political opportunities offered by the conflict.

But working out the conflict issues (at the level of the various positions and interests) and the conflict causes (at the level of the interests and needs) from wherever you stand will help us all examine our own positions and assist us gain an understanding of the interests and needs of the other side. This will help us lay the foundations for the permanent resettlement of the IDP’S hand in hand with enforcement of the rule of law. Try it. You will be surprised that our original needs are in fact perfectly compatible with each other and that in fact Positive peace encompasses human security, stability and development as needs, not positions as priorities to guarantee peace. And that a cabinet of 40 just adds to our socio economic dilemmas. Brace yourselves Kenyans. We are in for tough times.

*Alice Nderitu is a Nderitu is a senior human rights officer, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/362/47406camera.jpgAs the baton of violence heads over to Zimabwe, Bronwen Manby looks at the African Peer Review Mechanism in relation to Kenya, its shortcomings such as lack of follow-up and political teeth and the urgent lessons from its engagement with Kenya

"There is a need for a healing of the nation. The process of national healing and reconciliation is unlikely to proceed as long as society is still polarized. In addition, without also addressing past crimes, corruption, marginalization and poverty, it is unlikely that reconciliation can be achieved."

This is not a quote from a report on the recent election violence in Kenya, but from the country review report of the African Peer Review Mechanism, presented two years ago by the APRM panel of eminent persons to African heads of state and defended by President Mwai Kibaki himself on the margins of the July 2006 African Union summit.

The report went on to consider previous violence in Kenya, making observations that are just as valid today as when its writers made them. The APRM eminent persons noted ‘the role of prominent members of the ruling party and high ranking government officials in fuelling the so-called ethnic clashes’. They complained that many of the people involved ‘have neither been investigated nor prosecuted. Some have continued to serve as senior officers, ministers, or members of parliament. The inability to act [against them] tends to underline general public perception of impunity, while at the same time constricting the ability of people to come to terms with the past experiences of injustice and violence thus further aggravating and reinforcing polarities and suspicion.’

All in all, the APRM country review report made a remarkably frank assessment of Kenya’s problems. The report did not shy away from highlighting issues of corruption, especially in land allocation, nor from the ethnic tensions that have been so horribly demonstrated in recent weeks. It identified ‘overarching issues’ that Kenya would need to address, starting with ‘managing diversity in nation building’, and going on to filling the ‘implementation gap’ between policy and action on the ground; addressing poverty and wealth distribution; land reform; action against corruption; constitutional reform; and addressing gender inequality and youth unemployment.

Finally and notably, the report called for ‘transformational leadership’ – leadership that ‘recognizes the need for dramatic change in a society’ and that ‘entails not simply directing change but managing it in a way that ensures broad ownership, legitimacy and self-directed sustenance and replication of change in all associated systems.’

Thus, just two years ago, Kenya was being lauded as one of the first countries in Africa to complete the process of examination by the APRM, while the resulting report provided a hard-hitting analysis of the challenges the country faced and made some important recommendations on the way forward. The country’s decision to sign up for the APRM was supposed to be an indication of commitment to good governance and respect for the principles of democracy and human rights. Had the problems the APRM report then highlighted been tackled, it is possible that the violence and distress of the 2008 crisis could have been avoided. And yet nothing was done. What went wrong?

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/362/47406map.jpgThe Kenyan APRM report does have some weaknesses. Most importantly, it does not identify the issues relating to the independence of the Electoral Commission of Kenya that were so critical on election day and in the following period. This in turn reflects a weakness in the APRM questionnaire that guides the reviews, which does not focus on electoral management and its independence, but rather the simple fact of holding elections.

A much greater weakness lies in the gap between the country review report and the programme of action which is supposed to set out concrete, costed actions that will address the problems identified in the report.

For example, the review report decries the lack of independence of the judiciary, and especially the vulnerability to executive influence of the process for nomination and appointment of judges. The eminent persons noted that during their visits to Kenya, they had received reports of incidents in which prominent government officials either disobeyed court orders or expressed an intention to disobey them. They state forthrightly that, ‘The Chief Justice being an appointee of the President is not trusted to be able to take an independent decision’ – the very reason why Raila Odinga and his ODM party rejected the insistence by the incumbent PNU that any challenges to the election results should take place in court.

Yet the programme of action talks only of ‘enforcement of judicial reforms and existing administrative measures to ensure members of the bench improve efficiency, accountability and monitoring of judicial functions’. There is no mention of steps to end executive interference and ensure respect for the rule of law.

In other areas too, the programme of action shies away from the difficult political issues, focusing rather on capacity building and resource mobilisation; matters to which even President Kibaki could happily agree – and in many cases had already done so as part of ongoing donor-financed reforms.

But the biggest concern is the issue of political will. Was the Kenyan government ready to try to fix what was broken? Were the APRM eminent persons and secretariat willing to hold them to account? And were other African heads of state who had signed up for the APRM process – to whom the APRM eminent persons and secretariat report – ready to urge remedies for poor performance, or would their own glass houses discourage the throwing of stones?

A journalist and member of Kenya’s national NEPAD secretariat was present at the APR Forum (the meeting of all the heads of state who have signed up for the APRM) when it met to review the Kenya report. His account gives us a clue as to what the ‘peer review’ element of the APRM really means:

"I counted the number of leaders who spoke after President Kibaki had responded to Dr Machel. They were from Ghana, Ethiopia, South Africa, Rwanda and Nigeria. Not one posed a question to Mr Kibaki. They all praised the report and commended Kenya for being candid, thorough and open. They pledged to support Kenya in seeking solutions to its constitution review and diversity problems.

When it was all over, presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia expressed relief and promised to go on with the process, after realising that it was not a life-and-death situation."

Thus, though Kibaki was said to be ‘committed to addressing all the issues, among them tribalism, poor corporate management and corruption, which were raised’ by the APRM report, he need not expect too critical a review from the other heads of state on his follow-up in practice.

Although each country that has undergone the APRM process is supposed to report back to the APR Forum on its progress, there is no serious monitoring exercise of how effectively this is done. Nor any sanctions for failure to act. Nor, apparently, is there any real system to ensure that the commitments the government makes address the most important problems highlighted in the APRM review. Certainly, no individual or institution at the African level, least of all the APR Forum, raised the implementation of the APRM commitments as critical issues during the recent Kenyan crisis – or, perhaps more importantly, during the lead up to the election, when such a focus could perhaps have averted the near-catastrophe into which Kenya was drawn.

At national level, meanwhile, the implementation of the APRM programme of action is also left entirely to the executive, with no formalised role for parliamentarians or civil society to hold the government’s feet to the fire should it fail to perform. As in other countries, the APRM process has not been well-integrated into other national development planning processes – a problem recognised by the APRM secretariat in South Africa – and it does not appear to have informed other important reform programmes under way at the same time.

Moreover, the systems in place to monitor the implementation of other national policies (however imperfect) are also not mobilised to engage with the implementation of the APRM programme of action. President Kibaki did not report back to parliament on the APR Forum meeting and on the actions he had committed to take, nor was the report tabled for debate. Though there was some coverage in the media of the APR Forum discussion of Kenya, it did not generate a real national debate on the report and programme of action and their implications. The conclusions and recommendations were not widely disseminated throughout the country by the NEPAD-Kenya secretariat or other means. Although a meeting hosted by the NEPAD-Kenya secretariat in mid-February 2008 aimed – encouragingly – to involve civil society in the process of preparing the country’s progress report to the next APR Forum, the report of the meeting is surreal in its lack of any suggestion that this review might be relevant to, or affected by, the national political crisis.

Even the continental APRM secretariat failed to engage in any serious way with national institutions, such as the Electoral Commission of Kenya or the Kenya National Human Rights Commission, in order to brief them on the conclusions relevant to them and the follow-up role they might play.

Without this sort of integration into other national planning systems, debates and oversight mechanisms, the APRM process seems doomed to become little more than a cosmetic exercise without effect in the real world of policy and decision making.

There is no demand from civil society in Kenya or elsewhere for the APRM to issue condemnations of countries’ performance on governance or to ‘take action’ on the behaviour of recalcitrant governments (as some international commentators have suggested—for example, in the case of Zimbabwe): the APRM is not a human rights monitoring body, but rather a tool for mutual learning, and there are other AU institutions that are more appropriate for the more obviously critical and political role. Nevertheless, civil society groups do feel strongly that while peer review by fellow heads of state is all very well, it should be backed up by a greater effort by the APRM Secretariat or other independent groups to monitor performance of governments against the programmes of action to which they have signed up. The Pan-African Parliament could also be brought in to play this role.

‘National ownership’ – which everyone agrees is critical for the success of the APRM project – should not be interpreted to mean that the only actions agreed are those that ruffle no feathers and disturb no vested interests. And whatever actions are undertaken should be subject to monitoring and enforcement by institutions that are independent of executive control – at both continental and country levels, by national parliaments, constitutional oversight bodies and civil society coalitions.

There are now 29 countries that have acceded to the APRM – Mauritania being the most recent, after signing the APRM memorandum of understanding at the January 2008 AU summit. To date, the process has exceeded the expectations of many observers. The eminent persons appointed when the APRM was established have, by and large, done a good job in establishing its credentials: many civil society activists were taken aback that the level of criticism directed at Kenya could have emerged from the APRM process.

But lessons should be learned as the mechanism takes on its next countries. The APRM process needs a stronger connection to three critical constituencies: to the citizen in whose name it is being undertaken (through outreach by government, media and civil society); to the political class (through policy planning processes, parliament and political parties) and to the wider African and international community (through African continental institutions as well as the structures through which development assistance is channelled).

The new members of the APRM panel due to be appointed in 2008 will have to take on board the lessons learned so far – and be strong enough to resist the pressure placed on them to conform to executive wishes. The heads of state themselves should have the courage to stick to their original commitment that the process be independent and effective, as they select the next members and agree the budget for the secretariat.

For Kenya, meanwhile, the 2006 conclusion of the APRM report remains relevant today:

"From all indications, it is obvious that the challenge in Kenya is beyond the mere adoption of a new constitution. The challenge remains that of resolving the following contentious issues: the nature and character of executive powers, devolution of power, constitutional provisions for religious courts, and the mode of transition to the new constitution. These issues, among others, cannot be resolved by simple technicalities or constitutional legalese, but will require a modicum of political sagacity to evolve necessary political solutions. Current prognosis suggests that a carefully managed mediatory and conciliatory intervention under the aegis of the African Union may prove crucial in facilitating the much needed political compromise and solution in resolving these issues and minimise loss of face by the different power centres and factions. The sustainability of the proposed outcome will be hinged on the ability to devise a win-win formula while simultaneously responding to the collective aspirations of a highly divided society."

The important and serious effort that went into producing these recommendations must not go to waste. If the official oversight institutions are neglecting to ensure that they are implemented, then civil society organisations must step into their place.

*Bronwen Manby is a Senior Programme Adviser - AfriMAP at the Open Society Institute. For more analysis of the APRM process in Kenya and elsewhere see

**Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Steve Ouma argues that for the promised social transformation in Kenya to take root, "political class and other parochial interests" have to give way to consensus and truth telling.

The jubilations that followed the announcement of the Grand Coalition cabinet on April, 13, 2008 were expected. In the lips of most Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) supporters the talk was “at least now we shall also share in the National cake” and perhaps not just as “passengers” in government but real actors. Evoking the classical argument of legal theorist Bruce Ackerman, some analysts have argued that Kenya has been in a constitutional moment since the outbreak of the post 2007 election violent protests. My reading is that most of these commentators have not made a full reading of Bruce’s argument- and if they have, then their interpretation of the text is a little off the mark. Bruce argues that constitutional democracy in the United States has evolved along two distinct tracks of lawmaking. One track is that of “normal politics,” the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government make decisions on behalf of citizens in the absence of high levels of citizen engagement. The second track is what he refers to as the “constitutional moments” These are times characterized by sustained citizen engagement and mobilization and demand for social transformation. This track is therefore one of “higher” lawmaking enterprises.

During these constitutional moments, the people themselves assert their supremacy, and demand sweeping changes in the structure of constitutional democracy. When American democracy has functioned on this second, “higher track” of lawmaking -- as when the constitution itself was framed, when the country emerged from its civil war and brought an end to slavery, and when the federal government dramatically expanded its intervention in the national economy during the New Deal of the 1930’s – governing institutions were fundamentally reshaped.

By all measure, the Prime Minister Raila Odinga’s and President Kibaki’s hand shake and the subsequent deal, legal and constitutional changes have not generated such heights. In the recent history though, when Kenya experienced constitutional moments was the case during the 2002 elections and at the National Constitutional Conference held at Bomas of Kenya (popularly referred to as the Bomas conference). Before the conference, Prof. Yash Pal Ghai’s Commission had gone round the country listening to the people. After many years of misrule and oppression Kenyans used the Ghai hearing sessions as moments of reviewing their past and defining the future. Through Ghai and his team they demanded a presidency that did not replicate a god; one who was not above the law or omniscient. As, Barth (2005), notes the Kenyan president is like a Greek god- pompous in benevolence, and lethal in malevolence. On the super-centralized government framework, Kenyans lamented that they work so hard deep in their villages, and generously give unto “Caesar” through exorbitant taxes, but have no say on how “Caesar” shares out the national cake. For this reason they demanded to be allowed to participate more prominently in the way they are governed, and the way their resources should be shared. One cannot side step these moments simply because there was no violence associated with them. These were constitutional moments.

After the 2002 National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) velvet revolution, the clarion call “yote yawezekana bila Moi”( all is possible without Moi), was all over the air and there was increased vigilance by the citizens. In assertion of their supremacy, citizens arrested police caught extorting bribe. Workers in the Export processing Zones took to the streets in March 2003, to claim better wages, collective bargain agreement and justice relation in production. And most important, there was pressure on the NARC administration to fast tract the constitutional reforms- which in their pre-elections pledge, they had promised to do in 100 days. When Bomas re-opened, the debate was robust and unstoppable. Kenyans wanted wide sweeping changes in the structure our constitutional democracy.

The struggle was so intense that it finally polarized the country at the referendum. While there were other issues on which the “NO” and “YES” side differed and put forward passionate arguments amidst propaganda and mudslinging (which are common in vote-wooing campaigns), the subject of the executive and devolution of power was the real water shade. Evidently, most Kenyans wanted and still want a less powerful executive. These were constitutional moments which simply lacked a midwife. It is the frustration and abortion of these moments that created the recipe to the Post December violence pushing t the Country to its death bed.

Kenyans therefore know what they want and have defined it rather well during the 2002 and 2003 “constitutional moments”. These moments have been frustrated by the political class and other parochial interests. It must be in realization of this fact that the president quipped while making his contribution in parliament on the National Accord and Reconciliation Bill 2008 that “even Orengo alone can now write the Constitution”.

With this clarification, what Kenya is going through now can best be described as a moment of liminality. The theorist, Victor Turner (1922-83), introduced this concept in his famous essay “Betwixt and between; the liminal Period in the Rites-de- passage”. His thesis was focused on rites of passage and more so initiation. Turner regarded rites of passage and in particular initiation ritual, as a process of transformation whereby a person moves from one defined state to another, with an intervening period of uncertainty and crisis. It is this state of crisis- liminal stage – that is the focus of the ritual, which seeks to control it and to impose the values of the society upon the wavering individual who for a short but critical period, is in a “gap”. In this “gap” between social status, neither the old nor the new rules apply and the individual is compelled by the society to reflect on her situation, her place in the society and indeed the existence of the society as such.

Going back to the 18th March parliamentary debate ,perhaps this state of Kenya’s liminality was best captured by the Hon. Minister for Justice and Constitutional affairs who in her contribution reminded Members of parliament that the amendments the National Accord and Reconciliation Bill sought to make to the Constitution “is temporary, pending the full review of the Constitution.” The Country is therefore between the new and the old legal order, between authoritarian presidency and another centre of power, between a presidential democracy and parliamentary democracy, between an open and a closed society. One must also recall that the National dialogue Committee is still in session and its Chief mediator, Mr Oluyemi Adeniji, was in the parliamentary gallery on 18th March. What the Committee has been doing is to assist Kenya to reflect on her situation, her place as a member of regional and international community and indeed her own national identity.

The liminal period is also the state of truth telling. Within Victor’s analysis of initiation, it is during their period that the individual is taken through the rigor of community secrets and is invited to understand the truth about the community. Kenya intend to start two truth telling process. One shall be under way soon and that is the Independent Review Committee (IREC) whose mandate is to probe the presidential election fiasco that plunged the country into crisis. The other shall be the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. The common objective of the two parallel teams is to define the elusive truth. This shall be the most trying moment as truth is ultimately a matter of socially and historically conditioned agreement. This means that what the various parties may see as facts, may well depend on their vantage point of seeing the world.

It is only when this consensus is attained that the country shall move on towards the social transformation that we have been yearning for and create a new moral code and national physique. This new Kenya must be reflected in the new constitution whose time line has now been given as twelve months. Liminality is a creative and critical state of being, it is how best all Kenyan stride through it that shall determine our reintegration amongst ourselves and with the international citizenry.

*Steve Ouma is based at the Faculty of Arts, University of Western Cape, South Africa.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

The Kenyan government has embarked on an ambitious national programme to fast track the national rollout of male circumcision as a means of preventing HIV. Results from three randomised controlled trials in South Africa, Kenya and Uganda, in 2006 showed that following circumcision, the incidence of HIV infection was reduced in men by more than half.

Security in the Mt Elgon region of western Kenya, where the army was deployed in March to stop a local insurgency, has improved, but civilians still fear being targeted in the ongoing operation. "There is an improved sense of security and people are able to access the markets more," Sokwony Laikong, a local resident, told IRIN on 10 April. Most farmers were now able to reach their gardens, although they were suffering from high prices of inputs, such as fertilizer.

Ongoing changes in the licensing regime are holding back Kenya's potential to become a regional e-commerce hub, industry players said. Entrepreneurs say most of the changes are making it harder for them to compete and are tilting the market in favour of their rivals.

Journalists who covered and were psychologically affected by last year’s post election violence are now going to benefit from a trauma counseling programme that was launched last week. Organized by the Kenya Association of Photographers, Illustrators and Designers (KAPIDE) and Kenya Correspondents’ Association (KCA) and funded by International Media Support (IMS), the programme will provide trauma counseling to a total of 150 journalists.

The Council of the EU has issued a statement expressing same concern as Annan expressed on 2 April and calling for formation of “an effective and efficient coalition government as soon as possible that reflects genuine power-sharing between Kenya's parties”

Clashes between youths and police have returned to the streets of Kenya after the political deadlock. Police have fired tear gas as hundreds of youths protested at the delay in forming a power-sharing government. Opposition supporters have threatened more unrest if a cabinet is not formed soon with their leader Raila Odinga at the helm.

At least 6,000 people have been affected by flooding following heavy rains in the southern coastal district of Taveta, the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) said. Three primary schools have also been closed temporarily after being submerged," Anthony Mwangi, the KRCS Public Relations Manager said on 1 April. "The water levels in some areas are up to chest level."