A veteran radio journalist for French broadcaster Radio France Internationale, distinguished for his exclusive coverage of a seventh-month-old armed rebellion in northern Niger, was sent to prison today after four days in police custody on accusations of aiding the rebels, according to local journalists.

The West African Editors Forum (WAEF) has learnt that the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi has filed a suit against three independent newspapers in Niger. The weeklies Le Canard Déchaîné and L’Evénement, as well as the bi-monthly Action, are being accused of “defamation” and “publication of false news that could undermine the honour of the leader”.

Reporters Without Borders has voiced concern about a rapid deterioration in press freedom in Niger, especially in the north, following the imposition on 19 July 2007 of a one-month ban on the retransmission of French public radio station Radio France Internationale's (RFI) programmes throughout the country. "There have been many press freedom violations since fighting broke out in the north of the country," the organisation said.

"Air Info", a bi-weekly privately-owned newspaper in Agadez, about 1,000 km from the capital Niamey, was suspended on 29 June 2007 by the media regulatory body (Conseil Supérieur de la Communication, CSC) for covering the activities of a rebel group in the northern part of Niger. The CSC has also frozen the newspaper's annual subsidy provided by the government to the media under Niger's media law.

Nomadic rebels who launched a string of attacks in northern Niger's Sahara desert have said they wanted greater control over uranium and oil reserves being sold off to Chinese and other foreign firms.

New plans are being developed for the 4,100 km Niger River that passes through several West African countries. Regional leaders, with support from the World Bank and member states of the European Union, are now seeking to turn the Niger River's sprawling, churning expanse into a regional advantage, building up the region's economy and linking nations together in a shared vision of environmental preservation along the way.

Niger’s government along with two United Nations agencies have called on donors and NGOs to restart assistance for education in Niger following a corruption scandal last year which led to the freezing of most funds. “[We] call on all development partners to pool their resources to improve access to quality education in Niger,” Niger’s ministry of education said in a joint statement with the World Food Programme and the UN Children’s Agency (UNICEF).

Niger's parliament voted Prime Minister Hama Amadou's government out of office on Thursday after opponents accused it of complicity in a corruption scandal that has shaken the world's poorest country. A majority of 62 deputies in the 113-seat national assembly backed a no-confidence vote, which meant the government of the landlocked West African state was automatically obliged to resign under the constitution.

People are still enslaved in Niger, but an announcement that the government has agreed to sponsor an independent investigation into the issue has raised hopes for change among some human rights experts. Lompo Garba, president of the National Commission for Human Rights and Civil Liberties, the group conducting the new study, said: "Slavery as it was in the past in Niger, for example people owned by other people, no longer exists.

More strikes among primary and secondary school teachers have been met with violent protests in Niamey by their disgruntled students, and as separate protests erupt on university campuses, some observers are warning that the whole academic year is in jeopardy. Basic education, which is only provided to 30 percent of Nigerien children, is widely viewed as one of the main pillars to reducing mortality in the desperately poor country.

Stretching over more than 4,000 kilometres, the Niger is West Africa's longest river, and greatly threatened in the country of the same name by environmental degradation that is causing the water course to silt up, according to an IPS report.

Thousands of people in northern Niger who lost their homes in floods last August are still living in emergency shelters and struggling to survive cold desert weather. The August floods in Bilma, near the regional capital Agadez in northern Niger, destroyed around 1,200 houses and made 4,400 people homeless when their mud-walled houses were washed away.

Save the Children UK has started working in Niger in July 2005, due to the ongoing food crisis which is affecting millions of people. Community-based therapeutic nutritional care (CTC) and primary health care (PHC) to children under-five year’s old in Maradi and Zinder Regions are so far the main intervention domains. SC UK is now about to launch a new food security and livelihood programme in the same areas. This new programme will be a pilot one for the Sahel region and will be therefore highly supported by the Regional and London Offices.

Relief International, an international relief and development agency with cross-sectoral programs bridging relief and development is in search of a Program Manager (PM) for a USAID funded Child Survival (MCH) Program in Tessaoua District, Niger.

I read with great interest the article ‘Niger Delta: Restoring the rights of citizens’ (http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/38222) by Ike Okonta on the Niger Delta crisis. One thing, however, left me with some doubt about the explanation provided by the author for a very complex situation.

The author does not mention that one of the MEND requests is that Nigerian authorities release former Bayelsa State Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, jailed on corruption charges. His story should be well known in the UK since he managed to escape from house arrest in that country while under guard for money laundering.

It is difficult to believe that such requests can be in line with the principle or idea of "bringing the civic back in".

Probably one of the reasons why Oporoza (or other villages in the Delta) is in the condition described by the author is because the money which was supposed to be used for development was instead used by the Bayelsa (and other state governors) to build mansions in the UK, USA or South Africa, and to build refineries (in the case of Alamieyeseigha) in Latin American countries.

The situation in the Niger Delta is not so clear and the links between so called militant groups and the corrupt government officials is not very well understood. So the claim of MEND militants being political subjects forced to pick up AK47’s to restore their rights as citizens is, in many instances, questionable.

I want to thank Joel Bisina for the article, ‘Environmental Degradation in the Niger Delta’ which helped deepen our knowledge and understanding of all the processes going on in the Niger Delta. As we learned from Ike Okonta in previous articles http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/38119 published on Pambazuka News, we are witness to a socio-economic and political tsunami whose proportions are difficult to describe, let alone measure.

As a way forward, I would plea for us not to forget that processes such as those described by Joel,have a history which goes as far back as the process of stealing the land from the Native Americans, killing off the Arawaks in the Caribbean, and then stealing people in Africa, enslaving them in order to replace the most sought after resource of those times: labour, hunting it, maintaining it as cheap as possible has been going on ever since.

Native Americans are speaking up after, as some of them say, keeping silent for five centuries.

What is going on in the Niger Delta is just a microcosm of what James Lovelock has been describing in all his books about Gaia. Now, we hear from Al Gore in “Inconvenient Truth” (book and film) that the destruction of Earth cannot go on. He argues that the way of thinking which has led to this state of affairs has to stop, but I have yet to hear Al Gore say something like this: "Long before my great great grand father was born there were people in North America, who did see that this way of thinking advocated and propagated by European discoverers was not only killing people, but it was also killing Earth/Gaia. I suggest that we, the discoverers/destroyers atone for what our ancestors did, by taking those voices and today's, seriously." Would Al Gore, be willing to discuss with the people of the Niger Delta, with the Native Americans, with the Haitians, in short with all of the people and their descendants who have been screaming NO to a system which was born and continues to reproduce itself by way of a mind set which says it is ok for poor people to die?

Thank you Joel for letting us know about the kind of world your mother lived in, one we urgently need to hold on to.

It is reported that across large areas of Nigeria’s southeastern rainforest belt, hundreds of communities are threatened by erosion because of decades of uncontrolled deforestation and other types of pressure on the land. Joel Bisina explains that whereas both natural and human interventions can result in environment degradation, environmental destruction is a product of peoples’ unhealthy and unfriendly interaction with the environment.

The violence of the last ten years in the Niger Delta has brought to the front burner the issue of the environment, and its implication on regional peace and security. For four decades, ecological devastation on the one hand, and neglect arising from crude oil production on the other hand, have left much of the Niger Delta desolate, uninhabitable, and poor. The unholy contraception, or “joint venture partnership”, fraudulently contrived between the Nigerian state and the oil multinationals to the criminal exclusion of the inhabitants of the region presents a case study for now and the generations unborn.

Ours is a case of the goose that lays the golden egg. The Delta holds the bulk of the economic resources that sustains the public treasury in Nigeria. Yet, years of neglect and ecological devastation have left much of the Niger Delta despoiled and impoverished. This contradiction of riches is a constant refrain in most conflicts in the Delta. I cannot but agree with the summation contained in the UNDP human development report, “a delicate balance exists between the human population in the Niger Delta and its fragile ecosystem. There is a strong feeling in the region that the rate of environmental degradation is pushing the region towards ecological disaster.”

Conflicts in the region have often been blamed on among other things, neglect by government and oil companies, unemployment, military rule, the minority question, and a badly structured Nigerian federalism, especially as it concerns finances. While these factors separately or jointly bear on the conflict dynamics in the region, what has been lacking is their integration into an explanatory system in the addendum called environmental degradation.

I prefer to call it environmental destruction as against degradation. Whereas both natural and human interventions can result in environment degradation, destruction is a product of man’s unhealthy and unfriendly interaction with the environment. Okechukwu Ibeanu questioned if the factors are causal or only mediatory? (Ibeanu, 2000). He went further to query that if they are causal factors, are they principal, secondary, or tertiary, are they triggers, pivotal, mobilizing, or aggravating factors?

I will respond by saying that the environment factor is primary and is pivotal to the Niger Delta regional peace and conflict dynamics.

In attempting to underpin environmental degradation and its implication on peace and conflict dynamics in the Niger Delta, it will be necessary to try to examine the various contextual environments that present themselves and how they singularly or collectively interact to define the peace conflict spiral. Attempt will also be made to examine how this interaction dictates and reorders the peace security dynamics in the Niger Delta.

Natural Environment

Dr Egunjobi Layi in his paper published in Springlink Journal writes that “The relatively under-developed condition of the Delta Area of Nigeria is mainly due to its difficult natural environment. This is with particular reference to the mass, and complex maze, of water which floods the region, causing erosion and pollution, all of which adversely affect agricultural practice, transportation and other human activities.”

While I want to agree with the scholar to some extent, I beg to differ a little and state that attributing the under-development in the delta to a difficult natural environment is just over simplifying the problem. The natural Niger Delta environment we inherited from our forebears was an environment rich in bio diversity, varied species of wild life, dense population of marine and aquatic life, in fresh and salt water bodies, with rich mangrove and fresh water vegetation, flamboyant raffia and shrubs.

However, what we are now bequeathing for future generations is a natural environment whose lushness has disappeared completely, altered and degraded. This is due to canals that have been dredged, rivers and rivulets that have been blocked, streams and ponds that have silted to make way for oil drilling and exploitation. The resulting scenario is mass migration of fish species, destroying traditional livelihood systems. We now have polluted fresh water streams and rivers, fresh water vegetation completely wiped out by salt water encroachment caused by a combination of dredging and high tidal currents resulting from melting ice in the Arctic. The consequences of all these changes in the natural environment are poverty and frustration, resulting in tribes lashing out at one another or at the multi national corporations.

The Physical Environment

Our generation inherited a physical environment that was characterized by natural clean long stretch of sand beaches, fresh and healthy water lettuce that add their beauty and flavor to the environment. It is sad to say that we are bequeathing to our children an environment that is completely eroded or silted in some cases. We are bequeathing communities whose shorelines have been washed away or eroded due to the high volume of deep-sea exploration and exploitation activities. Once hilly and highland environments have been reduced to below sea level. Navigable creeks which once supported socio-economic activities among local dwellers have been silted with dredge dump, washed top surface soil arising from erosion and blocked canal of water ways to make way for oil activities; thus making them difficult for navigation.

We are beginning to find deserts in the delta due to pollution and oil spills, or forests that have been wiped out by bush fires caused by spills of petroleum products from aged or burst pipelines. The situation continues to reduce the land available for farming and infrastructural development. This has created unhealthy competition for available land space, further heightening cases of land related conflicts.

Our skylines are lit up with flares from gas, fumes and smoke associated with gas flare. In some of our communities it is difficult to differentiate between day and night.

Social Environment

The social safety nets of extended family system, communal labour, and communal ownership have broken or been replaced by greedy self-seeking and self-promoting values. I remember growing up as a child in the very strong sense of community that sustained peace and security for the environment.

There was this particular occasion, in 1971 when a stranger passerby pulled into our community in one of the evenings with a very small canoe. The stranger was in the middle of his small canoe, sitting on top of a huge red snapper because he does not want the fish to escape. Immediately when he got to our village he started asking who had set the fishing trap to the south of our community, and my elder sister came out and said, I am the one.

He pulled into our waterfront and said, please come take this fish, I saw it in one of your traps, it was almost escaping so I decided to rescue it and look for the owner. My mother was so moved by the act of courage, honesty and kindness that she told the stranger that he should wait so that they can butcher the fish to enable him to have some portion of the fish. As far as mama was concerned, the fish would have escaped from the trap, but for the resilience of the human spirit of honesty and kindness displayed by the man that rescued the fish. The man simply said, mama thank you for your kind gesture, but let it be next time because my journey is far before I get to my final destination, the portion would have decayed.

In another incident my mother lost her boat with the entire foodstuff she had bought for sale because the boat was not well tied to the shore. The next morning we went out looking for mama’s boat and her foodstuff. If you like, call it going out to search for mama’s shop or stall, because that mobile boat was the shop we had. In every community we got to, we would ask whether they found the boat or not. We finally located mama’s shop at the 8th community from our own. A hunter who had gone out in the night from that community found this strange boat shop and decided to take it to his water front hoping that the owner would show up. When we got there the entire content of mama’s shop boat was intact. The man did not remove a pin. My mother thanked him and we took our shop boat back without paying a dime.

The most exciting aspect of it was that the man even gave a portion from a bush pig he had killed that night, saying that mama’s shop boat brought him good luck that night. He claimed that for the past one week he had been going hunting without success, but that when he saw mama’s floating shop boat, he decided to bring it ashore and tie it firmly to his water front. He then decided to continue his hunting, and that not quite two kilometers away he ran into these bush pigs which by his explanation were mating and he was lucky to kill one of them, but the second one escaped. So not only did we recover our shop boat and its contents, we also had a very fresh portion of bush pig for meal that day.

These were the social settings that existed in our communities then. Communities that were driven by deep values of kindness, honesty and transparency, a communal philosophy of giving and sharing, where the haves have and keep for, on behalf of the whole not self. Societies where you could go to bed with your doors open; houses where there were no doors.

But today caution has been thrown to the wind and people brazenly even appropriate to self that which belongs to all. The social formations now create societies where some live in squalor and abject poverty, while others live in affluence at the expense of the whole. Today words that were alien to our lexicon have started to find their way into dominant pages. We now hear of sea piracy, hostage taking and kidnapping targeted at locals and strangers, highway and sea way robbery, heavily armed criminal gangs in our water ways who wreak all sorts of havoc, all in the name of the Niger Delta struggle. There is no longer trust for one another, not even at the community level.

Religious /Traditional Environment

The clash of traditional and western cultures, religions and belief systems also has opened up sacred shrines and places of worship for drilling and exploration for oil. Ancient landmarks have been pulled down and in some cases destroyed. We are now like a people without a past.

Legal Environment

By decrees, oil and gas became owned by the federal government, and progressively the region’s entitlements by way of derivation-based allocations declined from 50% to a mere 1½% in 1984 and later 3% in 1999 (Augustine Ekelegbe, The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region, p. 214).

The Northern hegemony taking advantage of military dictatorship began a regime of near total appropriation of the region’s oil resources through an intense over centralization and concentration of power and resources in the federal government. Oil resources were a major target. Various decrees and enactments were made to completely take away control of oil from the locals.

Under the Petroleum Act 1969, the entire ownership and control of all oil and gas in place within any land in Nigeria, under its territorial waters and the continental shelf, is vested in the state of Nigeria. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 further emphasized the state ownership in section 40(3), which provides that "the entire property in and control of all mineral oils and natural gas in, under or upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and shall be managed in such manner as may be established by law."

The implication of these laws is that the land available to the locals or people in the Niger Delta is further taken away from them on a daily basis as more oil is found in the land. As the land space gets smaller the struggle for its ownership and control increases and at the same time potential conflict over ownership of land increases.

The Local and International Economic Environment

Nigeria is a major player in the world energy market. It is the seventh largest producer of oil in the world. It supplies a fifth of United States oil imports. It is further becoming an important supplier in the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market. Instability in world oil supplies and the critical link of oil to the international economy has made Nigerian and more generally African oil to be more strategic than ever.

The irony is that the local economic environment is determined and driven by powers and economic forces that transcend beyond our borders - the IMF, the World Bank, Paris Club, Creditors Club, and so on.

We do not have any control over the oil we produce, the quantity to be produced, the price at which to sell, who to sell to and at what price to refine it. Nor do we have the powers to determine at what price we should sell to ourselves.

Other factors at the fore of regional conflicts are strong economic considerations, desperation and the need to amass wealth. Economies of crisis and war in the region have largely been underpinned by greed and high levels of corruption. There is also the profiting from conflicts by youth militias, rebels, armed gangs and even government soldiers. This involves plundering, bunkering, looting, and extortion, imposition of tolls, and robbery of local people, traders and farmers. Most youth militias are driven by the opportunity to acquire properties and riches. The economy underpins an extensive proliferation of arms and the pervasiveness of crime, violence and communal/ethnic conflicts.

The challenges of creating and ensuring access to these benefits have fuelled a deadly struggle among the ethnic and community leaderships, the elites, businessmen and politicians, youths, women and various other groups in the region. It has also fuelled deadly and violent conflicts as each group struggles to prove their relevance and capacity to disrupt the oil economy.

Individuals and groups struggle to control and dominate access and actual opportunities and benefits. The emerging greed, corruption and distributive conflicts underpin numerous incidents of community disturbances and criminal violence in the region.

Ibeanu (2002: 165) describes the situation as a ‘matrix of concentric circles of payoffs and rewards built on blackmail and violence.’ He continues:

The closer a person is to the centre, the greater his/her capacity to blackmail oil companies and therefore the greater his/her payoff. In time, members of the raucous inner circle fade away in a whimper and silence as a new core of vocal community leaders emerge: more blackmail, more payoffs.

Historical / Political Environment

The history of protests and conflicts of acrimony by the Niger Delta peoples against forced union and exploitation dates back to 1957 when testimonies were made in respect thereof before the Willink Commission of Inquiry into Minority Fears. What were those fears? They were fears of marginalization, neglect and the politics of exclusion, by the ethnic majority-based ruling political parties and governments of the then Eastern and Western Regions. Subsequently, several protests and clamors for justice have been registered to no avail.

Characteristically, both military and civilian governments have ignored clamors for equitable remedies, and forcibly smothered protests through use of overwhelming military might and other documented acts of state sanction and political violence.

The prevailing concept of federalism in Nigeria today falls short of expectations in both definition and practice. To the extent that it is being practiced as quasi-federalism, there has been an overly centralized control of resources by the Federal Government. This aberration continues to generate perpetual conflicts with indigenous rights; hence, it has become a major cause of conflicts in the Niger Delta Region, especially from notorious derivation principles for revenue allocation to states in the region.

The Way Forward

• Institutions of government and development interventionist agencies should, as a matter of urgency, fast track the process of environment remediation and ecosystem restoration.
• The issue of transparency and accountability should be taken more seriously.
• Legislations, decrees and enactments that are disempowering should be reviewed and where necessary abrogated as they continue to serve as an impediment to peace and security.
• Development priorities should be set by local communities.
• Local community participation in the resource mobilization, management and allocation should be given the attention it deserves. At least 30% of oil revenue should go directly to oil bearing communities.
• The political process should be made transparent and fair for free entry and exit of those with integrity and men whose vision and values are driven by the desire to serve not to be served.

• This paper was presented at the Niger Delta Environmental Roundtable at the Hotel Presidential Port Harcourt November 16, 2006.

• Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Reference:
[1] Augustine Ikelegbe - The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region
[2] Oke Ibeanu - Oiling the Friction; Environmental Conflict Management in the Niger Delta of Nigeria
[3] CYRIL Obi - Globalised Images of Environmental Security in Africa
[4] Actionaid - Policy Watch (Perspective on Peace Building)
[5] UNDP - Niger Delta Human Development Report
[6] Actionaid - Conflict and Human Security
[7] Joel Bisina - Oil and Corporate Recklessness in Nigeria
[8] Dr. Walter Abeng Mboto - Regional Resources Versus Environmental Conflict in the Niger Delta.
[9] Zak Harmon- World Bank, Big Oil and the Niger Delta.

A massive democratic deficit is at the heart of the Niger Delta crisis, concludes Ike Okota in the third and final article in a series on the troubled Nigerian region. The previous two articles can be found at and [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

[1] Reuters, ‘Nigerian oil “hangs in balance,” 23 March, 2006.
[2] See Reuters article.
[3] George Oji, ‘US to increase Naval Presence in Gulf of Guinea,’ ThisDay, 20 March, 2006.
[4] Segun James, ‘Militants to US: Steer clear of Niger Delta,’ ThisDay, Lagos, 24 February, 2006.
[5] Jeffery Taylor, ‘Worse than Iraq?’ Atlantic, April, 2006.
[6] Professor Jeffery Sachs, a Columbia University economist and UN Sec Gen Kofi Annan’s adviser on Millennium Development Goals, developed the ‘Resource Curse’ theory to explain the seeming inability of resource-rich states in Africa and Latin America to industrialise and prosper like their counterparts in south-east Asia.
[7] Michael Watts, Petro-Violence: Some Thoughts on Community, Extraction and Political Ecology, Berkeley Workshop on Environmental Politics, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, September 1999
[8] See ‘A Trip to Mend Headquarters,’ The Ijaw Voice, July 2006.
[9] See Constitutionality of the Ijaw Struggle, preface.
[10] Jimmy Carter, ‘Visit to Nigeria,’ The Carter Center, Atlanta, 25 February, 1999.
[11] See Anna Zalik, ‘The Niger Delta: “Petro-violence” and “Partnership Development”, Review of African Political Economy, 2004.

Niger's government has called off a threat to expel thousands of Arab refugees from neighbouring Chad. No reason was given for the move, announced in a government statement. "After studying this question and all its socio-economic implications, the government has decided to stop the expulsions," government spokesperson Mohamed Ben Omar said in a statement broadcast on state television.

As the crisis in the Niger Delta brews, Ike Okonta looks behind the fragile truce between the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and Nigeria's central government.Pambazuka News publishes here the first instalment of a substantive paper prepared following a recent visit to the blood and oil-soaked region.

The fragile truce brokered between Nigeria’s central government and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in April 2006, jerked to a bloody halt on 20th August. On that afternoon, soldiers of the Joint Task Force, a contingent of the Nigerian Army, Navy and Air Force deployed by the government to enforce its authority on the restive oil-bearing Niger Delta, ambushed fifteen members of the MEND militia in the creeks of western delta and murdered them. The dead men had gone to negotiate the release of a Shell Oil worker kidnapped by youth in Letugbene, a neighbouring community. The Shell staff also died in the massacre.

The incident occurred five days after Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s President, instructed armed forces commanders in the region to resort to force and quickly ‘pacify’ the region. This marked a sharp turn-around from the promise Obasanjo gave to representatives of the MEND militia in Nigeria’s capital Abuja, in early April that he would utilise dialogue and carefully targeted development projects to return peace, law and good government to the impoverished Niger Delta.

The streets of Warri, the city where Shell and ChevronTexaco’s western delta operations are based, were thick with tension on the morning of 2 September when Ijo youth converged on Warri Central Hospital in the suburbs to retrieve the corpses of their colleagues and commence the burial ceremonies. The Ijaw are the largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta. The MEND militia draws the bulk of its membership from the Ijaw.

Significantly, there were several prominent Ijaw political and civic leaders at the ceremony. Ordinary people, mainly Ijaw peasant farmers and fisher folk, had left their hoes and fishing nets and travelled from their hamlets in the creeks to pay their last respects to the slain. Spokesmen of the Nigerian government had sought to represent the fifteen militias as ‘irresponsible hostage-takers’ in the wake of the slaughter. But those massed at the hospital that morning spoke only of heroes who had fallen in the battle for ‘Ijaw liberation.’ MEND, it was clear to observers, was firmly embedded in the Ijaw communities from which it emerged in February 2006. MEND continues to enjoy the support of youth and impoverished peasants whose farm lands and fishing creeks – their sole source of livelihood - have been destroyed by half a century of uncontrolled oil production and whose cause they took up arms to champion.

Even so, members of the MEND militia have never seen armed force as a suitable and effective weapon, but only as a tactical tool. They were forced to wield this tool as a last resort after three decades of peaceful entreaty was replied with cynical indifference, from the central government and the oil companies. Leaders of the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), a civic group with headquarters in Gbaramatu, an Ijaw clan in which MEND’s activities are very pronounced, have served as informal representatives of the MEND militia in negotiations with President Obasanjo and Nigeria’s central government following the abduction of nine foreign oil workers in the creeks of the delta in February. When the author interviewed Oboko Bello, President of FNDIC in Warri in early August, two weeks before the Letugbene massacre, he spoke warmly about the peace meeting he and other Ijaw leaders had had in Abuja with Obasanjo and other government officials on April 5 and 18 2006. He even assured that MEND militants would put their weapons permanently beyond use if the government went some way to address the long-standing grievances of his people. [1]

But it was a sorrowful and stone-faced Bello who addressed his fellow Ijaw during the burial ceremony that afternoon in Warri. He said: “Shell officials were privy to the arrangements Ijaw patriots had made as part of the Joint Investigation and Verification exercise to free the captured company worker and also facilitate the re-opening of the company’s facilities in the creeks. Shell was in direct communication with the commanders of the Joint Task Force, even up to the time our young men set out in their boats to rescue the Shell worker in Letugbene. These young men were not hostage takers. They were Ijaw patriots, selflessly working to repair the damaged peace between the oil company and our people. For this they were ambushed and murdered by soldiers in the service of Shell.” [2]

Oboko Bello ended his one-hour speech on a note of conciliation, arguing that the peace process between the MEND militia and the government begun on 12 March following a meeting between President Obasanjo and prominent Ijaw leaders must not be derailed. But angry voices are rising all over the creeks vowing revenge. These are young men - the volatile, striking arm of the Ijaw political and civic resurgence. Whether moderate voices will be able to rein them in remain to be seen.

For its apart, the central government has adopted a new defiant, militaristic posture, publicly announcing in late August that it was now collaborating closely with the US and British governments to deploy more naval personnel and new hardware to “root out oil rustlers, kidnappers and other undesirable elements from the Niger Delta and the wider Gulf of Guinea.” [3] The MEND militants hunkered down in their heavily fortified redoubts in the creeks, this sounded ominously like an open declaration of war.

FNDIC leaders who spoke to the author shortly after the burial ceremony expressed the concern that the government’s belligerent posture could be an attempt to generate political turbulence in the Niger delta during the general elections, due in April 2007. This turbulence would provide an opportunity for Obasanjo to impose an interim government and extend his tenure beyond the constitutionally stipulated two terms. The elections had been massively rigged in the region (and even more so in the Ijaw areas) by the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in 1999 and again in 2003. But FNDIC officials continue to hold out hope that fair elections in which the Ijaw would be fairly represented will provide the solution to the political and economic crisis in which they are trapped. They insist they will continue to work zealously to thwart any attempt to prevent free elections from taking place in Ijaw communities next April.

However, elections in Nigeria and the Niger Delta in particular, are usually turbulent affairs, sometimes descending into the bloody and violent. As was the case in the past, politicians are replenishing their arms caches and resuscitating the network of thugs they rely on to intimidate their rivals, coerce voters to do their bidding, or stuff the ballot boxes outright. The region is awash with small arms and hard cash yet again, and the already volatile cocktail of local resentment of the oppressive activities of the government and the oil companies looks set to blend with guns for hire prowling the creeks and sire another bloody inferno.

Spectacle

The MEND militia and its political sponsors set out in the early months of the year to draw the attention of the world to the parlous condition of the Ijaw people, deploying spectacle as a powerful weapon. Images of armed youth in masks wielding sub-machine guns in the creeks and helpless oil workers at their mercy, squatting in the bowels of speedboats, were beamed to the media all over the world through a skilful use of the internet.

These graphic images generated intense emotions in government circles as well as in the environmental and human rights community in the West. Global oil prices surged and fell with the tone of MEND’s press statements and the physical condition of the captives, whose photographs they put out on the net. But the drama invariably ended on a peaceful note, with MEND setting the oil workers free unharmed. After a spate of armed attacks on the facilities of Shell and two other oil companies in the western delta followed MEND’s emergence in February, the militants and the government seemed to have reached an unspoken agreement that this drama could go on. The actors would be permitted to air their grievances on the world stage, as long as the oil workers periodically taken hostage were not harmed.

The outrage with which the Letugbene murders were greeted by Ijaw youth in the creeks, and rising political tensions all over the country, means there is no knowing whose voice will command allegiance in the coming months: the moderates counselling patience and political participation, or the young hotheads eager to return to the creeks and take on the government and the oil companies they are allied with.

Prelude to an uprising

Before the emergence of MEND, the last time the Ijaw took up arms against the Nigerian government in an organised effort to assert their political rights was forty years ago. In February 1966, Isaac Adaka Boro, a graduate of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, formed the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS), a militia comprising of several young and educated Ijaw men, and declared the Ijaw-speaking areas of Nigeria’s then ‘Eastern Region’ an independent ‘Niger Delta Republic.’ In an eleven-point declaration of independence, Boro stated that “all former agreements as regards the crude oil of the people undertaken by the now defunct ‘Nigerian’ government in the territory have been declared invalid,” and that “ll oil companies are commanded …to stop exploration and renew agreements with the new Republic. Defiance of this order will result in dislocation of the company’s exploration and forfeiture of their rights of renewal of such agreements.” [4]

Although Federal troops, directed from the regional capital Enugu soon quashed Isaac Boro’s uprising, the twelve-day revolt jolted the nation. It focussed attention on the travails of the riverbank communities of the Eastern Region, and re-opened debate about their demand (since the Willincks hearing in 1958) to be separated from the Eastern Region in an independent state of their own. At the time the Eastern Region was dominated by the more populous Igbo ethnic group, obliging the Ijaw, Ibibio, Ogoni and other smaller groups to band together and ask for a new ‘Rivers State.’

Boro and his two associates, Sam Owonaro and Notthingham Dick, were arrested and imprisoned. Developments elsewhere in the country were soon to alter the fortunes of the three militants in a dramatic manner. Nigeria had been convulsed in political crisis following independence from Britain in October 1960. At the heart of the dispute was the unwieldy three-region structure that the departing colonialists bequeathed to the country, ensuring that the Northern region, led by Muslim feudal lords who had cooperated with British administrators in governing the country, were given the largest slice, bigger than the Western and Eastern Region combined.

Northern politicians were quick to turn this numerical advantage into political and economic rewards, introducing a corrupt and authoritarian mode of rule in the country that enabled them to transfer wealth derived from the south to their own region. In January 1966 five young army majors, the bulk of Igbo extraction, staged a military coup in an attempt to overthrow the civilian government and put an end to the drift towards misgovernment. Several leading politicians and senior Army officers, including the Prime Minister and the Premier of the Northern Region, were killed. The bulk of those that lost their lives were northerners. Casualty figures in the East were light, leading to accusation by northern officers that the January coup was a plot by Igbo officers and politicians to take over the government of the country by force.

Six months later, in July 1966, northern officers staged a counter-coup, attempted to pull the North out of the Federation, but then changed their mind at the last minute (under pressure from the British High Commissioner and the American Ambassador). Leaders of the coup had killed the military Head of State, General Ironsi, an Igbo who had taken over the reins of government after the January coup had collapsed as the most senior officer in the Army. Over three hundred other officers, the bulk of them from the Eastern Region, were also murdered. The coup leaders appointed Yakubu Gowon, a lieutenant colonel and fellow northerner, Head of State and declared that the Ironsi government had been overthrown.

The military administrator of the Eastern Region, Col. Emeka Ojukwu, refused to recognise Gowon as Head of State, and insisted that the late Ironsi’s second in command, Brigadier Ogundipe take over. Relations between the two sides deteriorated swiftly. Fearing that the East was about to secede, the Gowon regime hunkered down in the federal capital Lagos, and split the country into twelve new states in May 1967, two for the ethnic minority groups of the Eastern Region. The Ijaw formed the bulk of the new Rivers State. Ojukwu responded a few days later by declaring the East as the Republic of Biafra, a new state independent of Nigeria. Federal troops invaded Biafra and civil war broke out. Isaac Boro and his compatriots were released from prison by Federal troops when they overran the riverside parts of Biafra. He subsequently joined the Federal side as a major and commanded his own unit under the Third (Marine Commando) Division. Boro was to die in battle a few weeks before the war ended.

The bloody civil war that raged for thirty months and in which an estimated three million people died, was to profoundly alter Nigeria’s political landscape. The war ended in January 1970 with a Federal victory. Although the Ijaw had reason to be content, having secured the new state they had been asking for since the 1950s, the euphoria was to prove short-lived. The central government had passed on to a victorious federal army the bulk of whose commanders were from the now defunct Northern Region. These officers quickly turned their attention to the oil wells of the Niger Delta. In cooperation with civil servants, they pushed through a number of military edicts nationalising the delta oil fields, and altering the formula for sharing revenue. Whereas previously fifty percent of revenue went to the region or state from which it was derived, all the states now had an equal share, with the central government in Lagos keeping the lion’s share for itself.

The new fiscal regime, which now left the Ijaw and the other oil-bearing communities of the Niger Delta at a distinct disadvantage, took nearly ten years to achieve. The process began in the heat of the civil war, when the Gowon government enacted Decree 15 of 1969, removing the control of the oil fields from their states of origin and putting this in its own control. By the time the soldiers handed over to a new civilian government in October 1979, a rash of decrees and edicts had transformed the Niger Delta into a colony whose inhabitants bore the brunt of the oil production on which the national economy relied heavily but enjoyed none of the benefits. These edicts included the 1978 Land Use Act that confiscated the oil-bearing land of the delta communities and put this under the ‘protection’ of the central government.

The new civilian government, under President Shehu Shagari, a northerner, was effete, purposeless and corrupt. This ill-fated Second Republic was overthrown in December 1983 by General M. Buhari. On Buhari’s watch, the portion of oil revenue that went to the Ijaw and the other oil-bearing communities of the Niger Delta plunged to a derisory 1.5 per cent, down from 20 two years previously. Meanwhile Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), the local subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch oil giant, and other Western oil companies operating in the Niger Delta continued to benefit from the legislations that had successfully reduced the delta communities to squatters on their own land. Shell had begun to produce oil in 1956, and now accounted for half of the country’s total oil production of two million barrels per day.

According to the provisions of the legal regime guiding oil production, oil companies were not required to obtain the permission of the local communities on whose land and creeks they explored for, and mined oil. They were only answerable to government officials far away in the capital. All that the oil companies were asked to do was pay ‘compensation’ to local people for crops and other valuables destroyed in the course of oil production. Estimation was largely left to the discretion of Shell officials, and they were quick to take advantage of this and undercut the local people. Environmental protection laws were also flagrantly breached by all the companies, resulting in the devastation of the farm lands and fishing creeks on which the Ijaw and the other communities had relied for livelihood for millennia. [5] Previous decades of government neglect had reduced the delta communities to excruciating poverty, but now their very existence was threatened.

General Ibrahim Babangida overthrew General Buhari in a palace coup in August 1985, and introduced a Structural Adjustment Programme, supervised by the IMF. Ostensibly designed to ameliorate the financial crisis into which decades of corrupt and inefficient government had plunged the country, Babangida’s new economic policies only succeeded in plunging the people into worse poverty. The currency was devalued, hiking up the price of imported necessities. Social services were cut. Millions were retrenched from jobs in government and the private sector.

The already impoverished Delta communities felt the new harsh economic climate particularly keenly. There were neither factories nor government jobs in the region. The enclave oil economy employed a handful of local people even as it left environmental destruction in its wake. Hospitals, roads, piped water, schools, paved roads and electric power were non-existent, and where they were supplied, grossly inadequate. As thousands of Ijaw, retrenched from their jobs in the cities and towns began to stream home in late 1980s, the Niger Delta region began to heave. It was clear to the discerning that a political storm was about to break.

The first storm came in the shape of an attempted military putsch, led by Ijaw and other Delta elements in the Army. In April 1990 these young military officers stormed Dodan Barracks, seat of the central government, and reduced its perimeter walls to rubble with mortars and AK47s. But General Babangida managed to escape, rallied senior commanders to his side and mounted a counter-attack. Outflanked and outgunned the coup plotters surrendered. After a hasty trial, closed to the public, they were executed.

The defiant utterances of the young officers as they faced the firing squad, declaring that they had ‘struck a blow for the oppressed people of the Niger Delta in the spirit of Isaac Boro’, and the economic upheavals in the delta and the wider country that led to this bloody episode, were to prepare the ground for the emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) sixteen years later. [6]

• Dr Ike Okonta is a research fellow in contemporary African politics at the University of Oxford. He is co-author of Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights and Oil, Verso, New York, 2003.
• Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

References

[1] Ike Okonta, interview with Oboko Bello, President of Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), Warri, 14th August 2006. In summary, Ijaw representatives asked for the creation of two states, in addition to Bayelsa state, for their people to be carved out of the existing states of Edo, Ondo, Cross Rivers, Rivers, and Akwa Ibom. They also asked that fifty per cent of oil revenue derived from the Niger Delta be given to the communities, that Ijaw businessmen be given a greater pie in the oil industry, and that the central government withdraw armed troops from the region and compel Shell and the other oil companies to put an end to incessant oil spills and gas flaring.
[2] Oboko Bello, ‘FNDIC Presentation During Burial Ceremony of Nine out of Fifteen Illustrious Sons Killed While Serving the Purpose of SPDC in Letugbene Community,’ Presented in Warri, Delta State, 2 September, 2006.
[3] Onyebuchi Ezigbo, ‘Niger Delta: Britain, US Offer Assistance to Nigeria,’ ThisDay, Lagos, 31 August, 2006.
[4] See Tony Tebekaemi, The Twelve Day Revolution, Ethiope Publishing Company, Benin City, 1982, p. 12. See also Kathryn N. Nwajiaku, ‘Oil Politics and Identity Transformation in Nigeria: The Case of the Ijaw in the Niger Delta,’ Unpublished DPhil thesis, Department of Politics, University of Oxford, 2005, for an excellent scholarly study of the political context of Isaac Boro’s revolt in 1966.
[5] For a comprehensive treatment of the social and environmental consequences of oil production in the Niger Delta, see Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas, Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights and Oil, Sierra Club, San Francisco, 2001.
[6] Ihuoma Iwegbu, ‘Why they Struck,’ National Concord, Lagos, 24 April, 1990.