Independent Advocacy Project (IAP), Nigeria’s leading anti-corruption group has called on President Umaru Yar’Adua to table, in the coming months, before the National Assembly, a bill that makes it mandatory for all public office holders – including the president, his vice, state governors and their deputies and local government chairmen - to publicly declare their assets. The 1999 Constitution only allows private declaration to the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) within one month of assumption of office.

The governor of Nigeria's Imo State , Chief Ikedi Ohakim, has declared that the evolution of Information Technologies (ITs), would make the difference in the fight to reduce poverty in any country. Chief Ohakim, who spoke at the on-going 21st international conference and Annual General Meeting of the Nigeria Computer Society (NCS) being held at the Imo Concorde Hotel, Owerri, Imo State, under the theme "Achieving the Millennium Development Goals in Nigeria: IT strategies and tools."

Nigerian, Human Rights Defender and founder of The International Centre for reproductive health and Sexual rights (INCRESE) in Niger State, Dorothy Aken’Ova has been ostracised and intimidated by family and community because of the work she does.

Tajudeen Abdul Raheem writes on the recent elections and presidential transition in Nigeria, and concurrent popular protests. He notes that it cannot be good for accountability that the resident president is not held accountable, because people are too obsessed with a former president. Instead, he argues that a new alliance and broad coalition for change needs to be built, to exert democratic pressures on the political system.

I was in Nigeria all of last week. It was my first time in the country since the innauguration of President Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua, following an election that is universally believed to have been flawed in practically all senses. There were threats by very angry politicians and aggrieved activists that 'Yar Adua will not be sworn in', come 29 May.

The first test of that threat was on 1 May, when the Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC) called for mass protests during its traditional May Day activities. I happened to be in Abuja at the time. Many of the activists thought the May Day events could become a wider protest about the elections, that would make the country ungovernable. It came to pass without the kind of mass support that was expected. However, a more popular protest called by the NLC after Yar Adua had been sworn in was more successful, because it was based on issues (yet another hike in the domestic oil price) that most Nigerians can easily relate to.

Anybody with a less partisan take on the dynamics of the power play should have realised that flawed as the elections were, it was highly unlikely that the new president would not have been sworn in. Even with the electoral challenges in the courts from the candidates of opposition parties, there was no way the state would have allowed a legal lacuna and political vacuum. But I was speaking to an unwilling audience of friends and compatriots. I warned them against making threats that cannot be enforced. Moses had more luck in his exile on the mountains. Part of the problem with the protests had to do with the anomalous situation of there being no credible leader to rally the population and transform their anger into political force that cannot be ignored. The truth is, that all the parties rigged where they could. But the PDP, being the ruling party at the centre, had more powers and better opportunities for robbing people of their mandate, essentially through control of the results declaration by an openly partisan electoral commission. The process by which the leading presidential challengers in other parties, governorship and other candidates emerged in the various parties was mostly imposed by powerful cliques.

In spite of the vast powers of the ruling PDP, in areas that are very strong opposition turfs like Lagos, Kano, Zamfara or Abia states, the incumbent governors used their popularity and advantages of incumbency to successfully checkmate the PDP machinery and retain power. Therefore, when it comes to rigging, most of the politicians, especially those in the three leading parties (PDP, ANPP and AC), cannot thump their chest about who is cleaner. Yes, Nigerians were robbed of their votes. But one does not intimate that the sense of loss at the national level is in terms of whether candidate A or B had been robbed. The fact that the politicians were not calling for the results to be cancelled in the areas where they had won presented other challenges.

How can the election be flawed only where the ruling party had won? Sections of civil society were calling for cancellation of the whole election, and a re-run. But the politicians who had 'won' were certainly not in favour of that, regardless of their parties. There were also those who had called for an interim government, which was also not a realistic option, because of the political interests at stake.

Nigerians may be aggrieved and remain extremely bitter. But not many are willing to die for any politician anymore, since there are no fundamental differences between them, apart from the ‘I want to chop too’, or ‘I want to be this or that’ - without any bother about policies or alternative programmes for the emancipation of the populace from poverty and want amidst plenty.

The situation is further complicated by two important factors. First, there is resignation that Yar’ Adua would probably have defeated the closest two of his many rivals. Second, the personality of Yar Adua himself - as non-confrontational, being unknown and therefore greatly underestimated - focused more attention on Obasanjo who had orchestrated his nomination and presided over his anointment. There was and still is great anger at the former president.

When I returned to the country early in July, I was hoping that by then the dust was settling, and that there would be a more sober atmosphere in the country. How wrong was I?

There are still many grieving democrats who are refusing to accept that Yar Adua, barring an unlikely decision in the tribunal to nullify the election, will be president for the next four years.

Talking to the usual chattering classes of media pundits, NGO activists and opposition-sympathising politicos, one could make the mistake of believing that General Olushegun Obasanjo is still the tenant in Aso Rock. Every decision or non-decision of Yar Adua is analysed through the lenses of Obasanjo still driving from the back seat from his country home in Ota farm.

In part, Yar Adua’s style of stoic silence in the face of public pressure makes him vulnerable to accusations of being a puppet of the former president. Nigerians are so used to militarised leadership, where things are done ‘with immediate effect’, by executive fiat, that they think Yar Adua is indecisive for taking time before nominating his cabinet, and making senior appointments in dribs and drabs.

If we rewind back to 1999, it took Obasanjo quite some time to exert control over his government. In fact, until his second term, he did not have full control of his administration. Unfortunately for Yar Adua, he does not have four years to wait. However, he will not act in the ways critics of Obasanjo would like. They want him to go after Obasanjo openly, which will not be wise, given the current power balance within the ruling PDP. A president who does not know where the cutlery is cannot start inviting people to dinner!

But as happened between Obasanjo and those vested interests that brought him to power: what goes around comes around. Yar Adua will sooner than later enforce his footprints on his administration and the party that brought him to power. The first cabinet will not be his personal 'A' List. The list of special advisers and key para-statal appointments may be more indicative of his policy thrust and political direction. Obasanjo's so-called 'dream team' did not come into cabinet until his second term, but most of them were key advisers or heads of para-statals.

Obasanjo should know better; that government by proxy does not work in Nigeria. However, the elixir of power is difficult to shake off. It is most deadly in its hangover effect on ex-presidents.

It is not just the pathological anti-Obasanjo elements in Nigeria that believe he is the power behind the throne, and look for him under every executive bed. From all available evidence, Obasanjo, too, is suffering from this grand delusion. I call it Executive withdrawal syndrome.

For now, Yar Adua can enjoy the unusual convergence between the two. This will mean that all his bad decisions, failure or inability to make any decision can be blamed on Obasanjo’s pressures. The good ones will be interpreted as evidence of his becoming his own man! I even read paid adverts and news reports in Nigerian newspapers warning Obasanjo to 'leave Yar Adua alone' - as if he had complained to anybody! It is quite unrealistic to expect that the PDP and the former president from the same party will not attempt to influence the president. That's what politics is all about. But to assume that a president is nothing but a creation of his sponsors removes human agency and turn politics into a game of zombies.

If Obasanjo is the only one putting pressure on Yar Adua, that is the only pressure he will respond to. However, if the grieving democrats can come back to earth, exert their own pressure and engage on their own issues, they may be suprised at the kind of potential influence they could wield. Issues around reform of the electoral process, constitutional reform, freedom of information, transparency and accountability, and independence of the judiciary could be important entry points. The pressure for reform cannot be driven by the political class. Most of them have lost all moral and political credibility. A new alliance and broad coalition for change needs to be built, to exert democratic pressures on the political system. It needs CSOs, NGOs, mass labour, youth, student and women's movements, and other popular forces in strategic partnership with democratically minded elements in the system.

My fear is that people are too obsessed with Obasanjo, baying for his blood and daring Yar Adua to wield the sword. This may actually make Yar Adua take it as his mantra that it is good for him to be permanently underestimated by his opponents. As long as they continue to blame Obasanjo, he may have more room to do what he really wants to do. It cannot be good for our accountability that the resident president is not held accountable for his action or inaction, because people are too obsessed with a former president!

Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Many HIV-positive Nigerians are still losing their jobs or being denied work because of their status. Activists say a national workplace policy to protect them from stigma and discrimination, adopted over two years ago, is practically toothless. "The policy is not effective at all; most companies are only paying lip service to it," said Josephine Odikpo, Executive Director of the Centre for Rights and Development, in the port city of Lagos.

Two former Nigerian governors, Orji Kalu and Saminu Turaki, have landed in trouble over their failure honour an invitation by the officials of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). They waited to be arrested over indictments relating to corruption. Turaki and Kalu were governors of Jigawa and Abia states respectively.

WACSOF is looking for suitable candidates for the position of General Secretary. The position will be based in Abuja, Nigeria. Thew deadline for applications is 30 July 2007.

The recent national strike in Nigeria ended after only four days. Femi Aborisade argues that despite the sudden surrender of the unions, working class people have shown that they are a force to reckon in the process of policy formulation and implementation.

The four-day general strike in Nigeria has once again demonstrated the potentials of the working class to influence the course of history. President Umaru Yar’Adua admitted this much when he said the strike ‘wreaked havoc on economy and our people’ (24 June 2007). Government offices, private companies, petrol stations, ports, airports, schools and hospitals closed down. Commercial vehicles were off the road and major highways became football pitches for youths. Oil exports in all terminals except one were prevented. In short, the strike ‘paralysed’ Nigeria.

While President Umaru mourned the paralysing effects of the strike on crude oil exports, ordinary people saw in the strike an opportunity to express a striving to free themselves from the shackles of poverty. Over 70 per cent of Nigerians, about 98,000,000 people of a population of 140,000,000, live in extreme poverty, with less than a dollar a day. In the midst of pervasive poverty, former President Obasanjo, in the twilight of his tenure, took the following actions: The prices of petrol, kerosene and diesel per litre were increased by ten Naira (^10.00); petrol (PMS) was raised from ^65 to ^75, kerosene (DPK) from ^54 to ^64 and diesel (AGO) from ^54 to ^64. This amounted to an increase of over 15 per cent in the price of petrol/litre, and about 19 per cent increase in the prices of diesel and kerosene. VAT rate was raised by 100 per cent, from 5-10 per cent. In addition, six companies, including the Port Harcourt Refining Company Ltd (PHRC) and Kaduna Refining and Petrolchemical Company Limited were sold to foreign and local private companies without resolving labour concerns. Public sector employees were also agitating for payment of 15 per cent increase in basic pay, which the former President had granted but never implemented.

The poor perceived government actions as punitive measures to compound their agony. The payroll tax, called PAYE (Pay-As-You-Earn) has recently been changed to 10 per cent of gross pay instead of the previous policy of taxing only basic pay, after making allowances for dependants, children and the aged, etc. There are also the following taxes: National Housing Fund (NHF), 2.5 per cent of salary; Pension deductions, 7.5 per cent; National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), 5 per cent. These add up to 25 per cent of the employee’s pay. Workers earning poverty pay would be hard hit by the increase in VAT because they spend the bulk of their earnings on consumption items. Increases in the prices of petroleum products automatically cause increases in the prices of all other goods and services.

The process of increasing the prices of petroleum products was illegal. The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPRA) was established by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPRA) Act No. 8 of 2003. Section 2 of the Act provides for the membership of the PPRA Governing Board, which includes representatives of organized labour. Section 7 empowers the Board to determine the pricing policy of petroleum products. Paragraph 1 of the 1st Schedule to the Act prescribes that the Board shall take decisions by majority support. The Board never met. It was the Secretariat of the PPRA that unilaterally increased the prices of petroleum products. The increases were therefore illegal.

Besides, there was no economic rationale for the price increases. Nigeria currently produces an average of about 2.6 mbd (of crude oil) and exports about 2.3mbd. (Udo, 2007: C7). The 2007 budget was prepared on the basis of a benchmark value price of US$30 per barrel. With the price in the international market hovering between US$65 and US$70 per barrel, this translates to between US$35 and US$40 per barrel going into the excess crude oil account.

The privatisation of public enterprises, including the sale of refineries, violates the current Constitution of Nigeria, which provides that wealth shall not be concentrated in a few hands and that the State, not the private sector, shall manage the major sectors of the economy. [Section 16 (4)].

The strike was therefore declared to achieve the following: reversal of the N10 increases in the prices of petrol, diesel and kerosene; removal of 100 per cent increase in VAT, from 5-10 per cent; payment of 15 per cent increase in basic pay for public sector workers, and review of the sale of refineries and power generating plants.

The labour movement gave a 14-day ultimatum, which government treated with levity. In fact, spokespersons of the regime threatened that even if labour embarked on strikes and mass protests for ten years nothing would change (The Guardian, 19 June 2007: 2). The Government declared the strike illegal following the judgment of the Court of Appeal in an earlier case where the court held that the Nigeria Labour Congress had no right to call out workers on strike against general economic and political decisions of the Federal Government because such have nothing to do with breach of individual contracts of employment with various employers as envisaged in the Trade Disputes Act.

While the Nigerian labour law restricts the right to strike and the judiciary goes ahead to declare strike action against general economic and political policies illegal, Nigeria is a member of the International Labour Organization, which recognises the right to strike as a fundamental right. The Abolition of Forced Labour Convention No. 105 of 1957 prohibits the use of forced or compulsory labour ‘as a punishment for having participated in strikes’ (Article 1 sub-paragraph [d]). Also, the Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation No. 92 of 1951 states in paragraph 7 that no provision of the Recommendation ‘may be interpreted as limiting, in any way whatsoever, the right to strike’. As a member of the international community, it is incumbent on any country that seeks to acquire the status of a civilised state to give effect to resolutions emanating from an organisation to which it belongs.

In spite of all the pre-strike arrogance of government officials and spokespersons, less than 24 hours to the strike, in a desperate effort to avert the strike, government offered the following concessions: increase in VAT rate from 5-10 per cent was revoked; 15 per cent salary increase to be effected for federal employees with effect from 1 January 2007; the N10 per litre increase on the prices of kerosene and diesel was reversed and reduction of the N10 per litre increase in the pump head price of petrol to N5 per litre.

Labour accepted all the concessions but one, insisting on reversal of the price of petrol/litre to the old rate of N65. The strike then continued until it was called off suddenly with effect from the midnight of 23 June 2007, without winning the demand. Labour capitulated on the basis of a letter by President Umaru Yar’Adua promising not to increase the price of petrol for the next one year. In effect, petrol will continue to sell at N70 per litre. The other concessions contained in President Yar’Adua’s letter included an undertaking to set up expert committees, which would include representatives of labour to examine the issues of petroleum pricing mechanism as well as sale of refineries and power generating plants. Government also undertook not to take any disciplinary action against any worker participating in the strike.

Daily Sun (25 June 2007: 6) explains that the role of traditional rulers, particularly the Sultan of Sokoto, was decisive in the sudden capitulation by the top labour leadership. However, there was a division even within the top leadership. As Sunday Punch (24 June 2007:13) reported, a section of the TUC leadership had threatened to call a Press Conference ‘to express a few reservations on the agreement labour reached with government’. Working class youths were angry about the sudden back down by labour leadership: ‘why embark on strike by rejecting the N70/litre price of petrol which government had offered in the bid to prevent the strike taking off, only to turn round to accept what had been rejected?, they questioned.

Dress Rehearsal Strikes

The anger of working class youths against the sudden surrender by national labour leadership is understandable. Weeks and months preceding the strike, there had been series of threats of strike and actual strikes, as dress rehearsals, preparatory to the nationwide strike. These included strikes by Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) workers, Electricity workers, Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASSU), and protests against the controversial 2007 general elections organized by the Labour and Civil Society Coalition (LASCO). There were also sabotage activities, bombings and kidnappings by militant groups and mass protests in the Niger Delta against exploitative oil companies as well as threats by self determination groups in the South Eastern part of Nigeria to disrupt the hand over program to a new President if key self determination leaders were not released from detention.

What the foregoing shows is that the working class, in several sectors, had been infuriated and imbued with a fighting spirit to protect jobs and improve their overall living standards. That opportunity to express their anger and reverse the privatization process has temporarily been botched by the shocking compromise and sudden strike call off. But it would be a temporary set back. On the basis of a system of exporting crude oil and importing refined products, we do not need a soothsayer to predict that crises lie ahead.

Gains

Regardless of the weaknesses of the strike, the working class has shown that based on a united force of organisations of the poor, it is a force to reckon with in the process of policy formulation and implementation. The strike represents a message to the ruling class that labour will not just slavishly accept attacks on its rights without a fight. No matter how marginal, the reductions in VAT and prices of petroleum products are gains that could not have been won without a fight. Also, contrary to the threat of applying the ‘no work no pay’ rule, one of the agreements in ending the strike was that no worker would be penalized for having participated in the strike.

Weaknesses

However, the basis of the united platform upon which the strike was called was not brought to bear on the strike sufficiently. Whereas the Federal Government made a concession to implement the 15 per cent increase in basic pay, similar commitment was not extracted from the state Governments. This resulted in the continuation of the strike by State organs of the unions in states like Oyo, Osun, Ekiti, etc - after the nationwide action had been called off (See for example Nigerian Tribune, 26 June 2007: 5). Similarly, ASUU, which had started its strike three months before the nationwide strike, had to continue its strike until 1 July because the agreements reached did not touch on their concerns. In the same vein, though workers in the Niger Delta participated in the strike, some militant groups in the sub region openly dissociated themselves from the nationwide strike on the ground that the plight of the Niger Delta people had never been the concern of organized labour.

Reactive or Proactive Struggles?

The 20 -23 June general strike was a defensive strike. Rather than being proactive, the leadership of the strike was reactive and predominantly economistic. The strike was not aimed at bringing about fundamental changes to the root cause of the problems. Instead of addressing the root cause, the strike was essentially about the effects of government policies.

The behaviour of the leadership of the strike fits into Marx description of non-forward looking trade union leadership:

Trade Unions work well as centres of resistance against the encroachments of capital. They fail partially from an injudicious use of their power. They fail generally from limiting themselves to a guerilla war against the effects of the existing system, instead of simultaneously trying to change it, instead of using their organised forces as a lever for the final emancipation of the working class. (Marx, 1958: 447, cited in Hyman, 1975: 98)

A more pro-active approach would require challenging the policy of reliance on private importation of petroleum products, insistence on investigation of corruption in the management of existing refineries, and advocating local refining through existing and new state-owned refineries.

Central to the fuel crisis in Nigeria is the government commitment to the neoliberal principle of disengaging from economic activity and promoting the private sector in the supply of critical goods. The idea of promoting the private sector, combined with stupendous financial corruption involving about US$550 million in the Turn Around Maintenance (TAMs) of the refineries, results in crippling the state owned refineries, in order to justify reliance on the private sector for importation of petroleum products and sale of the refineries under the guise of inefficiency of state enterprises.

Who Should Control Industries?

As the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW, 2001: 7-9) has pointedly posited, the big question for today is: how is industry to be controlled? Given the subsisting capitalist economic structure, the challenge is to interrogate managerial control with a view to accommodating a role for workers who work in each industry, and in the cases of mineral producing areas, the communities, in managing the enterprises. This suggests that working class organizations must reflect and advocate comprehensive solutions to issues regarding production, pricing and distribution of goods in an equitable and ecologically sustainable manner through advocacy of involvement of the trade unions and communities in the running of industries.

Mode of Strike Action and Process of Strike Call Off

That the strike was called off without resorting to the members, organs, and groups that sustained the strike for the period it lasted raises the issue of industrial/trade union democracy. Working class organizations must provide efficient democratic structure and process for carrying on daily struggles for better conditions and pay. The organs that take the decision to embark on strike must also be the ones to decide to call it off. With that kind of perspective, the need for mass protests and rallies rather than a-stay-at-home strike action will be seen.

The stay-at-home strike action renders the rank and file passive participants in the strike process and deprives the strike of the inputs and influence of the members from below in determining the direction of the strike, leaving the decision to call off or continue strike actions to the whims and caprices of the few leaders. In this regard, the Nigerian labour movement has a lot to learn from its South African counterparts that subjected government offers of wage increases to discussions at mass meetings of individual affiliate unions, during a strike that was taking place simultaneously in the two countries.

Indefinite or Limited Strike Action?

The strike also revealed the weakness of ‘indefinite’ strike action. Indefinite strike action is applicable in a situation in which the objective and subjective conditions point to the possibility of the working class taking over political power. Without such a revolutionary situation in existence, the state cannot tolerate ‘indefinite’ action. The situation will have to be resolved one way or the other, in revolutionary change or restoration of political control by the capitalist ruling class. For a working class leadership that completely lacks the perspective of the working class taking power, ‘indefinite’ form of action is a recipe for sudden back down. Therefore, it would be better to base actions on defined, limited number of days or weeks, continuation or discontinuation of action being determined by the mood and preparedness of the working class and the other poor strata, expressed at mass meetings. In other words, an attempt should be made to distinguish the Gramscian moments of ‘war of movement’ (when the actual revolution is ongoing) from moments of ‘war of position’ (when slow but steady preparatory revolutionary work is taking place).

Conclusion

The importance of drawing out lessons of struggles is implicit in a statement by Marx: ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted by the past’ (Marx, 1958: 247). It is hoped the lessons discussed in this paper will benefit future struggles.

* Femi Aborisade is a lecturer at The Polytechnic, Ibadan. He is the coordinator of the Centre for Labour Studies (CLS) & an Associate of the Centre for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa.

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

For references, see link below.

One of Nigeria's main opposition parties rejected an offer to join a coalition government on Friday because it considers the ruling party's victory in a recent election was illegitimate, reports Al Jazeera. Umaru Yar'Adua, the new president, has invited the three main oppostion parties to join the government to give him greater legitimacy.

Nigerian President Umaru Yar'Adua's list of 35 proposed ministers was announced on Thursday and political insiders said it was a tentative break with the era of former President Olusegun Obasanjo. The portfolios were not specified, prolonging the suspense over who would get the key oil and finance jobs.

Since 1999 there has been a consistent deterioration in the conduct of Nigerian elections. Abdul Raufu Mustapha assesses the impact on Nigeria’s recent fraudulent elections on the future political and economic development of Nigeria.

Nigerians have not forgotten the June 12th 1993 Presidential elections which were annulled under controversial circumstances by General Babangida, plunging the country into political crises. Similarly, Nigerians are unlikely to forget the state and national elections of April 2007. There was much hype in anticipation of the 2007 elections: US National Security Adviser, Negroponte testified before Congress that these were the most important elections in Africa in 2007, while Nigerians themselves trumpeted the fact that this was going to be the first time that a civilian-to-civilian transition took place in the country.

The elections have come and gone, trailed by near universal condemnation. But we need to pause and ask, what do the elections mean for Nigeria’s future? The problems with the elections can be classified into three broad categories: incompetence and deliberate bungling by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC); widespread use of thugs and the security forces against voters; and the flagrant abuse of the powers of incumbency.

The Electoral Commission’s catalogue of illegalities included the flouting of court orders; illegal/unconstitutional disqualification of candidates; refusal to include the names and pictures of major opposition candidates for the gubernatorial elections in Anambra State in spite of subsisting court rulings; the late arrival or non-arrival of voting materials in many places followed often by no voting, yet results were announced; in some states, the INEC headquarters announced a result when the Resident Electoral Commissioner in situ said there was no result; declaration of results while collation and counting of votes were still going on; and a month after the April polls ended, three INEC staff were caught thumb-printing ballot papers meant for the election at Igarra, Edo State, in a bid to manufacture supporting evidence for their already declared result. These can hardly be said to be the actions of a competent and fair arbiter in an electoral contest.

INEC’s commissions and omissions were compounded by the widespread use of violence in the party primaries and during the actual elections. Patterns of the systematic use of violence included the use of thugs, bombings and assassinations during the party primaries to select party candidates; the use of the police and soldiers to intimidate voters and in many places they were also observed to have participated in the seizure of ballot boxes; the use of thugs to perpetrate violence with impunity, leading to the killing of 260 people on April 14, according to Amnesty International; the assassination in a Kano Mosque on April 13th Sheik Jafar Adam, an act possibly aimed at provoking ethno-religious rioting; the attack by the so-called ‘Taliban’ on April 17th on the police in Kano and the subsequent killing of 21 policemen; and post election political assassinations in Ondo state.

Finally, there was the blatant abuse of incumbency particularly by the PDP-controlled Federal government, including the sudden declaration of a two-day public holiday to frustrate the judicial process involving opposition candidates; the unannounced closure of Kaduna airport the day before an opposition party was to hold its congress there; the block booking of hotels in Abuja to frustrate another opposition party from holding its convention; the use of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) to announce controversial results, such as in Jigawa State where the NTA reported that the opposition ANPP had won and two minutes later, reversed itself and awarded victory to the PDP; and finally, the physical assault on the Abia State Resident Electoral Commissioner by PDP party leaders.

Weeks before the presidential election on 21 April 2007, local and international pollsters predicted a tight race, all putting the opposition ANPP candidate Mohammadu Buhari slightly in front. In the end, INEC announced the victory of the Obasanjo protégé and PDP candidate Umaru Yar’ Adua with 24.3 million votes, with Buhari garnering 6.6 million votes and Action Congress candidate and Obasanjo antagonist, Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, trailing with 2.6 million votes.

These elections have been roundly condemned by local and foreign observers, with the exception of Baroness Linda Chalker. Condemnations and strong reservations have come from the Nigerian Bar Association, Nigeria Labour Congress, Trade Union Congress, Nigeria Union of Journalists, Academic Staff Union of the Universities, and a host of local NGOs and religious organizations. Similar condemnations have come from international bodies, including the National Democratic Institute, National Republican Institute, European Union, Economic Community of West African States, the Commonwealth, COSATU, International Crisis Group, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the committee of 48 Nobel Laureates, the Canadian parliament, and even Hilary Clinton. The EU observer delegation reflected generally held opinion when it concluded that the elections:

"were marred by poor organisation, lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, significant evidence of fraud, particularly during the result collation process, voters' disenchantment at different stages of the process, lack of equal conditions for contestants and numerous incidents of violence."

Implications of the Elections: Perils of Succession Politics

Some have argued that all elections in Nigeria have been rigged. 2007 is therefore not any different. While it may be true that rigging has been a recurring feature of Nigerian politics with all parties guilty of different degrees of undemocratic conduct, 2007 nevertheless represent a qualitative difference in election rigging in Nigeria. To miss this point is to miss the danger that the 2007 elections represent.

In previous elections, you needed a minimum level of social support and acceptance to rig; there was a sociological foundation to rigging. Where rigging took place without the necessary social support, as in the Western Region in 1965 and Ondo State in 1983, widespread violence often followed. Scholars of African elections like Staffan Lindberg have argued that were repeated elections are held, they tend to entrench democratic norms. Repeated contestation between parties is seen as leading to the gradual sedimentation of democratic norms and practices. Unfortunately, Nigeria’s experience of elections since the return to civil democratic rule in 1999 contradicts this observation.

Between 1999 and 2007, Nigeria has held three elections, and there has been a systematic and persistent deterioration in the quality of the elections; 1999 was not problem-free, but it was better than 2003 which was itself better than the 2007 elections. These observations are supported by a comparison of election monitors’ reports from 1999. In 1999, there were some complaints of old-style ‘competitive’ rigging as the different parties sought to press home their advantages in different constituencies across the country. Most observers remarked that the 1999 elections were peaceful, and that despite the perceived problems the announced outcome was roughly consistent with the wishes of the Nigerian electorate, even if the margins of victory had been inflated. In 2003, however, we begin to see the systematic deployment of organized thuggery, violence and the brazen manipulation of party congresses and the actual elections in few states, particularly in the Niger Delta and the South East. In 2007, this violence and brazen manipulation was broadcast across much of the country. In 2007, Nigeria decisively moved from ‘competitive rigging’ to ‘coercive rigging’; from elections, no matter how flawed, to brazen ‘selection’.

Under ‘competitive rigging’, your supporters simply stuffed some more ballot papers for their preferred candidate and party thugs sought to intimidate the opposition. But the law enforcement agencies generally tried to stop the thugs and maintain a semblance of public order. In some instances, the sanitary inspector, the local authority police, or the Emir’s courts were used to harass opponents of the ruling party. Under ‘coercive rigging’, there is the outright resort to state-sponsored violence, the blatant abuse of the electoral machinery, and the deliberate undermining of the courts. Cudgels, guns and administrative subterfuge have replaced the microphone as the preferred instrument of political communication. When Obasanjo said the elections were going to be a ‘do-or-die’ affair, most Nigerians missed the import of that statement for he must have meant exactly that. It is therefore not surprising that guns and ammunitions were imported for the election even when basic electoral material had not been provided!

It is little wonder that the declared winner, Yar’ Adua, claimed that he won ‘fair & square’, rather than ‘free & fair’. God he said gives power to whosoever He wants! I thought elections were about citizens’ choice? Between 1999 and 2007, there has been the gradual constriction of democratic space, as ‘selection’ of candidates replaced ‘elections’. If this trend is not corrected, future elections in Nigeria have the potential of degenerating into widespread social conflict as the opposition will quickly learn that ‘preparing for elections’ means training your own vigilante groups and thugs as counter-terror confronts state-sponsored terror. Yar Adua has rightly promised electoral reforms in tacit acknowledgement of the gravely flawed process that brought him to power. Without these promised reforms, democracy, or even the continued existence of the country, will be severely put at risk. Nigerians are lucky in that the current sharp political divisions do not correspond to the entrenched cleavages of ethnicity, region and religion. The country may not be so lucky in future, if it continues with the culture of shambolic elections and impunity. The simple message is that there can be no democracy without respect for voters’ choice; if this basic fact is not quickly grasped, Nigeria faces the peril of succession politics in subsequent elections.

After 2007, What Next?

There has been some suggestion that once the transition to another administration takes place, things will quieten down and the much-trumpeted economic reforms of the Obasanjo presidency will resume. This desire for reform continuity in the West is often exacerbated by the politics of oil supplies. Let no one have any illusions: 2007 has sown the seed of insecurity and instability and things will not get back to normal until that ghost, like the ghost of the 1993 election, is addressed.

Such has been the enormity of the assault of the 2007 elections on the collective psyche of the nation that it could easily have provided the pretext for military opportunists to begin plotting to seize power. The National Party of Nigeria’s rigged ‘landslide victory’ in 1983 provoked the Buhari/Idiagbon military regime. In earlier times, therefore, we could safely assume that some factions within the military are already planning some mischief. I doubt though that a military coup is a possibility today for various intra-military and extra-military reasons. And if, out of national misfortune, one were to happen, it is likely to cause more problems than it will solve. It is therefore gratifying that the opposition Action Congress recently slapped down a military chief who hinted that in the post April election situation, the military will not fold its arms if there is widespread breakdown of law and order. All Nigerians must resist the temptation of seeing the military as a solution to the current political crisis.

If we remove the military from the equation, then we have three other factors to ponder: the response of the opposition and Civil Society groups to Yar Adua’s ‘(s)election’; ex-president Obasanjo’s intentions and his real ‘exit strategy’; and the likely trajectories of Yar Adua’s administration.

Opposition & Civil Society
When the opposition failed to get the proposed mass action going on May 1st 2007, many felt that Nigerians had accepted the fait accompli of the enthronement of the new administration. In the face of belligerent threats from the police, many activists felt that they could not put themselves at risk for the benefit of unreliable opposition politicians. Ordinary Nigerians probably wanted to get on with their struggle to eek out a living. It would be wrong, however, based on the inaction of May 1st, to conclude that Nigerians have now accepted the Yar Adua administration. Importantly, a number of significant actions continue to signify widespread displeasure. For instance, the Nigerian Bar Association conducted a successful boycott of courts in protest at the elections and has suggested the likelihood of conducting a judicial review of the elections to document what happened; the Nigeria Labour Congress carried out a partially successful 2-day sit-at-home protest, and refused to serve on the presidential inauguration committee; there was also the unprecedented demonstration by the ‘Women in Black’ in Abuja and similar demonstrations against the elections have been held in London and 10 American cities. Nigerians United for Democracy (NUD), an umbrella group of prominent pro-democracy activists and politicians has given Yar Adua an ultimatum to quit office, while prominent opposition figures like Wole Soyinka have testified before a committee of the American Congress and demanded that Yar Adua set up a panel to investigate the failed elections which he blamed on the ‘criminal quartet’ of Obasanjo, INEC chair Iwu, former Police chief Ehindero, and PDP chair, Ahmadu Ali. Meanwhile, the legal challenge by opposition politicians in 11 states and the federal level continue at various election tribunals.

These actions may not be as dramatic of mass action, but collectively, they cast a dark shadow of illegitimacy on the Yar Adua administration. It is this obvious lack of legitimacy that made it difficult for ex-president Obasanjo to pay a proposed farewell visit to Washington just before his departure from office. Both Britain and the US sent relatively lower ranking officers to Yar Adua’s inauguration; for the inauguration of the President of Liberia, the US sent a delegation led by Laura Bush and included Secretary of State Rice. For Yar Adua’s inauguration, it was left to the State Department, not the White House, to send a low-key delegation led by Jendayi Frazer. It is speculated that Obasanjo might loose his membership of the club of ex-presidents and Prime ministers, Interaction, and his invitation to serve on Tony Blair’s Africa Panel has been publicly challenged in the British media. Blighted by its heritage and lacking both domestic and international legitimacy, the Yar Adua administration is vulnerable.

Obasanjo’s Intentions
A second important piece of our jig-saw is ex-president Obasanjo’s real intentions in foisting Yar Adua first on the PDP, and then on Nigeria as a whole. Under Obasanjo, the PDP changed its rules so that only he can be the leader and ‘conscience’ of the party. Candidates on the party’s platform were also compelled to sign contracts of ‘obedience’ to the party, and the rules have been changed so that the party is said to be supreme to its elected members in public office. Ladipo Adamolekun recently pointed what he called the ‘dangerous doctrine of party supremacy’ that now pervades the PDP as Obasanjo’s presidential term came to an end. Central to this syndrome was the equation of loyalty to the PDP to loyalty to the Nigerian nation, and a division of labour by which the party under Obasanjo’s control decided policy, while the elected governments under the party’s platform, including the Yar Adua administration, are given the role of policy implementation. There is no doubt that Obasanjo is seeking to entrench his influence in the new administration. But to what ends? One reason may be to defend his back as he moves off the centre stage of presidential power? Or to tele-guide Yar Adua from behind and consolidate his alleged status as the ‘founder of modern Nigeria’? Obasanjo’s real intentions will influence the stability of the Yar Adua administration for while Yar Adua is likely to be willing to defend him, it is not clear if Yar Adua is willing, or can afford, to be a tele-guided robot.

Yar Adua
The final piece of our jig-saw is Yar Adua himself. He has so far given contradictory signals with regard to his intentions. Will he be an Obasanjo robot? Or will he unfold an independent agenda once he consolidates his hold on power? On the one hand, he promised to only marginally tinker with the personnel and policies of Obasanjo’s government. On the other, he has promised a ‘servant-leadership’ style, which can only be taken as an oblique criticism of Obasanjo’s proverbial high-handedness; he has also promised a programme of national ‘restoration’, another Freudian acknowledgement of his tarnished inheritance.

Much of what we have heard about Yar Adua is that he is taciturn, ascetic and relatively incorrupt. These are good leadership qualities by Nigerian standards. We should also remember, however, that he is equally capable of political ruthlessness. For examples, he forced out all the five leading members of the Katsina State PDP after he became governor in 1999; he successfully frustrated Aminu Masari, influential Speaker of the Federal House of Representatives from running for Katsina governor under the PDP in 2007; force and violence were freely used against the opposition in Katsina and Daura in the 2007 elections. We are clearly not dealing with a bumbling saint, but it remains to be seen if he has the will and determination to resist being turned into a puppet.

The stability and security of post-election Nigeria will therefore depend on three critical factors: what the opposition and civil society do; what Obasanjo’s real intentions are; and Yar Adua’s capabilities and response to both. If out of vulnerability, Yar Adua sticks with Obasanjo and the PDP, he is likely to face increasing civil protest and rely more on the coercive apparatus set up under the Obasanjo presidency. If, on the other hand, he decides to be independent of Obasanjo, then he is likely to confront opposition from entrenched forces from within the PDP. Significantly, two people are already on record as saying that Yar’ Adua will ‘deal with’ Obasanjo: General TY Danjuma and Alhaji Makama, PDP Kaduna State Chairman. Whichever direction Yar Adua turns, he is likely to be confronted with stiff resistance, at least in the next 12 to 15 months. Those who think that reforms will continue once the transition to a new administration has taken place may well be mistaken. Nigerians live in the proverbial interesting times.

The Future of Democracy.

It is understandable that most Nigerians are disappointed and traumatized by the 2007 elections. There is no doubt that INEC’s conduct has brought dishonor to the country.

This current disappointment is coming on top of a long-run decline in support for the democratic administration since 1999. According to Afrobarometer surveys between 2000 and 2005, support for democracy in Nigeria has gone down from 81% of those surveyed in 2000, to 65% in 2005. Over the same period, ex-president Obasanjo’s approval rating plummeted from 84% to 32%. The ‘(s)election’ of April 2007 further aggravates this growing disillusionment. Under the circumstances, it is easy to understand the air of despair that pervades the country.

Nigerians however need to remind themselves of some of the positive things that came out of the 2007 experience. Firstly, Yar Adua was not Obasanjo’s first choice; Obasanjo’s first choice through term elongation was Obasanjo himself. The political will that defeated the sit-tight design under the ‘third term’ can also be mustered to defeat ‘the son of third term’. Secondly the judiciary and the media have largely been beacons of hope. In the Ararume and Atiku cases that went to the Supreme and Federal Appeal courts, we see a judiciary committed to the rule of law and worthy of respect and support. This was certainly not the case in the electoral debacle of June 12th 1993. Thirdly, important organs and personalities of civil society have shown that they remain unbowed in the face of authoritarianism. Fourthly, General Buhari, in his statesman-like conduct, and Atiku, through his dogged reliance on the courts, have shown that they can still make useful contributions to the entrenchment of democratic norms in Nigeria. Finally, it should also be borne in mind that this was also the election in which the middle classes came out in post-colonial Nigeria to stand for something new and refreshing: Utomi, Agbaje, Oshiomole, Bugaje, and Fayemi.

It will be important for the opposition and civil society to use the courts, the media, and all peaceful avenues to force Yar Adua to redeem his promise of electoral reform. Nigerian democracy, or even the country itself, will not survive without serious and urgent electoral/constitutional reforms. Logically, it would seem that the correct strategy would be to put enough pressure on Yar Adua to make him sit up and redeem his pledge, but not so much that his only source of succour is the bosom of the Obasanjo-controlled PDP. Only Nigerians can save their country from the scourge of impunity which the sham elections of 2007 represent.

* Abdul Raufu Mustapha is a University Lecturer in African Politics & Kirk-Greene Fellow, University of Oxford.

* Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

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