The future of the Net

The Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform was formed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a private U.S.-based nonprofit organization that controls the distribution of Internet addresses around the world and maintains the core systems at the heart of the Internet. At first glance, most of ICANN's work appears to be nothing more than obscure minutiae that have no effect on Internet users. But scattered through its highly technical work are important issues about Internet governance that affect users worldwide. Although ICANN was created to coordinate technical management, it has broadened its powers to include policy decisions that will dramatically affect what people are allowed to do online.

The organization that coordinates the Internet's technical management has been compared to Enron.

As ICANN expanded its mandate to become an organization that sets international Internet policy, it has been compared to Enron or the International Olympic Committee for its arrogance, potential for corruption, and lack of accountability. Many have called for the organization to be restructured or even eliminated.

ICANN finally answered these complaints by forming the Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform earlier this year and charging it to recommend appropriate changes to the organization's structure. But the committee's proposed changes, announced last week, would make ICANN even less responsive to outside concerns than it is now.

Why ICANN matters

MORE ABOUT ICANN

To learn more about ICANN, including its history and its special relationship with the U.S. Deparment of Commerce, see the DFN article "The secret gatekeeper."

ICANN has already made several important technical decisions that have hurt many individual users and organizations. Its two most controversial decisions were the creation of new Internet addresses and a policy for resolving disputes over ownership of addresses.

In November 2000, after years of contentious debate, ICANN added seven new global top-level domains (suffixes to Internet addresses) such as dot-pro and dot-info. Other organizations paid tens of thousands of dollars in non-refundable fees to be considered, but ICANN rejected their applications without giving any clear reasons. Since ICANN has given no indication as to when it might approve additional new top-level domains, Internet addresses remain scarce; benefiting ICANN (which retains the power to approve new top-level domains) as well as companies that manage the registration of Internet addresses.

In response to numerous complaints about "cybersquatters" (individuals who registered Web addresses identical to existing trademarks and then tried to sell the addresses to the trademark holders for profit), ICANN devised a controversial procedure called the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy. This policy stated that disputes over who should own a trademarked domain name would go to arbitration before one of several groups approved by ICANN. Critics charged that the ICANN-approved arbitrators issue decisions inconsistently, encouraging those who bring complaints to go to the arbitrator most likely to issue a favorable decision. Furthermore, they noted that ICANN created a new type of regulation that transcends national law, creating a disturbing precedent.

Right now, ICANN's authority over the Internet is limited only by its imagination.

The most alarming aspect of these two decisions is that ICANN acted unilaterally in making them. While it actively sought input from outside sources, it was under no obligation to listen to them. Given ICANN's history of expanding its powers and refusing to share information or authority with anyone, it could easily choose to set policy on other contentious Internet issues like regulating "spam" (unsolicited bulk e-mail) or copyright law. Without an independent body that can review and if necessary overturn decisions, ICANN's authority is limited only by the imagination of its board and staff.

ICANN's plan for reform

In its final report, released on May 31, ICANN's Reform Committee supported the idea that ICANN should solicit input from various groups but not cede any power to external groups. The report called for getting more funding for ICANN, creating a separate entity that focuses exclusively on the Internet's technical management (while keeping policy-making decisions within ICANN), and restructuring several ICANN committees and supporting organizations.

ICANN's reform plan actually reduces public participation.

Responding to frequent complaints that ICANN has acted unilaterally in making decisions, the Reform Committee created a plan for restructuring the board that actually further reduces public participation. Under the plan, the board would no longer include members elected by Internet users around the world. Seven of the directors would be appointed from ICANN advisory committees and supporting organizations, and a nominating committee drawn from various groups "interested in ICANN's work" and chaired by an ICANN board member would select the other directors, possibly with the ratification by the board. Since the public would no longer be able to elect board members and the nominating committee would be comprised mostly of ICANN insiders, the only way for Internet users or any outside organization to participate in ICANN's decision-making process is to send a letter to the organization; with no guarantee that the board or staff would take any action.

In addition to restructuring the board, the Reform Committee also proposed three weak mechanisms for limiting ICANN's authority and promoting transparency:

* A nonbinding arbitration process, in which a "recognized international arbitration body" would review alleged violations of ICANN's by-laws, would probably not lead to any real change since the committee argued in its report that giving any entity the power to reverse ICANN board decisions was "inappropriate."
* A proposed ombudsman's office, which would receive and investigate complaints against ICANN, lacks independence since ICANN's board would hire the ombudsman, take responsibility for funding the office, and set the office's mandate.
* A manager of public participation, hired and managed by ICANN's chief executive officer to "enable effective public input into the ICANN policy-development process," has no clear role other than to maintain ICANN's public forums and report to the board.

The need for accountability

Key dates in ICANN's future

June 12, 2002: U.S. Senate scheduled to hold public hearings to examine ICANN

June 24-28, 2002: ICANN meeting in Bucharest, Romania scheduled; ICANN expected to begin implementing its reform plan

June 30, 2002: ICANN's agreement to maintain root server system (a network of special computers that are critical to maintaining the Internet) scheduled to expire

July 2002: U.S. House of Representatives scheduled to hold public hearings on ICANN

September 3, 2002: Memorandum of Understanding (which outlines ICANN's work) between U.S. Commerce Department and ICANN scheduled to expire

September 30, 2002: ICANN's agreement with the U.S. Commerce Department to maintain "IANA functions" (certain tasks critical to the Internet infrastructure) expires

October 27-31, 2002: ICANN meeting in Shanghai, China scheduled

Between December 31, 2002 and June 30, 2005: ICANN's agreements for running dot-com, dot-org, and dot-net addresses scheduled to expire

Ironically, the U.S. government, which created ICANN in order to turn management of the Internet over to the private sector, still plays a major role in shaping its future. The U.S. Department of Commerce signed the contracts that currently govern the organization's work. Since most of those contracts expire this year, the Commerce Department could give the Internet's technical management functions to another organization or use that leverage to pressure ICANN to change.

ICANN critics believe that the expiration of its contracts gives them a timely opportunity to push for reform. Last week, a group of U.S.-based non-governmental organizations asked the Commerce Department to allow other entities to bid for contracts for controlling how Internet addresses are assigned. This "rebid" proposal holds considerable promise as a short-term solution, although substantive change is not guaranteed since no competitors to ICANN have been suggested yet. Others have called for ICANN to be broken up into smaller, more focused organizations. Such a breakup might involve a long and messy transition, although in the long run it would probably lead to a more stable Internet.

Almost all of ICANN's problems stem from its lack of accountability. By rejecting the need for anyone to oversee it, it has created an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion. Many have proposed sound and practical ideas for ensuring accountability, such as allowing at least some board members to be elected by the public or creating an independent organization not chosen by ICANN with the power to review and reverse ICANN decisions.

But in order to prevent ICANN from implementing its own flawed restructuring plan, someone with the political and legal power to challenge ICANN's authority will have to intervene. Unless someone like the U.S. government or the European Union steps in, the management of the Internet will soon be controlled by a small group accountable only to itself.

Copyright (c) 2002 Digital Freedom Network. All rights reserved. This article may be reproduced or redistributed for online not-for-profit use without prior written consent as long as DFN is recognized with this credit. For information about DFN's permissions policy, see .