Doubts on the veracity of Mutsinzi report

Anyone familiar with the basic provisions of the Arusha accords of 18 August 1992 (which among other things describes the composition of the transitional institutions agreed upon by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) and the Habyalimana government) is impelled to call into question Gerald Caplan's credentials in commenting on the merits of the Mutsinzi report. I refer to the crisply titled ‘Report of the Investigation into the Causes and Circumstances and Responsibility for the Attack of 06/04/94 against the Falcon 50 Rwandan Presidential Aeroplance, Registration Number 9x9-NN’.

Caplan writes ‘It's never been entirely clear what motive Kagame would have had for murdering Habyarimana at the very moment when the president intended to implement the Arusha Accords. The RPF had been the huge winner at Arusha, about to receive substantial political and military power. Conversely Habyarimana's officials were the great losers.’

I read the implications of article 55 and 62 of the protocol on the sharing of power very differently. In the Broadly Based Transitional Government (BBTG) the FPR and the pro-Habyalimana MRN Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement (MRND) each get five portfolios, Hutu-dominated Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MDR) and Parti Social Democrate (PSD), respectively four and three, the pro-Tutsi but ethnically split Parti Liberal (PL), three and the Hutu-led Parti Democrate Chretien (PDC) one. Furthermore the MRND ended up with the key ministries, i.e. Defense, Civil Service, Planning, whereas the FPR ended up with Interior, Health, Transport and Communication, Youth and Social Movements, Rehabilitation and Social Integration. With five ministerial chairs out of 21 it is hard to see how the FPR could be described as the big winner. So also with regard to its control of the armed forces, where the FPR ended up controlling 40 per cent of the troops and 50 per cent of higher ranks.

In the Transitional Assembly the FPR, MRND, MDR, PSD, PL each received 11 seats, and the PDC four. Which in effect made it impossible for the FPR to block a piece of legislation, much less an amendment to the Arusha charter.

Crucially, article 22 of the final protocol, dealing with ‘diverse questions and final disposition’, stipulates that the transition will last 22 months after the inauguration of the BBTG, only to be prolonged after a three fifths majority of the Assembly. At the end of the transitional period multiparty elections were to be held, which in all likelihood would have given the Hutu parties an overwhelming majority.

Is this what Gerald Caplan calls the FPR's ‘huge victory’ at Arusha?

I beg to differ. I also disagree that it was ‘extremely functional’ for Hutu extremists to shoot down Habyalimana's plane unless he means that killing some of the key members of the akazu, including the Chief of Staff, was to the advantage of Hutu extremists. His logic evades my grasp.

I have yet to read the Mutsinzi report from beginning to end, but, pending a more sustained exploration, the misinformation conveyed by Dr Gerald Caplan is enough to cast the strongest doubts on its veracity.

* René Lemarchand is emeritus professor of Political Science at the University of Florida.