The Al-Shabaab distortion

Al-Shabaab’s attack on the presidential palace in Mogadishu on 8 July 2014 is the latest of a string of violent assaults that have afflicted Somalia and neighbouring countries in recent weeks. Thereby, the Islamist rebels’ ability to penetrate the heavily fortified presidential complex is testimony to the movement’s potency to (literally) disrupt the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) reconstruction efforts. This is particularly striking against the backdrop of enhanced security precautions the FGS had recently taken, and the military offensive the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) troops had launched on 5 March. Just as was the case after the 21 September assault on Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall, there is a risk that al-Shabaab’s ‘Ramadan offensive’ triggers a predominantly military response at the part of the FGS and its international allies.

However, in a recent study entitled ‘Alternatives for Conflict Transformation in Somalia’ the Life and Peace Institute argues that dividing Somali political actors into a binary dichotomy of extremists and moderates has produced a distorted understanding of the conflict. Partly rooting in the prevailing counterterrorism narrative, this distortion goes in tandem with a one-sided perception of al-Shabaab. Yet, as rightly pointed out by the International Crisis Group’s latest policy briefing on Somalia, titled ‘Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War’, the group is multifaceted and constitutes much more than an armed insurgency. Unfortunately, simplistic portrayals of both the Somali conflict and its most prominent fomenter have significantly hampered the country’s prospects for conflict resolution and state building.

Simultaneously, there is a third distortion at play when it comes to al-Shabaab, namely the ubiquitous proposition that the Islamist movement constituted the greatest challenge to peace and stability in Somalia. However, this is questionable. First, at the grassroots, al-Shabaab offers practical solutions and benefits for numerous communities, including mediating local clan disputes, establishing local governance arrangements, and providing basic services. Second, despite popular claims to the contrary, defeating al-Shabaab is not a precondition for advancing Somalia’s state building project. For one, a victory over the extremist movement is likely to catalyse local clan disputes. For another, the historic track record of state building shows that the setting up of governance structures has, for better or for worse, generally been accompanied by violent contestation of all sorts – particularly during early phases.

Somalia’s obstacles towards peace, stability, and prosperity lie beyond the challenge posed by al-Shabaab. Just as has been acknowledged in the case of the pirates, the Islamist movement constitutes more of a symptom of underlying discrepancies than an insurmountable core problem in and of itself. Consequently, the FGS and its international backers should not exhaust themselves and their scarce resources in rather hopeless military operations against al-Shabaab, which, if anything, have encouraged it. Rather, President Mohamoud and the international community should consider devoting more attention towards tackling Somalia’s more fundamental problems, which would allow them to kill two birds with one stone: rebuilding a functioning state, and, thereby, draining al-Shabaab of its fertile soil.

SOMALIA’S REAL CHALLENGES

One central defiance that not only challenges prospects for peace and stability in Somalia, but that also provides fertile soil for al-Shabaab lies in the fragmentation of clans. That this dynamic has seen a revival with the rolling out of a federal agenda is evidenced by the increasing tribal tensions in southern Somalia. Rather than curbing such fragmentation, the military advances against al-Shabaab appear to have furthered it by establishing a power vacuum (see e.g. IRIN, ‘Clans clash in Somalia’s Lower Shabelle’, 11 June 2014). While al-Shabaab has frequently exploited resulting clan competition to its own benefit, such fragmentation is poisonous for Somalia’s state building endeavour. Hence, the FGS needs to successfully forge social cohesion on a national scale, if wanting to establish peace and stability.

A second challenge the FGS needs to come to grips with concerns the lack of a political vision. As of today, the government has failed to put forth a tangible plan on how to move forward in newly liberated areas or with regards to federalism. Against the backdrop of remaining social fault lines along clan identity, the recommendation of ‘facilitating local clan dialogue and reconciliation’ is generally advanced. Yet, its relevance is not only questionable in an environment of constantly shifting alliances, but it is also back-ward-looking and divisive in nature. What the FGS rather needs to come up with is a common vision that paints a tangible and realistic picture of the future. Such a vision could bridge clan divides, provide a political agenda for action, and provide an ideological framework that allows the FGS to mobilize popular support for state building, challenging al-Shabaab’s hegemony in terms of vision.

Another fundamental obstacle lies in the void of local administrations. For one, the absence of formal administrative structures has provided al-Shabaab with the possibility to fill this gap. This has not only allowed the extremist movement to establish its presence in rural areas for the past decade, but also enabled it to become part and parcel of political governance at the grassroots level. For another, it has deprived the FGS of the ability to control territory, provide basic services, and gain traction amongst local constituencies. And the arrival of ill-disciplined SNA troops and corrupt government officials in newly liberated areas soured rather than watered the population’s appetite for central government control. Thus, the challenge of setting up functioning administrative structures needs to be embraced in order to defeat al-Shabaab and build a viable state.

A fourth key defiance the FGS has to tackle concerns combating poverty, reducing vulnerability, and providing livelihoods by creating employment opportunities. While poverty remains endemic, warnings of another immanent famine are again on the rise. Yet, creating loyal fellowship for its state building project will be hardly possible in the absence of tangible improvements of popular livelihoods. Similarly, it seems next to impossible to create an engaged citizenship in the absence of a productive economy and the ability for popular taxation. If the government and the international donor community at large continue to remain largely unable to reduce the multitude of risks the Somali population faces, its objective of building a viable state and defeating al-Shabaab will remain a distant dream.

GOING BEYOND MILITARY APPROACHES

Clearly, insofar as al-Shabaab is an insurgency movement, it needs to be countered militarily. However, this should not (mis)lead the FGS and its international partners to become ‘locked in’ to a military response. Not only do continued military campaigns against al-Shabaab provide it with nurturing grounds, but also diverts attention from the underlying challenges for peace and prosperity in Somalia. Frequently heeded calls for a ‘political inclusion’ of the extremist movement are questionable. Not only do both sides of the table contain elements that reject political dialogue, but such a ‘solution’ maintains the focus on al-Shabaab as the primary hindrance to stability and development in Somalia. Yet, as this seems to be far from the truth, distorting al-Shabaab should be granted less rather than more attention.

Hence, and given that fighting al-Shabaab militarily does preciously little to advance the fate of the Somali population and the FGS’s state building project at large, other approaches need to be found. The most promising way forward appears to be a strategy that hones in on building a functioning state apparatus that, by consequence, renders organizations such as al-Shabaab irrelevant to the local populace. Obviously, this is a long-term and difficult endeavour. Yet, the FGS and the international donor community would be well advised to consider such a strategic shift before President Mohamoud’s term is up, and his empty-handedness triggers the international community’s retreat from Somalia.

* Dr Dominik Balthasar is a Researcher and Analyst with the Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellowship for International Relations and Security, in the framework of which he has worked with Chatham House, the US Institute of Peace, and the EU Institute for Security Studies.

* This piece was previously published in: http://tinyurl.com/ppp2x6n

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