Uganda's 2009 September hooligans' riots like 1966 crisis?

Though tempting, the likening of Uganda’s September 2009 riots to the 1966 crisis – as done by Kalundi Serumaga (‘Things fall apart again well-worn path to constitutional', The East African, September 14–20 2009) and Joe Powell (The Independent, issue 078) – would resemble comparing cheese and chalk. For to begin with while in 1966 the constitution allowed for a political Kabaka (who Serumaga seems to currently advocate for), today he is a constitutional, traditional ruler. Under the 1962 independence constitution, the Kabaka was the head of the Ugandan state and also the Buganda government and the Kabaka Yekka.

Under the fudge referred to as the 1962 Lancaster House constitution, the Kabaka was both head of the Ugandan and Buganda states and the de facto leader of the Kabala Yekka (king only) party. This anomaly that made the Kabaka political had negated the position adopted seven years prior in the Buganda Agreement of 1955, an august document made by the best well-meaning brains in Buganda together with the colonialists, which had conditioned the return of Sir Edward Muteesa from his first exile in the early 1950s upon his becoming a constitutional monarch. This was in addition to having of an elected Lukiiko and Katikiro. Indeed, both Michael Kintu and Mayanja Nkangi became Katikiro through elections.

The genesis of Uganda’s 1966 constitutional crisis lay in the conflict-prone 1962 independence constitution, the culture of political autocracy and impunity we had inherited from the British, political divisions within the Uganda People's Congress and the lack of political experience amongst our then rulers.

Uganda’s independence constitution, made by the opportunistic UPC–KY (Uganda People's Congress–Kabaka Yekka) coalition, in cosy cahoots with the departing British, was a partisan, sectarian document. This coalition was opportunistic and uneasy because while the UPC, then following the tradition of the Uganda National Congress (UNC), had set out to be a pro-democracy (Anglican) pan-Ugandan party, the Kabaka Yekka on the other hand focused on creating an ethnic federal entity (Federo/Majimbo) type governance system, headed by an absolute monarch. The KY was offered this, on a silver platter, at Lancaster!

Worse still, this fudge set out in black and white to perpetually rig from power the roman catholic establishment and their Democratic Party. They regarded this document as illegitimate. It also disfranchised the people of Buganda, for it was the Anglican landed gentry dominated Lukiiko which was ensured to elect, on their behalf, their own members of parliament. Furthermore it gave the Kabaka political power and made Buganda a state within Uganda.

Colonialism responded to political dissent with brute force. This thinking informed the operations of the colonial state apparatus, as for instance with the King's African Rifles, which the UPC–KY administration inherited and abused.

These tensions stressed to the limit the young Ugandan polity, a reality further complicated by the inexperience of the political actors at play. For instance, Milton Obote only meaningfully engaged with statecraft just four years into independence when he joined the Legco. Moreover, his leading the UNC was by fluke, resulting from an internal coup instigated by one Jolly 'Joe' Kiwanuka, who replaced Ignatius Musaazi with Obote in 1959.

Grace Ibingira was barely 30 when he become the all-powerful attorney general. Other key actors were equally inexperienced. Felix Onama (defence minister) had been a village cooperative union clerk, and Basil Bataringaya (interior minister) a primary school headmaster.

Inexperience and short-sightedness led Obote at the 1965 UPC Gulu Delegates Conference to dump John Kakonge, a reliable ally, for the position of party secretary general, for Ibingira. Soon afterwards Ibingira and Mengo (the seat of Buganda kingdom), led by Kabaka Muteesa, attempted to remove Obote from power. All this played out through the attempted failed coup by Brigadier Shaban Opolot, the Congo gold and ivory crisis debate, the Daudi Ocheing parliamentary motion of no confidence, and the internal UPC elections.

Obote responded by pushing forward with the referendum of the lost counties, ethnicising the military and security forces, imprisoning five dissenting senior cabinet colleagues during a cabinet meeting, abrogating the 1962 constitution, attacking the Lubiri (palace) where up to 1,000 people were killed and exiling Muteesa till death.

He then banned the monarchy, and hurt the psyche of the Baganda by militarily occupying the Lubiri and Bulange, all the while openly bragging about and justifying these excesses as a 'revolution'! Like a crazed bull in a China shop, he further undertook a catalogue of costly political mistakes as his 'encirclement of Buganda policy' and the hurried dismantling of the KY dominated the Buganda state within a state, with most of its functionaries being laid off without their due retirement packages. This alienated from Obote an important power structure. He also imposed a perpetual Buganda-specific state of emergency, hence affecting all and sundry and sealing his and whatever had remained of the UPC’s fate in Buganda.

Serumaga argues that Yoweri Museveni's administration’s stopping of Kabaka Mutebi’s visiting Kayunga was a sign of constitutional collapse. I would regard this as a misinterpretation of facts. For the Banyala of Kayunga may be a minority, numbering less than 10,000 people, but they are nonetheless recognised by the Uganda constitution as a separate ethnic group. Moreover, Kayunga district council recognised their cultural institution.

Now given that some Banyala were opposed to the Kabaka’s visit without being involved and consulted, and tempers were fired, it was in the country’s best interests to ensure that Kabaka Mutebi, his delegation and the people of Kayunga were protected from harm. Does this constitute a constitutional breakdown? Certainly not!

Furthermore, even in democracies, rioters – especially if they wantonly destroy private and public property, including burning down police stations and inciting racial and ethnic hatred – are never treated with celebration. They are dealt with firmly. For appeasement is likely to result in the very constitutional breakdown Serumaga refers to in his epistle to the diplomatic community and regional civil and political society.

In conclusion, it would mark the height of ignorance to liken Uganda’s 1966 constitutional crisis to the September 2009 hooligans' riots. For unlike Obote, Museveni and his inner circle, being better exposed and seasoned political actors, are unlikely to embark on a mistake-committing safari. Indeed, they acted to protect, rather that undermine or abrogate, a legitimate constitution. And the NRM (National Resistance Movement) party and state apparatus are cohesively behind their leadership. Additionally, Mengo lacks the formidable state and partisan political apparatus which Kabaka Muteesa had through the 1962 constitution. Lastly, unlike the UPC in the mid-1960s, the NRM has solid political support in Buganda. This is reflected at the crucial party, government and local government levels. These elected leaders would sway the population towards it when push comes to shove.

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* Kintu Nyago is the executive director of the Forum for Promoting Democratic Constitutionalism.
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