Zuma on the verge of victory

© With Jacob Zuma's African National Congress (ANC) on the verge of victory in today's South African election, William Gumede charts the leader's rise and endeavour to align himself with the country's poor black majority through presenting himself as a stark contrast to his erstwhile rival Thabo Mbeki. Now a self-styled 'champion' of the poor, the success of much of Zuma's campaigning has rested on his ability to exploit the core rich–poor dichotomy framing the election for his own benefit, argues Gumede. Having raised expectations among South Africa's poor to 'a level of fever pitch', the success of Zuma's presidency will ultimately rest on his capacity to harness the talents of the country's diverse peoples during testing economic times, the author concludes.

Jacob Zuma and his ruling African National Congress (ANC) will win the country’s poll today after successfully turning this election into a face-off with well-off blacks and whites on the one side and the black poor majority on the other, rather than what should it have been: a referendum on the government’s record in power.

With exceptions, after 15 years in power, little has changed for most black South Africans, who still living in appalling poverty, joblessness and homelessness. Yet Zuma will be voted in by most poor black South Africans, for whom little has changed since the country first became democratic in 1994. During this campaign, Zuma has successfully portrayed himself as ‘poor’ himself and made his personal marginalisation by the administration of former President Thabo Mbeki – of which he was deputy president and a close ally until he was sacked for alleged corruption in 2005 – at one with the marginalisation of the poor and their issues.

Zuma ousted Mbeki as party leader in 2007 following a fierce leadership struggle over control for power, rather than substantial differences over policy or ideology. Zuma has, in the perception of many poorer black South Africans, in fact managed to successfully dissociate himself from the failures of the ANC government, blaming them solely on Mbeki. Throughout this election campaign, he has portrayed his camp, now in charge of the ANC, as an almost entirely different party. Zuma's strategists have successfully portrayed him and the leadership of this now dominant ANC faction as ostensibly more ‘pro-poor’ and ‘democratic’ and less ‘corrupt’, and as a group which will ultimately govern far more effectively once in government. Furthermore, those at the helm of Zuma’s campaign have portrayed themselves as the victors of an epic battle against the ‘corrupt’, pro-business and black middle-class and ‘pro-white’ wing of the ANC, as represented by Mbeki. In fact, Zuma has successfully tapped into a dramatic change in the mood of South Africa’s poor black majority living in despair in sprawling shantytowns across the country. This group, forgotten by the elite, has now run out of patience, and is now demanding economic dividends of South Africa's democracy. Some poorer South Africans are blaming democracy itself for their marginalisation, rather than government incompetence, leadership's indifference and infighting within the ANC for their problems.

In contrast, those empowered by the new democracy have been the few connected to the ANC leadership and the black and white middle-classes. This reality has been at the heart of spontaneous violent protests by poorer black communities against the government's failure over the past few years. To many poorer black South Africans, Zuma has successfully portrayed the 16 formidable corruption charges against him as ‘manufactured’ by Mbeki and rich blacks and whites opposed to the success of a poor ‘peasant’ from Inkandla, the rural hamlet in KwaZulu Natal where he was born and where he has now built a luxurious mansion. Never mind the fact that he had been a close ally of Mbeki until he was fired in 2005, and a leading member of the black elite, who have become rich because of their ‘connectivity’ to the ANC.

As president, Mbeki – with Zuma's acquiescence prior to the two of them falling out in 2005 – routinely used democratic institutions and agencies to trip up opponents. The National Prosecuting Authority dropped corruption charges against Zuma early this month, claiming a political conspiracy between leading prosecutors in the timing of the charges, but emphasising that the case against him remained solid. Notwithstanding the motives for laying the charges, a previous court ruling said that a prosecution for wrongdoing remains valid as long as there are grounds for it. In his election campaign Zuma has also successfully portrayed the abuse of democratic institutions by the Mbeki administration – of which he was a part until 2005 – as intended to trip up opponents, arguing that these institutions' attempts to derail him, ‘a poor peasant’ and the ‘champion’ of the poor, from becoming president represent a broader symbol of the marginalisation of the poor.

As a ‘champion’ of the poor, Zuma spends more than a million rand a month on his personal security. Of course, Zuma’s rise to power as leader of the ANC as the first person not to come from a middle-class background is an inspiration in itself. Zuma’s anti-constitutional statements, such as his comments that he can see by the way a woman sits that she is looking for sex, that a shower after having unprotected sex with an HIV/Aids-infected person can cure one from getting infected, and that criminals enjoy far ‘too much’ in the way of human rights, have been brushed away.

In the campaign to drop the corruption charges against Zuma, the ANC leadership has closed down the crack anti-crime unit that brought the charges without consulting parliament, which should have decided the issue. The leadership has also daily attacked critical sections of the media and judges who ruled against Zuma, saying last week for example that South Africa's highest court, the Constitutional Court, is ‘not God’. His supporters have launched a drive to purge all Zuma critics in the ANC, government and state-owned companies. Critics are labelled as ‘coping’ in reference to being with COPE (the Congress of the People) – even if they are not – formed by ANC members opposed to Zuma’s election as ANC leader, before being purged. Zuma and some of his supporters have also subtly played the ethnic card, encouraging some fellow Zulu speakers to support him merely because of the fact that he is a fellow Zulu speaker, rather than on his record. During the Mbeki administration, partisan intellectuals denounced critics of the former president as they tried to ingrain themselves with him. Alarmingly, the same his now happening under Zuma, with some of the country’s black and white intellectuals, many of whom were marginalised by Mbeki for being critical of his undermining democracy, uncritically rallying to Zuma’s side.

In this campaign Zuma has raised expectations among the poor to a level of fever pitch. There have been a lot of promises of new policies and institutions, but little detail of the contents of these, let alone a timetable for when promises will be delivered or the costing of programmes. The breakaway from the ANC last year to form COPE has opened up the political space dominated by the ANC since 1994. Yet COPE, like all the other parties, has not focused on the issues of the black poor whether in the townships, rural areas or shantytowns, the group whose support is crucial to winning elections. They have been unable to undermine Zuma and the ANC’s message that they are part of a rich black and white cabal opposed to the black poor.

COPE and the current main opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), have lambasted Zuma’s compromised morals and attacks on democratic institutions, criticism which may resonate with the black and white middle-classes but which is falling on stony ground among those living in shacks and without jobs or food. The poor have clung desperately to Zuma’s promises of free healthcare, education and social grants, which are of course desperately needed but about which the president-in-waiting has given no details. Not even the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), Zuma’s ally, has pledged its support to him to deliver targets and clear timeframes. South Africa is about to face the full brunt of the global financial crisis, with rising job-losses across the economy. Zuma will take over an economy in decline after almost a decade-long boom with economic growth averaging 5 per cent over the past five years.

Yet neither the ANC nor opposition parties have proposed any remedy with timeframes on how to tackle the country's social problems. Right now the glue holding the different groups within the ANC family together is not a consensus over policy, the direction of the country or any particular ideology but rather simply the desire to get Zuma elected president. On the way to capturing the presidency of South Africa, Zuma has amassed a disparate coalition of interests by promising each group what it wants to hear through often diametrically opposed promises. The reality is that some groups promised heaven and earth are going to lose out. Disappointed expectations and infighting within the Zuma coalition over how to address South Africa’s urgent problems under a Zuma presidency may trigger another fracture of the ANC.

Zuma is unlikely to have the same honeymoon period that previous ANC governments enjoyed. Likewise, if Zuma does not deliver, the poor will turn against him in the same way that Mbeki was ousted. In scenes reminiscent of 1980s apartheid South Africa when black communities in the townships protested over government neglect, in 2005 the residents of a poor black township called Khutsong burnt down government buildings and physically attacked local ANC politicians whom they accused of failing them. There are going to be Khutsongs all over South Africa if Zuma does not deliver immediately. How Zuma will respond to such pressure to deliver in an economic downturn will determine the future of South Africa. Mbeki did not mind using state institutions to crush such dissent. Zuma’s supporters hope and pray he won’t do the same or worse.

Zuma’s initial actions are not encouraging. Not yet formally in power, Zuma has copied many of the bad things of the Mbeki era he had previously distanced himself from. But Zuma can yet be successful and prove his detractors wrong if he uses his power to harness the talents of all South Africans – from all races, whether critical of him or not – rather than rewarding incompetent cronies, dodgy financial backers or those from the same ethnic group. His will be a challenge to not simply talk glibly about defending the country’s constitution, democratic institutions and values, but to actually do so in his everyday behaviour. As Zuma assumes the presidency, he will do well to take the warning of former ANC stalwart Mac Maharaj to heart: 'It is actions that are going to inspire confidence.'

* William Gumede is author of the bestselling Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC.
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