Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced last week that he plans to appoint Nigeria’s Shola Omoregie as his new representative in Guinea-Bissau and as head of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office to the West African country (UNOGBIS). Mr. Omoregie, 59, a veteran UN official, replaces Joao Bernardo Honwana of Mozambique, who left the post in mid-September to return to UN Headquarters.

Three political parties are engaged in a secret fight to have President Kibaki as their candidate in next year's General Election.The Democratic Party, of which the President is the official chairman, the National Rainbow Coalition (Narc) and government-leaning Narc Kenya want the President to state categorically the party on whose ticket he will seek re-election.

The Lords Resistance Army leader, Joseph Kony, has lashed out at Members of Parliament from northern Uganda, currently in Juba on an observation mission, accusing them of taking an inducement of Shs60 million each to "to mess him up."In a two and a half hour teleconference with the MPs and members of the LRA peace negotiation team, a rather infuriated Kony told off the legislators and said, "You MPs are all useless, you have been bribed with Shs60 million each to come and mess me up."

FEATURE:
- As in many communities in Nigeria’s oil rich Delta region, most people of Yenagoa live in mud huts. They have no hospitals, no running water, no schools. And there is unemployment too, writes Emira Woods.
COMMENT AND ANALYSIS:
-Aaron Tesfaye argues that the situation in Darfur is a grim reminder “of the after-effects of colonialism.
- Glenn Brigaldino describes Somalia as a state that only exists on paper, including maps
- Mouhamadou Tidiane KASSE argues that the implementation of neo-liberal policies and strategies in Africa, which have culminated today in globalisation, resulted in the feminisation of poverty on the continent.
LETTERS: Disarmament Programme in Mozambique
PAN AFRICAN POSTCARD: Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem despairs at the Latin Americanization of Nigerian politics
BLOGGING AFRICA: This week, Sokari Ekine focuses on Kenyan blogging community.
BOOKS: Robtel Pailey interviews Tsitsi Dangarembga
CONFLICT AND EMERGENCIES: Links to news on Sudan, Nigeria, Uganda and Angola
HUMAN RIGHTS: A call on the UN Assembly to approve Indigenous Declaration
WOMEN AND GENDER: Renewed efforts to outlaw Female Genital Mutilation
REFUGEES AND FORCED MIGRATION: Risk of polio amongst Somali refugees
ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE: EISA Regional Observer Mission To The Zambia 2006
DEVELOPMENT: Making trade work for the poor
CORRUPTION: Corruption is rampant in relief work
HEALTH AND HIV/AIDS: HIV/AIDS, A threat to national development
EDUCATION: World Teachers’ Day
ENVIRONMENT: Download A new book on Carbon Trading
LAND AND LAND RIGHTS: Land reform a tricky issue in South Africa
MEDIA AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: Campaign of intimidation against Burundi radio stations
DIASPORA: Black women and stress
INTERNET AND TECHNOLOGY: Lack of consensus threatens EASSY cable
FAHAMU Announces free online course: Introduction to human rights
PLUS: e-Newsletters and Mailings Lists; Fundraising and Useful Resources; Courses, Seminars and Workshops; Jobs.

The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) has aggressively extended its authority beyond Mogadishu to vast areas of southern Somalia. One consequence has been a sharp increase in the number of refugees entering Kenya. Glenn Brigaldino describes Somalia as a state that only exists on paper, including maps. “It is most favourably described as a desolate and impoverished place, where a traditional society wildly fragmented along clan allegiances struggles to secure a livelihood.”

One evening in early 1988, my Ugandan friend Samuel Opondo and I were sitting on the porch of my house in Hargeisa, Somalia. “You know what...” he started, “…this place is not Africa. I will cut it off from my map of Africa and push it into the ocean.” It hardly seemed like an odd idea. African expatriates in Somalia are frequently irritated at being called “African” by average Somalis, who seem to consider themselves above non-Muslim Africans, especially if those who are noticeably dark-skinned. It struck me as ignorant behaviour, given that so many Somalis are illiterate, can perhaps recite but hardly read the Koran and in their daily lives, often appeared to be Muslim only in name. Today, Sam’s outlandish idea may well have genuine merit as an analytical insight, notably his reflective after-thought that “…by the time Somalis are ready for this century, we will be well into the 21st.”

We all know that Somalia in 2006 is a state only on paper, including maps. It is most favourably described as a desolate and impoverished place, where a traditional society wildly fragmented along clan allegiances struggles to secure a livelihood. To most political observers, it is a violent and unwelcoming semi-desert zone, of obscure “strategic interest” where perpetual clan disputes and warlordism reign on the remnants of a failed state.

At the best of times, life in Somalia was hard and troublesome. As these times slipped into decades of misrule and anarchy, an entire generation grew up with no exposure to notions of social order and development. Instead, they became embedded and often actively engaged in the break-up of whatever social order existed. Sadly, most Somalis today are accustomed to a seemingly natural state of perpetual clan rivalries, political violence, human tragedy and socioeconomic collapse.

In a recent article for Towardfreedom, an independent online source for democratic debate, I have explored in some detail the current political context in Somalia from an international perspective.[1] The situation remains in flux. Although the US-backed warlords are no longer “calling the shots”, the quest for political control is far from resolved. It seems only a question of time until the now dominant Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), led by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), based in the town of Baidoa of interim President Abdullahi Yusuf begin to battle it out for sole control. External players continue to sponsor their preferred Somali ally.

Eritrea and Arab countries are siding with and delivering weapons to the UIC, while the authoritarian Ethiopian regime of Meles Zenawi backs the TFG, including with troop deployments into Somalia, with unofficial, tacit support of its US pay-master.

More players are about to enter the scene as an African Union endorsed plan for an African peace-keeping force of some 8000 is being seriously considered, with the first contingent of Ugandan troops reportedly already in Baidoa. [2] It seems only a matter of time until outright war breaks out between the two opposite factions, regardless of periodic peace-talks in Sudan and the involvement the African Union.

While the prospect of such a conflict is deeply troubling, most analysts would be at a loss to formulate any peaceful and democratic scenario in a country that is no more, perhaps never was and in any case, consists of an entire population marred by decades of political violence, poverty and social erosion. At best, it is only possible to make a half-informed guess as to what future lays ahead for the young generation in Somalia.

From an early age, Somali children face hardships and disadvantages in terms of health and nutrition. In addition, kids in Somalia have little opportunity for carefree play and when they do play, they do so without many toys. While in most countries, the importance of play and stimulating toys is acknowledged as an important factor in child development, Somali children tend to have few such toys available to them. There are of course creatively assembled self-made toys, as made by children around the world. But apart from sporadic attention to specific children’s’ needs, investment in kids tends to be an alien concept in Somalia, at best thought of as a secondary need. [3]

In the Somali context, successive generations of parents have grown up in similar conditions, where attention to early-childhood development is virtually non-existent. In the absence of the necessary social stability to allow for continuous years of formal education and under conditions of protracted gender inequality, investment into the future well-being of children becomes an afterthought.

It should come as little surprise that kids emerging as youths from such circumstances, are readily available to be recruited into the omnipresent clan, gang, or militia-groupings and associations that have flourished in Somalia. It is hard to imagine many ordinary Somalis making a decent living from farming, handicrafts, trading or animal herding.

The take over of Mogadishu by the hardliner Islamists of the UIC has perhaps had one major effect upon the population living under their rule: for the first time in living memory, social and political order seems a realistic proposition. It would seem that not all has been bad since the UIC has taken over. Indeed they have moved in remarkable ways to re-establish a degree of normality that is a new experience for many, if not most Somalis. Random acts of robbery; extortion and petty crimes have decreased. The once infamous piracy business off the Somali coast, that repeatedly caught international attention, has been quelled.[4] In late August the first commercial ship in over a decade called port in Mogadishu. The airport has been re-opened: another vital supply route for a starved country and a new regime in need of links to foreign supporters (although at least two of the arriving planes were unmarked, most likely carrying weapons for the UIC from Eritrea).

Environmentalists would be pleased to learn that the export of charcoal has been forbidden and there is now a ban on capturing and selling birds of prey to Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Reportedly, wealthy expatriate Somali businessmen (probably not many women though) have descended on Nairobi, Kenya, where they hope to set up and conduct new business deals with merchants in Mogadishu. Of course, a surge of inflows of external supplies, notably food-aid relief can quickly rekindle a “refugee economy” as during the 1980s.

At that time, Somali received aid for a highly inflated number of refugees, easily 40% above actual numbers. In a country of only 7 million people, that aid translated into a sizeable portion of GDI, and combined with “regular” aid, it accounted perhaps for half of Somalia’s entire GDI. In the cold war context of that time, donors knew this but chose not to ask too much.

But if only there were not that infamous “price to pay”, which has already taken its toll on many. Several public executions have been carried out, also open for kids to attend. Suspicion of foreigners is deep-rooted and the shooting to death of a catholic nun and an international journalist are unlikely to be the last. The ban on Khat chewing, the narcotic drug so many Somali men seem to be unable to do without, has been banned, at least during the Ramadan period (a hard to enforce measure that has already sparked some protests).

Women are now being further relegated to the stone ages (some are already all veiled-up, apparently quite willingly so), and working for foreign NGOs is heavily frowned upon. Political violence has certainly not ceased, but is now far less rampant and visible. Then there is the repeated claim that in the UIC controlled parts of Somalia, training camps for Jihad recruits are being established. This is a hard to verify claim, and difficult to distinguish from planted US propaganda. But it does seem to be true that many of the defeated former militia members are being “re-educated” in camps outside of Mogadishu.

Who can tell how far such re-education goes? The most fervent “graduates” may well be those who raise their hands first when presented with the option to join obscure groupings that may or may not be linked to Al-Qaeda. Who knows?
It is suggested that the current situation in Somalia is in large part the result of US-efforts to supposedly quell the rise exactly of this kind of situation. A “CIA coup in Somalia” is said to have occurred, in the sense that “a major policy blunder by the United States opened the way for the UIC to seize power…(as) the CIA saw Somalia as a potential Afghanistan.” [5]

Thus, it should come as little surprise then that support for the UIC has deepened, not least as the scores of mostly young and idle Somali men with no recollection of living in a peaceful and productive society are readily enticed to fight for anything that resembles a meaningful cause. To them, joining militias is the only livelihood that provides any sense of security and income. The last engineer to graduate from what was once called the university of Mogadishu, must have done so nearly 20 years ago, and if not dead or in a militia himself (female Somali engineers would have been most unusual then) he lives and works now in Europe or maybe the US. The only thing usual in Somalia in living memory is the fragility of life and the constant risk of and submersion into repeated and ongoing humanitarian crises. In a recent interview, UNICEF Somalia representative Christian Balslev-Olesen noted that Somalia has become the "optimum" breeding ground for extremism because levels of malnutrition and education are among the worst in the world. He went on to say "If you have generations and generations out of school...we should not be surprised there is extremism in Somalia...”. [6]

As the internally driven and externally fuelled violence in Somalia continues to prevent any semblance of normality from taking hold, a new generation of Somalis is growing up in the midst of the previous social and political rubble.

When reading the International Crisis Groups’ well-researched and detailed account of the Somali political crisis with its countless clan facets and regional dimensions, I cannot help thinking that the report’s title “Can the Somali Crisis be Contained?” is merely a rhetorical question. [7] Sometimes I wonder what would have happened to Somalia, had it been somehow possible to implement Samuel Opondo’s idea of cutting it off the Africa map and letting it drift into the Indian Ocean. Once freed of the Siad Barre dictatorship, would Somalis have had the time and firmness of mind to find their own path to stability and peace? Perhaps Somalia today would be an agreeable island in a calm sea where adults share poems and kids run and play along the beach after school? Too good to be true, I know.

* Glenn Brigaldino is a Canada-based political analyst and commentator on international affairs. As a specialist in development cooperation, he is associated with in Germany and www.APKconsultancy.com of South Africa. Previously he has been a contributing writer for www.newtopiamagazine.net and more recently started writing for www.towardfreedom.com

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

References:
[1] Somalia, the Horn of Africa and US Troops in Odd Places, 20 July 2006, online at:

Quoting Uganda’s “Daily Monitor”, Allafrica (27 Sept.’06) reports that the recent visit to Uganda by Ethiopian dictator Meles Zenawi “…had been disguised as a trip on matters of ‘trade,’ was to draw a war plan for the already troubled Horn of Africa country.”

[3] While there is a good and valid case to be made that “Western” approaches to and ideas on childhood development and education should not be mechanically transplanted to other societies, I would add that there can be not retracting form demanding that children are especially vulnerable in impoverished, in turmoil societies. Securing children’s’ basic human rights are a minimum requirement for any developmental progress; a society or nation state that pays increased attention to children’s’ needs has an immeasurably greater chance to develop in peace than places where children needs are ignored or violated.
For a discussion on the context for child development in a globalized world, see:
Unequal Childhoods – Young children’s lives in poor countries, by Helen Penn, Routledge, London, 2005
[4] see: Somalia: Reported incidents of pirate attacks and hijackings off the coast of Somalia (January 2005 - March 2006) http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L21391236.htm
[7] Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?, International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°116, 10 August 2006

About two million people have been driven from their homes in three years of fighting in Darfur. Aaron Tesfaye argues that the situation in Darfur is a grim reminder “of the after-effects of colonialism and hastily cobbled, post-colonial states in Africa that cannot deliver political and economic goods to their people.”

The Darfur tragedy refuses to leave our consciousness, even when newer atrocities in the world present themselves. As the genocide unfolds - more viciously now that the Peace Agreements have collapsed - the world is aware of the failures of the African Union to resolve the conflict between the central government of Sudan led by Omar el-Bashir, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) faction led by Mr. Abdul Wahid el-Nur, and its close ally the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) led by Dr. Khalil Ibrahim.

Today the Bush administration seems to have opted for merely providing humanitarian assistance, making lots of "noise" at the UN, and a policy of benign neglect of the people of Darfur. It has refused to use its political and economic might to persuade Sudan to either cut a genuine deal with the rebels or invite the UN peacekeeping forces to safeguard the lives of innocent civilians. The current US stance is an indication of the closeness between Washington and Khartoum in the complex politics of oil and the War on Terror and seems to say, as in the Rwandan case, that African lives don't matter because Darfur is not Kosovo -- a European enclave.

Roots of the Conflict

The Darfur insurrection is connected to the conflict between state and society in southern Sudan. The insurrection and genocide has its roots in the complex milieu of inter-ethnic relations where ecological niches of the Fur, Zagawa, Massalit farmers, and Baqqara pastoralists were stressed due to famine and competition over space and water. But this connection between scarce resources and conflict must be understood through a glimpse of the past.

Modern Sudan is the creation of two imperialisms: Egyptian and British. Darfur was an important independent kingdom that was tacked onto Sudan by the British in 1916. Eventually, neglect by the Nile riverine elite of Khartoum led to the emergence of political protest in the 1960s and eventually to the current conflict. But two important factors added fuel to the fire. First was the venture of Libyan leader Muammar al Gaddafi into Chad in the 1980s with the resultant conflict over the Aouzou strip, rich in gas and other resources, and the mobilizing and arming of an "Islamic Legion" of the Sahelian "Arabs" and Turegs in his expansionist ambitions.[1]

Second was the 1986 decision of the prime minister of Sudan, Sadiq al-Mahdi, an important leader of the Umma Party, to launch an offensive to crush the secessionist Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in the south led by the late Dr. John Garang. This decision exacerbated the situation in the west because the Sudanese state armed with modern weapons the Baqqara and Ben Habla Fursan, "Arabs" (Janjaweed) including mercenaries from former Libyan Islamic Legionnaires of the failed Libyan expansionist war. As noted by an astute observer of Sudanese politics, it was "counterinsurgency on the cheap."[2]

These groups - along with the regular Sudanese Army - caused considerable destruction and spread terror amongst the Dinka and others in Bahr–El-Ghazal in the south. Eventually, the Baqqara and the Fursan used state-sponsorship to turn their full fury against their old neighbors in Darfur, with whom they had past conflicts. The consequence of such repression in the west was the formation of a self-defense force, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), in the Jabal Marra Mountains of Darfur in 2003, which was later joined by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The ensuing conflict has resulted in immense suffering, killing, and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Darfurians, raising deep concerns in Africa and elsewhere in the world.

On April 8, 2004, due to the mediation of the African Union (AU), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), and the Sudanese government signed a ceasefire agreement in N'djamena, Chad. This was followed by a signed protocol in Abuja, Nigeria, on November 9, 2004, by which the parties agreed to avoid a humanitarian crisis by seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict.[3] The leaders in these agreements were Minni Arkou Minnawi for the SLM/A, Ahmed Mohammed Tougod Lissan for JEM, and Magzoub El-Khalifa for the government of the Sudan. In October 2004, substantive discussions and a framework for addressing the contentious issues of power and wealth sharing were fleshed out, leading to the deployment of some African Union military personnel from Nigeria and Rwanda.[4]

The African Union presence was strengthened when the parties to the conflict convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May 2004 to cut a deal on conditions towards a political settlement, which culminated in the signing of an agreement on a ceasefire and the deployment of observers in Darfur. This was to be followed by the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in Nigeria in May 2006, after enabling the leading members of the SLM/A and JEM to express their support for and adherence to the provisions. But the Darfur political leaders Abdul Wahid el-Nur and Dr. Khalil Ibrahim of the SLM/A and JEM respectively, failed to show up for the signing. As a result, the agreement was signed by Minni Arkou Minnawi, a leader of the majority faction of the SLM/A, who are mostly Zagawa. This set the stage for internecine conflict.

Failure of the Darfur Peace Agreement

What were the reasons for the Darfur leaders and the government of the Sudan not signing the agreement? And what were its highlights? The answers are to be found in the practical calculations of the Sudanese state, the confluence of ethnic politics, as well as the demands of the SLM/A and the JEM. At first glance, it would seem that the Sudanese government had made substantive concessions towards peace in terms of political and wealth sharing.[5] However, in practical terms the government dragged its feet on key demands. The JEM and SLM/A leadership had a joint stand and had several demands. First, that their grievances be given full national coverage; that is, national access and dissemination of information about past atrocities via the media similar in spirit to what took place in South Africa under the "Truth and Reconciliation Committee." Second, that Khartoum provide a timetable and process by which displaced Darfurians would be able to immediately return to their homeland, be integrated, and be compensated. Third, that the supremacist Janjaweed be disarmed and demobilized.

In making these demands, the Darfur liberation movements did not represent a solid united political front, but were rife with past quarrels and mistrusts. They had different origins and varying connections with state leaders of Sudanese politics. The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and its armed wing, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), which was founded in 1989, did not acquire its present nome de guerre until 2003 when its founder, Abdul Wahid El-Nur, emerged from his exile and base in Eritrea. The SLA is not a separatist movement. Its political declaration clearly states "Sudan's unity must be anchored on a new basis that is predicated on full acknowledgement of [its] ethnic, cultural, social and political diversity . . . [and will] work with all political forces that ascribe to this view."[6] But such a platform does not preclude self-determination if the economic and political disparities continue to grow between Darfur and the riverine elite who commanded the state's resources. The SLA's position regarding the role of the mosque and state is also very clear. Its manifesto states: "Religion and politics belongs to two different domains . . . with religion belonging to the personal domain and the state in the public domain."[7]

On the other hand, the other main rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) has a different origin because it was established under the sponsorship of the National Islamic front (NIF) in the late 1980s. It is heavily influenced by and very close to the prominent Muslim scholar and Sorbonne-educated Ph.D. Dr. Sheik Hassan Al-Turabi and his Islamist supporters. Like the SLA, the JEM is not separatist, but it shares the objectives of the SPL/A and pursues the creation of a just society. But whereas the SPL/A's views on the role of religion and the state are clearly stated in its manifesto, the JEM's views are very ambiguous. Also, the JEM envisions a federal political structure for the Sudan similar to the one proposed by the National Islamic Front (NIF), allowing perhaps non-Muslim regions to opt out of Sharia law.

In any case, despite the solidarity between the SLM/A and the JEM, the astute brokers of the Sudanese state observed political and, above all, age-old competition and differences between the mostly Zagawa SPL/A and the Fur (JEM) and decided to exploit the differences. Thus as time passed and per the modalities of the agreement, Khartoum hesitated and then decided not to disarm the Janjaweed. Instead, sensing a weakened SLM/A and with the tacit indifference if not direct approval of the Minni Arkou Minnawi faction, the government decided on a military solution, attacking also the mostly Fur JEM led by Dr. Khalil Ibrahim. As for the stance of the JEM, it may have opted out of the peace agreement, in part, because it did not get a green light from one of its most influential spiritual and political leaders, Hassan Al-Turabi. The regime in Khartoum also may have been motivated to scuttle the agreement because it wanted to destroy the support of the SLM/A and the JEM, particularly of the Umma Party, by creating support institutions for Omar al-Bashir's National Congress Party. In such conflict, the troops of the African Union, numbering some 7000, were unable to defend civilians in the vast hinterland of Darfur because they were caught in spiralling violence between the armed might of the Sudanese state and its plural societies. The failure of the AU has emboldened the Sudanese state, which has launched a major offensive, committing tens of thousands of troops including bombers and helicopter gun ships to the region.

Failures of the UN and US: Rwanda and Darfur

On Sept. 1, 2006, the U.S. and Britain helped pass a resolution in the UN Security Council calling for over 20,000 UN troops to be sent to Sudan to take over from the AU forces. But Sudan is rejecting such a move, insisting on its sovereignty. For its part, the AU had threatened to pull its troops out by September 30 2006, unless Sudan acquiesced to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. On September 11, 2006, Sudan made a counter threat that the AU force could remain in the country only if they accepted Arab League and Sudanese funding.[9] The US has been quick to point out that the unfolding disaster needs a well-funded, well-staffed, and well-equipped force for peacekeeping purposes. Sudan has so far been firm in its demands. It is able to remain firm because it has powerful allies on the UN Security Council, namely China and Russia as well as the oil-producing nation of Qatar.[10] There are economic and political considerations behind the support of Russia and China, who insist on Sudanese sovereignty. Russia is now a major arms supplier to Sudan and indirectly responsible also for the tragedy in Darfur.[11] As far as China is concerned, it is a major investor in oil field exploration and development in the Sudan, and its increasing presence in Africa has to do with its insatiable demand for resources.[12]

The UN Secretary General not only clearly stated that the wholesale genocide of civilians is illegal under international law, but also expressed his fear that Darfur could be a Rwanda in the making.[13] But the Secretary General’s pronouncements rang hollow as the UN, the US, and the world were silent while 800,000 Africans were massacred in Rwanda in 1994. In fact, the US under the Clinton and Bush Jr. administrations seemed to have a consistent policy in terms of responding to genocide in Africa. In 1994, after the plane of Rwandan President Habyarimana was shot down, sowing the seeds of the crisis, the Clinton administration evacuated American citizens and left extremist Hutus to carry out their genocide of the Tutsis. The administration sat still while the bloodbath took place, with its state department spokesperson quibbling over the precise language regarding whether the killings constituted "genocide."[14]

It is widely believed that the reluctance of the US to intervene in Rwanda was the result of the shock experienced at the American causalities in Somalia in 1993, which led to a humiliating withdrawal. But Africa has no public lobbyists or public activists in the US. As a result, Rwanda was easy for the Clinton administration to ignore. Thus, while Washington insisted on a ceasefire in Rwanda and later crafted an arms embargo against the Hutu-dominated government, for all practical purposes it left the Tutsis to their fate, feigning ignorance until the genocide was over. In 1998, during a state visit to Africa, President Clinton did a mea culpa, apologizing for US inaction. The apology has been criticized as insincere as it cost nothing and Rwanda was regarded as some far-away country in Africa.

The UN was also impotent, doing nothing to stop the tragedy in Rwanda. Although the UN had peacekeeping troops in Rwanda as the genocide unfolded, its mandate was strictly limited to monitoring ceasefire violations. In fact, its force was reduced because the US feared increases in UN peacekeeping would eventually require some US troop commitment. In time, the US actively supported a UN peacekeeper withdrawal from Rwanda as the genocide was underway.[15]

The Bush Jr. administration's response in the Sudan has been no better. Although in 2004, then Secretary of State General Collin Powell acknowledged that what was happening in Darfur was genocide, no action was taken by the government. Subsequently, in an address to the UN General Assembly, President George Bush Jr. explained the US position on the genocide but had not suggested any new plans on how to stop the violence, more than a year later. In several instances between 2005 and 2006, US officials ranging from Vice President Dick Cheney to Assistant Secretary of African Affairs Jendayzi Frazer have made statements that seemed to show concern over the Darfur tragedy, but the concern has been all talk. On the other hand, the US has contributed close to $1 billion dollars in humanitarian efforts since the conflict began in the 1980s and has facilitated the Darfur peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria. However, the US has not taken "steps to directly address the worsening security situation or to protect civilians and humanitarian operations on the ground."[16]

The US response to the Darfur crisis is conditioned by its national interest in a rapprochement between Washington and Khartoum that began soon after September 11, 2001. The US ended its isolation of Sudan, which began in the 1990s due to the latter's role in hosting Al Qaeda, and the Sudan is now sharing intelligence in the Bush administration's War on Terror. The US position was given expression in July 2006, when President Bush, asked about the immediacy of Darfur, replied that the US strategy was to help "African Union forces to be complemented and blue-helmeted."[17] That is, the UN should be invited in.

But so far the Bush administration has not been willing to commit its substantial diplomatic and political muscle - essential to securing an invitation for UN deployment by Sudan. A main reason for the soft-peddling by the US may be that Sudan is a member of the conservative Arab League and usually acquiesces to its policy. The US may not want to exacerbate already strained relations in the Muslim world by forcing an Islamic state to do its bidding. In a recent "compromise," the el-Bashir government, after referring to the proposed presence of UN troops in Darfur as a "Zionist" plot to weaken states in the region, indicated its willingness to allow AU troops to stay as peacekeepers with "non-African advisers." [18]Whether the UN and the AU accept such a racist fig leaf will determine the lives of millions in Darfur.

Meanwhile Darfur has also generated internal cleavages in the el-Bashir government among "African" members of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, (SPLM) of the late Dr. John Garang, who support the plan to bring the UN to Darfur. But the SPLM is also preoccupied with other serious matters in South Sudan. The Machako Agreement between Khartoum and the SPLM of South Sudan also seems to be faltering. For example, the agreement on wealth sharing, essential for the re-settlement of some 3 million southerners who live in the north, has not as yet been fully implemented, leading to some grumbling by southern leaders. The government that has been set up in Juba, the capital, under the terms of the agreement is fragile, underfunded, and at times looking towards the World Bank and donors to underwrite some projects. Finally, there has been no movement or discernable preparations, such as voter registrations, towards the national elections that are to take place in July 2007.[19]

Conclusion

The Darfur insurrection, crisis, and genocide are grim reminders of the after-effects of colonialism and hastily cobbled, post-colonial states in Africa that cannot deliver political and economic goods to their people. In this kind of struggle between the modern African state and its plural societies over the command of power and resources, Darfur is not alone. In the east in 2005, centered in Port Sudan, capital of the Red Sea State, the Beja Congress recently went on strike, demanding more power and wealth sharing. In the south, while the Machako Agreement between the state and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) seems to be holding - with the South having significant autonomy - for all practical purposes the peace is tenuous, dependent partially on the politics of the region, especially of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda. As for Darfur, as the historian R.S. O'Fahay has noted, "I believe Darfur's future lies with the Sudan - I prefer with rather than in - but it has to be with Sudan that is ruled very differently than the present Sudan."[20] How differently Sudan is ruled and how to constitutionally engineer and above all implement a new arrangement, including wealth sharing, that will augur peace and development is a challenge to all Sudanese and their friends in Africa and the world. Such a challenge begins with the acceptance of UN peacekeeping forces that will put a stop to the slaughter of the innocents.

•Aaron Tesfaye, is author of Political Power and Ethnic Federalism: the Struggle for Democracy in Ethiopia, (Lanham: MD: 2002).
•Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Notes

1.Alex de Waal, "Counter-insurgency on the Cheap," London Review of Books, August 2004, p. 2. http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n15/waal01_.html
2.De Waal, 2004, op. cit.

3."Protocol between the Government of the Sudan (GoS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) on the Enhancement of the Security Situation In Darfur In Accordance with the N’Djamena Agreement Abuja, Nigeria. November 9, 2004.

5. See highlights of the Darfur Peace Agreement.

6. Political Declaration of SLA/SLM, March 14, 2003, pp.1-2.

7. Ibid. p. 3.

8. Alex de Waal, "Darfur Violence Intensifies as Deadline for the Withdrawal of AU Peacekeepers Looms," September 7, 2006, Democracy Now!.

9. Robert O.Collins, "Darfur and the Arab League," The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, Policy Watch No. 1141.

10. Eric Reeves, "China in Sudan: Underwriting Genocide" Testimony by Eric Reeves before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission: "China's Role in the World: Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?" Aug 3, 2006.

11. See Amnesty International, "Sudan: Arming the Perpetrators of Grave Abuses in Darfur," Nov. 16, 2004.

12. Simon Henderson, "China and Oil: the Middle Eastern Dimension," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy watch 898, September 15, 2004.

13. Lydia Polgreen, "Darfur Trembles as Peacekeepers' Exit Looms," New York Times, Sept. 10, 2006. Also see Kofi Annan's speech.

14. See Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in the Rwandan Genocide, (London: Zed Books, 2000).

15. See, Africa Action, Tale of Two Genocides: The Failed US Response to Rwanda and Darfur. Sept 9, 2006.

16. Ibid.

17. Eric Reeves, "Security in Darfur: Donors' Conference in Brussels Fails to Take Action," Africa Focus, July 23, 2006.

18. BBC, "Decision for Darfur Peacekeepers," Sept. 20, 2006.

19. See Human Rights Watch News, "Southern Sudan: Khartoum Reneges on Promises" March 8, 2006.

20. R.S. O. Fahey, "Does Darfur Have a Future in the Sudan?" The Fletcher Forum in World Affairs, Vol. 30; 1 winter 2006.

Regarding Joseph Yav Katshung’s article (http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/37403), can I suggest that Mr Katshung expand his article to a book in order for all of us to understand and know better the intricacies of the Ugandan politics?

Thank you Pambazuka for making this profound analysis accessible to the general public.

Donors have again pledged massive support to Mozambique's state budget but lack of progress in implementing the anti-corruption strategy remains a concern. At a recent press conference Deputy Finance Minister Pedro Couto said progress had been made in implementing "some elements" of the strategy, and the government was strengthening the Criminal Investigative Police (PIC) and the Anti-Corruption Unit of the attorney-general's office, the Mozambican news agency, AIM, reported.

Four former Kenyan ministers should be prosecuted for their part in one of the country's biggest corruption scandals involving about $300-million, Kenya's anti-graft body said on Monday (October 2). It did not name names in the statement, which was issued amid mounting political pressure over the slow pace of investigations into the so-called Anglo Leasing affair, which involved state tenders awarded to fictitious firms.

A Finance Ministry report on the alleged looting of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company has been pulled out of circulation, government sources said, thickening the plot in the "Steelgate" scandal that some say is the biggest since independence. Sources in the Finance Ministry said President Robert Mugabe's office had recalled the report from the handful of officials who had received copies, apparently to keep it from being leaked.

Elimination of double-digit inflation, economic growth in the region of five percent last year, a reduction of foreign debt from some seven billion dollars to 500 million: these are figures guaranteed to earn the president of a developing country another term in office, not so? Maybe yes, Maybe no.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) region urge Ministers to thoroughly review the proposed form of an Economic Partnership Programme (EPA) and to seriously consider and propose alternatives to solve the problem of retaining preferential trading arrangements with the European Union.

Fatou Lamin Faye, Secretary of State for Education, has described HIV/AIDS, as the biggest threat to development in many countries. Speaking at the opening of a five day HIV/AIDS national workshop held at the Kairaba Beach Hotel Monday, SoS Faye said the pandemic is also a major concern for our collective security in consideration of the fact that the most vulnerable group to this deadly disease are the women and youths who form the larger part of the workforce of African countries including the Gambia.

Creditors wrote-off $18 billion, while Nigeria paid-off the balance of $12.1 billion to exit the club, but the federal government still faces a heavy debt burden of US$16,926.billion. The debt stock according to Debt Management Office, (DMO) data, comprised of an external debt figure of $4. 847 billion and a domestic component of $12. 078 billion, as at the end of June.

The following is the opening address from the Executive Director of the International Trade Centre to the ITC Executive Forum on 27 September 2006: Madame Minister of Economic Cooperation and Development of Germany; Madame Deputy Director General, World Trade Organization; distinguished ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon.I would like to extend a warm welcome to ITC's 8th annual Executive Forum global debate.

The Netherlands today granted the African Development Bank a grant of US$ 25 million to finance the Bank’s operations in the water sector. This contribution comes on the heels of the successful visit to the Bank and discussions held with President Donald Kaberuka by Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation Mrs A. van Ardenne van der Hoeven in February 2006.

Zambia's newly elected president, Levy Mwanawasa, pledged to improve the lives of the country's millions of poor, and extended an olive branch to his rivals as he took the oath of office after an abrasive and bitter general election campaign. His two closest contenders for the presidency, Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front (PF) and Hakainde Hichilema of the United Democratic Alliance (UDA), were conspicuous by their absence at the presidential inauguration ceremony, held in the more secluded grounds of parliament after a last minute change from the traditional venue of the High Court.

The Kenyan blogging community is one of the largest in Africa. 18 months ago the online community was created for Kenyans and friends of Kenya. It consists of a webring and an aggregator of all members’ blogs. Earlier this year the KU community held their first Kaybees Blog Awards under 13 categories.

One of the most innovative Kenyan sites is Mzalendo, set up to monitor and report on the activities of the Kenyan parliament. The site content includes Bills, Committees, Constituencies, Ministries, Motions, MPs, Political Parties, Provinces and Districts. The site is also a forum for discussion by Kenyans and in future could well form the basis of a platform for citizens to interrogate and call ministers to account for their actions.

The Kenyan Democracy Project is a blog that has just recently returned from a long hiatus. As well as some very good political commentary the site is full of interesting links on social justice and gender issues. This week KDP writes on “How the other Kenyan half subsists”. While discussions on corruption continue to be the mainstream focus, the concerns of Kenya’s marginalised groups go unnoticed.

“For instance over the last seven days, I have seen on Kenyan national television, countless stories featuring the demolition and eviction of hundreds of slum dwellers in the Embakasi neighbourhood of Nairobi. A couple of nights ago (Friday, September 22, 2006) I watched as a group of evictees, featuring a sixty something Akorino man, a forty something woman among others, complain bitterly how they were now rendered homeless despite the fact that they had spent up to 200,000 Kenya shillings (representing, in the case of the Akorino man, his entire life savings) on setting up and maintaining their structures only to be thwarted by the violent attacks instigated by a private developer...The sickening thing was that these vicious acts of inhuman vandalism were being supervised by uniformed members of the state employed and tax-payer bankrolled police force.”

Steve Ntwiga is an excellent resource for African music. Steve manages to dig out forgotten artists and music from the 60’s and 70’s as well as contemporary artists.

White African is the creator of the African Network project which is a “centralised web portal for information important to Africans, customized for their location, their tastes and their needs. It consists of: a vertical search engine, news portal and community site.”

The community site Zangu, as well as being online, hopes to enable access via mobile phone technology. White African also writes about the latest in “Web2” technology and how bloggers can use these to improve their blogs.

Soyapi Mumba's Blog is also a technology blog. Soyapi writes on technological developments in Malawi, East and Southern Africa. This week he reports that Mozambique may be in the picture to assemble Chinese computers.

"Indeed, it has been reported that negotiations are underway to build a plant to assemble Chinese computers in Mozambique...I haven't seen any report or news article about the negotiations. Have you? If it is true, this is good news for Mozambique and its neighbouring land-locked countries of southern Africa like Malawi, which is almost surrounded by Mozambique.”

Bankelele like the name suggests, is a blog on banking, finance and business news in Kenya. Bankelele,along with Kenyan Pundit, is also behind the Kenyan parliamentary blog mentioned earlier, Mzalendo. Bankelele also has a weekly job spot where he posts the latest job opportunities in the sectors he covers.

Finally Mental Acrobatics is a general blog by a Kenyan man who has just recently left rainy Manchester for sunny Nairobi. This week he comments on the state of Kenya’s breakfast radio which he says should be “safe” for children but instead is crazy and in fact pornographic.

“Take this example from last week. A lady wrote into a station asking for advice as a foreign man she had met on the internet had just sent her a plane ticket to go visit him. For the next half hour we were subjected to a discussion on penis size and which countries you should travel to for some good loving. A few days later another show was discussing a couple who had not had sex for 6 months and what sex advice we could collectively give to get them at it like rabbits again. Now these are all valid topics for discussion I agree, but I am just not sure why these discussions are taking place when the nation is having its morning uji [porridge consumed for breakfast in Kenya].”

* Sokari Ekine produces the blog Black Looks, www.blacklooks.org

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

The Congolese government and the international community must move quickly to secure the run-off presidential election between Joseph Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba on 29 October 2006. “Securing Congo’s Elections: Lessons from the Kinshasa Showdown”, the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, analyses especially the situation on the ground in the capital, which events after the first round demonstrated is the most sensitive point in the country.

Nigerian Vice President Atiku Abubakar, who is a candidate for next year's elections, was last week suspended from his party functions for three months over wide-ranging corruption allegations. Meanwhile, Nigeria's anti-graft agency has announced that almost all of the country's 36 state governors are being investigated over corruption suspicions.