Kenya’s draft bill to establish a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission is flawed and should be amended, Human Rights Watch has said. Human Rights Watch urged parliament to revise the bill before it becomes law. “The national dialogue and reconciliation process was supposed to create institutions that can address Kenya’s historical injustices and bring criminals to book for their crimes,” said Georgette Gagnon, Africa director at Human Rights Watch.

When the Government of Kenya began resettling more than 10,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) on Monday, thousands of them who have been camping at the Nakuru Agricultural Society of Kenya (ASK) show ground, some displaced persons said the Government should have reconciled them with the neighbouring communities first instead of rushing to resettle them.

Mzee Ibrahim Githatwa, 76, was among the IDPs who vowed never to go back to Keringet in Kuresoi where he had lived since the 1942 but was forcefully told to leave the premises. This is where he left when their houses were burnt in January with all the properties destroyed.

Mzee Githatwa is not only a widower, but also a father of 13 children some of whom are still depending on him. This is the man who has suffered a great deal under Moi regime and now Kibaki. During Moi he lost seven houses in the 1992 ethnic violence. Even after he could manage, together with some of his children to built five houses, they again got burnt down in January during the pos-election violence.

Even 13 farms where some of them are going to be resettled which include Sirikwa, Kiambogo, Githirika, Muthenji, Nyota, Kangawa and Lagwenda, Sasumua, Willa, Muchorwe, Karirikania, Kadonye and Nyaruai have history of violence every five years when they have general elections.

These are some of the areas that have been the scene of periodic violence since 1992. Since then fighting has not only intensified during general election years – held in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 - and in 2005, when the national referendum on the country's constitution was held, but also leading to loss of properties worth million of shillings, deaths and turmoils.

The lad dispute around these areas, especially in Molo and Kuresoi is between the Kalenjin, Kikuyu and Kisii - against one another. Not forgetting that last year’s violence, in the run up to the 27 December elections intensified in affecting the Kuresoi divisions Keringet, Kuresoi, Kamara and Olenguruone as opposed to other years.

The government is forcing them back when high-ranking politicians who have been consistently implicated in organizing political violence since the 1990s have never been brought to book and continue to operate with impunity.

According to the annexes to the Ndung'u land dispute report released in 2004 the families of former presidents Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi feature prominently in the list of prominent high ranking politicians and people who matter in Kenya government as those who have grabbed public land that was recommended for repossession.

Mr Moi and five of his children, Mzee Kenyatta's widow Mama Ngina and scores of MPs, top civil servants, military officers, High Court judges and former Cabinet ministers featured in the report now and then.

Then Lands and Housing minister Amos Kimunya who releasing the report on grabbed land compiled by the Paul Ndung'u Committee without the names, can tell a lot why the issue of lad in Kenya will always remain a big problem even after forcing the displaced to go back to their disputed lands.

The report contained in the two massive volumes is measuring 10 centimetres, of which at 2,017 pages are thicker than two telephone directories. The reports were released by the Government Printer and since then no action has been taken by the government to repossess the lands.

If the government were to take action it would mean that names of all those who have been irregularly allocated public land in urban areas, settlement schemes, forests and reserves, with Moi alone owning 937 hectare farm in Narok hived off Trans Mara Forest be repossessed, then this would at least solve some of the land problems in the country.

According to the report, among President Moi's children who were illegally allocated land includes former Baringo Central MP Mr Gideon Moi and his wife Zahra, Raymond Kiprotich, Doris Choge and Jonathan Toroitich.

The problem would even be more resolved if the government were to go by the Ndungu recommendation that allocation of various parcels to Mama Ngina Kenyatta be revoked. It includes 38 hectares hived off the Kikuyu Escarpment Forest in Kiambu District in 1965, including another 36 hectares in Thika District from the same Kikuyu Escarpment forest allocated to her in 1980 for farming, which Ndungu also recommended to be reclaimed, as well as another 24 hectare parcel allocated in 1993.

Among the cabinet ministers, judges and top soldiers listed to be among beneficiaries of settlement schemes carved out of Agricultural Development Corporation farms include then minister of State William ole Ntimama (now ODM minister of Heritage), assistant minister Kipkalya Kones (now ODM minister for Roads), Court of Appeal Judge Emmanuel O'Kubasu and deputy chief of general staff, Lt Gen Nick Leshan.

Mr Ntimama who claims to be the spokesman of the Maasai communities, also human right activists, was allocated 34 acres of Moi Ndabi Farm where Mr Leshan got 233 acres. Mr Kones got 145 acres in the Agricultural Development Corporation Sirikwa scheme where the average allocations were five acres, according to the report. While Mr Justice O'Kubasu got 40 acres of ADC Jabali also in Nakuru, his land in the ADC Sirikwa scheme in Nakuru District, a public figure that got more than the average that is, Mr Justice William Tuiyot who has since died got 85 acres in the ADC Sirikwa scheme.

Other according to the report include retired Judge Mbito who was also allocated 50 acres of the ADC Zea, while a former commissioner of prisons, Mr Edward Lokopoyit got 90 acres of the land.

According to Daily Nation, December 17, 2004, story by David Okwemba ad Mburu Mwangi, former MPs Joseph Kimkung (Mt Elgon) and Jesse Maizs got 30 and 15 acres respectively in the ADC ZEA area. Former Principal Immigration Officer Henry ole Ndiema got 50 acres and a house in the same area.

A former permanent secretary, Mr William Kimalat got 80 acres of ADC Jabali, while a former top policeman Stanley Manyinya got 130 acres in the same area. Former PC Ishmael Chelang'a (since dead) got 90 acres.

Former MPs G. G. Mokku, Japheth Ekidor, Immanuel Imana, Mr David Sudi, Boaz Kaino and Francis Mutwol also benefited. Mr Kaino got 50 acres, Mr Imana 25, Mr Ekidor 20, Mr Mutwol 10 and Mr Sudi 20 from the ADC Milimani land.

The report also implicates many top soldiers and also clerics as among those listed as having been allocated the land. Most of the Moi Ndabi land was allocated by the director of lands.

Another prominent figure in the list is Kerio Central MP Nicholas Biwott who if could lose the 161 hectares in Kaptagat forest allocated to him in 1994 for the Maria Soti Education Trust was going to benefit thousands of landless people.

Other prominent politicians whom Ngungu recommended that their illegally acquired lad could be repossessed included former minister, a former head of the civil service and a former permanent secretary who stood to lose about 1,170 hectares of land hived off South Nandi Forest in 1999.

The three, Mr Henry Kosgey (the ODM chairman and minister), Dr Sally Kosgei (also ODM minister of Higher Education) and Mr Zakayo Cheruiyot were to exchange the land with farmers on a hilly terrain, even though according to the report there was conflict in the exchange as the Ngerek community, which was supposed to benefit, was left out.

The family of former Lands and Settlement minister Jackson Angaine, was expected to lose more than 900 hectares of land hived off from Mount Kenya forest in 1975 and 1977 if the recommendations were to be taken seriously by the government.

Former Limuru MP Mr Kuria Kanyingi was also named as the beneficiary of a 24 hectare farm carved out of Kiambu Forest in 1984. The report also noted that a title deed was issued for only 15 hectares to Kama Agencies in 1995. It recommends that the allocation to the MP should be revoked.

Those allocated parts of the Ngong forest and Karura Forest in the 1990s that Ndung'u Committee recommended that should all be revoked included former Mathioya MP Joseph Kamotho, former Cooperative Bank of Kenya chairman, Hosea Kiplagat, former Commissioner of Police Shedrack Kiruki and Maj-Gen Humphrey Njoroge.

Also named in the report was former Comptroller of State House John Lokorio who appeared as a beneficiary in settlement schemes in Nakuru District including the Nakuru/Olenguruone/Kiptagich extension.

Also in the same scheme is Mr Kiplagat, Mr Samson Cheramboss who once headed President Moi's security detail, former nominated MP Mr Mark Too, former Moi aide Joshua Kulei and former head of Presidential Press Service Lee Njiru.

Others named include former CID boss Mr Francis Sang, former managing director of Telkom KenyaMr Augustine Cheserem, former minister William Morogo and Eldama Ravine MP Mr Musa Sirma and his wife.

Former MD of the National Cereals and Produce Board Major (Rtd) Wilson Koitaba, former land commissioner Mr Sammy Mwaita received 10 plots and the deputy governor of the Central bank Dr Edward Sambili was allocated 7 hectares. Mr Gideon Moi and his wife got the biggest chunk of 44 hectares.

Other beneficiaries are former PS Dr Nehemiah Ng'eno, Dr Julius Rotich who had been named as one of the anti-corruption authority assistant directors, another former PS Mr Mark Bor, Cooperatives PS Mr Solomon Boit, Deputy police commissioner Mr David Kimaiyo and the chaplain of Kabarak high school Rev Jones Kaleli.

Baringo North MP William Boit, director of Motor Licensing Simon Kirgotty, director of survey Mr H. H. Nyapola, security intelligence deputy director Mr Shukri Baramade and Administration Police commandant Kinuthia Mbugua also got land illegally.

Even after former Kitale Catholic Justice and Peace Commission Director, Father Gabriel Dolan, a year later told the Government to implement the recommendations of the Ndung’u Land Report, nothing has ever happened since.

Dolan was quoted by the Standard Newspaper (March 5, 2005) as saying the Government had promised to effect the proposals by the end of February, but this did not happen.

His suggestion that the Government should restore the faith of its citizens by immediately acting on the findings of the land report landed on the deaf ears. He wanted all grabbed and illegally allocated land should be repossessed and re-distributed to the landless instead of a few people managing all the land resources in the country when the larger population is landless.

* Fr Joachim Omolo Ouko, AJ, People for Peace in Africa (PPA),

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/371/48136vote.jpgThe challenges confronting Africa's democratic experiments are many and complex and include entrenching constitutionalism and the reconstruction of the postcolonial state, writes Femi Falana. To move Africa forward, emerging democratic governments would have to confront a legacy of poverty, illiteracy, militarization, and underdevelopment produced by incompetent or corrupt governments.

After several decades of colonialism, Zimbabwe became independent in 1980. Having regard to the progressive antecedent of the leaders of the liberation movement expectations were high that the country would witness rapid socio-economic transformation and political stability. Instead of facing the challenge of the development, President Robert Mugabe turned the country into a one party state. Human rights were suppressed whilst some of the colonial laws were refurbished and applied with ferocity. Many opposition figures were either jailed or driven to exile.

Farmlands, which had been illegally acquired under colonial rule, were violently seized by war veterans at the instance of the government when the national parliament controlled by the ZANU-PF could have promoted land redistribution through legislation. The mismanagement of the economy has led to the unemployment, poverty, deprivations and general dislocation, which has virtually brought the country to her, kneels. The silence of African leaders and connivance of the South African regime led the opposition to turn to the West. Ironically, Mugabe’s anti-imperialist rhetoric, in the circumstances, won him sympathy in many African countries. This development has divided government and even civil society groups with respect to taking a united stand against the misrule of President Mugabe.

Recent experiences from Kenya and Zimbabwe illustrate the difficult and daunting task of consolidating democracy on the continent. Available evidence indicates that many of the new democratic regimes remain fragile and some of the euphoria of the early 1990s had evaporated. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the authoritarianism and statism of the early post-independence years was in retreat, and, where it persisted, was vigorously contested in a context in which democratic aspirations were firmly implanted in popular consciousness and the pluralization of associational life was an integral part of the political landscape. It was indeed a mark of the changed times that, whereas previously development had been regarded as a prerequisite of democracy, now democracy is seen as indispensable for development.

The challenges confronting Africa's democratic experiments are many and complex and include entrenching constitutionalism and the reconstruction of the postcolonial state; ensuring that the armed forces are permanently kept out of politics, instituting structures for the effective management of natural resources; promoting sustainable development and political stability; nurturing effective leadership, and safeguarding human rights and the rule of law.

In Africa, as elsewhere, democratic government and respect for human rights are closely linked. Democracy is the best means the world has produced to protect and advance human rights, based on individual freedom and dignity. In turn, respect for human rights is the only means by which a democracy can sustain the individual freedom and dignity that enables it to endure.

Despite some improvements in some parts of the continent, Africa remains the site of very serious human rights problems. For example, in the Sudan, the armed conflict in Darfur continues and the dismal human rights situation shows no signs of improvement. Both government and rebels commit horrendous abuses. In Somalia, the civil war continues unabated and the human rights situation goes on deteriorating; the civilian population has been the ultimate victim, as recently reported by Amnesty International. Only a handful of countries that hold the regular multi-party elections in Africa are rated as free, and in line with international and regional standards.

In addition, most of the countries in Africa operate ‘semi-authoritarian regimes’ because they have the facade of democracy; that is, they have political systems, they have all the institutions of democratic political systems, they have elected parliaments, and they hold regular elections. They have nominally independent judiciaries. They have constitutions that are by and large completely acceptable as democratic institutions--but there are, at the same time, very serious problems in the functioning of the democratic system.

Semi-authoritarian regimes are very good at holding multi-party elections while at the same time making sure that the core power of the government is never going to be affected. In other words, they are going to hold elections, but they are not--the regime is not going to lose those elections. Semi-authoritarian regimes intimidate voters, as it happened in the recent elections in Zimbabwe. Semi-authoritarian regimes manipulate state institutions for self-ends—governments don’t respect the laws, and don’t work through institutions. Semi-authoritarian regimes amend constitutions anytime they want.

Semi-authoritarian regimes will not introduce fully participatory, competitive elections that may result in their loss of power, and some are even unsure of how far they really want to go toward political pluralism in their countries. African politics is generally speaking, a matter of personality, not programs. For example, during the Obasanjo administration the prevailing idea was that the president was the father of the nation, the big man, or Kabiyesi, that is, no one dared question him.

A strong and effective democratic process should be able to establish a functioning administrative structure; and address the issue of how leaders are chosen; the issue of how different institutions relate to each other; the issues of how officials should act, for example, how the judiciary should act, the independence of the judiciary from other branches of government, and the problem of how the decisions that are taken by these democratic institutions can be implemented.

To move Africa forward, emerging democratic governments would have to confront a legacy of poverty, illiteracy, militarization, and underdevelopment produced by incompetent or corrupt governments. The syndrome of personal dictatorships and the winner-take-all practice as we have in Zimbabwe for example would need to be addressed, and there must be full respect for human rights; constitutional government and the rule of law; transparency in the wielding of power, and accountability of those who exercise power.

The basic rule of the democracy game is that the winners do not forever dislodge the losers. It is important for the consolidation of democracy that losers believe in the system and think that they can get back into the game. African governments must create an enabling environment in which traditions and values of the constitution will be able to take root and where rights and duties are set out. In this process, the separation of powers must be facilitated. Government must allow institutions to work and must allow citizens to exercise their rights, to live in accordance with their religious beliefs and cultural values, without interference. The legal order must be based on human rights, societal awareness of the instrumental and intrinsic values of democracy, a competent state, and a culture of tolerance.

Democracy requires that those who have authority use it for the public good; a democratic system of government begins by recognizing that all members of society are equal. People should have equal say and equal participation in the affairs of government and decision making in society, because, in the final analysis, government exists to serve the people; the people do not exist to serve government. In other words, governments must enhance individual rights and not stifle their existence. Repressive laws on many African countries’ statute books against personal liberty and habeas corpus must be removed from the statute books.

In most African countries, a tremendous amount of information does not circulate beyond a small portion of the urban population, owing to illiteracy, language barriers, and costs. Because the individual ignorance of personal rights and understanding of what democracy means has encouraged authoritarianism in Africa, political education at the grass roots is necessary. If a genuine democracy is to become a reality in Africa, the participation of the masses has to be sought by politicians, and not bought by manipulators.

Politicians should try to understand what the masses know, because they sometimes lack the ability to articulate their interests and grievances. However, politicians also should be educated about human rights and respect for the constitution. Education is crucial to the development of a culture of tolerance, which, it is hoped, would contribute immensely to the creation of an enabling environment for democracy.

We must encourage citizens to learn the habits of civil disobedience on a massive scale. We must encourage people to go out and demonstrate, to show their opinion regarding issues, because we must eliminate the culture of fear.

Role of civil society

It is unrealistic to expect that African countries will suddenly reverse course without internal pressure from civil society groups and institutionalize stable democratic government. The significance of a strong and energetic civil society in the transition to democracy cannot be over-emphasised. Perhaps one reason that Africa has not crumbled into total absolutism is because civil society has managed to survive, providing a mode of expression against authoritarianism, despite systematic efforts by the state to destroy it.

It is incumbent upon civil society to promote socialization by moving people away from thinking about the state and encouraging them to think what they want without fear. The public must fully participate in the affairs of state, with the state protecting their rights to be recognized. In this context, the value of the role of citizens and civil society is to organize and articulate the interests of local communities and the grass roots to the highest levels—even bringing about the change of laws—by serving as effective pressure groups.
Many governments are not willing to create an enabling environment. But by standing up, civil society organizations can insist and force governments to create a space. We must keep the culture of resistance alive and continue to question authoritarian rule especially on the important issues of human rights, constitutionalism and rule of law.

Political parties, human rights organizations and other civil society groups should mobilize the people to reject economic policies dictated to African governments by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which have exacerbated poverty in Africa. The demand for participatory democracy should not be limited to conduct of free and fair elections only. It must also include the management of the economy in the interest of the people, otherwise, the fragile democratic process in bound to collapse.

With the pending elections in Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Guinea, civil society organizations in West Africa gathered in this forum should unite in sending a clear message to the ECOWAS and AU that the subversion of democracy under whatever guise. Following this meeting, our engagement should be to immediately commence sensitization and mobilization of the population against the manipulation of constitutions and electoral laws, as well as the electoral process.

* Femi Falana is President West African Bar Association

* This article is based on a presentation at the West African Bar Association held in Abuja, Nigeria, 13 May 2008. The final communique from thetwo-day regional dialogue on the political situation in Zimbabwe can be found at the link shown below

* Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

The Africa Public Health 15% Now Campaign has launched a 30 day countdown to the mid year African Union summit which holds in Egypt from the 24th of June. The 30 day countdown which starts from the 15th of May to the 15th of June is aimed at mobilising national level and continental support for a civil society message to urge African Heads of States to restate their commitment to and urgently implement the Abuja 2001 pledge by African Heads of State to allocate 15% of national budgets to health.

Mr. Fletcher did you protest against the illegal sanctions placed Zimbabwe? [Zimbabwe: Black America must not be silent; []

Did you write that African-Americans should not be quiet about these illegal sanctions? Furthermore, I feel that you should speak to the leaders in that region, if you have not already done so, because they have not put great pressure on Mugabe. In fact, President Mbeki of South Africa said there is no crisis. Many African-American leaders really scare me because of their love for Rome (I mean America). They are usually used against the interests of African people.

As long as the legacy of Apartheid has not been fully erased, and the playing field levelled so that ALL South Africans benefit from the alleged Independence and the end of apartheid, I would say, Jeremy Cronin - Why South Africa will never be like Zimbabwe; better believe that the Jewish saying, "from your mouth to God's ear," is in place.

I am always fascinated by those who regard the current state of South Africa as being the best that can be, for the masses of black and brown South Africans. I even went to a lecture at an American graduate school, where a white American had gone and used a pool of 1000 different people. He came back to give a talk on how South Africans of color are wishing apartheid would return, since things were better for them. I also find alot of skilled black South Africans still in exile, or in the diaspora, because they are being told that dual citizenship is the problem or some other excuse. I see nothing in the quality of life of the majority of South Africans of color to make me believe that their patience with the "Tommorrow" that even one of my siblings used to describe the slow changes will continue indefinitely.

There is also something else, the world is getting very hostile to those of a different hue, setting up Fortress Europe, and the Fence along the US border, etc. etc. It becomes harder and harder to accept that we, Africans, who have been exploited and abused for so long, and even after the alleged dismantling of apartheid, will continue to tolerate the stories that come out, throwing the kaffir to the lions, abuse on farms, forcing workers to eat...

We read about South Africans being used as laboratory animals for experimental drugs, and then read about the disasters created by this. We read and hear about South Africa being turned into a place where Brazilians are brought for the their organs to be harvested for a market that is not in South Africa, and knowing the legacy of apartheid; this is just a small part of what is really happening.

We see the disasters that are happening in the mines, and the fact that many miners where let go to a bleak future whilst DeBeers moved its trading to the UK and now has a huge flagship store in New York...

The only constant is change, and South Africa still has the chance to avoid a Zimbabwe, but from what one hears and sees, Apartheid is still alive and well, and doing a brisk business. So, I do not see anyone forcing the redressing of wrongs, whites never give up what they deem theirs by some right of skin, or belief in a god that has made the earth theirs. I do not see or hear anything from South Africa that shows that the "droit de seigneur" that whites feel has changed. Instead, one sees the slow attempts to continue the 'cape to cairo' fantasy of Rhodes and the other imperialists. The recolonization of Africa that is now being implemented.

My parents gave up alot in leaving their homeland, and took us with them. I was born a month before Apartheid became the law, and saw what it did to ALL of us of color. I was also in Zimbabwe when the Federation of Rhodesias and Nyasaland was dismantled, and the Ian Smith era.

I still have not been fortunate to go home, though my siblings have returned. I do not read or see anything that makes me in a hurry to go home, though life in the diaspora is no paradise. My father advised me on his return to South Africa, not to come home yet, and I will follow his advice, it would be difficult to go home to the same "For Whites only" system. So, Jeremy Cronin, I do hope you are right, and believe the redressing of a lot of the wrongs of the Apartheid era would go far in preventing a Zimbabwe, but from what I hear, "it is too soon, ten more years!!" I find myself not as optimistic, the Wheel turns, and lost opportunities can come back to haunt those who believe that "South Africa will never be like Zimbabwe," it could in fact be a lot worse.

I have been avoiding the feeling that there is an agenda at work here, in which Southern African countries, i.e., Zimbabwe and South Africa, are in the crosshairs. I do not see any article on Bongo, in Central African Republic, or the Cameroonian President who is going to be declared the lifetime "head of state", the fact that in Liberia, local elections were called off the reason being given, " a lack of resources" yet these "resources" could be found to entertain and welcome President Bush.

I have wanted to avoid the feeling that pambazuka was being financed and used as a tool, but find myself wishing to have a question answered by the Editor, "Why is the focus solely on Zimbabwe and South Africa, and all the issues being discussed are those on the agenda of the alleged, "civilized world"? Why does one not see articles on the plight of the Somalis who have been invaded by a foreign state, and are being bombed from US warships along the coast? Why are we not hearing of the plight of those Somalis starving, and let us not forget those in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia? When the focus of your organization is solely on countries in the crosshairs of neo colonialists and imperialists, who now covert the wealth of Africa, and are concentrating all their resources into destabilizing and undermining legitimate African governments, one wonders who are you serving? AFRICA or foreign interests that are hostile to African aspirations?

I do not wish to discontinue receiving your newsletter and other information, since it does provide a window into just how entrenched and scary the control of information and real news on Africa and real African interests is. I mean for what one is now constantly reading on your website, one could as easily read the BBC, New York Times, Daily News, New York Post and all the other corporate controlled media in the West.

Just throwing this out there. Keep on sending the stuff, it is, for lack of a better word, "fascinating!!!!"

Editors: We look forward to your articles on the topics you feel we are not covering adequately.

The 11th African Union (AU) Summit will be held in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, between June 24 and July 1, 2008, under the theme of “Meeting the Millennium Development Goals on Water and Sanitation”. The Permanent Representatives’ Committee will be held between June 24 - 25, the Executive Council between June 27 -28 and the Assembly of heads of states and government between June 30 and July 1. The draft agendas for each of these sessions are available to download at In addition, the Citizens and Diaspora Directorate of the AU Commission will hold an AU-civil society meeting on June 17-19, in Sharm el Sheikh.

The Center for Citizens’ Participation in the African Union (CCP-AU) has written an essential policy brief for civil society detailing the key issues that will be discussed during the summit as well as providing logistical information for civil society participants. Among the issues highlighted are the adoption of a social policy framework for Africa, peace and security in Africa, the union government proposal and the audit of the African Union. Indeed, the Executive Council of the AU has just concluded an extraordinary session to discuss the audit report of the union. During this meeting, the chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), H.E. Mr. Jean Ping, noted that: “The Commission of the African Union agrees with the bulk of the Panel’s recommendations and would wish to see them implemented as soon as possible. In other areas, we have reservations based on experience and our own contact with the facts on the ground”. Also in preparation for the summit, the Committee of heads of states and government will meet later this month in Arusha, Tanzania, to discuss the union government proposal.

As civil society continues to advocate for African Union (AU) intervention in Zimbabwe, urging the AU leadership to call for the immediate cessation of violence and the protection of the Zimbabwean people as well as to deploy an exploratory mission of experts into Zimbabwe to assess the electoral environment, the African Union issued a statement on the situation in Zimbabwe following an official visit to the country by the chairperson of the AUC. Within the statement, the AU “urges the ZEC to ensure that the said run off [election] is undertaken as provided for in the Electoral Act”; “re-emphasizes the need for Zimbabwe to implement the conditions set out in the Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa; urges that agreements reached and the conditions prevailing prior to the 29 March polls be upheld; appeals to all the Zimbabwe political actors to conduct their activities in a free, transparent, tolerant, and non-violent manner to enable eligible Zimbabweans exercise their democratic rights”. Further, “the AU will continue to play an active role in assessing all further developments in preparing for the effective observation of this election with a view to providing an independent judgment on its outcome.

Following the presentation on peace and security in Africa by the chairperson of the Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution at the session of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) this week, Hon. Euggene Kparkar of Liberia charged PAP to be firm and decisive on issues related to Heads of State, adding that “even though PAP must be commended for sending election observer missions to both Kenya and Zimbabwe, African leaders must be told in the face that too much of staying in power brews conflict. Therefore, they must always prepare their minds to vacate the presidential seats whenever their time is due”. However, recognizing the weaknesses of PAP’s mandate, the chairperson of the committee noted that PAP cannot hold African presidents entirely to account because it is currently an advisory, and not yet legislative, organ.

In further peace and security news, the AU has condemned the attacks on the Sudanese capital of Khartoum by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) from the Darfur region, saying that their actions could jeopardize efforts to find a political solution to the crisis and escalate regional peace and security tensions. The chairperson of the AU Commission and the Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra are expected to visit the country.

As continued economic growth is predicted in 2008 and 2009 by the African Development Bank, the Monetary Affairs Committee of the East African Community has said high interest rate spreads, budget deficits, high domestic debt and relatively high levels of non-performing loans continue to be major challenges that need to be addressed before a monetary union can be realised. Seeing information and communication technology as central to African development, the AUC is engaging development partners to fund nine flagship projects under the Africa Regional Action Plan on the Knowledge Economy programme. While, Jose Graziano da Silva argues that “agro-energy emerges from the current financial crisis as a safe haven of real consistency and strategic continuity”, further stating that “agro-energy can help sustain the expansion of poor countries and usher in a new dynamic of trade independence by industrialising biofuel crop farming and creating bridges between family agriculture and a peak sector of the global economy that is here to stay.” Lastly, as African leaders will attend the Tokyo International Conference on African Development this month, Felix Osike explores the courting of Africa by so-called emerging powers such as Japan, China and India.

Breaking News Kenya

Breaking News Kenya provides a link to an article in Business Daily about the increasing use of the Internet by Kenyan employers to screen job applicants:

“Local figures are hard to trace, but in a recent survey of executive recruiters by execunet.com, 77 per cent of respondents said they used the Internet to uncover additional information about candidates…

Job seekers who have more “presence” online are generally expected to be more believable as the employer can often verify content on an applicant’s CV, such as where they went to school or if they really worked for companies they lay claim to…

A third of the managers polled by execunet.com said they would eliminate applicants based on what they found out about them online, saying scandalous photos, political commentary or inappropriate videos found on websites such as Flikr, in blogs or on YouTube would have a negative impact on the candidacy of an applicant.”

Mother City Living
http://www.mothercityliving.co.za/20080514/food-gardens-on-the-cards-for-the-western-cape-its-about-time/

Mother City Living comments on proposed solutions to the burgeoning world food crisis:

“For the past week I’ve heard people debating the food crisis until they’re blue in the face. Increase the number of VAT-exempt food items, they said, issue food stamps, put a cap on food prices.

Not once did I hear anyone saying what I thought would be the most obvious option: get people growing their own food.

But, happily, today I read an article on Iafrica that gives me hope. In short, according to the report, Western Cape premier Ebrahim Rasool has proposed the launch of a “food security campaign” with “concrete initiatives” that would include:

‘…making state land at hospitals and schools available for community food garden schemes, setting up food co-operatives , distributing seed packs to vulnerable households, and increasing the school nutrition budget by R5-million.’

Hallelujah! Now, here’s hoping this gets off the drawing board, and out into the community. It’s about time.”

Magharebia
...
The new federation's plan to raise awareness within parliament, political parties and the government is already beginning to see results. Some political parties now promise to give women greater participation during next year's elections.
...
Voters disagree as to women’s ability to run public affairs. While many young people say they will make their choice based on clearly-defined criteria, irrespective of the candidate’s gender, older people make no secret of their preference for male candidates.

Think Ghana
http://blogs.thinkghana.com/2008/05/12/welcome-ghana-correctional-service/

Think Ghana comments on the state of correctional facilities in Ghana and plans to change the name of the Ghana Prisons Service:
“The Prisons Service, like many other public institutions, has over the years suffered under the proverbial ‘No funds’ syndrome and those who know the system very well, will admit that there is very little correction in our prison system.
Overcrowding, poor sanitation and lack of learning and training facilities have made the prisons more of concentration camps than centres of reformation...
In Ghana, very few can claim that they came out of our prisons better equipped than when they went in. Some claim spiritual development, which only confirms the physical deprivations they went through while in prison custody…
These deprivations and the stigma associated with prison life have seriously contributed to the situation where most convicts come out from the prisons ready to exert revenge on society…

We know the problems of the Ghana Prisons Service… So why do we think by giving an old institution a new name, everything will change for the better overnight?”

Omar Basawad
http://omar-basawad.blogspot.com/2008/04/kidepo-ugandas-hidden-wonder.html

Omar Basawad writes about one of Uganda’s ”hidden jewels”, the Kidepo National Park:

“Very few people visit the Kidepo National Park in Uganda. Even fewer tourists ever visit the rugged, breathtaking Ugandan hidden wonder, tucked away in the triangular North Eastern part of the country…

Of all Ugandan national parks and game reserves, Kidepo is the most remote and has the most unique wilderness and terrain. Karamoja too, is the most dry and the hottest part of Uganda; it has a most unique people too: the Karamojong, whose warriors, tall and black, still walk and graze their cattle while almost totally naked; they seem too, to have a liking for AK47 rifles. The Kalashnikov seems to be the only modern technology that Karamojong men have accepted; unlike in most parts of Uganda where the mobile phone is.

Sadly, semi arid Karamoja, though large and has great potential for development, is the poorest and the most undeveloped district of Uganda. I very much hope that the authorities concerned will do more for Karamoja and its people; and make the remote, isolated magical Kidepo more secure… Any one visiting Uganda and has the time and means, should visit enchanting, breathtaking Kidepo and experience not only some of the most spectacular sceneries Uganda and Africa has; but also feast on the abundant unique mix of wildlife that Kidepo boasts.”

Scribbles from the Den
[email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org/

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/370/48058islam.jpg Armelle Choplin examines the case of Mauritania to debunk the oft-proffered links between Islamism and terrorism.

In the space of a few weeks, Mauritania suffered a number of terrorist attacks, responsibility for which was claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. Radical Islamism is not new in Mauritania, but terrorism and the sheer scale of violence witnessed in these acts is unprecedented. Although radical trends are on the rise, this should not be confounded with terrorism, which has not taken root in Mauritania. In this case, the threat originates elsewhere.

On the 24th of December 2007, Christmas Eve, four French tourists were brutally killed in Mauritania. It quickly became apparent that this was not an ordinary crime, but rather a terrorist attack. Two days later, three soldiers were killed at the Al Ghallawia military base in Northern Mauritania. The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), formerly the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) claimed responsibility for the attack.

On the 5th of January 2008, the organizers of the Paris-Dakar rally decided to cancel the race, following advice from the French government that has been on high alert against terrorist threats in Mauritania, where most of the attacks have taken place. On the night of 1st February, 2008, Nouakchott’s biggest night club the “VIP”, and the adjoining Israeli embassy were targeted: six gunmen opened fire, injuring a French woman and two French Mauritanians. Once again Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb claimed responsibility.

Mauritania, previously a little-known country, suddenly hit the headlines. Straddling the Arab and Black world in this Sahara-Sahel “grey area”, Mauritania has come under sharp focus from the West, and particularly the US who suspect a growth in influence of Maghrebin extremists. This is a radical shift from the past when Mauritania professed a tolerant form of Islam that was open and receptive. Recently, the International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that Islamic fundamentalism had only a limited foothold in Mauritania due to a socio-religious system based on ethnicity and under the control of powerful Islamic brotherhoods that curtailed the rise of extremist ideas (ICG, 2005).

In this paper we shall attempt to raise a number of key points that may serve to explain the current sequence of events and debunk the oft –proffered links between Islamism and terrorism. This analysis is by no means exhaustive, given the sheer complexity of the situation in Mauritania.

It is noteworthy that the central government has always had an ambiguous policy towards Islam in general and in particular Islamist movements. This brief exposé will give us a better understanding why these movements are attracting a following, in an environment characterized by despair and growing poverty – ideal conditions for the rise of dissent. We must however emphasize that the Mauritanian Islamism has no directly linked to these acts of terror perpetrated in the name of foreign terror groups such as the AQIM, in this case.

From the Islamic Republic, to the rise of Islamism in Mauritania

The official name “ Islamic Republic of Mauritania” can be misleading, since an Islamic state is nothing more than a Muslim state. However there has been a rapid lexical shift from “Islamic” to “Islamist”, the “Islamic Republic” of Iran under Khomeini as an oft-quoted example. Iran under Khomeini, however, bears little similarity to the “Islamic Republic of Mauritania”, that has always espoused a more “tolerant” brand of Islam.

The appellation was adopted upon attaining independence, and was a response to the political aims of Mauritania’s first president, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, who envisioned the country as a bridge between North Africa and Black Africa. In order to overcome the dual cultural identity and ensure cohesion between the Moors and the “Black Mauritanians” (Halpulaar, Soninke, Wolof), Islam was brought to the fore. This lent legitimacy to the Mauritanian state and brought together a 100% Muslim nation.

Colonel Haidar came to power in 1980 and sought to further entrench Islam and it practice in the country. To this end, Sha’ria law was enacted in 1982. Maouiyya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya took over in 1984 and maintained the trend, instituting restrictions on, among other things, alcohol. Come 1990, Taya was under immense external pressure to “democratize” the country. In this new climate, Islamists were prevented from active involvement in politics: in 1991 Taya further eroded their influence by banning the formation of religion-based political parties.

Between 1994 and 2005, there were numerous arrests, followed by equally frequent pardons. This was part of a government strategy to harass these groups rather than openly fight them. Taya frequently asserted that there was no place for Islamism in Mauritania, since everyone was Muslim. According to the ICG (2005), the Taya regime was in effect using the “Islamic threat” to gain the support of the West and detract from the frequent calls for greater democracy in the country.

Following the coup of 3rd August 2005, there was a radical change of policy towards Islamism. The Military Committee for Justice and Democracy (CMJD) came to power and embarked on democratic renewal. It sought to distance itself from the coercive methods that Taya used in his 20 years of power. The CMJD, led by Ely Ould Mohamed Vall, immediately began consultations with civil society and bringing about democratic reforms. In this climate of change, the Islamists quickly re-emerged. The members of the CMJD committed to exclude themselves from the presidential elections in order to restore civilian rule. The March 2007 presidential elections were the culmination of the democratic transition initiated by the military junta, and Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi was democratically elected as Head of State.

The new government was similarly tolerant of Islamism. In June of 2007, several individuals accused of being members of an Islamist organization were acquitted for lack of evidence. As it turns out, among those acquitted was Sidi Ould Sidna one of those accused of murdering four French tourists. This shift in attitude is further evidenced in the registration of Tawassoul (National Congress for Reform and Development), led by Mohamed Jemil Ould Mansour, a moderate Islamist. The party holds a parliamentary seat in the heart of Nouakchott, a clear symbol of its legitimacy.

For some, this new attitude towards Islamism, smacks of connivance. For others, it is reassuring, and symbolizes a “restoration of the Faith”, manifest in the return of the Muslim weekend (Friday and Saturday), the construction of a mosque at the presidential palace, and frequent raids and arrests at bars and restaurants in Nouakchott suspected of selling alcohol..

A state of socio-economic crisis ripe for conflict

The “democratic transition” and the installation of a new elected government gave the population a renewed sense of hope for change. The transition was widely hailed and held up as an example. At the same time, Mauritania joined the elite group of petroleum-exporting countries. The sinking of an offshore well in 2006 brought about economic renewal and raised expectation. However, petroleum production had to be reviewed following technical glitches and the fact that only a small minority was reaping the economic rewards.

Three years after the discovery of oil and the start of the transition, hope and enthusiasm had given way to despair and anxiety. On the one hand, Mauritanians quickly realized that the much-touted “democratic transition” was only relative – it was still the same cabal holding the reins of power. On the other hand, the population noticed a decline in living standards, in contrast to the promised growth fueled by the famous “oil find” and the redistribution of resources following the democratic transition. In the autumn of 2004 the breakout of “bread riots” in several towns following the rise of consumer prices pointed to social breakdown. These social conditions led to a growth of sympathy for extremist views.

These views called for a moral regeneration in government, and resonate with poor citizens who watched Nouakchott’s skyline dotted with an increasing number of palatial residences, each more opulent than the last. Never before had luxury been more conspicuous. People began to question the source of this newfound wealth. Corruption was suspected. Development aid given to a country seen as a good example was regularly misappropriated.

The new government claimed to fight against scourge, with few results. The drug trade was also very lucrative, and the country was now seen as a hub for Mafia networks. There have been a number of arrests in recent months, one involving the son of ex-president Haidallah. There is a widening gap between the public and the urban elite with its questionable western values.

The radicalization of the discourse and growing unrest are most visible in the urban milieu, which is rich in debate and vociferous expression, and highly politicized. There have been massive waves of rural-urban migration in the last thirty years, following long periods of drought. The capital Nouakchott was built from scratch in 1957, and, with its 1 million inhabitants, provides the clearest example of this spectacular urban grown (Choplin, 2006). The Neo-urbanites are connected to various information networks: the Arabic language channels, notably Al-Jazeera, and the Internet. In fact, it is in these urban areas that citizens gain a sense of their marginalization and seek to have their voices heard (Choplin, Ciavolella, 2008).

In the face of rising poverty levels, some have turned to highly critical political movements. Wahhabi Islamic readings, spread through Saudi influence and Islamist NGOs, began to appear in the poorer parts of town. Sociologist and expert in Mauritanian Islam, Yahya Ould El Bara (2003) showed the rise in the number of mosques in the last few years: between 1967 and 2003 the number rose from 17 to 617. Of these, 322 were run by benefactors from the Persian Gulf, a further 17 of which were distinctly fundamentalist in character.

The most notable of these fundamentalist mosques is in an impoverished part of the city. A large number of the faithful at this mosque are young 'haratin' (descendants of former slaves) who are particularly drawn to the egalitarian discourse of so-called pure Islam (ICG, 2005). The haratin eschew the Mauritanian form of Islam that has never questioned the oppressive traditional social hierarchies. In fact, fundamentalism provides a means to challenge the hegemony of the Marabout tribal chiefs who see themselves as the custodians of the religion.

Mauritanian Islamism versus foreign terrorism

This growth of the fundamentalist discourse does not mean that all Mauritanians are followers of Bin Laden, ready to perpetrate acts of terror. Rather, the Mauritanian public has been quick to denounce these acts, whose motives it does not share. The murder of four French citizens drew a lot of popular indignation and reproach. Even though the VIP club was not viewed in a popular light, and was seen as a venue frequented by foreigners, and where alcohol, prostitution and drugs were common currency, the attack was roundly condemned.

Those who attacked the Israeli embassy clearly sought to condemn the Mauritanian government’s decision to bow to US pressure and establish diplomatic ties in 2000. Even though many Mauritanians, particularly the moors, who hold a great affinity to the Arab world, have always been strongly opposed to these political ties, there was no support for this attack. Likewise, many Mauritanians reacted with disappointment to the cancellation of the Paris-Dakar Rally, puzzled at how their country had overnight transformed from a “peaceful country” into “a dangerous enemy of the West”.

It must be noted that however radical Mauritanian Islam might be, it has never condoned acts of terror, as the case may have been elsewhere (Kepel, 2000; Roy, 2002; Gomez-Perez, 2005). Islamist parties clearly proclaim that they have never called on their followers to use violence, and have no links whatsoever to Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. In a recent interview with RFI, Jemil Ould Mansour, a moderate Islamist leader, roundly condemned the acts of terror, attributing them to isolated groupings. The terrorist threat is thus seen to originate outside the country, and have no ties to local groups. Another telling fact is that after the murder of the French citizens, the attackers fled to neighboring countries, indicating the absence of a Mauritanian rearguard to protect them.

Therefore the supposed links between Islamism and Islamist terrorism do not hold water in the case of Mauritania. Today, ordinary citizens are alarmed by the authorities’ apparent inability to control the situation. They continue to distance themselves from terrorism through public demonstrations and numerous articles in discussion forums. It still begs the question, however, whether the growing disaffected radical groups may consider acts of terror in the future. The line between the two realities holds for the moment, but could easily become porous, if the number of locals leaving to join foreign “Jihadist” groups is anything to go by.

* Armelle Choplin ([email protected]) lectures in geography at l’Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée. She is also an Associate researcher at UMR PRODIG, where she completed her studies, and currently conducts research on Urbanization in Mauritania and Sudan.

The original article in French can be found at

The article also appeared in the French language edition of Pambazuka News: [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Christian Aid's new report seeks to expose the scandal of a global tax system that allows the world's richest to duck their responsibilities while condemning the poorest to stunted development, even premature death. The situation is stark and urgent. Our report predicts that illegal, trade-related tax evasion alone will be responsible for some 5.6 million deaths of young children in the developing world between 2000 and 2015. That's almost 1,000 a day. Half are already dead.

I must express deep appreciation to Jeremy Cronin for his piece on the Zimbabwe election struggle (Why South Africa will never be like Zimbabwe: ). His use of the rural site of struggles (for Zanu PF) in contrast to the urban-township sites (for ANC combatants), to struggle from, is most helpful in understanding the possible power of the mass-base to monitor and discipline their post-freedom leaders.

That analysis does, however, have problems when compared with the experience of TANU/Chama Cha Mapinduzi in Tanzania (with its predominantly rural base); as compared to Kenya, where KANU under Kenyatta's determination to create a "Kenya aristocracy" (according to an interview he gave to Sunday Times Magazine in London 1967), met a different fate. In the former, Nyerere used various devices, including his stepping down from Prime Ministership for one year to tour among the rural majority so as to devise strategies for holding elected politicians accountable and committed to the implementation of "one-party democratic elections" as well as to "Ujamaa". In Kenya, Kenyatta ruthlessly demobilized the party and its branches; and eliminated all effective challengers among the political class, including Tom Mboya. Pio Gama Pinto and J.M. Kariuki.

In this regard, Cronin's quip about Fidel Castro not blaming the failure of Americans to subsidize Cuba's tobacco or sugar-based economy, is most apt in highlighting the role of bold and ideologically focused leadership. He, however, fails to bring in that invisible but creatively lethal force called the rump of the White Settler political class that had known power and political management, including electoral competition ( albeit within a limited racial electorate), since the 1920s. Their combination of control of economic power, deep political experience and bitter but resurgent ambition for power, must not be left out of the picture.

Mugabe had made the mistake of failing to constantly call attention to this critical mass of race-located economic and political energy whose critical location made them a vital entry-point for any external British, American and European Union "sabotage" initiatives against Mugabe. As an example, the political skills of this class was demonstrated during the summit of Commonwealth leaders when they met in Abuja, Nigeria's capital. The efforts of their agents to capture the debate on Zimbabwe at sessions held by civil society groups, was formidable; if crude in parts when white individuals found it hard hiding their commandist relationship with the black activists in their team.

A critical focus on this group, and its much larger and more complex sector in South Africa, must not be hidden by a form of analysis that appears like a form of 'tribalism by silence' by analysts who share or do not share their aspirations for a return to the front row in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe and post-Mbeki South Africa. Such silence inhibits a creative and continuous engagement of this group for the challenge to undertake internal regeneration towards contributing to building de-racialized political and economic cultures in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Seen in this light, their possible success in exploiting Mugabe's disadvanatges since 1980, should not be glorified without drawing attention to poisonous racism that drives it; and their failure to join hands in creating rehumanized freedom and equality-rooted new societies.

President Obasanjo went on television in Nigeria to take some of the blame for Mugabe's difficulties. He told Nigerians that in 1980 and 1990 African leaders pressurized Mugabe and Zanu PF to stay their hands off land-reform. In 1990, African leaders begged Mugabe to make it easy for the conservative white settlers in South Africa to go along with getting Nelson Mandela out of prison; and for the elections, that gave power to the ANC, to be held. This information should be put on the table as we judge Mugabe. That, as Cronin rightly insists, must not exonorate the policy failures and crimes against the people of Zimbabwe by Mugabe and the Zanu PF's class of 'primitive accumulationists'. But my stomach did get some bitter knots when I watched Jacob Zuma on a BBC interview dismissing the political delays of the election agency in Zimbabwe while failing to acknowledge shackles that Mugabe was pressured to wear by other African leaders in the interest of ANC.

I deeply appreciate Cronin's drawing attendion to the gap in the political education that the ANC went through in comparison to the highly compressed military-combat dominated schooling of Zanu-PF. A deeper exploration of such factors would give value to his analysis; and be a useful guide for comparative studies of experiences with succession traumas in other African countries.

Finally, it is not honourable to treat Mugabe as if he had tripple machine-gunned MDC challenegers. He is also decades away from Idi Amin's treatment of Asians in Uganda and Amin's use of massacres of opponents as a form of remuneration for his killer squads: from the first night of his grabbing power in 1971 to his last moments of panic and flight in 1979. Put the credit on the Catholic priests who gave Mugabe education, or Ian Smith's barbaric refusal to let Mugabe see his sick child when he was in detention; but do give Mugabe credit where he deserves it. That will help us build a healthy tradition of critical review of leadership and governance in Africa while plucking off warts from out plumes.

Finally a commentary [Zimbawe - the other kinds of silences; ] that objectively evaluates the shortcomings of ZANU-PF without degenerating into an echo of imperialist propaganda.

Henning Melber looks at the possibilities for a people-centred opposition and ultimately a true liberation in Namibia and Zimbabwe, after years of misrule by the liberation movements-turned-ruling parties.

‘There is a need for a healing of the nation. The process of national healing and reconciliation is unlikely to proceed as long as society is still polarised. In addition, without also addressing past crimes, corruption, marginalisation and poverty, it is unlikely that reconciliation can be achieved.’

This insight was contained in the Kenya mission report of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). It was submitted by the APRM panel of eminent persons to the continent’s heads of state at the African Union summit in July 2006.[1] One and a half years later, Kenyan society was traumatised by the worst violence since independence and its people more divided than ever. The (allegedly orchestrated) civil war-like situation erupted over disputed election results. It showed that, beneath the surface of a seemingly peaceful society, deep-rooted antagonisms could be mobilised to unleash blind hatred and massive destruction of property and lives between people who had hitherto lived in relative peace with each other. In such circumstances an assumed socio-political stability proved to be treacherous, fragile, and prone to easy manipulation.

Many societies in Africa are confronted with similar challenges. Since the mid-1990s national reconciliation initiatives have emerged in a series of African countries. These were inspired by the widely praised Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa, which symbolised the country’s collective effort to come to terms with a past that still dominated its present and could have a lasting impact on its future. Despite all its limitations, the TRC has been widely perceived as an encouraging initiative, as a lesson in bringing skeletons out of the closet and dealing publicly with the lasting effects of violence and counter-violence. Far from solving structurally rooted historical legacies and their daily impact on the lives of ordinary citizens, or ending discrimination, or bringing to task many of the perpetrators, it brought to the fore the need to address history in the present.[2] Similar initiatives were taken in other war-torn societies marred by organised repression and mass violence, which had left festering wounds and scars among people now longing for healing and seeking a common future.

Two former settler societies neighbouring South Africa are among the countries whose governments did not follow this trend and refused to seek national reconciliation by means of public debate and transitional forms of justice and reconciliation. Zimbabwe and Namibia achieved their independence through long anti-colonial struggles led by liberation movements. In both cases the final defeat of colonialism was not achieved through the barrel of a gun (although the military dimension had an important role in forcing the colonial power to the negotiating table) but through agreements reached between the parties for change. These provided a transitional framework which limited the space for social transformation and the redistribution of wealth.

As a result of this negotiated decolonisation, the former liberation movements (Zanu PF in Zimbabwe and SWAPO in Namibia) were elected as legitimate governments in 1980 and 1990 respectively and have held absolute political power and control over the state bureaucracy since then (although, as we can currently see in Zimbabwe, not for eternity). In contrast to South Africa’s democratically elected government under the ANC, the Zimbabwean and Namibian political leadership never pursued anything similar to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Instead, they proclaimed national reconciliation as some kind of pragmatic agreement which became effective with independence. Their policy was to leave the past behind, with no public debate or dialogue over the injustices committed (although selective reference to colonial crimes was made when needed and commemorated as part of the liberation gospel).

In both societies the justification for casting this kind of official smokescreen over the colonial past was rooted to some extent in the argument that the repressive machinery of colonial occupation had been staffed and executed by many who at independence could no longer be held accountable. This was either because of an amnesty declared for those on all sides of the conflict, or because some of the worst abusers of human rights had retreated to their British or South African countries of origin. National reconciliation was defined in terms of closing the colonial chapter without seeking justice through institutionalised hearings or other forms of coming to terms with the past. The cleansing process, which to some extent was initiated and implemented in the South African TRC, was conspicuously absent. Not so, however, the collective blame placed on colonialism for all subsequent failures in post-independence nation-building and re-structuring of society, which (despite some relevant aspects) was often used as an excuse to evade responsibility for ‘good governance’.

This seemingly pragmatic (and rather self-righteous) approach denied the need and missed the opportunity to deal with failures in the ranks of the liberation movements themselves. This had never been the main issue in the TRC, but was unavoidably brought to the fore when the excesses of the apartheid regime were laid open. Even though the degree of self-critical examination of human rights violations within the ANC was rather limited (and hampered the final process of publicising the TRC report’s findings), it nevertheless became an issue for which President Nelson Mandela apologised to the victims and their families. Having been imprisoned for almost three decades since the early 1960s, Madiba was a charismatic leader and moral role model who could apologise for failures in the exiled ANC, for which he was obviously not personally responsible, nor perhaps even aware. This sign of remorse and indirect moral responsibility only added to his aura.

In contrast, both Robert Mugabe of Zanu PF and Sam Nujoma of SWAPO were active leaders in exile, deeply involved in internal power struggles. They were not only an integral part of the authoritarian hierarchy but its personification. In ultimate charge of the command structures dominating their liberation movements, they were to some degree personally accountable for the abuses and malpractice within their ranks. As heads of state they were not inclined to address such issues. Instead, past injustices on all sides would be put to rest. By doing so, however, the liberation movements sacrificed the moral high ground they had been able to occupy vis-à-vis the oppressive colonial regimes. Their own failures remained unfinished business and left festering wounds within the new post-colonial societies. The dominant mindsets emerging at independence represented more of an old order than a new one and showed the limits to liberation.[3]

In Zimbabwe, violence within and between the liberation movements escalated soon after independence in organised massacres in Matabeleland (the western part of Zimbabwe occupied mostly by Ndebele-speakers considered in large part to be supporters of the Joshua Nkomo-led ZAPU, which competed with Zanu PF for power). Between early 1983 and late 1986, an estimated 20,000 people were killed in horrific acts of barbarism carried out by the Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwe National Army, trained by North Korean military advisors. Although known and reported at the time, the massacres went largely ignored, even by the former colonial power. Described by Robert Mugabe as Gukurahundi (‘the rain that washes away the chaff before the summer rains’), this organised mass violence was a defining moment for his regime. The Catholic church in Zimbabwe was a lonely voice in revealing the scale of the atrocities.[4] Since then, the openly violent character of Mugabe’s rule has drawn worldwide attention. However, it only became a concern for the international community (represented by Western countries) when the so-called fast-track land reform process dispossessed most of the commercial farmers and portrayed the conflict (misleadingly so) as one between a remaining white settler minority and the government. This suggests a moral selectivity in Western perceptions, which the populist rhetoric of the despotic regime managed to exploit.

As part of the Namibian independence process, several hundred members of SWAPO in exile, who were accused of being South African agents, were released and repatriated in mid-1989. Known as ‘ex-detainees’, they shared their plight with the Namibian public at home. Since the early 1980s several thousand were thought to have been imprisoned, tortured and raped in camps in southern Angola. Many did not survive the ordeal; others remain missing. Ever since their return, these ex-detainees have asked for rehabilitation and an apology from SWAPO for the human rights violations committed.[5] But the liberation movement in power has applied a policy of denial, on the grounds that this would open wounds and thereby put peace and stability at risk. Moreover, SWAPO argued, the atrocities by the South African regime and its local collaborators would also need to be scrutinised in return, which would undermine national reconciliation. Instead, and similar to the official narratives cultivated by Zanu PF in Zimbabwe, SWAPO started a ‘nation-building project’ guided by what has been termed ‘patriotic history’, which cultivates the gospel of an organisation and its leaders as the morally impeccable liberators of the people.[6]

In both Zimbabwe and Namibia the former liberation movements in political power were also granted the power of defining the national interest. But the political and ideological hegemony assumed at independence is now deteriorating, with governments failing to maintain control over the one-dimensional collective identity constructed and imposed earlier on. This has been evident since the turn of the century in Zimbabwe, with the emergence of the MDC as a meaningful political opposition, suggesting that the liberation gospel has an expiry date. The coerced legitimacy of the government has been eroded, provoking intimidation, an ever-growing culture of fear, and ultimately rule based on state terror. As we know from history, these kinds of dictatorial regimes sooner or later come to an end through the same popular movements that they intimidated and oppressed for so long.

In Namibia, an opposition emerged towards the end of 2007 from within the belly of the beast. Former high-ranking SWAPO officials formed the Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP) to challenge the undisputed dominance of the former liberation movement. The next presidential and parliamentary elections, scheduled for the end of 2009, could result in SWAPO’s loss of its two-thirds majority in parliament, and hence absolute control over the country’s political and legal decision-making process. Nervousness is mounting. Leading office-bearers in the Namibian government warn of a Kenyan situation and blame the new opposition for fuelling ethnic rivalries. This is an argument which resorts to the culture of fear rather than seeks reconciliation and common ground; it names and shames others rather than identifies common denominators as Namibians. Such a knee-jerk response to political challenge also suggests an inability to deal with one’s own shortcomings and failures.

Leaders of the Namibian Lutheran churches have responded to the growing polarisation by means of a pastoral letter read out during sermons on 23 March 2008 and later published. In light of the violence that erupted between the two main rival parties, triggered by a local election campaign, the bishops of the three churches expressed their fear that the country is moving backwards rather than forwards in terms of freedom and democracy. The bishops wrote in their letter of ‘intolerance, verbal and physical attacks and counter attacks’. They warned that ‘failure to redress this situation now can lead to mass loss of lives country wide’. ‘What we say as leaders… is the seed which bears the consequential behaviour for violence and peace… Political opponents are not enemies, but participants in a democratic set-up.’[7] This is the first time since independence that the church has commented on the country’s politics in this way. Alarm bells are ringing, but Namibians still have the opportunity to learn from the sad lessons in Kenya and elsewhere – not least in neighbouring Zimbabwe, which in many respects is so close to home.

*Henning Melber is Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in Uppsala, Sweden. A son of German immigrants to Namibia, he joined SWAPO in 1974. This text is a contribution to 'New Routes – A Journal of Peace Research and Action' vol. 13, no. 2, 2008, to be published by the Life & Peace Institute.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

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In response to the recent extract from William Gumede's book "Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC" published by Zed Books (http://zedbooks.co.uk), Patrick Bond suggests that there is a need to go beyond the individual reasons and look at the structural forces that have informed Mbeki's AIDS policy such as international and domestic financial markets, pharmaceutical manufacturers and a large reserve army of labour.

With millions of South Africans dying early because of AIDS, the battle against the disease would become one of the most crucial tests of the post-apartheid government. Its systematic failure to address AIDS, and especially its ongoing sabotage of medicinal treatment for HIV+ patients, led to periodic charges of ‘genocide’ by authoritative figures such as the heads of the Medical Research Council (Malegapuru William Makgoba), SA Medical Association (Kgosi Letlape), and Pan Africanist Congress health desk (Costa Gazi), as well as leading public intellectual Sipho Seepe.

Aside from Mbeki, Pretoria’s main saboteurs were health minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang and trade minister Erwin; the latter two were accused by the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) of culpable homicide during a March 2003 civil disobedience campaign. Even in the weeks before the 2004 election, Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang continued to practice denialism, obfuscation, delays, bureaucratic manoeuvres, and withdrawal of resources for treatment. Educational campaigns like LoveLife’s were based upon fatuous marketing to hip-hop youth, and there was virtually nothing done to combat domestic violence, rape, multiple partners and patriarchy. Across Africa more generally, the ‘ABCs’ of abstinence, being loyal and condoms were particularly ineffectual within the confines of male-dominated marriage, leading to the tragedy that young women’s infection rate was twice as high as that of men.[1]

A great deal has been written about Pretoria’s malfeasance.[2] The point of revisiting it here while documenting South Africa’s elite transition is to provide a structural explanation for the crisis. Beyond the oft-cited peculiarities of the president himself, there are three deeper reasons why local and global power relationships mean that the battle against AIDS has to date mainly been lost.[3]

One reason is the pressure exerted by international and domestic financial markets to keep Pretoria’s state budget deficit to three per cent of GDP. Recall the telling remark of the late Parks Mankahlana, Mbeki’s main spokesperson, who in March 2000 justified to Science magazine why the government refused to provide relatively inexpensive antiretrovirals (ARVs) like Nevirapine to pregnant, HIV-positive women: ‘That mother is going to die and that HIV-negative child will be an orphan. That child must be brought up. Who is going to bring the child up? It’s the state, the state. That’s resources, you see.’[4] Instead of saving lives, Mbeki’s finance ministry adopted higher priorities: slashing corporate taxes, redeploying state resources to purchase high-tech arms, and repaying roughly $25 billion of apartheid-era foreign debt and a bit more in apartheid domestic debt, which could have been declared ‘odious’ in legal terms. Local and international bankers generally approved such examples of fiscal laxity, in contrast to expanding state health spending and other social budgets, which they have explicitly not supported.

The second structural reason is the residual power of pharmaceutical manufacturers to defend their rights to ‘intellectual property’, i.e. monopoly patents on life-saving medicines. This pressure did not end in April 2001 when the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association withdrew their notorious lawsuit against the South African Medicines Act of 1997. That Act allows for parallel import or local production, via ‘compulsory licences’, of generic substitutes for brand-name antiretroviral medicines. Big Pharma’s power was felt in the debate over essential drugs for public health emergencies at the November 2001 Doha World Trade Organisation summit, and ever since.

The third structural reason for the ongoing HIV/AIDS holocaust in South Africa is the vast size of the reserve army of labour, for this feature of capitalism allows companies to replace sick workers with desperate, unemployed people instead of providing them with treatment. The latter point deserves elaboration, simply because so many lives are at immediate risk, and so much evidence has mounted that corporate South Africa’s preferred approach has been, in essence, mass murder by denial of medical benefits.

This was the initial conclusion reached after a year of study at Africa’s largest company, Anglo American Corporation. Anglo has 160,000 employees, of whom 21 per cent are estimated to be HIV-positive. Once Big Pharma appeared to retreat from its lawsuit, the company announced that it would provide antiretroviral medicines to its workforce, which meant literally tens of thousands of lives might be saved in the short term. But in June 2001, the Financial Times reported on Anglo’s ‘plans to make special payments to miners suffering from HIV/AIDS, on condition they take voluntary retirement.’ However, in addition to bribing workers to go home and die, Anglo told the Financial Times, ‘treatment of employees with antiretrovirals can be cheaper than the costs incurred by leaving them untreated.’ In August, Anglo’s vice president for medicine, Brian Brink, bragged in Business Day about a ‘strategy [which] involved offering wellness programmes, including access to antiretroviral treatment.’ According to that report, ‘The company believed that the cost of its programmes would eventually be outweighed by the benefits its received in gradual gains in productivity, [Brink] concluded. Although it was indeed a risky strategy, it was the only one Anglo could pursue in the face of such human suffering.’

Then in October 2001, Anglo simply retracted its promise, once cost-benefit analysis showed that 146,000 workers just weren’t worth saving. According to the Financial Times, Brink ‘said the company’s 14,000 senior staff would receive antiretroviral treatment as part of their medical insurance, but that the provision of drug treatment for lower income employees was too expensive.’ Brink explained the criteria for the fatal analysis: ‘[Antiretrovirals] could save on absenteeism and improved productivity. The saving you achieve can be substantial, but we really don’t know how it will stack up. We feel that the cost will be greater than the saving.’ As the Wall Street Journal recorded:
‘In a controversial move that could have wide ramifications for how companies in poor countries handle AIDS, mining giant Anglo American PLC has put on hold a feasibility study to provide AIDS drugs to its African work force, according to people familiar with the situation. When it disclosed its plans for the study a year ago, Anglo garnered wide praise because it was one of the first major corporations to reveal measures aimed at treating AIDS cases among its rank and file African employees.’[5]

A few months later Anglo changed its mind once again, as AIDS ravaged the middle layer of the workforce, and the multi-class TAC raised consciousness sufficiently high as to get trades union support for members’ treatment. Indeed, in the cases of both Anglo and Coca Cola, the other factor that appeared in 2002 was the spectre of consumer protest over the firms’ refusal to treat employees. I was reliably informed by insiders that for Anglo, the prospect of demonstrators at the August 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development dragging up many other bits of dirty laundry intimidated the company’s executives into taking pre-emptive action on the AIDS front. Coke’s main bottler in South Africa had also failed to insure two-thirds of its 4,000-strong workforce at a sufficient level to allow the HIV-positive workers access to ARVs, and was subject to international protest over African AIDS policies.

However, even though the costs of HIV/AIDS - absenteeism, declining productivity, payouts for early death - soared to as high as 25 per cent of payroll by 2003, according to the Financial Times, most employers are still hesitant to provide ARVs:

‘Untreated, HIV typically takes four to five years to manifest itself as full-blown AIDS, and companies are reluctant to pay for a risk that they cannot see… Persuading managers to part with fees [AIDS treatment programmes] today for costs that will hit company earnings years down the line has been a hard sell.’[6]

In sum, no matter the effectiveness of activism against government, Big Pharma and the corporate employers, all three structural factors are still deterrents to the provision of treatment. By late 2003, each was slightly mitigated, however, and that led to an ostensible change of policy by Pretoria. The budget deficit was projected to climb from just over one per cent of GDP during the early 2000s to nearly three per cent in 2004-05, allowing extra leeway for AIDS spending. Pharmacorps were cooperating more closely with the World Health Organisation, the Global Fund, the Clinton Foundation and governments to lower prices for Africa. Canada’s former prime minister Jean Chretien - spurred by the dynamic, outspoken UN advisor Stephen Lewis - even introduced path-breaking legislation to promote generics (although a sabotage clause was later included in the draft law to support patent rights, in turn attracting a new round of solidarity protests). And employers began waking up, in part because of the dramatic rise of AIDS-related disability claims as a percentage of all disability claims, from 18 per cent in 2001 to 31 per cent in 2002.

These factors converged in a November 2003 cabinet statement, finally endorsing a roll-out of antiretrovirals. Pretoria cited factors which included:

‘a fall in the prices of drugs over the past two years…new medicines and international and local experience in managing the utilisation of ARVs… [sufficient] health workers and scientists with skills and understanding… and the availability of fiscal resources to expand social expenditure in general, as a consequence of the prudent macro economic policies pursued by government.’

However, these factors were minor compared to intensive activist pressure, which Pretoria did not dare mention lest it encourage further protests. TAC’s victory statement was explicit: ‘The combination of the Constitutional Court decision on mother to child transmission prevention, the Stand Up for Our Lives march [of 15,000 people on parliament] in February, the civil disobedience campaign and the international protests around the world have convinced Cabinet to develop and implement an ARV roll-out plan.’

Another factor, of course, was the 2004 presidential election, which Mbeki would win easily but which would be characterised by high levels of apathy and no-vote campaigning by the Landless Peoples Movement. An AC Nielsen survey in November 2003 confirmed that Mbeki’s AIDS policy was hurting the chances of the ruling African National Congress of turning out the vote. The cabinet statement promised that ‘within a year, there will be at least one service point in every health district across the country and, within five years, one service point in every local municipality.’ In addition to medicines, the state would provide an education and community mobilisation programme, promotion of good nutrition and traditional health treatments such as herbal remedies, support for families affected by HIV and AIDS, and funds for upgrading health infrastructure. The health system was already massively overextended, with far too few essential medicines, much less ARVs, available in South Africa’s under-funded rural clinics.

As TAC was the first to concede, ARV availability could generate negative unintended consequences. One would be non-compliance with treatment regimes by poor people, and the concomitant emergence of drug-resistant strains. Another would be the black market smuggling of cheap drugs to Europe and North America which would reduce access in Africa. Another would be that, although stigmatisation would decline given the availability of hope-giving drugs, so too might the practice of safe sex. These would remain major challenges to TAC and other health-sector groups, although the Khayelitsha operation of Médecins Sans Frontières was already proving high levels of treatment compliance.

Moreover, the conflict between neo-liberalism and life, so explicit in the case of access to AIDS medicines, was severely compounded by patriarchy, traditional and modern sexual practices such as multiple partners for men, and domestic violence against women. Rape continued at scandalous levels.

But the primary contradiction involved the regime in Pretoria. In February 2004, TAC attacked President Thabo Mbeki in the wake of more government prevarication on AIDS treatment.[7] Claiming that Mbeki ‘misrepresented facts and once again caused confusion on HIV/AIDS’ on national television, TAC’s Zackie Achmat accused him of ‘denialism.’ Moreover, Pretoria had originally promised to distribute AIDS medicines to at least 50,000 people within a year, and to reach everyone in need of treatment within five years. Tshabalala-Msimang blamed slow drug procurement – Pretoria’s own fault – and the lack of qualified health personnel. TAC strategist Mark Heywood commented, ‘Many hospitals have the capacity, they just don’t have the medicines.’ The finance ministry also cut the budget dramatically for medicine purchases in February 2004.

At the same time, Tshabalala-Msimang suggested that while HIV-positive people waited for medicines, a diet of lemons, beetroot, (extremely expensive), olive oil and garlic would improve the body’s immune system. A week earlier, the minister had come under fire by the SA Medical Association, whose chairperson Dr Kgosi Letlape accused her of ‘dividing the profession when we have gone to great lengths to unite it.’ The minister unsuccessfully attempted to halt a protest march of 2,000 medics against poor conditions in public health facilities by implying that the demonstrating doctors were white, whereas black medics supported the government.

Mbeki continued supporting his minister, no matter how outrageous this became. He told the SA Broadcasting Corporation on 8 February 2004 that the major problem was inaccurate mortality statistics, which made it impossible to know whether AIDS was as fatal as claimed. According to Mbeki, his doctors informed him that diabetes is also an epidemic, and he questioned why no-one talks about diabetes. Achmat replied:

‘Drugs for treating diabetes are heavily overpriced; there should be a campaign for their reduction. But unlike HIV until November 2003, diabetes is treated in the public health sector. However, the President should be aware that according to an initial investigation into the burden of disease estimates in South Africa released in 2003 by the Medical Research Council, AIDS was responsible for 39 per cent of lost life-years in 2000 - more than the next 10 worst diseases. Diabetes is the 12th worst disease and is responsible for slightly more than one per cent of lost life-years. The two diseases are incomparable in scale.’

Achmat also ridiculed Mbeki’s claim that ‘few countries can hold a candle to South Africa’s HIV/AIDS programme.’ Achmat replied:

‘A number of developing countries do much better than South Africa when it comes to HIV prevention and treatment, often with far fewer resources. Currently, South Africa treats approximately 1,500 people in its public sector, who are not on drug trials, paying for their own medicines or being sponsored. By contrast, Brazil’s government treats over 100,000 people and has less than a quarter of South Africa’s HIV infections. Botswana is treating approximately 15,000 and Cameroon approximately 7,000 people.’

In March 2004 the need to harass Pretoria to ensure roll-out was confirmed again, when TAC was forced to threaten an urgent court interdict in order to permit the urgent acquisition of antiretroviral medicines consistent with the November 2003 cabinet decision. Tshabalala-Msimang was sufficiently threatened by yet more embarrassing court proceedings that she finally agreed, just before a deadline provided by TAC lawyers. TAC declared victory, though remarked that ‘by implementing the interim procurement mechanism and thereby avoiding a three-month delay of the treatment programme, approximately 6,000 excess deaths could be avoided.’ [8]

What is the way forward, given persistent presidential denial, state bureaucratic sabotage, and structural factors that mitigate against access to treatment? One major stumbling block would probably emerge in subsequent months and years: the nature of political alliances within South African politics. TAC had been effective in attracting support from the most forward-looking trades unions, the SA Communist Party, churches, NGO activists and technical supporters (lawyers, health workers, academics, journalists). Yet these alliances did not stray far from the ANC. Would TAC forge sufficient linkages to non-ANC communities, especially those devoted to building the new independent left? In coming years, would the myriad of problems that cause opportunistic infections, especially dirty water and air (thanks to coal/wood/paraffin), also be addressed? At a time that the South African government was disconnecting water and electricity at a lethal rate, alongside evictions for those who could not afford expensive rental and mortgage bond payments, the need to address the links between AIDS and the diseases of poverty/homelessness was obvious.

Moreover, would TAC and its allies make the case that access to ARVs is a human right and that people should not pay user-fees or partial cost-recovery for the medicines? By 2004 they were taking this position, but only in the event that people were too poor to pay for medicines. Yet means-testing of black South Africans with irregular informal incomes is notoriously difficult. In contrast, a more explicit ‘free lifeline’ strategy would parallel the demands of the water and electricity campaigners.

Nevertheless, whether or not TAC continues to tackle the three structural impediments to ARV access – neo-liberal fiscal policy, pharmacorps and corporate control of health perks - the immediate victory of November 2003 will potentially make a huge difference. For the half million South Africans who are symptomatic with AIDS or who have a CD4 blood count less than 200, there was suddenly hope. Across the world, for three million people who die each year of AIDS, and for 40 million others infected, the treatment activists and their international allies deserve a standing ovation.

* Patrick Bond directs the Centre for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban. This article is an extract from his book 'Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa'.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

For additional notes, please follow this link:

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/370/48047zim.jpg Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights issued this statement concerning escalating cases of organised violence and torture, and the intimidation of medical personnel.

Since the last report on the 25th of April, our members have reported a dramatic escalation in incidents of organised violence and torture with the number of victims documented in the post election period now standing at over 900. This figure grossly underestimates the number of victims presenting countrywide as the violence is now on such a scale that it is impossible to properly document all cases. There have been 22 confirmed deaths but at least double that number have been reported but are yet to be confirmed. It is alleged that some of those killed have been buried on the orders of state agents before documentation can take place.

There has been a dramatic increase in violence since the beginning of May. In the last 24 hours alone, 30 victims of violence have been treated for limb fractures in Harare hospitals and clinics and supplies of Plaster of Paris bandages are reported to be exhausted in most health centres.

One hospital in Harare has treated an average of 23 victims a day over the last week. On the 8th of May, there were a total 53 more seriously injured patients (13 females and 40 males) admitted to wards in 3 Harare hospitals. These included one 30 year old man on life support in the intensive care unit with severe, irreversible head injuries and a 30 year old man with severe soft tissue injuries to the buttocks and secondary renal failure, also on life support. Both of these patients died later that day. Also admitted was a 3yr old boy with trauma to his R eye from being struck with a rock and a 78 year old man with a fractured lower leg from blunt trauma. One young breast-feeding mother had bilateral fractures of her hands and was unable to hold her baby to feed her. Among the other patients, 20 had defensive, forearm or hand fractures, 5 had leg fractures and 1 fractured ribs. Fourteen patients had severe injuries to the buttocks from blunt trauma which required surgery for the removal of necrotic (dead) tissue. The perpetrators in all cases were alleged by the victims to be war veterans and Zanu PF supporters. Similar patterns of injuries are being reported from other hospitals.

As emphasised in the previous ZADHR reports, the cases documented by our members represent only a fraction of the total number countrywide. ZADHR is concerned that many victims of current violence are not receiving treatment. Numerous incidents of violence are being reported from remote rural areas where there is no access to transport and there are also widespread reports of the injured being denied treatment at health centres where staff have been intimidated and/or are acting under specific instructions from state agents not to treat victims of violence. It was reported from one district (Headlands) that medical care was being provided only if the victim had a letter from the police authorising this. Accounts have also been received of ambulances, sent to collect seriously injured victims, being turned away by war veterans. Under these circumstances, it is likely that many of those with less severe injuries are not seeking medical attention. This seems to be confirmed by increasing reports of victims presenting with complications such as wound infections or infected haematomas which are directly attributable to delayed treatment.

Doctors and nursing staff at rural hospitals are working under conditions of severe stress and many health workers have reported intimidation with some having been specifically instructed by state agents not to treat opposition supporters. These health workers, who, according to some reports are treating up to 60 victims of torture and violence a day, are emotionally traumatised and depressed. One nursing sister treating victims in a rural clinic was observed to be shaking so violently with fear that she was unable to write.

Government spokespersons have repeatedly claimed that they have not received reports of violence or of deaths from the police. However, there is evidence that the police themselves are being intimidated. ZADHR has eyewitness statements that on the 24th of April, at Mayo Police Station in Headlands District, a high-ranking police officer from Harare physically assaulted the Member in Charge, accusing him of being sympathetic to the opposition. The police post had been taking statements from victims and referring them for medical treatment. The Member in Charge was summarily transferred out of the district.

The current pattern of organized torture and violence being perpetrated by state agents in the rural areas of Zimbabwe is similar to that documented prior to the 2002 elections. However, the current violence is dramatically more intensive and unrestrained. The level of brutality and callousness exhibited by the perpetrators is unprecedented and the vicious and cowardly attacks by so called war veterans on women, children and the elderly shames the memory of all true heroes of the liberation struggle.

It has been clearly documented that much of the violence has been specifically directed against members of the opposition party, particularly those who acted as election agents or monitors in the recent elections. Villagers and school teachers from districts where the opposition predominated in the elections have also been targeted even though they have no political affiliations. Without exception, victims treated by our members have identified the perpetrators either as war veterans, armed security force members or Zanu PF youth militia or varying combinations of the three. The few acts of violence attributable to opposition members appear to have been retaliatory or defensive. It is clear from the widespread and coordinated nature of the violence and the consistent pattern of injuries inflicted, that state agents including elements of the security forces are organizing and directing this campaign of terror.

It is now obvious that the intent of the campaign is to secure victory for President Robert Mugabe in a run off election. As in the 2002 election, it may be anticipated that the violence will be halted just prior to the arrival of international election monitors, to create the illusion of a peaceful and fair election, although state agents will maintain an intimadatory presence throughout the rural areas.

ZADHR again appeals for the immediate cessation of acts of violence and for the restoration of the rule of law in Zimbabwe. To this end it calls for:

1) the immediate, large- scale deployment of teams of SADC and other credible international observers to all districts where violence is being reported.

2) attested members of the Zimbabwe Republic Police to assume sole responsibility for the enforcement of law and order, and for the protection of the law be extended to all Zimbabweans irrespective of political affiliation.

3) the immediate withdrawal of all military personnel, both regular and irregular to barracks and the arrest of those war veterans and those posing as war veterans who are instigating violence.

4) the withdrawal of uniforms and arms from all irregular police and army militia not formally attested into the service and not entitled under law to bear arms.

5) the postponement of all run off election activities until the above conditions have been achieved.

Finally, ZADHR again appeals to the international community of health workers, including the Zimbabwe Ministry of Health and Child Welfare and the Zimbabwe Medical Association to bring whatever effective pressure is within their capability to bear on the Government of Zimbabwe to stop these grotesque, cruel and shameful acts of violence, and to be prepared to actively defend their colleagues facing intimidation and physical threat.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/370/48046camp.jpgThe National Internally Displaced Persons Network of Kenya is deeply concerned with recent moves by the Government of Kenya to forcibly close IDP camps across the country in violation of the international Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and basic human decency.

Operation "Rudi Nyumbani" seems to be based on no policy or legal framework but instead uses the force of the provincial administration to prematurely close the IDP camps. It aims at solving the problems of displacement by simply forcing people back to their homes:

1) without honoring legal obligations to compensation;

2) without providing adequate security and;

3) without allowing time for some reconciliation to take place.

The National IDP Network asks that the Government of Kenya recognize its responsibility to protect these victims of violence including many children. According to the guiding principles, which it has agreed to in the Great Lakes Pact, the government is also required, to give the displaced choices and alternatives to returning to the site of very recent trauma. By closing the camps the government is in effect forcing people to return or face starvation, disease and perhaps home in a slum.  Such scenarios are likely to breed more poverty and recruits for gangs and future violence. Few seem to remember that Mungiki was a product of the 1991-92 violence and that we are in danger of magnifying and multiplying such groups if we do not deal with both the sites of violence and the trauma and plight of the displaced in a comprehensive manner.

It should also be noted that a number of those IDPs who have agreed to be taken back to such places as Kuresoi have experienced threats, violence and no services. At least one man has committed suicide on return, and many have literally returned by foot to the camps. In Nakuru, the site of one of the largest camps the government discontinued water five days ago to the camp causing much distress and the potential outbreak of disease. Residents have been forced to send children out to collect water and tomorrow they will bury a child killed by a car on one desperate mission to collect water.  This is no way to treat victims of violence who are already traumatized.

We are asking concerned citizens and friends of Kenya to take urgent action:

- Ask the Kenya Red Cross and international partners to end any complicity in forced returns. Water must be restored to the Nakuru camp immediately. The Kenya Red Cross can be e-mailed at [email][email protected] or texted at 722-206958 or 733-333040

- Ask the Kenya National Commission for Human Rights to investigate and monitor the ongoing Resettlement and camp closures and to demand that the government recognize the Guiding Principles as the legal framework for dealing with IDPs. Commissioner Maina Kiai can be reached at [email][email protected]

- Ask the government to create an IDP policy that includes some alternatives, which could be in the form of reinstatement of salaries for displaced government employees, monetary compensation, trauma counseling and help in individual relocation choices. Some IDPs have also suggested that they enter into temporary farming arrangements on underutilized land until reconciliation and security can be restored.

- Ask the Government to recognize that some IDPs will prefer to relocate in other parts of the country including Nairobi to do business rather than return. This must be respected and the Ministry of Special Programmes must work with the Ministry of Lands to find alternatives as well as temporary farming arrangements for those who do not wish to return. Finally, urge them to restore water to the Nakuru camp immediately.

*Dr. Naomi Shaban can be texted at 722814412.

**Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

This letter is written in the wake of your justification to Dr. Haider Eid of your intention to attend a Writers' Festival in Israel.

I write to you as an American-Israeli Jew who ignorantly immigrated from the US to Israel 50 years ago. I came then to raise my children as Jews in a Jewish country. Only many years later, after much experience living here in Israel and much research, did I finally realize how misguided I'd been about Israel—what it was meant to be and what it is.

Let me begin with a question: how would you, an individual so widely recognized and admired both as author and as courageous rebel against apartheid, how would you have felt about a celebrity who during the height of your efforts against apartheid would have agreed to come to South Africa to attend a public function of the kind that you propose now to attend?

Would you not have felt that it was a debasement of all the efforts that yourself and others—particularly of those who were calling for sanctions, boycott, and divestment—were engaged in? Would you not have realized that however respectable and honest the intentions of the celebrity in coming to South Africa, that the government would use his/her attendance at the function for its own purposes?

Do you not realize that even though the writers' festival that you intend to come to is not sponsored by the Israeli government, the event nevertheless will be associated with the 60 years of so-called Independence celebrations? Do you not realize that your criticisms of Israel's policies will be so much stronger if instead of expressing them while attending a forum in Israel you state them as explanation of why you refuse to attend?

I deeply hope that it is still possible to convince you to not come, at least not as a guest to a public function. For you to attend a formal affair organized by Israelis in Israel--be it literary, academic, or other--is to undercut the endeavors of those of us who call for change, and believe that boycott, sanctions, and divestment from Israel can help bring about that change.

Israel is a disaster for Israeli Jews as well as for the indigenous Palestinians. Not that there is symmetry—for, as I'm sure you realize, there can never be symmetry between occupier and occupied, oppressor and oppressed.

Nevertheless, Israel, instead of being a safe haven for Jews, is the contrary. Where else since WWII have Jews gone through 10 wars and battles in less than 60 years? Where else since WWII have over 23,000 Jewish soldiers been killed in violence? Where else in the world do so many Jewish youngsters suffer from post-traumatic distress symptoms following their army service (and during it) because of what they experienced and what they did to Palestinians? Where else in the world do over 80,000 Holocaust survivors live in dire poverty, ignored by their government, which has money for expansion but not for them or for health, education, or social benefits?

Peace could have come long ago had Israel's leaders wished it. There have been many opportunities for peace (e.g., the Saudi Arabian proposal). But because Israel's leaders deem expansion more important than life, they not only do not protect Israelis but demand instead of Jewish inhabitants to be forever prepared to live by the sword. As Professor Robert Aumann, an American-Israeli Nobel Prize Laureate, has argued, the country is more important than lives; Israel's continued existence, he says, rests on readiness to sacrifice its young: "We are too sensitive to our losses, and also to the losses of the other side . . . In the Yom Kippur War, 3,000 soldiers were killed. It sounds terrible, but that's small change."*

'Small change,' indeed! Yet the acts of Israel's leaders from Ben Gurion till today clearly imply that to them lives are 'small change.' Thus, for example, Israel's present government instead of furnishing the long-suffering residents of Sderot either peace or shelters to protect them from the missiles fired from Gaza, tells the people of Sderot to learn to endure. Israel's leaders hold the residents of Sderot hostage so as to use their sufferings from missile attacks as propaganda.

Some of the above data is elucidated in a petition that Israelis recently sent to the United Methodist Church in support of its proposals to divest from companies that contribute to the occupation: More data is available in two compilations that I prepared as handouts for my speaking tour in the United States in March and April this year. I would gladly send them to you (and to anyone else interested) by email or other means, if you wish.

Rather than celebrating 60 years of Israel's existence, there is every reason to reconsider the establishment of an ethnographic state—a Jewish state—whose criterion is not democracy but demography, whose leaders care not an iota for peace but for expansion. For centuries Jews, Muslims, and Christians lived in Palestine in amity prior to Zionism. They could again live together in peace. But this will not happen until there will be justice, freedom, and security for Palestinians (including the right of refugees to return).

Your agreement to come here to participate in any official or semi-official function undermines our endeavors to bring justice, freedom, and security to all who love this land—be they Jews, Muslims, Christians, or seculars.

Since the last report on the 25th of April, our members have reported a dramatic escalation in incidents of organised violence and torture with the number of victims documented in the post election period now standing at over 900. This figure grossly underestimates the number of victims presenting countrywide as the violence is now on such a scale that it is impossible to properly document all cases. There have been 22 confirmed deaths but at least double that number have been reported but are yet to be confirmed. It is alleged that some of those killed have been buried on the orders of state agents before documentation can take place.

A major new partnership has been launched to provide smallholder farmers and small agricultural enterprises with the financing they need to break out of poverty and build viable businesses. The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), in partnership with Equity Bank Limited, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the Kenya Ministry of Agriculture signed an agreement for a loan facility of US$50 million (3 billion Kenyan shillings) to accelerate access to affordable financing for 2.5 million farmers and 15,000 agricultural value chain members such as rural input shops, fertilizers and seed wholesalers and importers, grain traders and food processors.