Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the World Bank's energy portfolio still fails to reap the double dividend of renewable energy technologies that would tackle both energy poverty and climate change. Nigerian economic policies shaped by World Bank and IMF recommendations, policy agreements and conditionality have so far lead to a dysfunctional electricity privatisation process, a heavy and as yet unfulfilled reliance on reform of the gas sector, and the failure to make any widespread practical progress on pro-poor, decentralised renewable energy.

Still in its nascent stages, the Kenya National Social Protection Plan is an ambitious government project that proposes far-reaching policies and actions for the poor and vulnerable that will enhance their capacity to cope with poverty and equip them to better manage risks and shocks. The process begun in early 2007.

A positive correlation has been found between dependence on primary agricultural commodities and poverty, as measured by the human development index. This is due, according to this South Centre study, to three prominent features of commodity markets: price volatility; the secular decline of long-term prices; and market concentration.

People Development Consulting, is searching for a committed collaborator, for a West African NGO based in Dakar. The job mission is: Under the supervision of the Director General, the Institutional Development Officer formulates and implements a proactive funding plan as well as an institutional development strategy. He/She is the focal point of the information about and towards donors.

People Development Consulting, is searching for a committed collaborator, for a West African NGO based in Dakar. The job mission is: Contribute, within the frame of the 5 Years Strategic Plan, to the consolidation of Information Pluralism and Media Development at the West African regional level through the implementation and visibility of the programme at regional and international levels.

East Africa Law Society (EALS) is calling for an emergency Pan-African Citizens’ Consultation next week to discuss the Zimbabwe crisis. The meeting which is supported by the Foundation Open Society Institute (FOSI) takes place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on Monday, April 21, 2008.

At the time of Zimbabwe’s 28th anniversary of independence, Amnesty International is deeply concerned about reports of the deteriorating human rights situation in Zimbabwe following presidential, parliamentary and local government elections which took place on 29 March 2008. The organization is particularly concerned about apparent retribution attacks against opposition supporters in rural areas, townships and farms across the country. Victims allege that they have been assaulted by soldiers, police, so-called “war veterans” and supporters of the ruling party, ZANU-PF, and have been accused of not having voted “correctly.”

The Southern African Legal Assistance Network (SALAN), a network of legal aid NGOs in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zanzibar, Zimbabwe joins the regional and international community in noting, with great concern, the disturbing developments unfolding in Zimbabwe. Though acknowledging the effort made by the SADC member states to mediate an end to the election crisis in Zimbabwe, SALAN joins the rest of the world in adding its voice to the following demands:

DELAY BY ZEC TO ANNOUNCE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS RESULTS

• SALAN regrets the continued failure on the part of the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission (ZEC) to disclose the results of the election, without any reasonable explanation

• This inexplicable delay in the announcement of Presidential election results is both unwarranted and unjustifiable and has caused unnecessary anxiety and heightened tension in Zimbabwe inviting suspicion that electoral outcomes will be manipulated and that the Zimbabwean peoples' peacefully registered political preferences will be contemptuously discounted.

• SALAN therefore calls for the expeditious release of all outstanding Zimbabwean electoral results in accordance with due process of the law, including that the verification and counting must be done in the presence of candidates and / or their agents.

• SALAN also urges the Government of Zimbabwe to desist from interfering with the work of ZEC and enable ZEC to immediately announce results of the presidential vote taken on 29 March.

Much of Black America stopped discussing Zimbabwe after its liberation in 1980; at least, we stopped discussing it for a while. After years of regular coverage of the liberation war, details regarding Zimbabwe became harder to obtain as attention shifted to struggles in Mozambique, Namibia, Angola and South Africa. Not to be misunderstood, it was not that facts were being withheld for us here in Black America, so much as we paid less attention to developments, and did not dig for information.

President Robert Mugabe, the leader of ZANU (later ZANU [PF]) was, of course, a hero to so many of us insofar as he was the main, though not only, leader of the liberation struggle. He seemed, at least at first, to be oriented toward the development of an independent and, at least theoretically, socialist-oriented Zimbabwe, with land redistribution, workers’ control, and black power all on the agenda.

So many of us chose to ignore developments, however. We ignored purges that had taken place within ZANU prior to Liberation. We ignored the violent crushing of a rebellion in the early years of the Mugabe administration. We ignored President Mugabe’s adoption of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank formula of “structural adjustment”, despite its economic theory running contrary to a pro-people economic transformation. And, we ignored the fact that the land was not being redistributed. We ignored this and other unsettling matters while the focus of much of Black America was on events unfolding in other parts of Southern Africa.

It was only after the seizures of white farms in 2000 that a new discussion of Zimbabwe emerged, albeit a much distorted one. For many it was as if they had jumped through a time portal between 1980 and 2000, oblivious to the development of the country and the challenges that it had encountered. President Mugabe, it seemed to many, was finally seizing the land and completing Liberation…at least, that is what many of us thought. But what was missing was a broader context to understand developments and too many well-intentioned African Americans interpreted Zimbabwean developments through our lens here on the opposite side of the Atlantic. Instead of reviewing the actual developments on the ground, many of us fell prey to interpreting facts based on what we would have liked to have believed was unfolding rather than what was actually playing out.

Many well-intentioned supporters of Zimbabwe ignored or were oblivious to the growing protests that had swept Zimbabwe in the 1990s among workers who stood in opposition to the economic policies of structural adjustment that were impoverishing them. We were further prepared to ignore, or forget, that President Mugabe had been quite delayed in taking steps to redistribute the land in the first place, even factoring in that the British and USA reneged on pledges that they had made to subsidize a “willing seller, willing buyer” land transfer. And some of us closed our eyes to who was actually benefiting from land redistribution and who was not.

In 2003, several African American activists - including this writer - penned a letter of protest against the policies of President Mugabe. Each of us had been supporters of ZANU (PF) and had been reluctant to voice public criticisms. Our criticisms were aimed at the repression being conducted against opponents of the Mugabe administration and their supporters. We also questioned how - but not whether - land was being redistributed and who was gaining from this. We made it abundantly clear that our criticisms bore no resemblance, in either form or content, to those voiced by US President Bush and British then-Prime Minister Tony Blair.

The response we received was, let’s say, quite remarkable. Some pro-Mugabe individuals and organizations, despite knowing the histories and work of the signatories, declared us to be CIA agents and/or agents of the US State Department (a difference without a distinction for our critics). Some people even went so far as to suggest that we were being paid by the Zimbabwean opposition. We were vilified for even questioning what was transpiring in Zimbabwe, even though in some cases we had first hand knowledge of brutal repression.

The other response was just as interesting. Quietly we were applauded by many African Americans who were pleased that someone(s) had spoken up, though they, themselves, were not necessarily prepared to publicly do so. While this was encouraging, it was equally unsettling in that it evidenced a fear within Black America about having a genuine debate on such an important issue.
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of this verbal/written slugfest, little real exchange took place. The atmosphere had become so charged that many people decided that it was not worth saying one more thing about Zimbabwe. Rather, too many of us just sat back and watched in silence.

So, we watched. Colleagues of mine in Zimbabwe, individuals whose progressive work I was familiar with, were jailed and tortured by the Mugabe administration, but I was expected by pro-Mugabe activists in the USA to say nothing, and indeed, to deny everything. Any hint of criticism was immediately construed as allegedly giving aid and comfort to the Bush administration and its mania for regime change. In a brief visit to Zimbabwe I had the opportunity of speaking with a group of Black Zimbabwean trade unionists. I found myself attempting to explain to them why many African Americans were silent in the face of President Mugabe’s repression, or in some cases, actively supported President Mugabe. They shook their heads in collective disbelief.

Over the last two weeks we have seen events surrounding the Zimbabwean election and it feels surreal. I must, however, ask some tough questions. What does it mean that an incumbent administration fails to reveal the ACTUAL election results, yet demands a recount? One need not be a supporter, and I am not, of the principal opposition party in Zimbabwe - the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under Morgan Tsvangirai - to sense that all is not right with the world following the election. One’s attitude toward the MDC should actually be secondary to whether one believes in the notion of free and fair elections. To put it bluntly, if one is going to call elections, they should be transparent; if one does not want transparent elections, don’t call them in the first place.

The MDC is politically inconsistent, and outside of Zimbabwe there are very mixed feelings about them within Southern Africa. Though originally planned as a labor party, the MDC became a sort of united front of opponents of President Mugabe, ranging the political spectrum from the revolutionary Left to some conservative white farmers. The economic views of the MDC are themselves difficult to ascertain at various moments. But this is a matter for the people of Zimbabwe to resolve. Whether we like or dislike the MDC, or President Mugabe for that matter, holds second place to whether there is a political environment that advances genuine, grassroots democracy and debate in Zimbabwe. If that environment does not exist, then all of the revolutionary rhetoric in the world will not amount to a hill of beans on the scale of things.

The Zimbabwe political crisis threatens to go from bad to worse. A reenactment of the events in Kenya following their stolen election a few short months ago is not beyond imagination. The role of the African Union, and particularly Zimbabwe’s neighbors, becomes all the more important in attempting to resolve the crisis. Threats by Britain and the USA are not only counterproductive, but they are insulting since the administrations of neither country possesse the moral authority to actually entertain or offer a positive solution. But supporting the African Union would be a positive step.

There is something that I believe that African Americans can and should do, and in some respects it might represent an important chapter in our continuing relationship with Zimbabwe. This is a variation on a proposal I made once before. We should offer to assist the African Union in mediating the talks toward a peaceful resolution of the on-going crisis. Specifically, the Congressional Black Caucus should contact the African Union and offer to constitute a mediating team to work with the African Union. This should not be interference and should not be construed as interference, but it could be a genuine act of solidarity.

Within Black America, we have to be prepared to have more open and constructive debates without resorting to the “nuclear option.” I have seen a variant of this in the discussions surrounding the candidacy of Senator Obama. Someone voicing a reservation or concern, let alone a criticism, is open to being called everything but a child of God. This infantile approach to controversy WITHIN our community must end; indeed, it must not be tolerated. The stakes are far too high.

Let me apologize to some in advance: I cannot maintain silence for fear of upsetting an opponent. As I said, the stakes are too high.

*Bill Fletcher, Jr. is Executive Editor of The Black Commentator (www.blackcommentator.com) where this article first appeared. He is also a Senior Scholar with the Institute for Policy Studies and the immediate past president of TransAfrica Forum.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Kenyan Pundit

Kenyan Pundit identifies the key challenges facing Kenya’s coalition government whose creation has been received with “widespread cynicism, bewilderment, anger and disappointment”. Top on the list of challenges is the government’s lack of credibility:

“The fact that almost half of the 220 member Kenya National Assembly will be in government is astounding, especially if one takes into account the high falutin’ earnest pledges by the three leading presidential candidates in the 2007 elections-Kibaki, Raila and Kalonzo-on how they would all have lean, clean and efficient cabinets.

As one of the many Kenyans who were tear gassed recently for demanding a 24 member cabinet at Uhuru Park recently, I need not regurgitate what I think of the 42 member bloated cabinet.

Unfortunately, unless something dramatic happens over the next few days to reverse it, the reality of an obese (some say obscene) cabinet is a de facto reality.

The Grand Coalition thus has its work cut out for it when it comes to persuading Kenyans that it will somehow justify all those billions of tax payers’ shillings it is robbing from the meagre national coffers.”

In the News
http://www.inthenews.co.za/2008/04/16/under-the-spell-of-a-dark-lord/

In the News argues that President Thabo Mbeki’s increasingly controversial stance on the Zimbabwe crisis is damaging his legacy:

“President Mbeki has a ridiculous sense of loyalty to a man who has tarnished and will continue to tarnish his image and legacy for years to come. One can’t imagine what President Mbeki thought when he said there is no crisis in Zimbabwe when the whole of Africa is watching Zimbabwe. He failed to exercise wisdom and tact thus once again taking the attention away from Zimbabwe and putting it on himself.

President Mbeki has once again failed to take positive leadership on Zimbabwe and he looks like Mugabe’s subordinate. Time and time again President Mbeki looks to be an underling of the Mugabe, who continues to hold the Zimbabwean nation hostage. President Mbeki has tried to build a Kwame Nkrumah like Pan-African legacy but Mugabe has tainted this legacy. All the gains Mbeki made in Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi have been blown away by the never ending Mugabe Tsunami. President Mbeki has to save himself and his legacy and tell Mugabe like it is. Zimbabwe is dying because of Mugabe and his cronies. President Mbeki should not hide behind the culture of respecting elders. He should show Mugabe enough respect to tell him that his renegade government is affecting Southern Africa and not in a good way.”

African Unchained
http://africaunchained.blogspot.com/2008/04/burden-of-cfa.html

Africa Unchained cites an article about the negative effects of the CFA Franc on the economy of Francophone Africa:

“For every growth in France’s GDP, the euro appreciates against the Dollar, thus the CFA franc assumes too high an exchange rate. This puts the brakes on growth in the African economies that are also heavily dependent on commodities produced by Asia and South American countries that have much more flexible currencies. Put simply, a strong euro just kills CFA member economies as they experience declining export prices... A high fixed rate also kills economic growth in member countries, as it’s incompatible with productivity. The level of regional integration among member countries and the two central banks is remarkably low, even further undermining economic growth. Because the economies of Central African countries are heavily dependent on oil, and those of West Africa heavily dependent on other commodities, it is hard to argue for the long-term viability of the CFA unless of course you’re De Gaulle.”

Ndagha
http://ndagha.blogspot.com/2008/04/malawi-women-shun-internet-discussions.html

Ndagha posts an article which originally appeared in the Daily times which analyzes the (non)participation of women in Malawian internet forums:

“Apart from issues of content, some moderators believe that Malawian women cannot actively participate as Internet access is the domain of men only. One moderator claimed this reality “may be a reflection of the gender tilt in Malawi's education. It is biased towards men and this is reflected in mailing list membership.”
[…]
They alluded to “years of patriarchal influences” which Malawi and other countries the world over are known for.

These tendencies “in the Malawi context, may prevent women who could potentially participate in mailing lists with the same vigor, tenacity, boldness and intellect as men. These influences, may be embedded in their sub-conscious, have taught them to stay away from the public space,” argued Nyasanet moderators.”

The Imhotep blog

Scribbles form the Den posts an International Herald Tribune article on the recent political crisis in Cameroon which has led to fears that Cameroon may become another “failed state”:

“The international community could take steps to help prevent a crisis. Unfortunately, promises of preventive measures and "never again" rhetoric regarding Africa rarely translate into action on the ground. I fear that the international community will wait until it is too late to prevent a major conflict in Cameroon - and will then have to spend massive resources in response to a humanitarian crisis.

Today, many people are trying to leave the country. But most of Cameroon's neighboring countries are themselves collapsing states and cannot provide a safe haven.

Unless there is clear political reform that will allow citizens to finally enjoy basic civil liberties - including full freedom of expression, free elections and the rule of law - a crisis is inevitable.

Cameroon is another Central African country where time is running out.”

* Dibussi Tande, a writer and activist from Cameroon, produces the blog Scribbles from the Den

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org/

The AU Monitor and the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) invite research papers for the forthcoming publication “African Perspectives on Aid in Africa” to be published in September 2008. While Africa is the biggest recipient of aid globally, the terms, conditions and principles upon which aid is delivered are rarely defined by the people of Africa for whom, at least rhetorically, this aid is supposed to create positive change. Indeed, recent analysis from Third World Network, highlights the “effect of circumscribing national sovereignty and country autonomy over development policies” “contrary to the stated principles of country ownership and mutual accountability” of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In light of the September 2008 high-level meetings on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, Ghana, Fahamu and AFRODAD seek to publish a comprehensive volume on Aid in Africa from the diverse perspectives of African civil society, social commentators, policy makers, academics and citizens. The “African Perspectives on Aid in Africa” book will uniquely seek to explore the very premise and foundation upon which the concept of aid is based, the history and context of aid, how the emergence of new global powers such as Venezuela and China are redefining aid, related power dynamics and its relation to development, all from the perspectives of Africa. The deadline for submission is May 30, 2008. Please contact us via email at [email][email protected] and [email][email protected] with a one page abstract for your paper and for further information by April 25th, 2008.

In this week’s AU Monitor, we bring you news from the extraordinary summit of heads of state of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to discuss the “deepening tensions in neighbouring Zimbabwe”. The summit, which was attended by eight SADC heads of state, concluded that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) should announce the results as guided by the country’s laws and expressed support for the continued mediation of President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. However, both civil society and the opposition party have expressed disappointment at the outcome claiming that the summit almost endorsed the ZEC’s delay in announcing the election results, failed to denounce rising violence, the closure of the ZEC command centre and the ban on rallies or to pronounce on the failure of President Mugabe to attend the summit.

As Zimbabwe’s electoral crisis continues, Bronwen Manby analyses the Kenyan post-election crisis in light of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) report of 2006, noting that “had the problems the APRM report then highlighted been tackled, it is possible that the violence and distress of the 2008 crisis could have been avoided”. Indeed, the APRM eminent persons noted “the role of prominent members of the ruling party and high ranking government officials in fuelling the so-called ethnic clashes” with impunity and called for leadership which “recognises the need for dramatic change in a society” that “entails not simply directing change but managing it in a way that ensures broad ownership, legitimacy and self-directed sustenance and replication of change in all associated systems.” Highlighting areas of weakness of the APRM report and process that contribute to the lack of implementation of its decisions, the author notes that the report “does not identify the issues relating to the independence of the Electoral Commission of Kenya” but focuses rather on “the simple fact of holding elections”. Further, she stresses “the gap between the country review report and the programme of action”, the lack of monitoring on reporting related to implementation of the recommendations and the lack of sanctions for failure to act, concluding that without “integration into other national planning systems, debates and oversight mechanisms, the APRM process seems doomed to become little more than a cosmetic exercise without effect in the real world of policy and decision making”.

The Delhi Declaration, adopted at the end of the India-Africa summit, stresses the need for strengthened ties not only at the bilateral level but through India’s strengthened “partnership with the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities of Africa”. Notably, the declaration also urges “the international community to give real and immediate effect to commitments on climate change, especially in the areas of technology transfer, financing and capacity building. There is also need for a closer look at the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regime to ensure cost-effective transfer of appropriate and advanced clean technologies to developing countries.” The Declaration also stresses the importance of the development dimension of the Doha Round of trade negotiations at the World Trade Organisation and welcomes “the strengthened engagement, solidarity and cooperation among developing countries in that process”, while Peter Draper claims that “the Doha Round is likely to result in a host of opt-outs for the majority of African states, meaning they will benefit from free trade by being able to export goods more easily to developed countries, but will be protected to a degree from having to reciprocate by opening their markets in a way which would damage them”. The next Africa-India Summit will be held in 2011 in Africa. Meanwhile, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) council, will host the Europe Africa Business Summit on April 28-30, in Hamburg, Germany, “aimed at providing a critical assessment of the current state and future of the European African economic relationships.”

Also this week, representatives of African civil society organisations, regional economic communities, gender experts and policy makers convened to finalize the draft African Union Gender Policy aimed at accelerating “the execution of mandates of the AUC and its organs to promote the social, economic, political and cultural development for continental cooperation and integration”. The final draft of the policy will be submitted to another experts group meeting prior to the joint Economic Commission on Africa/AU Ministers of Gender Conference scheduled for June and will be submitted for adoption by heads of state and government during the June-July AU Summit in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt.

Finally, a stakeholder consultation was held last week by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission to improve intra-Community movement of citizens and reduce the harassment at the borders. Participants called for “the operationalisation and reinforcement of the pilot committees set up in eight Member States and meant to improve the circulation of citizens and stem their harassment at the borders”. Meanwhile in East Africa, civil society organisations concluded that “the African Court of Justice has failed to make an impact on human rights abuses on the continent, two years after its inception” at the close of a roundtable held in Arusha, Tanzania.

Among the complex questions in Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem's Pan-African Postcard WHAT KIND OF POLITICAL CHANGE? one has a clear answer [http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/panafrican/47413].

He asks: "Is it not clear that they (Zanu-pf & Mugabe) are preparing for the rerun while the opposition is shuttling between the court and diplomatic capitals? I am not quite sure if the MDC will achieve anything by choosing this course. Why can't they just go for the rerun and humiliate the Old man?"

Answer: Yes, it's clear. Zanu-pf, Mugabe and the military are preparing for a 're-run' because they are the only ones who know there will be
a re-run AFTER the recount. They have now had 2 weeks to doctor the ballot boxes to suit that purpose. The MDC wants the existing results from the

polling stations to be announced first so everyone will have confirmed what they know already which is that Tsvangirai won the Presidency.

The Reason the MDC don't want a run-off or a re-run is bcause: (a) they won and (b) brutal violence will be used by Mugabe and co. in their 'campaign' to 'win' the re-run. This is already happening. See reports of violent retribution of MDC voters in areas where Zanu-pf lost their previous stranglehold (Reports by Zimbabwe Peace Project, Zimbabwe Doctors for Human Rights, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights etc.)

Why do we need to constantly prove and re-prove to the world that Mugabe uses violence? Haven't we already seen it? Why do people defend him by denying it? Why do citizens have to be beaten into a pulp - again? On 29 March they peacefully used their civil right to chose their president. What gives Mugabe and the military the right to deny the people the results of that vote and demand a re-run?

As Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem's advisor Thomas Deve says:" the opposition may
be more vulnerable than everyone is predicting if there is a run off." That is: Vulnerable to being beaten with sticks and stones, bloodied and tortured,

hands broken so they cannot write the X on the ballot paper even if they dare to come out to vote! How many times do people have to vote before their voices are respected?

Change is hard to accept, but Pan-Africanists especially need to clear away old 'treasures' that have gone wrong, to see and acknowledge reality before too many more people have died.

Farai Kashiri

What would you do if you found out that a pyromaniac worked in the fire department in your town?  You would urge the fire department to fire him, right?

Well, what if you heard that a law professor had written a memo authorizing and, in a sense, advocating illegal torture by the Bush administration?  We assume the reaction would be the same.

Last week, I wrote to you about a shocking memo written by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel in 2003 advising the Pentagon that laws and treaties forbidding torture and other forms of abuse did not apply to U.S. interrogators because of the president's wartime power.

The man who wrote that memo -- John Yoo -- is now happily ensconced as a tenured law professor at the UC Berkeley School of Law.  While an unknown number of people suffer the aftereffects of illegal torture he encouraged, Professor Yoo is teaching, writing, and generally enjoying life in California.

This is flat out wrong.  John Yoo should not only be disqualified from ever serving in government again, but he should also be prohibited from spreading his distorted view of the law and the role of lawyers to young law students.

The National Lawyers Guild has called for his dismissal.  We are joining their call and hope you will, too.

Please take a moment and send a strongly worded (and pre-written) E-mail to Christopher Edley, Jr, Dean of the UC Berkeley School of Law, today, urging the dismissal of John Yoo.  Just click on the following link to get started:

After you have taken action, please forward this E-mail widely to friends, family, and colleagues. Together, we can rid John Yoo from the ranks of law professors in this country.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/364/47421mbeki.jpgIn this Pambazuka exclusive look at William Gumede's "Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC", we serialize in five parts Gumede's chapter on Mbeki and the controversies surrounding his AIDS policies. Be sure to look for parts two through five in the upcoming Pambazuka issues.

For too long we have closed our eyes as a nation, hoping the truth was not so real. For many years, we have allowed the HI virus to spread, and at a rate in our country which is one of the fastest in the world. – Thabo Mbeki, 9 October 1998

Now ... the poor on our continent will again carry a disproportionate burden of this scourge – would if anyone cared to ask their opinions, wish that the dispute about the primacy of politics or science be put on the backburner and that we proceed to address the needs and concerns of those suffering and dying. – Nelson Mandela, 13 July 2000

It is important that we recognise that we are facing a major crisis and that we want to invest as many resources as we did when we fought against apartheid. This is not a state of emergency but it is a national emergency. – Archbishop Desmond Tutu, 30 November 2001

As his international AIDS Advisory Council met for the first time, Thabo Mbeki mulled over the words of Irish poet Patrick Henry Pearse: ‘Is it folly or grace?’

Notwithstanding the conclusions of mainstream scientists almost a decade before, Mbeki set up the council to examine both the cause and most effective way of treating acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) in developing countries. His ‘folly’ in reopening the debate on what causes AIDS rather than focusing on practical ways to curb the pandemic sweeping Africa was roundly condemned. ‘Stop fiddling while Rome burns,’[1] chided Desmond Tutu, former Archbishop of Cape Town. But AIDS denial is not the exclusive province of presidents. Mbeki’s controversial health minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, enthusiastically prescribed an alternative therapy that sounded more like a salad dressing than treatment for a sexually transmitted disease that kills around 600 South Africans a day[2].

After years of foot-dragging and obfuscation, the South African government finally rolled out antiretroviral drugs that could save the lives of millions at state hospitals two weeks before voters went to the polls in April 2004.The long-awaited plan to distribute ARVs to an estimated 5 million people had been approved in November 2003, but due to what officials claimed were ‘capacity constraints’, patients had to wait another five months for the first drugs to reach them.

Few were surprised when AIDS activists questioned the government’s timing and motives. ‘Even though we welcome the roll-out plan, we have mixed feelings about whether the government reached a turning point because of elections, ’said Tembeka Majali of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), the country’s most vocal and visible AIDS activist group.

Before the limited public roll-out, fewer than 20000 South Africans were taking ARVs, as only those with expensive private medical insurance could afford them. Zackie Achmat, head of the TAC and the country’s best-known AIDS activist, only started taking ARVs towards the end of 2003 after refusing for years to avail himself of the life-giving drugs until the government agreed to offer treatment through the public health system.

Leading black gay activist Simon Nkoli,a close friend of Achmat, died in 1998 after contracting AIDS-related thrush. He was among the millions who could not afford the drugs, and at his funeral Achmat announced that he was launching a campaign to make ARVs available to poor South Africans.[3] He had learnt that a single dose of the generic version of fluconazole, used to treat thrush but not sold in South Africa because of international patent laws, cost just eighty cents.[4]

Government blamed lack of efficacy, potential toxicity and high costs for ARVs not being made available at state expense, but scientific evidence indicates that the drugs are highly effective against mother-to-child transmission of HIV and, at least in the short term, the benefits appear to outweigh the risks.

In Europe, North America and Brazil, ARVs have reduced mortality due to HIV/AIDS-related illnesses by between 50 and 80 per cent. In South Africa, two critical barriers remain to the widespread availability of these life-saving medicines and a possible nett saving on the health budget in the long run: lack of political will, and resistance on the part of patent holders to generic competition.

Pharmaceutical companies are protected by intellectual property rights policed by the World Trade Organisation from the manufacture or import of cheaper versions of their drugs. The corporate view is that high prices are necessary to recoup research and development costs.

However, generic anti-AIDS drugs are sold in India for a quarter of the price charged by the big pharmaceutical companies, and have the added advantage of Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC combining three drugs in a single pill that has to be taken twice a day. The Western ARV protocol requires patients to take up to twelve pills – all produced by different companies – a day, at different times, some with water, some without. Despite the obvious advantages of a simplified regimen, South Africa succumbed to pressure from the West and opted for the more expensive and complex therapy in its limited ARV roll-out.[5]

Private health care in South Africa makes up around 70 per cent of the total national budget, yet only about 7 million of the country’s 44 million citizens can afford private health insurance. The rest depend on government services. Until 1999, medical aid funds were allowed to cherry-pick their paying members, and typically accepted young, healthy, low-risk candidates.

The poor and unemployed were generally excluded due to the high premiums, and relied on the state for health care. An Act of Parliament put a stop to the rejection of certain candidates by insurance carriers, but most South Africans still cannot afford the astronomical costs of private care.

Drug costs are a significant factor in the national health budget. Only medication that is included on a list of essential drugs is available within the state system, and generics are encouraged where possible. When no generics exist, the health department buys in bulk from the pharmaceutical industry via a tender system. Drug companies have fiercely resisted parallel imports of cheaper generics, insisting that their patents be respected.

The social, economic and health consequences of AIDS for South Africa are devastating. Particularly harrowing has been the rise in the number of orphans and the emotional impact on millions of children who will grow up without parents. Not only are crime and social instability destined to follow in the wake of the pandemic, but current and future demands on the state coffers are astronomical. In alliance with COSATU, the SACP, churches and social organisations, the TAC has been at the forefront of attempts to shift government’s head-in-the-sand AIDS policies. The cabinet plan released in November 2003 promised that government would establish a network of centres for distribution of ARVs, beef up efforts to prevent transmission of the virus and increase support for families affected by HIV/AIDS.

The cost of offering treatment to all South Africans with AIDS by 2010 was estimated at between $2.4 billion and $3 billion a year. The cabinet cited the lower costs of ARVs as a major factor in the decision to go ahead with the roll-out, noting: ‘New developments pertaining to prices of drugs, the growing body of knowledge on this issue, wide appreciation of the role of nutrition and availability of budgetary resources [had] allowed government to make an enhanced response to AIDS.’[6]

But why had it taken so long to reach this point?

In the heady days following the unbanning of the ANC, little attention was given to AIDS. Although alarm bells were ringing, South Africa’s collective political focus was on the delicate and engrossing negotiations for a democratic dispen- sation. The apartheid regime had been deaf to calls for action, seeing AIDS largely as a disease that affected gays and blacks, constituencies the previous government was not particularly interested in, and was most prevalent among migrant workers from the southern African region.

AIDS was not high on the first democratic government’s ‘to-do’list either. The ANC alliance’s priority was trying to hold the fractured country together while getting to grips with governance, delivery and the economy. AIDS was one among many seemingly less urgent problems.

Given South Africa’s combustible social mix – a large migrant population, people displaced because of apartheid, the breakdown of traditional family bonds, a labour system that keeps men away from home for most of the year – it is hardly surprising that AIDS struck with such devastation. But when the full realisation sank in, there was first denial, then perplexity, and finally escapism, as confronting the situation became mired in foolish debate over what had caused the pandemic in the first place.

During his term of office, Nelson Mandela effectively ignored AIDS, avoiding the subject on the grounds that, in his culture, an elder did not publicly discuss sexual issues.[7] Since then, he has recognised the severity of the problem and become deeply involved in efforts to stop the spread of AIDS.

When Mandela assumed the presidency of the ANC in 1991, SACP general secretary Chris Hani and future health minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma were the ANC’s most vocal harbingers of a looming crisis.[8]As deputy president, Mbeki barely mentioned AIDS, except for allusions in a couple of speeches to the disease being as great a threat as poverty in the new South Africa.

In fact, the AIDS time bomb threatened to decimate the world’s youngest democracy unless vast resources were made available to defuse it, but the initial response of the ruling elite was ‘this isn’t happening to us ... it cannot be as bad as people say’.[9]

But it was.

The ANC in exile had held a number of meetings on HIV/AIDS, and the first paper on the disease published in South Africa in 1985 forecast that it would remain largely confined to male homosexuals, as had been the case in America and Europe up to that time. In the same year, the government appointed an AIDS advisory group, followed six years later by a network of training, information and counselling centres.

In 1992, the ANC’s health secretariat, the government, non-governmental organisations, AIDS service organisations, representatives from business, trade unions and churches, and a diverse group of concerned individuals set up the National AIDS Coordinating Committee of South Africa (NACOSA). In the spirit of the CODESA talks, it was instructed to reach consensus on a national AIDS strategy for the new South Africa.

Their plan, adopted in July 1994,recommended the pooling of large amounts of money from government and donor organisations for expenditure on countrywide education and prevention programmes.

First, however, an AIDS infrastructure had to be established. The centrepiece was a special directorate in the department of health, and the government also appointed a ministerial AIDS task team, headed by Mbeki. Awareness campaigns and support for an HIV vaccine initiative followed.

By early 1996,it became apparent that the plan was full of holes. Much of the intended funding was diverted by the Treasury to more pressing needs, while money that was allocated to the health department remained unspent as the AIDS plan was buried by competing priorities in a health system in transition. Many of the AIDS policy targets were never attained.

Public controversy followed revelations that a hefty chunk of the AIDS budget – R14.27 million – had been spent on Sarafina II.The musical production by acclaimed playwright Mbongeni Ngema was designed to raise AIDS awareness among African youth,but the critics panned it as an ineffective and costly failure in terms of relaying the anti-AIDS message. Worse, it emerged that normal tendering procedures had been bypassed in awarding Ngema the funds, and the production was scrapped in midstream.

The resulting scandal strained the bond between government and AIDS activists. Opposition parties, the media and many NGOs unleashed a barrage of attacks on the health minister, who withdrew into a defensive shell. Government and Ngema claimed the criticisms were anti-government, anti-black and racially inspired,and on the eve ofWorld AIDS Day in 1996,activists and health workers denounced the entire National AIDS Plan as a shambles, greatly angering both Dlamini-Zuma and Mbeki.

The furore erupted just as the gloss of freedom was starting to give way to grassroots anger over non-delivery and thwarted expectations. Acutely sensitive to criticism, especially when it emanated from the ANC camp, political home to most of the AIDS activists, the government lashed out in anger. At the party’s national conference that year, President Mandela railed against NGOs that stood in judgement of government.

The dust had hardly settled when a new AIDS scandal broke out.

*William Gumede is the author of Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC - Published by Zed Books (http://zedbooks.co.uk).

* This article is the first part of a chapter in the second edition and is published with the kind permission of the author. His latest book, "The Democracy Gap - Africa's Wasted Years", will be published later this year.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

It’s been more than two weeks since Zimbabweans went to the polls to elect a legislature and President. But instead of the outcome of the elections, Zimbabwe’s ruling ZANU-PF party led by President Robert Mugabe has delivered harsh crackdowns and stonewalling to the electorate.

Defeat can be hard to accept, “but at the very least, the people of Zimbabwe have the right to know the result of their vote,” says the Executive Director of ARTICLE19, Dr. Agnes Callamard. The government of Zimbabwe is obligated under the International law “to conduct an election and to let the people know those they’ve chosen to lead them.”

ARTICLE 19 urges Zimbabwe’s government to heed the calls of Zimbabweans, the 2008 first extra-ordinary SADC summit of Heads of State and Government, and the international community “to comply with the rule of law and SADC Principles and Guidelines governing democratic elections.”

It is in the interest of Zimbabwe and the southern African region that President Mugabe adheres to electoral procedures as set out in Zimbabwe’s electoral law and release the result of the election immediately. “In the event that a run-off is needed, that must also be conducted according to accepted norms and standards.” ARTICLE19 strongly urges Zimbabwean authorities to back away from chaos and violence and move towards reason and the rule of law in settling the outcome of this election.

*ARTICLE 19 is an independent human rights organisation that works globally to protect and promote the right to freedom of expression. It takes its name from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees free speech.

ARTICLE 19 (www.article19.org) is an international human rights organisation which defends and promotes freedom of expression and freedom of information all over the world. It takes its name from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Zimbabwe remains a sensitive issue, that has been allowed to fester to almost unredeemable proportions. But it is the people of Zimbabwe who must stand up and be counted. Yes, they need support from all of us in Africa and the world, but they must know that they have the power to decide how they want their country to move forward.

It is clear that the outgoing ruling elite of Zanu-PF is not willing to let go of power. The irony of the situation in Zimbabwe is that you hear of only one man, who runs the show there! Who are the side-kicks? Who are the pretenders to the throne? Does that mean there is no other potential leader to take over, as in all cases it is Mugabe being put forward? Does he ever consult or get any second opinion from party members? Is there space for such opinion or advice?

My opinion is that Mugabe has become a liability for Zanu-PF, hence people like Simba Makoni and others decided to jump ship, though very late! But it is disappointing that in Africa, leaders are doing what is not in the interest of their people! They don't seem to take advice kindly if they get it at all!

Why are both the AU and SADC silent when such clear electoral transgressions as happened in Kenya and Zimbabwe take place? Is this the closing of ranks among the elite? President Mbeki said "the situation in Zimbabwe is manageable", really so? How do you prepare for a run-off when the results are unknown, have not been released? Shouldn't a run-off take only after a tie? Who is fooling who here?

Africa stand up, clean up your act!

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/362/47411mbeki.jpgAzad Essa speaks to Grace Kwinjeh, Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum on South Africa, foreign aid, the MDC and the role of the Zimbabwean diaspora in bringing about change, amongst other things

GRACE KWINJEH: The Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum (ZDF) was launched in 2005 to bring together a plethora of Zimbabweans civil society organizations and individuals. It is platform to initiate dialogue, network and build a community of Zimbabweans abroad committed to lobbying for a new democratic Zimbabwe. While the world waits with bated breath too witness how Robert Mugabe deals with a new expected MDC victory, Zimbabweans in exile just cannot wait to get back home.

AZAD ESSA: Tell us more about the ZDF?

GRACE KWINJEH: We are 3 million Zimbabweans in exile. This forum was launched in December 2007, with the view to unite the diaspora, to create dialogue and networking. We also deal with specific issues to do with health, issues of access and education of children in the diaspora. We are essentially a platform that brings together a diverse group of Zimbabweans in exile, and these include professionals working abroad to organizations on the grassroots level.

AZAD ESSA: So much is said to rest on the outcome of these elections. Why so?

GRACE KWINJEH: For many of us, we want to go home. We want to reconnect with our family. As long as there is political conflict, we cannot return. The elections are crucial, and with indications there might be a regime change, if so, and if this is handled well, we will be home sooner than later.

AZAD ESSA: If Mugabe has indeed lost the elections - does he have the muscle and support to continue ruling Zimbabwe?

GRACE KWINJEH: It depends, if he concedes that he has lost the elections, then he cannot do much. However, if he does not concede, then we have a problem. The balance of power lies with the security forces and the side they end up supporting will largely determine the outcome. There is a lot of anxiety and speculation in this regard.

AZAD ESSA: It is reported that even his closest allies are advising Mugabe to quit - what is he hoping to achieve with delaying the results?

GRACE KWINJEH: We are all wondering! He is even printing too much money. In fact, economically, I don't see him holding the country for even a month more. There is no capacity for a run-off. This was the opportunity to lay the platform for a proper framework, involving democratic reform and reconstruction of the economy.

AZAD ESSA: But if Mugabe stepped down in respect of the outcome: Wouldn't this be ironic?

GRACE KWINJEH: Yes it would be. The chances that he steps down without charges against him for his acts of brutality during certain parts of this tenure as President is quite slim. But the opposition party has been careful not to suggest that he will be charged, but this does not stop an individual to charge him, especially through using international legal instruments.

AZAD ESSA: What does this reaction tell you about Mugabe's pre-election expectations?

GRACE KWINJEH: He insisted he wanted it now. You will recall that the MDC wanted it in June, but it is clear he underestimated how unpopular he had become in his own party. He was unprepared and misread the political climate. If he unleashes violence, he will be condemned by SADC and the international community. He has no option but to exit gracefully.

AZAD ESSA: What would an MDC victory mean for Zimbabwe?

GRACE KWINJEH: Firstly, a breath of fresh air. Secondly, Zimbabwe will become part of the community of nations once more. Thirdly, much needed AID and assistance would return. And lastly, it would mean that Zimbabwe would be run by a new government with a lot of repair work. The people of Zimbabwe will have expectations, for we will be looking at a government emerging out of the social liberation movement - with an understanding of the multifaceted crisis at hand - the people will want results immediately. This is going to be very difficult.

AZAD ESSA: So much talk about aid - and the role of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank - plans that Robert Mugabe rejected a number of times, for a number of reasons including the conditions of such economic assistance. Working under the tutelage of the IMF and World Bank - is this the way forward?

GRACE KWINJEH: This is one the challenges that Tsvangerai and the MDC faces. The MDC emerged from the union movement, and so how it balances its ideological stance with the literally the desperate need for economic aid - and we cannot deny aid - is what is going to be very tricky. We need aid; there is not question about this. But to secure aid immediately while considering the sustainable economic advancement of all of Zimbabwe will be a very difficult path to follow. We are surrounded by nations that have assumed political change but with economies that have not reduced economic inequality. Kenya and Zambia are prime examples, and of course so is South Africa. How they find a balance, a very tricky balance to negotiate.

AZAD ESSA: President Thabo Mbeki's stance of not interfering just yet - is this the right approach?

GRACE KWINJEH: It is not. Things are deteriorating fast and he must reconsider. He must reconsider a more robust approach. The war veterans are said to be intimidating in certain areas. To what extent this will continue, is unknown.

AZAD ESSA: But the South African government has been ambiguous in its approach to the Mugabe regime, and that is putting it quite mildly. How do you see their role now?

GRACE KWINJEH: South Africa must play a role in resolving the election crisis. They don't benefit from an influx of Zimbabweans and we want to go home. The South African government issued a statement that the will of the people must be respected. How big and how robust a commitment this implies is yet to be tested. Looking forward with regards to the MDC assuming power and political shifts in South Africa - especially post-Polokwane - a more trade union backed ANC has come to the fore. Given the COSATU-MDC link, and the political focus (in South Africa) somewhat shifting, we are looking forward to a good partnership between a potential new government and the ANC

AZAD ESSA: So we wait for the courts to decide?

GRACE KWINJEH: Well for the MDC - yes. But on the Zanu PF side, there is all this talk of recounting votes and all that. To sum up, it is a total mess. Yet, we are optimistic that Zimbabwe, as indicated by the people, are geared for change, but we know it is going to be a very hard transition.

AZAD ESSA: Finally, you mentioned a few times that the diaspora wants to return home. What do you see as the role of the diaspora in this process?

GRACE KWINJEH: The diaspora is crucial. But before we return home, we will have to know that we have some sort of security there. Will we have jobs to support our families? Poverty drove many out?we have had qualified teachers who have swept in South Africa, and who would rather do that than suffer in Zimbabwe. We do not want to pre-empt these things, but we have started discussions - to start programs to get the diaspora back home - not unlike those that took place when Zimbabwe found independence in 1980 and what happened after the fall of Apartheid in South Africa. The challenge is indeed to get people back and into the reconstruction process.

*Azad Essa is a researcher & journalist at the IOLS-Research Unit, UKZN.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

The Young Communist League of South Africa [YCLSA] had sent its delegation to Zimbabwe as observers in the recently held elections. The purpose of the mission was to make our own observation independent of various observer missions.

The delegation was led by the Deputy National Secretary, Cde. Khayelihle Nkwanyana, and comprised of 12 members of the YCLSA drawn from district, provincial and National Committees. The delegation was based in the three main regions of Zimbabwe, which are Bulawayo, Harare and the Midlands.

INTIMIDATION OF THE DELEGATION

It should be noted that the delegation observed constatnt surveillance from the Central Intelligence Officers, which led to three members of the delegation returning to South Africa before they were due. In the same vein, one members of then delegation who was based in Bulawayo was interogated by the CIO. This shows the level of intimidation that is still prevalent in Zimbabwe.

We are however pleased that the Zimbabwe government allowed our delegation to enter and leave the country without any major intereference of the mission.

We engaged various formations and structures that are active in Zimbabwe. Amongst those were our interactions with civil society organizations, the attendance of political rallies of the contesting parties. We engaged with the Youth structures such as the NYDT, student formation ZINASU and individual candidates contesting in constituencies for Parliament and Local government from all the political parties.

ABSENT CONDITIONS FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS

Our observation as the YCL is that conditions towards elections were not conducive to be regarded as "free and fair elections" because of the following factors:

1. The State controlled media (the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and the paper – Herald) were openly campaigning for the incumbent President, vilifying the contesting opponents and giving more TV airtime and paper spaces to the ZANU-PF.

2. No voter education done given that these elections were harmonized for the first time with Presidential, Senate, Parliament and Local government level.

3. Voters roll was not given to the opposition, this underpinned the court challenge against the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and dead people in the voters roll.

4. Delimitation of constituencies in favour of the ruling party.

5. Polling station where there was no people residing in the area.

6. The Army generals who threaten Zimbabweans that they will not support any Head of State except Mugabe.

7. Zimbabwe Electoral Commission is ran by senior leaders of the Zanu PF.

The current electoral results which are displayed outside the various polling stations shows that the MDC has won this current electoral process in all the four categories. The remaining result for the Presidential contest is reported to be in favour of Morgan Tswangirai. There is fear of rigging the Presidential leg, thus the delay of the announcement of the results.

As the YCL we are calling for the ZANU PF and the current President of Zimbabwe to accept the will of the people. He must accept the outcomes without any attempt of rigging.

(The actual parliamentary votes as tabulated by the opposition has MDC-Tsvangirai at 14, Zanu at 2 and MDC-Mutambara at 1. See

INTERVENTION BY SADC, AFRICAN UNION AND UNITED NATIONS ON THE POST ELECTIONS' PROCESS

We are calling, once more, the SADC and AU to immediately deploy the peace keeping mission in Zimbabwe to avoid any instability that might be generated by the electoral outcomes. There is fear for the Kenyan situation if Mugabe force his way back. And there is fear about the Army and police staging a coup if the opposition takes the Presidency.

In this regard, we call for the immediate deployment of SADC and United Nations Peace Keeping forces so as to avert any attempt towards sinking Zimbabwe further into violence.

This should serve as a post elections process undertaken by all the parties involved in the elections and all the countries in the region.

**Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/362/47406camera.jpgAs the baton of violence heads over to Zimabwe, Bronwen Manby looks at the African Peer Review Mechanism in relation to Kenya, its shortcomings such as lack of follow-up and political teeth and the urgent lessons from its engagement with Kenya

"There is a need for a healing of the nation. The process of national healing and reconciliation is unlikely to proceed as long as society is still polarized. In addition, without also addressing past crimes, corruption, marginalization and poverty, it is unlikely that reconciliation can be achieved."

This is not a quote from a report on the recent election violence in Kenya, but from the country review report of the African Peer Review Mechanism, presented two years ago by the APRM panel of eminent persons to African heads of state and defended by President Mwai Kibaki himself on the margins of the July 2006 African Union summit.

The report went on to consider previous violence in Kenya, making observations that are just as valid today as when its writers made them. The APRM eminent persons noted ‘the role of prominent members of the ruling party and high ranking government officials in fuelling the so-called ethnic clashes’. They complained that many of the people involved ‘have neither been investigated nor prosecuted. Some have continued to serve as senior officers, ministers, or members of parliament. The inability to act [against them] tends to underline general public perception of impunity, while at the same time constricting the ability of people to come to terms with the past experiences of injustice and violence thus further aggravating and reinforcing polarities and suspicion.’

All in all, the APRM country review report made a remarkably frank assessment of Kenya’s problems. The report did not shy away from highlighting issues of corruption, especially in land allocation, nor from the ethnic tensions that have been so horribly demonstrated in recent weeks. It identified ‘overarching issues’ that Kenya would need to address, starting with ‘managing diversity in nation building’, and going on to filling the ‘implementation gap’ between policy and action on the ground; addressing poverty and wealth distribution; land reform; action against corruption; constitutional reform; and addressing gender inequality and youth unemployment.

Finally and notably, the report called for ‘transformational leadership’ – leadership that ‘recognizes the need for dramatic change in a society’ and that ‘entails not simply directing change but managing it in a way that ensures broad ownership, legitimacy and self-directed sustenance and replication of change in all associated systems.’

Thus, just two years ago, Kenya was being lauded as one of the first countries in Africa to complete the process of examination by the APRM, while the resulting report provided a hard-hitting analysis of the challenges the country faced and made some important recommendations on the way forward. The country’s decision to sign up for the APRM was supposed to be an indication of commitment to good governance and respect for the principles of democracy and human rights. Had the problems the APRM report then highlighted been tackled, it is possible that the violence and distress of the 2008 crisis could have been avoided. And yet nothing was done. What went wrong?

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/362/47406map.jpgThe Kenyan APRM report does have some weaknesses. Most importantly, it does not identify the issues relating to the independence of the Electoral Commission of Kenya that were so critical on election day and in the following period. This in turn reflects a weakness in the APRM questionnaire that guides the reviews, which does not focus on electoral management and its independence, but rather the simple fact of holding elections.

A much greater weakness lies in the gap between the country review report and the programme of action which is supposed to set out concrete, costed actions that will address the problems identified in the report.

For example, the review report decries the lack of independence of the judiciary, and especially the vulnerability to executive influence of the process for nomination and appointment of judges. The eminent persons noted that during their visits to Kenya, they had received reports of incidents in which prominent government officials either disobeyed court orders or expressed an intention to disobey them. They state forthrightly that, ‘The Chief Justice being an appointee of the President is not trusted to be able to take an independent decision’ – the very reason why Raila Odinga and his ODM party rejected the insistence by the incumbent PNU that any challenges to the election results should take place in court.

Yet the programme of action talks only of ‘enforcement of judicial reforms and existing administrative measures to ensure members of the bench improve efficiency, accountability and monitoring of judicial functions’. There is no mention of steps to end executive interference and ensure respect for the rule of law.

In other areas too, the programme of action shies away from the difficult political issues, focusing rather on capacity building and resource mobilisation; matters to which even President Kibaki could happily agree – and in many cases had already done so as part of ongoing donor-financed reforms.

But the biggest concern is the issue of political will. Was the Kenyan government ready to try to fix what was broken? Were the APRM eminent persons and secretariat willing to hold them to account? And were other African heads of state who had signed up for the APRM process – to whom the APRM eminent persons and secretariat report – ready to urge remedies for poor performance, or would their own glass houses discourage the throwing of stones?

A journalist and member of Kenya’s national NEPAD secretariat was present at the APR Forum (the meeting of all the heads of state who have signed up for the APRM) when it met to review the Kenya report. His account gives us a clue as to what the ‘peer review’ element of the APRM really means:

"I counted the number of leaders who spoke after President Kibaki had responded to Dr Machel. They were from Ghana, Ethiopia, South Africa, Rwanda and Nigeria. Not one posed a question to Mr Kibaki. They all praised the report and commended Kenya for being candid, thorough and open. They pledged to support Kenya in seeking solutions to its constitution review and diversity problems.

When it was all over, presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia expressed relief and promised to go on with the process, after realising that it was not a life-and-death situation."

Thus, though Kibaki was said to be ‘committed to addressing all the issues, among them tribalism, poor corporate management and corruption, which were raised’ by the APRM report, he need not expect too critical a review from the other heads of state on his follow-up in practice.

Although each country that has undergone the APRM process is supposed to report back to the APR Forum on its progress, there is no serious monitoring exercise of how effectively this is done. Nor any sanctions for failure to act. Nor, apparently, is there any real system to ensure that the commitments the government makes address the most important problems highlighted in the APRM review. Certainly, no individual or institution at the African level, least of all the APR Forum, raised the implementation of the APRM commitments as critical issues during the recent Kenyan crisis – or, perhaps more importantly, during the lead up to the election, when such a focus could perhaps have averted the near-catastrophe into which Kenya was drawn.

At national level, meanwhile, the implementation of the APRM programme of action is also left entirely to the executive, with no formalised role for parliamentarians or civil society to hold the government’s feet to the fire should it fail to perform. As in other countries, the APRM process has not been well-integrated into other national development planning processes – a problem recognised by the APRM secretariat in South Africa – and it does not appear to have informed other important reform programmes under way at the same time.

Moreover, the systems in place to monitor the implementation of other national policies (however imperfect) are also not mobilised to engage with the implementation of the APRM programme of action. President Kibaki did not report back to parliament on the APR Forum meeting and on the actions he had committed to take, nor was the report tabled for debate. Though there was some coverage in the media of the APR Forum discussion of Kenya, it did not generate a real national debate on the report and programme of action and their implications. The conclusions and recommendations were not widely disseminated throughout the country by the NEPAD-Kenya secretariat or other means. Although a meeting hosted by the NEPAD-Kenya secretariat in mid-February 2008 aimed – encouragingly – to involve civil society in the process of preparing the country’s progress report to the next APR Forum, the report of the meeting is surreal in its lack of any suggestion that this review might be relevant to, or affected by, the national political crisis.

Even the continental APRM secretariat failed to engage in any serious way with national institutions, such as the Electoral Commission of Kenya or the Kenya National Human Rights Commission, in order to brief them on the conclusions relevant to them and the follow-up role they might play.

Without this sort of integration into other national planning systems, debates and oversight mechanisms, the APRM process seems doomed to become little more than a cosmetic exercise without effect in the real world of policy and decision making.

There is no demand from civil society in Kenya or elsewhere for the APRM to issue condemnations of countries’ performance on governance or to ‘take action’ on the behaviour of recalcitrant governments (as some international commentators have suggested—for example, in the case of Zimbabwe): the APRM is not a human rights monitoring body, but rather a tool for mutual learning, and there are other AU institutions that are more appropriate for the more obviously critical and political role. Nevertheless, civil society groups do feel strongly that while peer review by fellow heads of state is all very well, it should be backed up by a greater effort by the APRM Secretariat or other independent groups to monitor performance of governments against the programmes of action to which they have signed up. The Pan-African Parliament could also be brought in to play this role.

‘National ownership’ – which everyone agrees is critical for the success of the APRM project – should not be interpreted to mean that the only actions agreed are those that ruffle no feathers and disturb no vested interests. And whatever actions are undertaken should be subject to monitoring and enforcement by institutions that are independent of executive control – at both continental and country levels, by national parliaments, constitutional oversight bodies and civil society coalitions.

There are now 29 countries that have acceded to the APRM – Mauritania being the most recent, after signing the APRM memorandum of understanding at the January 2008 AU summit. To date, the process has exceeded the expectations of many observers. The eminent persons appointed when the APRM was established have, by and large, done a good job in establishing its credentials: many civil society activists were taken aback that the level of criticism directed at Kenya could have emerged from the APRM process.

But lessons should be learned as the mechanism takes on its next countries. The APRM process needs a stronger connection to three critical constituencies: to the citizen in whose name it is being undertaken (through outreach by government, media and civil society); to the political class (through policy planning processes, parliament and political parties) and to the wider African and international community (through African continental institutions as well as the structures through which development assistance is channelled).

The new members of the APRM panel due to be appointed in 2008 will have to take on board the lessons learned so far – and be strong enough to resist the pressure placed on them to conform to executive wishes. The heads of state themselves should have the courage to stick to their original commitment that the process be independent and effective, as they select the next members and agree the budget for the secretariat.

For Kenya, meanwhile, the 2006 conclusion of the APRM report remains relevant today:

"From all indications, it is obvious that the challenge in Kenya is beyond the mere adoption of a new constitution. The challenge remains that of resolving the following contentious issues: the nature and character of executive powers, devolution of power, constitutional provisions for religious courts, and the mode of transition to the new constitution. These issues, among others, cannot be resolved by simple technicalities or constitutional legalese, but will require a modicum of political sagacity to evolve necessary political solutions. Current prognosis suggests that a carefully managed mediatory and conciliatory intervention under the aegis of the African Union may prove crucial in facilitating the much needed political compromise and solution in resolving these issues and minimise loss of face by the different power centres and factions. The sustainability of the proposed outcome will be hinged on the ability to devise a win-win formula while simultaneously responding to the collective aspirations of a highly divided society."

The important and serious effort that went into producing these recommendations must not go to waste. If the official oversight institutions are neglecting to ensure that they are implemented, then civil society organisations must step into their place.

*Bronwen Manby is a Senior Programme Adviser - AfriMAP at the Open Society Institute. For more analysis of the APRM process in Kenya and elsewhere see

**Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/362/47404flag.jpgWe the under-signed Zimbabwean women, in our capacity as THE FEMINIST POLITICAL EDUCATION PROJECT (FePEP), urgently call for an end to the political impasse that our country is in. Over a week after we voted in the harmonized elections, we note with great dismay that the results of the Presidential elections are yet to be released. The country is in limbo. Violence, poverty, HIV & AIDS and deterioration of social services continue to disproportionately affect women and girls. We voted on the 29th of March for our representatives in Parliament and for a Head of State in the hope that collectively they can address these problems. As citizens we demand to know and see the fruits of our vote, which would affirm our rights to participate in politics.

We call for the immediate release of the presidential election results. But regardless of who wins this elections among the four presidential candidates, it is our view that the country is too politically polarized to move on. Whoever becomes our next President has the Herculean task of bringing all sides together to think nationally, and in the best interests of all Zimbabwean citizens, not just their own party, or personal self interest. We believe that neither Mr Robert Mugabe nor Mr Morgan Tsvangirai is trusted enough by everyone to foster unity and national coherence that will be required to move forward. We strongly believe that this is what is at the heart of the present impasse. Equally we do not believe that a run-off will be in our best interests as women. We are too familiar with the violence that was meted upon numerous of us from 1890 when the colonialists came into our country right up to the most recent elections. Chief among these forms of violence is sexual violence, and it concomitant implication, HIV infection. Zimbabwean women now have the lowest life expectancy world wide because of HIV & AIDS, 34 years. We can not afford yet another pointless violent election that will slice more years off our lives.

We boldly suggest that all political parties and players in Zimbabwe come together in a national Transitional Authority, (TA). The TA should be headed by a person who can be trusted by both ZANU PF and the MDC formations. She or he must not be the leader of a registered political party. The TA will be composed of up to 15 members, ensuring geographic, ethnic, and gender balance. We believe that such an interim authority will provide a moderating voice and can pave the way for a government of national unity that can steer Zimbabwe to a more democratic dispensation, guided by a new constitution.

We therefore call upon the Southern African Development Community, supported by the African Union, and the United Nations, to bring all the parties in Zimbabwe together to discuss a move towards this interim arrangement. In this regard the South African President Mr Thabo Mbeki should continue his mediation role. It is our contention that the people of Zimbabwe are so deeply polarized yet again and can not possibly negotiate on their own.

Our position as FePEP reflects and amplifies the voices of so many women, who are tired of seeing their country torn apart by selfish male egos, the quest for unbridled power, and total disregard for citizens’ rights.

Signed,
Teresa Mugadzam, Isabella Matambanadzo, Thoko Matshe, Everjoice Win, Shereen Essof, Juliana Manjengwa, Karin Alexander, Janah Ncube, Priscllah, Misihairabwi-Mushonga Revai Makanje

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