African experts should carefully examine why the continent has failed to implement numerous international agreements to which it is signatory to, before charting a way forward on the continent's development, according to Ato Mekonnnen Manyazewal, the minister of state for finance and economic development of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

The government of Zimbabwe has been condemned for barring leading international news media from covering the next weekend's general elections. Zimbabwe's act is not in tandem with international conventions it had signed, guaranteeing "total access to national and international media." The Paris-based Reporters sans frontiers the government's act forms part of its designed authoritarian measures and irregularities.

In collaboration with both its European andZimbabwean partners, Zimbabwe Watch organised a roundtable titled“Elections and Post-Elections period in Zimbabwe: What to do after 29 March2008 - Views from Civil Society and Dialogue with the European Union” on 13 March 2008 in Brussels. The roundtable brought together civil society activists from Zimbabwe, officials of the European Union (EU) institutions and variousEuropean and international interest groups. These are the recommendations from the round-table.

1. The conditions for the elections are such that they will not be free nor fair and therefore cannot be called a legitimate expression of the will of the people. The African Union (AU) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) should be encouraged to make objective assessments of the conditions and the process based on the SADC Guidelines on Free and Fair Elections. The European Union (EU) should welcome such assessments that recognise the unfree and unfair environment. If the AU and SADC fail to recognise this, the EU needs to voice a very clear position on the the unfree and unfair nature of the elections and condemn these partial assessment. The international community must exert pressure on the Zimbabwean government to restore the rule of law.

2. The delegation of the European Commission in Harare will produce a report on the election process and outcomes. The EU Commission needs to consult relevant Zimbabwean and European civil society organisations and include their inputs in this report as well as in the EU’s common position on the elections. This report and the EU conclusions will should refer explicitly to the SADC Guidelines for free and fair elections and look at the longer term election environment which can already be considered as not conducive for free and fair elections.

3. After the elections, a new fully inclusive AU led mediation process that leads to a transitional process need to take place. This mediation must include not only the political parties but also Zimbabwean Civil Society and take place in an open, transparent and accountable process. Such a process should be actively supported by the EU.

4. SADC proposed and started discussing an economic recovery plan for Zimbabwe in 2007 but they will need the support of the international community to implement this plan. The EU should work together with SADC (and with the broader international community) through its regional assistance programme on a broad economic, political and social recovery plan. This process must be strongly inclusive of Zimbabwean Civil Society (including Trade Union). Any recovery plan must reflect the demands and needs of Zimbabwean Civil Society while having good governance and human rights as key concepts.

5. For such a recovery plan to be devised initial audits of all the relevant sectors (such as education, health, land, etc – not only the economy) needs to be undertaken. For example proper accounting of the education sector is required and support to local research institutions and universities is needed. In addition a comprehensive census, including of Zimbabweans outside the country, is needed for planning the recovery. Such a recovery plan needs sustainable planning and clear commitments from the EU for at least the next ten years.

6. The new Africa strategy emphasises common principles on human rights and governance, the role of civil society and regional approaches – the EU should together with SADC develop regional programs on governance, human rights and crisis prevention in which Zimbabwe can be addressed. Europe must develop and maintain a consistent position on Zimbabwe which also responds to the needs and demands of the Zimbabwean Civil Society. The EU must look at all the policy and financial instruments it has at its disposal (such as the Cotonou agreement, the EU-Africa strategy, human rights, peace and security and crisis prevention instruments) to engage SADC and AU partners on Zimbabwe in a principled manner. It must consider Zimbabwe as a military crisis and bring SADC and the AU to look at it in this way e.g. by having SADC excluding Zimbabwe from joint military operations. The EU must investigate if they support regional military training which includes Zimbabwe and pressure for their exclusion from such programs.

7. The European Commission has produced a draft Country Strategy Paper (CSP) in negotiation with the current Zimbabwean government for the spending of the 10th EDF. It plans to adopt it as soon as the political situation allows it. This is not the way to go. The EU has stopped bilateral aid because the current government is not following good governance rules and is not accountable. The EU therefore needs to re-open the negotiation of the CSP with an eventual new (transitional) government and negotiate the key sectors with them and Non-State actors in a very inclusive, transparent and accountable manner. This must apply for any assistance to any new (transitional) government.

8. The influence of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) should be fostered in Zimbabwe, so that labour standards are observed and upheld and serious abuses stopped. Zimbabwe should be answerable to the ILO.

9. The International community should now start to plan for and deploy assistance programmes for the coming transition phase including recovery policy development plans by Zimbabwean Civil Society. Planning the transition is campaigning for it! In the event of significant power shifts leading to a transitional government and policy changes, swift support for the reconstruction of institutions, especially the justice, police, banking and education sector must be available.

10. Continued support to civil society organisations as providers of checks and balances for the human rights situation is needed. Protection of human rights defenders (HRDs), especially in the case of escalating post-election violence and security/military clampdowns needs to be prioritised and the EU and member states must find urgent ways to provide necessary support. Adequate actions need to be devised in accordance with the demands from HRD’s themselves, the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders and the Handbook linked to them provide examples of such actions including observation of demonstrations and trials, visits in prison or hospital, staying in touch with the HRD’s and providing safe houses.

11. The EU must support the strengthening of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council and making the AU Peace and Security instruments more effective and operational, using Zimbabwe as a test case. The full implementation of the African Charter of Peoples and Human Rights, which Zimbabwe signed, must be demanded. In view of the military nature of Mugabe’s regime, no Zimbabwean participation in international peace and military interventions, in the context of the UN or the African Union, must be allowed.

12. Silence of the United Nations Human Rights Council to post-election violence would not be acceptable; it must then come up with a clear resolution. The Mugabe government must be pressurised particularly by African countries to extend an open invitation to all UN human rights special rapporteurs (such as the one on torture) to the country. The EU must work with African partners to ensure such steps. The EU must also continue the monitoring of the human rights violations on the ground and engage the AU and African countries to implement the resolutions coming out of the Afican Commission on Human and People’s Rights condemning the human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. Finally, in the event of escalating post-election violence, Zimbabwe needs to be referred to the UN Security Council.

Comoros demanded on Thursday that France hand over a rebel leader wanted by the Indian Ocean archipelago for crimes against humanity and troops fired teargas to stop protests against the former colonial power. Mohamed Bacar, the 45-year-old self-declared leader of Anjouan island, fled to nearby French-run Mayotte during a lightning offensive by African Union and Comorian forces. The French government said he has asked for political asylum

Both the ruling Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM ) have contacted the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan with a view of recalling him back to the country after both parties failed to agree on the composition of a lean grant coalition cabinet.

The committee that monitors last year’s political agreement in Côte d'Ivoire has accepted conditions for certifying the validity of upcoming elections which had been proposed by the United Nations’ top envoy to the divided West African country. The so-called five-criteria framework, proposed by Y. J. Choi, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s Special Representative for the country, was approved yesterday by the follow-up committee in Ouagadougou, capital of Burkina Faso, and the site where the agreement was signed.

Opposition groups in Zimbabwe are suffering harassment, intimidation and discrimination in the run-up to national elections on 29 March. Police in some parts of the country are clearly restricting the activities of opposition party members, while supporters of the ruling party enjoy total rights. Amnesty International has warned that the right to freedom of expression, association and assembly are being unnecessarily restricted in advance of the poll date.

Kenya’s exiled anti-corruption tsar John Githongo has accused the World Bank of complicity in the chaos that rocked Kenya after the December 2007 General Election. Mr Githongo indicted the World Bank for celebrating the country’s economic growth at the expense of the much-needed reforms. He said although he tried to pinpoint the problems in the Government the bank closed its eyes and supported everything that the Narc administration was doing.

An op-ed in the Wall Street Journal by American policy analyst Marian Tupy and Zimbabwean lawyer legislator David Coltart leaves no doubt in one's mind that the 'façade of democracy' manifesting itself in so-called 'political pluralism' in Zimbabwe is indeed an illusion.

Kaari Murungi, the Director of Urgent Action Fund - Africa, passed by Fahamu's office this week to tell us that as a result of the appeal sent out in Pambazuka News in January for support for the rape crisis centres in Kenya, they received nearly $1 million! Kaari told us: "The majority of the funds we received were from people who had read about the appeal in Pambazuka News."

We take this opportunity of thanking our readers for responding so wonderfully. This is exactly the kind of solidarity that Pambazuka News stands for. So, thank you to all of you who responded!

Within 24 hours of the outbreak of the post election violence in Kenya, Kenyan blogs were posting hour by hour reports. On December 31st there was a complete shutdown of the mainstream media. Sokari Ekine, who blogs at explores how bloggers filled the information gap.

Explore the map and then consider whether elections held in this context can ever be considered 'free and fair'. Information on how to use the map, the map data limitations, and the background to how we mapped the data is provided below the map. Please visit our Zimbabwe Election Watch section, and explore our database for a comprehensive look at the many ways the articles listed in the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections have been breached by the Zimbabwean government.

Troops from the Comoros archipelago in the Indian Ocean have recaptured most of the island of Anjouan after a year-long rebellion, officials say. They said troops backed by an African Union force had taken Anjouan's main city and airport with light resistance.

Under AGOA, Ramatex Textile & Garment Factory, a Malaysian company moved to Namibia. Herbert Jauch looks at the cost of allowing companies to operate without government regulation, tax exemption and government sanctioned suspension of worker rights in Export Processing Zones.

The closure of the Ramatex clothing and textile factory in Windhoek last week, marked the end of one of the most controversial investments in Namibia since independence.

The way in which the closure occurred once again showed the disregard of the company for its workers as well as the host country.

The company managed to mislead Namibia (in particular the government) time and again by providing false information to hide its true intentions of using the country merely as a temporary production location.

While trade unions and government are still trying to achieve some compensation for the retrenched workers, we need to draw some hard lessons from the Ramatex experience.

This article sketches some of the events surrounding the company's operations in Namibia and suggests that a fundamentally different approach to foreign investments should be pursued in future.

When Namibia passed the Export Processing Zones (EPZ) Act in 1995, government argued that both local and foreign investment in the first five years of independence had been disappointing and that EPZs were the only solution to high unemployment.

The EPZ Act went as far as suspending the application of the Labour Act in EPZs which government described as necessary to allay investors' fear of possible industrial unrest.

Namibia's trade unions on the other hand opposed the exclusion of the Labour Act and after lengthy discussions a "compromise" was reached which stipulated that the Act would apply in the EPZs, but that strikes and lock-outs would be outlawed for a period of 5 years.

In 1999, the Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI) carried out a comprehensive study of Namibia's EPZ programme which found that EPZs had fallen far short of the expectations of creating 25 000 jobs and facilitating skills and technology transfer needed to kick-start manufacturing industries in the country.

At the end of 1999, the EPZs had created very few jobs although millions of dollars had been spent on promoting the policy and on developing infrastructure with public funds.

By 2001, Namibia still had not managed to attract any large production facility through its EPZ programme. This changed when the Ministry of Trade and Industry announced that it had succeeded in snatching up a project worth N$1 billion ahead of South Africa and Madagascar, which had also been considered by the Malaysian company Ramatex.

This was achieved by offering even greater concessions than those offered to other EPZ companies, such as corporate tax holidays, free repatriation of profits, exemption from sales tax etc.

Drawing in the parastatals providing water and electricity (Namwater and Nampower) as well as the Windhoek municipality, the Ministry put together an incentive package which included subsidised water and electricity, a 99-year tax exemption on land use as well as over N$ 100 million to prepare the site including the setting up of electricity, water and sewage infrastructure.

This was justified on the grounds that the company would create close to 10 000 jobs.

The plant turned cotton (imported duty free from West Africa) into textiles for the US market.

Ramatex' decision to locate production in Southern Africa was motivated by the objective to benefit from the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which allows for duty free exports to the US from selected African countries who meet certain conditions set by the US government.

Even before the company began its operations in 2002, it made headlines, as it became the most talked about investment in Namibia.

The debate around Ramatex revolved around the massive size of its operations, the establishment of a new industry and the controversies surrounding the company's environmental impact and working conditions.

A study carried out by LaRRI in 2003 found widespread abuses of workers rights, including included forced pregnancy tests for women who applied for jobs; non-payment for workers on sick leave; very low wages and no benefits; insufficient health and safety measures; no compensation in case of accidents; abuse by supervisors; and open hostility towards trade unions etc.

Tensions boiled over on several occasions.

After spontaneous work stoppages in 2002 and 2003, Ramatex finally recognised the Namibia Food and Allied Workers Union (NAFAU) as the workers' exclusive bargaining agent in October 2003.

The recognition agreement was supposed to pave the way for improved labour relations and collective bargaining.

However, the union was unable to make progress on substantive issues and on several occasions reported Ramatex to the Office of the Labour Commissioner for unfair labour practices and the company's unwillingness to negotiate in good faith.

Despite several attempts to find a solution through mediation, no agreement was reached.

By September 2006, the company had not raised wages and benefits and claimed that its operations in Namibia were running at a loss.

Ramatex' workers, however, had run out of patience and declared that they would go on strike unless their wages were significantly improved.

When the company refused to meet their demands, they went on strike in October 2006, bringing the operations to a standstill.

Within 2 days, workers achieved what 4 years of negotiations had failed to deliver: Hourly wage increase from N$ 3 to N$ 4 plus the introduction of some benefits such as housing and transport allowances.

Ramatex used a significant number of Asian migrant workers, mostly from China, the Philippines and Bangladesh.

Although the companyclaimed that they were brought in as trainers, most of them were employed as mere production workers with basic salaries of around U$ 300 - 400 per month which were higher than their Namibian counterparts.

The import of Asian workers also served the company's strategy of "divide and rule".

Workers were divided according to nationalities, received different remuneration and benefits and found it hard to communicate with each other.

As a result there was hardly any joint action by all Ramatex workers.

Protests by Namibian, Filipino and Bangladeshi workers were isolated and found no support from their Chinese counterparts while protest by migrant workers usually resulted in the immediate deportation.

At the height of Namibian operations in 2004, Ramatex and its subsidiaries employed about 7000 workers, including over 1000 Asian migrant workers.

Following retrenchments in 2005 and 2006 (including the closure of one subsidiary), this number dropped to 3 400 (including 400 Asian migrants) in early of 2007 and further to about 3000 by the end of that year.

These trends provided a clear indication that Ramatex was preparing for closure.

This followed the end of the global clothing and textile quotas in 2005 and could be observed all over the continent.

In Ramatex' case, the company indicated it was planning to expand in Cambodia and China and negotiations are underway for the establishment of 2 new plants in Vietnam.

Ramatex' global strategy always regarded Namibia as a temporary production location although the Namibian government seemed to think otherwise.

Ramatex' claims of losses of up to N$ 500 million in Namibia seem devoid of truth.

Ramatex pays no taxes in Namibia, receives water and electricity at subsidised rates and is exempted from import duties in the USA.

It is thus almost impossible for the company to make losses in Namibia and the truthfulness of Ramatex' claims is highly questionnable.

The economic assessment of Ramatex' operations must also take into account the substantial environmental damages caused by operations including the pollution of Goreangab dam and underground water resources.

The Namibian government had been warned by Earthlife Africa but did not take precautionary measures. Instead, the municipality announced near the end of 2006 that it would take over the company's waste management.

Ramatex should have been held fully accountable and forced to rectify the damage at its own costs.

Ramatex represents a typical example of a transnational corporation playing the globalisation game. Its operations in Namibia have been characterised by controversies, unresolved conflicts and tensions.

Worst affected were the thousands of young, mostly female workers who had to endure highly exploitative working conditions for years and in the end were literally dumped in the streets without any significant compensation.

Ramatex had shown the same disregard for workers when it closed its subsidiary Rhino Garments in Namibia in 2005.

Workers had observed the company shipping equipment out of the country but when confronted, Ramatex initially denied plans to close its subsidiary but then retrenched about 1 500 workers in April.

Overall, Ramatex' presence in Namibia was a disaster for the country and some hard lessons will have to be learned to avoid a repeat in future.

When dealing with foreign investors there is an urgent need to ensure (at the very least) compliance with national laws and regulations, workers rights, as well as environmental, health and safety standards.

Experiences elsewhere have shown that compromises on social, environmental and labour standards in the name of international competitiveness lead to a "race to the bottom", leading to a process of self-destruction.

In the case of Ramatex, the Namibian government abandoned its role as regulator and some officials defended Ramatex.

The case has shown the problems of blindly accepting any investment as beneficial.

Instead of adopting an open-door policy towards foreign investment, Namibia (and Africa in general) need to adopt selective policies that channel investments into certain strategic sectors that will have a lasting developmental impact.

They require a very clear and strategic development agenda that is not based on blind faith in foreign investment as the panacea to our development problems.

The lack of alternative programmes for effective economic development and job creation places government in a weak position to negotiate adherence to labour, social and environmental standards with foreign investors.

This has to be the starting point for breaking the chains of dependency.

The project on Alternatives to Neo-Liberalism in Southern Africa (ANSA), for example, is an attempt to develop a different and comprehensive development strategy for the region.

The ANSA proposals will be introduced in Windhoek next week and hopefully will pave the way for a more open-minded discussion about a suitable development strategy.

* Herbert Jauch is head of research and education for the Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI). This report was written prepared for The Namibian by the author.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Tajudeen Abdul Raheem argues that regardless of the outcome in Zimbabwe, African people's solidarity should be with the Zimbabwean people

Zimbabweans go to the polls on 29th April the outcome of which many have forecast as going only one way: the 84 years old former Guerrilla leader and President since independence in 1980 will, willy-nilly, be ‘re-elected’ to power. Admittedly he is facing stiffer challenge than before in the person of his former Finance Minster, Makoni, and the official opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai.

If there is a more level playing field it may not be a foregone conclusion that President Mugabe will win. The playing ground is very much weighted against Mugabe’s opponents. In spite of the enthusiasm with which Makoni has been received both nationally and internationally by forces of regime change that are tiring of the dramas surrounding Morgan and beginning to wane in their support for him Makoni’s performance in the elections may actually be more to the benefit of Tsvangirai as it is at the expense of President Mugabe and his dwindling support within the ZANU-PF. I may be wrong but I don’t think the election will provide a Makoni moment. It is also highly unlikely that Morgan’s courage and perseverance in forcing open the political space is about to be rewarded with electoral victory. What the election may show is that as in Kenya in the 1990s the majority of the masses are tired of President Mugabe but the opposition is not ready to assume power.

The comparative experience from other countries in Africa with long term Personal/One party rule is that as long as the incumbent Maximum ruler is standing in the election it is more difficult to defeat the ruling party. A combination of intimidation, open bribery of voters, restraints on the opposition and the media or brutal force and scandalous manipulation of all rules governing the electoral processes will be used to retain power failing which direct theft of the votes would be effected. Senegal (Abdou Diouf) and Benin ( Kerekou) were exceptions in the 90s and early 2000s where Presidents in a One party Dominant state was defeated by an opposition alliance. In Kenya and Ghana before that it was not possible to defeat Moi/KANU and Rawlings/NDC respectively as long as the incumbents were standing. Coincidentally it took 10 years in both countries before the opposition could get their acts together and realise that individually they could not defeat the ruling party. Another factor is that in both countries the unseating did not happen without a significant breakaway from the ruling party thus eroding its hegemony through the equivalence of internal bleeding.

Is Zimbabwe at this stage now? Judged against the three factors I will say Zimbabwe has not arrived at the point for change. The incumbent is still standing. The opposition still believes they can win on their own or are expecting a runoff which will establish whether Morgan or Makoni is best placed to unseat their aged Uncle! Finally while Makoni represents an important internal rupture in ZANU-PF causing self doubt and realignment away from ZANU –PF the much talked about and expected break within ZANU-PF has not produced significant smoking guns. This means that so far not enough influential individuals and constituencies are willing to put their heads above the parapet to unseat Mugabe.

A particularly distorting aspect of the Zimbabwe conflict is the open advocacy for regime change by outside non African forces that has made it difficult for Africans to decisively intervene in the Zimbabwe situation without being dubbed lackeys of imperialism by Mugabe and his fellow travellers. Some of his more hard line supporters especially in the Diaspora have even accused some of us who openly criticise Mugabe and advise him to quit as being paid by MI5 and CIA!. What is so revolutionary about taking a country that you help to build back to the dark ages just to prove you are a strong man to Bush and Blair! Many of those who cheer Mugabe as revolutionaries from their rostrums outside Zimbabwe would not go and live and suffer in ‘revolutionary Zimbabwe’.

The focus on the Anglo-American and Western multiple standards in relation to Zimbabwe also make many Africans suspicious of the opposition and amenable to Mugabe’s propaganda that his opponents are traitors’ to the cause of Zimbabwe and Africa. In particular Morgan/MDC’s perambulations on the Land issue (very popular with Africans with historical memory of land alienation by colonialists) further strengthen their hostility. While Mugabe/ZANU –PF complain about the ‘unfair’ coverage they get from Western Media I have never heard them raise any query about their overwhelmingly positive image in many African Media!

However we should not allow other people’s agenda, legitimate or illegitimate, to detract us from formulating our own. The knee-jerk cold-war induced reaction of ‘if the Americans are here I must be there’ no longer hold. This does not mean that imperialism is dead or that the West has suddenly become our friends but their enemies need not necessarily be our heroes or heroines either. It is certainly not the case that everybody opposed to President Mugabe is a traitor working for the British just like it is true that not all those refusing to back the opposition are supporters of of ZANU-PF/Mugabe. They may even be ZANU-PF loyalists without being fans of Mugabe.

Our solidarity is with the people of Zimbabwe whether they are in ZANU-PF or outside of it and their right to choose those who govern them. President Mugabe does not own the people of Zimbabwe. They are no less Zimbabweans for voting the opposition therefore it is most undemocratic for President Mugabe to say as quoted recently that the opposition will never rule Zimbabwe in his life time . That is a decision that only the people of Zimbabwe can make.

This election may be another missed opportunity for changing the deplorable conditions that the long suffering masses of Zimbabwe live with. Real change may not happen until after President Mugabe either quits (highly unlikely) or is retired by the ancestors. Zuma coming to power in neighbouring South Africa may also trigger realignments that may limit Mugabe’s room for manouvre.

*Dr Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem writes this syndicated column in his private capacity as a Pan Africanist. His views are not attributable to that of any organization he works for or is affiliated with.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Libreville– Despite the Japanese Government’s emphasis that it is an international development forum for Africa, Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) and its action plan are still pretty much perceived as Japan’s official aid package deal towards Africa.

Firstly, there is notable under-reorientation of key players: other donor governments (for harmonization of aid efforts), other Asian governments (for Asia-Africa partnership), private sector (for economic growth), the civil society organizations (for the downward accountability) and more. One of the African Government expressed the frustration in the plenary of the Ministerial Conference in Gabon that TICAD should stop pretending that it was the Asia-Africa meeting.

The Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), for one, have been fighting to find its way to be involved in the process since the first TICAD held in Tokyo in 1993. To be fair, TICAD has come a long way. Since the third TICAD in 2003 especially, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has continued dialogue with the Japanese CSOs, and today the CSOs have gotten the observatory status in the TICAD proper and all the preceding meetings. The participation of the CSOs, however, still depends on the approval of the Japanese and the host country governments, and it is limited to African and Japanese organizations.

Secondly, the draft Yokohama Declaration and Action Plan are weak with respect to CSO engagement vis a vis CSO being recognized as a strategic partner in fostering the TICAD process forward. The documents do not necessarily reflect the positions of the co-organisers (The Japanese Government, The World Bank, the UNDP, and the UNOSAA) on the Civil Society participation in development, either. As the two documents are considered by some as the guideline of Japan’s bilateral commitment, the political game seems to continue to make the bilateral aid process as exclusive as possible. The obvious omission of the CSOs from the documents was lamented by the some Government Delegates in the plenary session.

Finally, the involvement of the co-organisers are no way equally prominent in the meetings. The presence of the World Bank, UNDP, and UNOSAA seems only tokenistic. The African Governments only acknowledge the contribution of GoJ in their diplomatic speeches. The commitments from the TICAD process are almost exclusively from the Japanese Government. Where is the spirit of “harmonization of aid?”

TICAD is standing at the turning point. In mid 1990s, when the developed world was experiencing the aid fatigue, it played an important role to keep Africa on the agenda. Today, African Governments have plentiful commitments from different donors. There are different forums that discuss African Development. Time has changed. The Japanese Government and the Co-organisers should revisit the relevance and mandate of TICAD seriously in May. If the age demands the transformation of TICAD, so should it be.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/358/46928powershare.jpgAs Zimbabwe threatens to pull a 'Kenya', this is a good time to consider the implications of the Annan mediated power-sharing deal. Antony Otieno Ong'ayo dissects and weighs the Kenya power sharing deal.

While the tensions and apprehension as a result of the post election violence in Kenya subsides, focus is now placed on the newfound relationship between the antagonists during the 2007 elections. More important are the hopes of thousands who have been since the onset of electoral violence, displaced and still live in degrading conditions in various camps in the country. Business in various parts of the country seem to return to “normal” although large sections of the population are not sure of what will come next? Commentators have pointed to the optimism about the peace agreement between Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki; however, less attention is being given to the implications of the deal for governance and state restructuring.

In the recent past, two positions have defined the discussion about power in Kenyan politics. This begun with the commencement of the Bomas constitutional review process, where one position has been against devolution of powers, arguing that two centres of power is not workable. The other view is that devolution of powers is possible within a framework that provides for accountability in the highest office in the land. However interest-ridden views and adversarial approach hijacked the debate hence, a stalemate in finding a best alternative. Proponents of centralised power, failed to justify that position, except for suggestions that doing so is likely to lead into chaos and disunity. They did not state what benefits the country has enjoyed under such a system since independence. Their arguments seem to ignore the historical injustices caused by a presidential system with concentrated powers, a system that took the country through decades of authoritarianism and dictatorship. The previous presidents abused these enormous powers; hence politicised ethnicity that now threatens to tear the country apart. Through their abuse of power, the country continued to experience high levels of poverty, illiteracy and high unemployment rates, leave alone poor roads, lack of health and educational facilities. They used this power to detain opponents and allocate resources in a skewed manner to their own regions. They used the power to employ their own kinsmen in the armed forces, state corporations, and government departments without regard for the multiethnic composition of the country. Moreover if the centralised system was meant for the unity of the country, ethnic tensions that have plagued the country for decades is but a sign that the much touted unity was a coerced unification or a unity/peace that was forced, first by the colonial state and later by the three post-colonial regimes. These regimes did not take into account the institutional and constitutional arrangements that would pull every group towards the centre, but instead, adopted a system which broadly kept them under one (“roof”) territory, at the same time keeping them apart as much as possible. The economic and political marginalisation of certain regions in Kenya is a manifestation that the system was and is still not conducive for a country with a complex mix of diversity.

The common contradictions in the two positions are however inherent in the views of when change is necessary, which is also informed by which “group”, is in power. The attitude in Kenya is that if our man is in power, then nothing is wrong with the system, hence no need to re-negotiate or restructure the state. The malgovernance problem in Kenya, which lies in the elaborate power structure built up around the presidency, is also synonymous with the state structure. This has been done through minor constitutional change that entrenched the status quo in which “elite minority” monopolise state power and resources and in most cases in the name of an ethnic group. During the process there are extremists who have shown through their power strategy mix that they do not think about long-term interests of the entire country, instead, they are focused on short-term benefits and to have a place in the ‘grand coalition’. This rush to create positions without reflecting on how the very institutions could serve the country well undermines their potentials to diffuse the tension around access to and use of state power. All over sudden, both the opponents and proponents of centralised power are “silent”, and are not questioning the implications of this new arrangement for “national unity”. Therefore would the 2008 Bill be that different from its predecessor bills?

The concept of power sharing has been used in many contexts as a response to conflicts ranging from ethnicity, political differences of resources allocation and use, a means of setting up governing coalition in context where political parties have failed to win majority seats in parliament or in post-conflict situations where multiple actors who represent diverse backgrounds seek to control the state power. Power sharing it is also seen as “a multiple vehicle to create broad-based governing coalitions of a society's significant groups in a political system that provides influence to legitimate representatives of minority groups." It is also described as “a strategy for resolving disputes over who should have the most powerful position in the social hierarchy”. But it also implies a joint exercise of power where such an agreement is reached. While Kenya cannot be described as a deeply divided polity or experienced conflicts of a highly intense nature, enormous powers in the presidency have been used to “command monopolistic access to available resources, to employ violence and exclusion to safeguard interests”.

RELEVANCE IN THE KENYAN CONTEXT

While application of power sharing agreements might entail “the creation of broad-based coalition of significant groups, in a political system”, in the case of Kenya, it is however not a power sharing or negotiation between “ethnic minority groups”, but between an “elite minority”. The majority of “minority groups” that would have qualified for consideration under this conception are not part of the deal being signed in Nairobi nor are they represented in any way. For instance, those minority groups that are politically and economically marginalised, such as the Ogieks, Jemps, Rendile, are not represented in the process. Instead, we see some form of representation based on “political parties” even though some of them have no “official structures” other than in paper. This is because the political competition in Kenya has been between the dominant forces against the citizenry, and with the advent of multiparty, it has been between political parties that are individualistic, and disconnected with the citizenry they claim to represent, while at the same time using or whipping ethnic feelings for political expediency. So what difference would it make with the new power-sharing arrangement? This scenario raises problems with representation, but also aspects of collaboration and block building, which could reflect consociational arrangements that takes care of the interests of minority groups at the political table.

In the foregoing, Kenya of today demands some level of patriotism and commitment to the principles of effective representation and leadership for change. In order to bring back the confidence of Kenyans on leadership and use of power there is need to turn these negative and dangerous trends around, through power sharing. But this could also be problematic if there will be no equity and fair play through properly constituted institutions of the state. Turning the current volatile politics into a more amicable order is crucial, because a less conflictual politics would lead to and prompt elite disposition towards political accommodation and adoption of non-majoritarian political arrangements. Therefore what does the current power sharing deal mean for the ordinary Kenyan whose life has been disrupted or cut short by the police bullet, gang machete, or tribal fire? What are the long-term implications of this re-negotiation for governance in Kenya? What precedence would it set in the context of contested election results in the future? From a political and constitutional law perspectives, many important questions have not been asked while there is a rush to return to “normal” life. High hopes have been placed on the deal between Raila and Kibaki, but not much is asked whether it is the medicine Kenya needs for the many constitutional and institutional defects and deficiencies, that have plagued the country for decades. It is therefore crucial to question whether the deal is a step towards deal a long-term goal to devolution of powers or decongestion of the system from Presidentialism, which has been at the core of governance deficiency in Kenya? Is the current power sharing deal any different from previous manipulation of the system to serve partisan interests? What is the role of the citizenry in the process of state restructuring of this magnitude, and during a contested legitimacy?

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORD

It is hoped that the peace accord, would be entrenched in the constitution, peace would return and that some level of democratic governance, equity and accountability, would be realised, however the accord as legally framed does not take into the account the stability, cushioning and democratic governance role of the very institutions it is creating. The bill provides for the “insertion” of a new section into the constitution but at the same time (in section 15 A (3) (a) provides for its termination at the whims of the parliament. Here too the drafters either intentional ignored the interest-ridden nature of parliamentary politics in Kenya, or potentials for “stomach philosophy” to carry the day and not constitutional considerations that matter to the millions of impoverished Kenyans. With such discrepancies, implementation of the accord might not entail the prospects for fostering a durable peace or devolution of powers that many Kenyans desire. This is because the “deal” and the “bills” are not about the internally displaced; land squatters, voters whose right was violated during the 2007 elections, nor it is for posterity, it seems to solve the differences between “elite minorities”.

Another concern is the way in which various groups are making claim to diverse stakes. Power sharing often includes reviewing such key institutions as “federalism and the devolution of power to ethnic groups in territories that they control; or providing for minority vetoes on issues of particular importance; grand coalition cabinets in a parliamentary framework, and proportionality in all spheres of public life such as budgeting and civil service appointments”. Taking this path in Kenya has implications for “ethnic” re-orientation” in the face of state re-negotiation and could present further obstacles to reconciliation, national cohesion and efforts towards a national identity. Un realistic power sharing will not augur well for development of issue oriented political parties since “ethnicity” and other particularistic considerations would come first in the national psyche. All signs point to some kind of elite mobilisation, bankrolling and interference with state apparatus to bolster their power at the centre, which is currently being negotiated. Therefore if power sharing is done with these factors as the underlying forces, then it will “reinforce the ethnic divisions in society rather than promote cross-cultural understanding”

The power-sharing deal also falls short of addressing the very factors that underpinned the post-election violence namely the decades of political and economic marginalisation, and the deprivation of millions of Kenyans, spanning generations to realise their full potentials as citizens of Kenya. It fails to address the problems of non-democratic governance, politicised ethnicity, draconian and defective constitutional order whose beneficiaries are local elites in collaboration with international interests. The deal fails to address the system of exploitation and expropriation the national resources in the name of millions of Kenyans who toil under harsh labour conditions and dehumanising wages. It also fails to address the relationship between various institutions within the broader governance structure that could directly link and relate to local needs, participatory democratic processes and decision-making.

POINTS FOR REFLECTION

The contents of the accord could still be fine-tuned to give it substance, through an integrative approach, to “eschew ethnic groups as the building blocks of a common society”. Power sharing in this direction can entail re-designing of the institutional and constitutional frameworks to provide for "centripetalism," whereby political dynamics are engineered in a “centre-oriented spin”. Examples include “multiethnic political parties, electoral systems that encourage pre-election pacts across ethnic lines, non-ethnic federalism that diffuses points of power, and public policies that promote political allegiances that transcend groups”. Recent political realignments have shown that there are potentials for ethnic accommodation due to crosscutting interests.

Another consideration is for the power sharing to move towards a group block building approach, a form of “consociationalism” in which there is an accommodation of the various “ethnic-groups” at the political centre and guarantees for minority rights. Such an approach might not necessarily lead to demands for autonomy because the interdependency of the various regions and groups within Kenya would not allow such a framework to function. This interdependency is caused by unequal availability of resources, un-equal infrastructure development, and disparities in climatic conditions with serious implication for food production or subsistence economy, which is still common in most part of Kenya. However a consociational arrangement could also lead to an outcome that “reflects the divisions in society but fails to provide incentives for building bridges across community lines”, hence the need for a framework, that encourages the various groups to identify with the state. This is also possible if the institutional framework and constitutional dispensation provides for receiving “something” back from the state regardless of “ethnicity”.

A "consociational" framework could also encourage collaborative decision-making, policy formulation and budgetary allocations that reflect the diversity of the Kenyan citizenry. The reality is that only through a broad based dialogue that the country can chart its way forward in these times of intensified globalisation. Arendt Lijphart maintains, “consociational democracy is the most viable structural model of politics for multiethnic societies”. But this is only possible if there is a political will, combined with the “will of the capital”, foreign forces and interests. Crucial at this juncture is a system that provides for institutional independence, holds people in power accountable and that decision-making is “consociational” as much as possible. It is only through centripetalism that all Kenyans would feel that they “belong” not just in words, but also through the policies of equity. The on-going power sharing therefore needs to look beyond Raila and Kibaki, focus on improving governance, accountability, equity and national cohesion and foster a common identity. It should also lead to institutional re-engineering to cater for governance conflicts. Although there exists a contrary notion that “fundamental conflicts in segmented politics cannot be solved by constitution writing and constitutional engineering”, it is also recognised that “rules can restructure a political system and cause changes in the game where there is some determination to obey the rules”.

Finally, re-thinking of an integrative approach would be a viable option. These would include “making persuasive appeals to people on the other side (usually focused on common values, goals, or needs), offering apologies and/or forgiveness for past deeds, seeking areas of commonality, reversing the de-humanisation process and building trust with opponents”. Integrative options are noted to be “less expensive to implement than force based options, and they are often more successful, as they do not generate the level of resistance and backlash that force often does”. Non-the less, how and whether the process will be taken seriously is a matter that heavily depends on the contents of the peace accord, its implementation, and acceptability by the citizenry. The success of the on-going power sharing however depends on whether the “grand coalition” would survive the conflict of interest and destructive confrontation, which are the hallmarks of Kenyan politics.

*Antony Otieno Ong’ayo is a researcher at the Transnational Institute, Amsterdam.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

African Union (AU) troops this week supported the Comoros army to take control of the rebel island of Anjouan. The crisis began in June 2007 when African Union monitored elections were due to be held on the islands of Anjouan, Grand Comore and Moheli. The Union government of Comoros postponed the elections on Anjouan “citing irregularities and intimidation in the run-up to voting” but Mohamed Bacar went on with voting preparations, printing ballot papers and claiming a landslide victory. Following the elections, AU efforts failed to break the deadlock between the Union government and Bacar who claimed the presidency of Anjouan. In February 2008, the AU Peace and Security Council “revised its stance on the political conflict and moved to backing the Union government's position of using military force”. 1,500 AU troops backed the Union government army’s intervention on the island on March 24.

Also, in peace and security news, Africa’s defence and security ministers are meeting this week to discuss progress towards the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF), which is mandated “to intervene in various cases, including violation of human rights, war crimes and genocide as well as providing humanitarian assistance”. The ASF is facing challenges regarding the harmonisation and rationalisation of the five Regional Standby Brigades set up by the Regional Economic Communities and which have evolved at difference paces. According to the AU’s Peace and Security Commissioner “another chronic challenge facing the AU is the paucity of funding” for the Standby Force.

Following a global assessment on levels of food insecurity, the European Commission (EC) has selected seventeen priority countries to benefit from a food program valued at 160 million euros, the biggest annual amount to date. All East African Community countries except Rwanda are included in the relief program, as are Sudan, Chad, Somalia, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Zimbabwe and the Sahel Countries. Meanwhile, Oscar Kimanuka analyses the new opportunities presented by Chinese aid and trade as an alternative to United States and European domination, warning in closing that “whatever Africa may be gaining from its renewed interest in China, we should not lose sight of our own interest as Africans. We need to benefit from these relations for the sake of the development of our people”. Also in aid-related news, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) has pledged US$10 billion by 2010 for African country-members of the OIC under the Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development. The reduction or cancellation of debt owed by African countries to member countries of the Ummah was also discussed at the recent OIC summit in Dakar, Senegal.

Upcoming AU related events include the third African media summit, which will be held in Tunis, Tunisia, next week under the theme “how youth can help change the image of Africa in the re-branding process”. In addition, the AU will be holding a meeting of ministers of justice in mid-April which will discuss, amongst other things, the legal instrument on the merger of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union as well as the harmonisation of ratification procedures in member states. Further, the third conference of African Ministers for Integration will be held in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, between May 19-23.

In a promising development for civil society and citizen participation in regional integration, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) held a workshop this week “to familiarize the civil society in West Africa with the new vision of ECOWAS and the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA) and help deepen the regional integration process”. The workshop took place in in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, under the theme “from Integration of States to Integration of Peoples in West Africa: Broadening Dialogue to Embrace Civil Society”.

Lastly, as Zimbabwe prepares for elections on March 29, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) will be sending an observer mission of twenty parliamentarians representing the five regions of Africa, supported by staff from the secretariat of PAP and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.

Thank you very much for posting the three thought-provoking, sensible and reflective essays with differing perspectives on the impact of Obama [http://www.pambazuka.org/en/issue/current]. They offer in complementing ways to outsiders like me additional understanding of how to read some of the substantive contentious issues. With this posting, Pambazuka News shows once again its relevance in information sharing.

In response to Truth commissions and prosecutions: Two sides of the same coin? [http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/46719]. I just finished reading "A Human Being Died That Night: Forgiving Apartheid's Chief Killer" by Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela. I had a meeting with Elazar Barkan about my work in Liberia on collecting stories from Victim and Perpetrators in Liberia making them talk on the radio about what had happen to them during the war and what (perpetrators) did during the war in Liberia. How both Victims and Perpetrators felt when it was happening to them as a Victim and the how Perpetrators how felt when they were hurting people.

I worked with the Liberia TRC trying to talk to the Perpetrators to be part of the TRC processs in Liberia. Since they have beening coming on my radio program to talk about what they did during the war, they also needed to go to the TRC. The TRC has been charged with the responsibility of investigating the root causes of the conflict in Liberia, amplifying historical truths. If this is the work of the Liberia TRC then the Perpetrators have to be part of the Liberia TRC.

You ask: Are TRC's designed to generate more truth, more justice, reparations, and genuine institutional reform? Or are they designed to undermine the State’s and society’s legal, ethical and political obligations to their people? I have asked myself this question alot.

Again you say "Truth commissions have been multiplying rapidly around the world and gaining increasing attention in recent years. They are proposed for different reasons and driven by diverse motives. They can be used firstly, for the purpose of national reconciliation and in the interests of the society; secondly, sometimes they can be used to avoid accountability or prosecution and merely to shield an offender from justice." If we are going to have TRC in Africa after conflicts - are we going to have the same type of South Africa TRC?

In Sierra Leone there was a TRC. How did was it at the end? Did the people of Sierra Leone get Justice? After theTRC finished its work and gave its recommendations, did the Sierra Leone Government adopt them? How can the Liberia TRC learn from these two TRCs? What will Happen to the Kenya TRC?

We have to see what will work for us in Africa after our conflicts. There are so many tensions between Truth Commissions and Prosecution in Liberia. Prince Yormie (or Yeomi) Johnson is a Liberian political and former military figure. He was elected to serve as a senator in the Liberian congress in the historic 2005 election. Johnson was born in Nimba County, in the east-central interior of the country.

In 1990, Johnson was allied with Charles Taylor as part of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which crossed the border from Côte d'Ivoire and began operations in Liberia on Christmas Eve, 1989. However, an internal power struggle resulted in Prince Johnson leading a faction of fighters which he named the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL).

In spite of ECOMOG opposition, INPFL forces captured most of the capital, Monrovia, late in the summer of 1990, and Johnson's supporters abducted President Samuel Doe at ECOMOG headquarters, the Free Port of Liberia. Although Johnson has recently denied killing Doe, there is no question that Doe was brutally executed in Johnson's custody on September 9, 1990, as the spectacle was videotaped and seen on news reports around the world. The video shows Johnson sipping a Budweiser as Doe's ear is dismembered. Ahmadou Kourouma also accused Prince Johnson of war crimes (abduction and torture of several Firestone's executives) in his book "Allah is not obliged". Shortly after Doe's death, Johnson allied with UN-supported ECOMOG peacekeepers in capturing the Liberian capital.

Subsequently, Johnson briefly claimed the presidency of Liberia in the fall of 1990. His claims ended following the consolidation of rebel power by his rival Charles Taylor of the NPFL. In an attempt by the weak national government to reconstruct Liberian politics, the INPFL was recognized at a conference held in Guinea, where Amos Sawyer was elected president. However, Johnson was forced to flee to Nigeria in fear of rebel forces supporting Taylor. He returned to Liberia in March 2004, stating his intention to return to politics by running for a senate seat in Nimba County; however, he left Liberia again on 7 April, apparently due to death threats he had received from the country's dominant rebel group, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). In the October 11, 2005 elections, Johnson contested and won a Senate seat representing Nimba County, in spite of having a reputation for wartime brutality and having committed gross human rights abuses. He is the chair of the Senate's defense committee. Can we have him prosecuted in Liberia? How long will it take and how much money will the government spend on him? After all, he is a Senator in the same Liberia where he commited Human Rights abuses.