This week's AU Monitor brings you updates from the African Union. During the Pan-African Parliament's (PAP) Eighth Ordinary Session, members discussed the need for increased citizen involvement in international affairs, especially within the United Nations. Further, the PAP held motions on financial matters, following speculation of misappropriation of funds and mismanagement. UN Deputy Secretary-General Migiro met with AU and NEPAD officials in Ethiopia for consultation on various issues. Also, AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare delivered opening remarks at the Inter- Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur in Lybia, encouraging leaders that there is no other choice but to make peace. ECOSOCC held it first General Assembly, electing eight African Civil Society organizations to its Council. Lastly, The African Commission on Human and People's Rights is holding its 42nd Ordinary Session in the Republic of Congo-Brazaville from November 14-28th.

In youth-related news, African youth are being urged to remain in Africa after completing school instead of going abroad to live and work, to play an integral role in developing their homeland instead of "selling their souls". Further, November 1 marked the first African Youth Day, an extension of the African Youth Charter, created to enhance the partnership between youth and public authorities towards the development of the continent.

In African Diaspora news, Activists Danny Glover and Nicole Lee advocate to stop the US Africom Command's (Africom) plans to establish permanent military bases in Africa, which will increase dependency on outside forces, inhibit Africa from devising its own solutions to its security problems, and further destabilize regions. Further, Ugandan President Musevini urged members of the U.S. Congressional Black Caucus to " support the African development cause by supporting pro-African policies and programmes in the US Congress", while reminding them that Africa is their homeland.

In Asia-Africa news, India recently hosted the India-Africa Hydrocarbon conference to increase partnerships and opportunities between the two regions in the hydrocarbon sector. Further, efforts are being made to increase the AU's role in business relations between Africa and China, ensuring that Chinese business decisions are made in the best interest of the African people. Lastly, Chinese Acting Ambassador to Rwanda, Wang Xinm Li, insists that China's presence in Africa is meant to improve living standards for Africans, not to merely extract resources from the continent.

In technology related news, the Euro-Africa Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) Strategic Partnership seeks to strengthen science and technology cooperation between the two continents. Further, at the recent Connect Africa conference, investments were pledged to further develop Africa's ICT sector in order to facilitate economic growth in the region.

In trade news, The South African Development Company reports on plans to develop infrastructure in the region that " ensures the availability of an integrated, efficient and cost-effective system to sustain regional economic development and trade". Further, Russia's new trade agreements will allow African imports to be tax-free in hopes of increasing opportunities amongst Russian-African trade. Lastly, economic partnership agreements (EPA's) continue to be criticized, for their potential to destroy Africa's economic progress and "do little for its political self-determination".

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/authors/Lynne_Muthoni_Wanyeki.jpgA survey by the African Centre for Open Governance finds that corruption is the number one issue in the forthcoming Kenyan elections.

The people have spoken. And, unsurprisingly, what they have said is diametrically opposed to what their leaders have been saying on their behalf.

What am I talking about? Last week, the African Centre for Open Governance launched a survey it had commissioned from the opinion polling company, Infotrak, into citizens’ views about corruption, the electoral process and transitional justice.

The findings? For no less than 89 per cent of those with voters’ cards polled across the country, corruption was the foremost electoral issue. Disaggregated by age, no less than 94 per cent of 18-24 year olds — the largest voting bloc — ranked corruption as their priority concern. And even a majority of those above 55 — 56 per cent — did the same.

Disillusionment with efforts of what remains of the National Rainbow Coalition was high, with no less than 70 per cent saying they did not feel the government of President Mwai Kibaki had done enough to address corruption. Granted, awareness of the details of those efforts was low. Only 13 per cent, for instance, were aware of the National Anti-Corruption Committee headed by Mutava Musyimi. This, of course, is somewhat ironic, given that the NACC is tasked with creating public awareness about corruption. But low levels of awareness aside, citizens were quite clear about why they gave Kibaki’s government a failing grade — pointing to the fact that the highest office holders accused of corruption have either remained in office or been re-appointed to the same. No less than 92 per cent said that they want an end to ‘sacred cows’— only eight per cent said that they were concerned about the conflict that going after the ‘sacred cows’ might create.

Citizens, then, gave their thoughts on past and present “grand corruption” — listing the cases of Goldenberg, the Kroll report, the “Artur brothers,” Anglo-Leasing and sugar imports. They were unhesitant about what they want done. No less than 81 per cent want those implicated and found guilty to be jailed, with 72 per cent demanding that they be forever barred from holding public office again. And no less than 77 per cent want any properties acquired with the proceeds of corruption confiscated. They were equally clear about what they want done with recovered funds and property — invested back into public services. Only a paltry five per cent said they would be satisfied with apologies.

What this shows, as Gladwell Otieno, head of AfriCOG, pointed out during the survey’s launch, is that all presidential candidates and other aspirants should know that there exists among Kenyans “a bedrock of support for firm action” on past and present grand corruption. What the survey’s findings should tell all three is that wishy-washiness — and a flat-out refusal — to act on past and present grand corruption will be their downfall. Especially because the findings of the survey held even when disaggregated to confirm that voters already committed to a certain presidential candidate felt the same way.

As for the electoral process in general, citizens were equally clear — no less than 93 per cent of citizens polled said they would not vote for a candidate alleged or known to be corrupt. And, even though only 51 per cent said they would not accept campaign bribes — named by them as including money, food and drink, clothes and, interestingly, jobs and title deeds — 80 per cent of the same said doing so would have no influence at all on their voting. As Maina Kiai, head of the Kenya National Human Rights Commission said during the launch, this finding confirms that “bribes do not work.” And as Mwalimu Mati, head of the Media Analysis and Research Group, added, the survey’s findings are no less than a ‘wake up call’ for all aspirants who have been warning us that the ‘skies will fall’ should past and present grand corruption be dealt with. We want our money back.

This article originally appeared in the East African Standard on November 5th.

*L. Muthoni Wanyeki is the Executive Director of the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC)

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Arnaud Chaltin traces the role and participation of civil society in a human rights context within the Commonwealth.

The participation of civil society within the Commonwealth is fundamental in order to ensure that it remains true to its principles. The origins of the current Commonwealth can be found enshrined in the Statute of Westminster (1931), where countries within the Commonwealth were found to be equal in status and as having a common allegiance to the Crown. Bound together by shared values, including respect for human rights, commitment to democratic forms of government, toleration and mutual respect for differences of background and belief, the Commonwealth Foundation was established in 1965. Established in the same year as the Commonwealth Secretariat, this linear development was one of the early signs of the Commonwealth’s interest in encouraging and supporting its civil-society links.

One of the first significant manifestations of civil society influence and interest in human rights context within the Commonwealth occurred during 1961, in the form of opposition to the apartheid system in South Africa. Some ten years later, with the advent of the Singapore Declaration of shared principles, Commonwealth commitments were cemented, ensuring individual liberty, freedom from racism, peace, economic and social development and international cooperation. In the 1979 Lusaka Declaration, the Commonwealth stressed its opposition towards racism and racial prejudice. In turn, leading to the 1991 Harare Declaration, which gave recognition to principles of human rights, democracy and good governance. It was this same year that the first civil society report was submitted to the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting (CHOGM), calling for governments to view non-government organisations as potential allies and recommending official inclusion of non-government organisations in the procedures of any human rights protection mechanisms within the Commonwealth. In 1993, hearing this call, the Commonwealth began standardising its relationships with civil society. A desk was instituted for non-governmental organisations within the Secretariat, in order to serve as a focal point for coordinating the Commonwealth’s interactions with non-government organisations. An accreditation procedure was set up the same year, for the CHOGM in Cyprus. It was as these events unfolded that Commonwealth countries gradually began to become aware of the importance of the role of civil society.

It was during the 2002 CHOGM, in Coolum, that member states advised their desire for “[…] the many intergovernmental, professional and civil society bodies, which help to implement our Commonwealth values to join with us in building closer Commonwealth family links and strengthening consultation and collaboration”. This declaration was directly forwarded by the High Level Review Group, a Committee of 10 heads of government, stressing the need to recognise “the networks for sharing expertise, information and experience among organisations, the people-to-people links and the existence of a wider Commonwealth civil society are valuable assets that give the Commonwealth a depth and reach that is unique.” The report from the review findings provided new criteria, including the requirement that organisations must be committed to the values of the Commonwealth, represent the true diversity of the Commonwealth, and that they should be transparent in their activities and open to all Commonwealth members. This newly established accreditation criteria opened doors for official cooperation and participation within the Commonwealth, enabling organisations to call at the headquarters of the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth Ministerial meetings are one arena where civil society can participate. Depending on the nature of the meeting, accredited non-government organisations, working in areas of direct relevance to the meeting, can be invited to access documents, make submissions, or to act as observers to the discussions. More importantly, the proceedings of these meetings often inform the CHOGM discussions or will be taken by the Ministers to other international fora. However, it is the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), a rotating group of eight foreign ministers, that is the venue usually targeted by human rights organisations. Established in 1995, as a body to sanction action against “serious or persistent” violations of the principles of the Harare Declaration, CMAG accepts submissions from non-government organisations. It has the power to initiate fact-finding missions and/or to recommend the Heads of Government suspend or expel a member state. However, civil society’s ability to participate has been limited somewhat given the narrow interpretation accorded to CMAG’s mandate.

Civil society collaboration has often been far more effective in those arenas with a less political profile, such as the Coolum Committee. The Coolum Committee has operated by reuniting non-government organisations, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and other Commonwealth agencies for periodic consultations on the progress towards achieving the goals of the Coolum Declaration. This can also include discussions on the best way to ensure thorough collaboration between the official commonwealth and non-government organisations. The Expert Group on Democracy and Development (presenting its report in 2003) had also welcomed submissions from non-government organisations. However, most non-government organisations consider CHOGM as their most important advocacy target; as it provides the Commonwealth’s most visible representation of official participation at the biannual event. The CHOGM Procedures allow organisations to submit papers to the Committee of the Whole, which drafts the CHOGM agenda, as well as CHOGM itself. Interactions with government officials at CHOGM are, however, limited, not allowing specific opportunities for dialogue with officials. Such limitations, as felt by Commonwealth civil society led, in turn, to the development of an informal parallel forum, the Commonwealth People’s Forum (CPF), organised by the Commonwealth Foundation. The sessions and programmes within CPF, such as the Commonwealth Human Rights Forum (CHRF), were established in order to provide non-government organisations, and other sections of civil society, with a space to showcase their work and define advocacy goals. The conclusion of the Forum, provides the link with the Official Commonwealth, where civil society drafts and presents a written communiqué to the CHOGM.

This landscape is completed by the Commonwealth Inter-Governmental Agencies. The Commonwealth Foundation, for example, is mandated to enhance the role of civil society organisations with the official Commonwealth. Yet, if the Commonwealth Foundation is viewed as civil society’s most important partner, the Commonwealth Secretariat can be seen as an important target for advocacy. The Secretariat is an important target for human rights advocacy largely as the result of its broad mandate. Constant contacts with the Commonwealth secretariat, such as submissions and consultation procedures, in particular with sections, such as the Human Rights Unit or the Political Affairs Division, have proven to be the successful way in which to draw attention to persistent human rights issues within the Commonwealth. However, even where there is a right to make submissions, there is no obligation for the official body to consider it. In this regard, the position of the Commonwealth Secretariat Secretary General, charged with the development and delivery of the Strategic Plan – a four-year framework which sets out the Secretariat’s main goals and programmes, has a large degree of influence over the importance accorded to issues, including ensuring the actual promotion of civil society participation within the Commonwealth. In this context, it is of particular relevance for members of civil society to question and analyse the commitments of nominated candidates at up-and-coming candidacy selections, as well as their follow-through after selection.

To ensure that the future Commonwealth remains true to its values, by recognising the stake that civil society has in the transformation of the Commonwealth from its past colonial history, we must ensure that its institutions remain open to Commonwealth peoples. Where there is little space or commitment to the promotion and protection of such a space, our voices may become a little harder to hear in the future. Such a failing will lead to civil society’s disenchantment and questioning of the Commonwealth’s ability to act as an agent of democratic transformation and development.

For more information regarding CHRI or this article, contact Arnaud Chaltin or Lucy Mathieson at CHRI: Email [email][email protected] or access the CHRI website at www.humanrightsinitiative.org

The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) is an independent, non-partisan, international NGO working for the practical realisation

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

On 6 February 2007, President Bush announced that the United States would create a new military command for Africa, to be known as Africa Command or Africom. The Bush administration wants to significantly expand its security assistance program for regimes in Africa that are willing to act as surrogates, says Daniel Volman. It also reflects the growing alarm at the efforts of China to expand its energy supplies in Africa and to extend its political influence on the continent.

On 6 February 2007, President Bush announced that the United States would create a new military command for Africa, to be known as Africa Command or Africom. Throughout the Cold War and for more than a decade afterwards, the U.S. did not have a military command for Africa; instead, U.S. military activities on the African continent were conducted by three separate military commands: the European Command, which had responsibility for most of the continent; the Central Command, which oversaw Egypt and the Horn of Africa region along with the Middle East and Central Asia; and the Pacific Command, which administered military ties with Madagascar and other islands in the Indian Ocean.

Until the creation of Africom, the administration of U.S.-African military relations was conducted through three different commands. All three were primarily concerned with other regions of the world that were of great importance to the United States on their own and had only a few middle-rank staff members dedicated to Africa. This reflected the fact that Africa was chiefly viewed as a regional theater in the global Cold War, or as an adjunct to U.S.-European relations, or—as in the immediate post-Cold War period—as a region of little concern to the United States. But when the Bush administration declared that access to Africa’s oil supplies would henceforth be defined as a “strategic national interest” of the United States and proclaimed that America was engaged in a Global War on Terrorism following the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, Africa’s status in U.S. national security policy and military affairs rose dramatically.

According to Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs—the highest ranking Defense Department official with principal responsibility for Africa at the Pentagon, who has supervised U.S. military policy toward Africa for the Bush administration—Africom attained the status of a sub-unified command under the European Command on 1 October 2007, and is scheduled to be fully operational as a separate unified command no later than 1 October 2008. The process of creating the new command will be conducted by a special transition team—which will include officers from both the State Department and the Defense Department—that will carry out its work in Stuttgart, Germany, in coordination with the European Command.

Africom will not look like traditional unified commands. In particular, there is no intention, at least at present, to assign the new command control over large military units. This is in line with ongoing efforts to reduce the presence of large numbers of American troops overseas in order to consolidate or eliminate expensive bases and bring as many troops as possible back to the United States where they will be available for deployment anywhere in the world that Washington wants to send them. Since there is no way to anticipate where troops will be sent and the Pentagon has the ability to deploy sizable forces over long distances in a very short time, Washington plans to keep as many troops as possible in the United States and send them abroad only when it judges it necessary. This, however, was exactly the intention when the Clinton and Reagan administrations created the Central Command and based it in Tampa, Florida; and now the Central Command is running two major wars in southwest Asia from headquarters in Qatar.

Africom will also be composed of both military and civilian personnel, including officers from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the commander of the new command will have both a military and a civilian deputy. On 10 July 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced that the President had nominated four-star General William E. “Kip” Ward to be the commander of Africom. General Ward, an African-American who was commissioned into the infantry in 1971, is currently serving as the deputy commander of the European Command. Previously he served as the commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) in Mogadishu, Somalia during “Operation Restore Hope” in 1992-1994, commander of the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia during “Operation Joint Forge” in 2002-2003, and chief of the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation at the American Embassy in Cairo, Egypt. The novel structure of the new command reflects the fact that Africom will be charged with overseeing both traditional military activities and programs that are funded through the State Department budget (see below for details on these programs).

The Bush administration has emphasized the uniqueness of this hybrid structure as evidence that the new command has only benign purposes and that and that, in the words of Theresa Whelan, while “there are fears that Africom represents a militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa and that Africom will somehow become the lead U.S. Government interlocutor with Africa. This fear is unfounded.” Therefore, Bush administration officials insist that the purpose of Africom is misunderstood.

On closer examination, however, the difference between Africom and other commands—and the allegedly “unfounded” nature of its implications for the militarization of the continent—are not as real or genuine as the Bush administration officials would have us believe. Of course Washington has other interests in Africa besides making it into another front in its Global War on Terrorism, maintaining and extending access to energy supplies and other strategic raw material, and competing with China and other rising economic powers for control over the continent’s resources; these include helping Africans deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic and other emerging diseases, strengthening and assisting peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts, and responding to humanitarian disasters. But it is simply disingenuous to suggest that accomplishing these three objectives is not the main reason that Washington is now devoting so much effort and attention to the continent. And of course Washington would prefer that selected friendly regimes take the lead in meeting these objects, so that the United States can avoid direct military involvement in Africa, particularly at a time when the U.S. military is so deeply committed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and preparing for possible attacks on Iran. The hope that the Pentagon can build up African surrogates who can act on behalf of the United States is precisely why Washington is providing so much security assistance to these regimes and why it would like to provide even more in the future. Indeed, as argued below, this is actually one of the main reasons that Africom is being created at this time.

So why is Africom being created and why now? I would argue that the answer to this question is twofold. First, the Bush administration would like to significantly expand its security assistance programs for regimes that are willing to act as surrogates, for friendly regimes—particularly in countries with abundant oil and natural gas supplies—and for efforts to increase its options for more direct military involvement in the future; but it has had difficulty getting the U.S. Congress and the Pentagon to provide the required funding or to devoting the necessary attention and energy to accomplish these tasks. The creation of Africom will allow the administration to go to the U.S. Congress and argue that the establishment of Africom demonstrates the importance of Africa for U.S. national security and the administration’s commitment to give the continent the attention that it deserves. If Africa is so important and if the administration’s actions show that it really wants to do all sorts of good things for Africa, it hopes to be in a much stronger position to make a convincing case that the legislature must appropriate substantially greater amounts of money to fund the new command’s operations. And within the Pentagon, the establishment of Africom as a unified command under the authority of a high-ranking officer with direct access to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will put the new command in a much stronger position to compete with other command for resources, manpower, and influence over policymaking.

Secondly, key members of the Bush administration, a small, but growing and increasingly vocal group of legislators, and influential think tanks have become more and more alarmed by the growing efforts of China to expand its access to energy supplies and other resources from Africa and to enhance its political and economic influence throughout the continent. These “alarmists” point to the considerable resources that China is devoting to the achievement of these goals and to the engagement of Chinese officials at the highest level—including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, both of who have made tours of the continent and have hosted high-level meetings in Beijing with African heads of state—as evidence of a “grand strategy” on the part of China that jeopardizes U.S. national security interests and that is aimed, ultimately, at usurping the West’s position on the continent. The creation of Africom, therefore, should be seen as one element of a broad effort to develop a “grand strategy” on the part of the United States that will counter, and eventually defeat, China’s efforts. It should also be understood as a measure that is intended to demonstrate to Beijing that Washington will match China’s actions, thus serving as a warning to the Chinese leadership that they should restrain themselves or face possible consequences to their relationship with America as well as to their interests in Africa.

So, what will Africom actually do when it becomes fully operational? Basically, it will take over the implementation of a host of military, security cooperation, and security assistance programs, which are funded through either the State Department or the Defense Department. These include the following:

Bilateral and Multilateral Joint Training Programs and Military Exercises

The United States provides military training to African military personnel through a wide variety of training and education programs. In addition, it conducts military exercises in Africa jointly with African troops and also with the troops of its European allies to provide training to others and also to train its own forces for possible deployment to Africa in the future. These include the following:

Flintlock 2005 and 2007

These are Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises conducted by units of the U.S. Army Special Forces and the U.S. Army Rangers, along with contingents from other units, to provide training experience both for American troops and for the troops of African countries (small numbers of European troops are also involved in these exercises). Flintlock 2005 was held in June 2005, when more than one thousand U.S. personnel were sent to North and West Africa for counter-terrorism exercises in Algeria, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad that involved more than three thousand local service members. In April 2007, U.S. Army Special Forces went to Niger for the first part of Flintlock 2007 and in late August 2007, some 350 American troops arrived in Mali for three weeks of Flintlock 2007 exercises with forces from Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Burkina Faso, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Both Flintlock exercises were conducted as part of Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) which now links the United States with eight African countries: Mali, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. In 2004, the TSCTP was created to replace the Pan-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Initiative, which was initiated in 2002. The TSCTP also involves smaller, regular training exercises conducted by U.S. Army Special Forces throughout the region. Although changing budgetary methodology makes it difficult to be certain, it appears that the TSCTP received some $31 million in FY 2006, nearly $82 million in FY 2007, and is expected to receive approximately $100 million annually from FY 2008 through FY 2013.

Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA)

This program, which began operating in 2002, replaces the African Crisis Response Initiative launched in 1997 by the Clinton administration. In 2004, it became part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative. ACOTA is officially designed to provide training to African military forces to improve their ability to conduct peacekeeping operations, even if they take place in hostile environments. But since the training includes both defensive and offensive military operations, it also enhances the ability of participating forces to engage in police operations against unarmed civilians, counter-insurgency operations, and even conventional military operations against the military forces of other countries. By FY 2007, nineteen African countries were participating in the ACOTA program (Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). New budgetary methodology makes it impossible to ascertain the levels of funding for ACOTA, since the program’s funding is subsumed within the budget for the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

International Military Education and Training Program (IMET)

The IMET program brings African military officers to military academies and other military educational institutions in the United States for professional training. Nearly all African countries participate in the program—including Libya for the first time in FY 2008—and in FY 2006 (the last year for which country figures are available—it trained 14,731 students from the African continent (excluding Egypt) at a cost of $14.7 million.

Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS)

This program sells U.S. military equipment to African countries; such sales are conducted by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency of the Defense Department. The U.S. government provides loans to finance the purchase of virtually all of this equipment through the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF), but repayment of these loans by African governments is almost always waived, so that they amount to free grants. In FY 2006, sub-Saharan African countries received a total of nearly $14 million in FMF funding, and the Maghrebi countries of Morocco and Tunisia received almost another $21 million; for FY 2007, the Bush administration requested nearly $15 million for sub-Saharan Africa and $21 million for the Morocco and Tunisia; and for FY 2008, the administration requested nearly $8 million for sub-Saharan Africa and nearly $6 million for the Maghreb.

African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBS Program)

This program provides specialized equipment (such as patrol vessels and vehicles, communications equipment, night vision devices, and electronic monitors and sensors) to African countries to improve their ability to patrol and defend their own coastal waters and borders from terrorist operations, smuggling, and other illicit activities. In some cases, airborne surveillance and intelligence training also may be provided. In FY 2006, the ACBS Program received nearly $4 million in FMF funding, and Bush administration requested $4 million in FMF funding for the program in FY 2007. No dedicated funding was requested for FY 2008, but the program may be revived in the future.

Excess Defense Articles Program (EDA)

This program is designed to conduct ad hoc transfers of surplus U.S. military equipment to foreign governments. Transfers to African recipients have included the transfer of C-130 transport planes to South Africa and Botswana, trucks to Uganda, M-16 rifles to Senegal, and coastal patrol vessels to Nigeria.

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)

In October 2002, the U.S. Central Command played the leading role in the creation of this joint task force that was designed to conduct naval and aerial patrols in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the eastern Indian Ocean as part of the effort to detect and counter the activities of terrorist groups in the region. Based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, long the site of a major French military base, the CJTF-HOA is made up of approximate 1,400 U.S. military personnel—primarily sailors, Marines, and Special Forces troops—that works with a multi-national naval force composed of American naval vessels along with ships from the navies of France, Italy, and Germany, and other NATO allies. The CJTF-FOA provided intelligence to Ethiopia in support of its invasion of Somalia in January 2007 and used military facilities in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya to launch its own attacks against alleged al-Qaeda members involved in the Council of Islamic Courts in Somalia in January and June of 2007. The command authority for CJTF-HOA, currently under the U.S. Central Command, will be transferred to Africom by 2008.

Joint Task Force Aztec Silence (JTFAS)

In December 2003, the U.S. European Command created this joint task force under the commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet (Europe) to carry out counter-terrorism operations in North and West Africa and to coordinate U.S. operations with those of countries in those regions. Specifically, JTFAS was charged with conducting surveillance operations using the assets of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and to share information, along with intelligence collected by U.S. intelligence agencies, with local military forces. The primary assets employed in this effort are a squadron of U.S. Navy P-3 “Orion” based in Sigonella, Sicily. In March 2004, P-3 aircraft from this squadron and reportedly operating from the southern Algerian base at Tamanrasset were deployed to monitor and gather intelligence on the movements of Algerian Salafist guerrillas operating in Chad and to provide this intelligence to Chadian forces engaged in combat against the guerrillas.

Naval Operations in the Gulf of Guinea

Although American naval forces operating in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea and other areas along Africa’s shores are formally under the command of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, based in the Mediterranean, and other U.S. Navy commands, Africom will also help coordinate naval operations along the African coastline. As U.S. Navy Admiral Henry G. Ulrich III, the commander of U.S. Naval Forces (Europe) put it to reporters at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, in June 2007, “we hope, as they [Africom"> stand up, to fold into their intentions and their planning,” and his command “will adjust, as necessary” as Africom becomes operational. In a significant expansion of U.S. Navy operations in Africa, the U.S.S. Fort McHenry amphibious assault ship will begin a six-month deployment to the Gulf of Guinea in November 2007. The ship will carry 200-300 sailors and U.S. Coast Guard personnel and will call at ports in eleven countries (Angola, Benin, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, and Togo). Its mission will be to serve as a “floating schoolhouse” to train local forces in port and oil-platform security, search-and rescue missions, and medical and humanitarian assistance. According to Admiral Ulrich, the deployment matches up perfectly with the work of the new Africa Command. “If you look at the direction that the Africa Command has been given and the purpose of standing up the Africom, you’ll see that the (Gulf of Guinea) mission is closely aligned,” he told reporters.

Base Access Agreements for Cooperative Security Locations and Forward Operating Sites

Over the past few years, the Bush administration has negotiated base access agreements with the governments of Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Namibia, Sao Tome, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia. Under these agreements, the United States gains access to local military bases and other facilities so that they can be used by American forces as transit bases or as forward operating bases for combat, surveillance, and other military operations. They remain the property of the host African government and are not American bases in a legal sense, so that U.S. government officials are, technically, telling the truth when they deny that the United States has bases in these countries. To date, the United States has done little to improve the capabilities of these facilities, so that there is little or no evidence of an American military presence at these locations.

In addition to these publicly acknowledged base access agreements, the Pentagon was granted permission to deploy P-3 “Orion” aerial surveillance aircraft at the airfield at Tamanrasset in southern Algeria under an agreement reportedly signed in during Algerian President Aldelaziz Bouteflika’s visit to Washington in July 2003. The Brown and Root-Condor, a joint venture between a subsidiary of the American company, Halliburton, and the Algerian state-owned oil company, Sonatrach, is currently under contract to enlarge military air bases at Tamanrasset and at Bou Saada. In December 2006, Salafist forces used an improvised mine and small arms to attack a convoy of Brown and Root-Condor employees who were returning to their hotel in the Algerian town of Bouchaaoui, killing an Algerian driver and wounding nine workers, including four Britons and one American.

Over the course of the next eighteen months, there is one major issue related to the new command that remains to be resolved: whether and where in Africa will Africom establish a regional headquarters. A series of consultations with the governments of a number of African countries—including Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Djibouti, Kenya—following the announcement of Africom found than none of them were willing to commit to hosting the new command. As a result, the Pentagon has been forced to reconsider its plans and in June 2007 Ryan Henry, the Principal Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy told reporters that the Bush administration now intended to establish what he called “a distributed command” that would be “networked” in several countries in different regions of the continent. Under questioning before the Senate Africa Subcommittee on 1 August 2007, Assistant Secretary Whelan said that Liberia, Botswana, Senegal, and Djibouti were among the countries that had expressed support for Africom—although only Liberia has publicly expressed a willingness to play host to Africom personnel—which clearly suggests that these countries are likely to accommodate elements of Africom’s headquarters staff when they eventually establish a presence on the continent sometime after October 2008.

* This article is a revised and shortened version of an article that will be published in the next issue of The Review of African Political Economy

* Daniel Volman is the director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC, and the author of numerous articles on US security policy and African security issues. He can be contacted at the following email address: dvolman at igc dot org

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

It is often asserted that AIDS is at the core of a “vicious circle”, whereby the impacts of AIDS increase poverty and social deprivation, while poverty and social deprivation increase vulnerability to HIV infection. In examining this view, authors Piot, Greener and Russell assert that it is important to distinguish between what might be called the “downstream” effects of AIDS on poverty, and the “upstream” effects of poverty upon the risk of acquiring HIV.

This week's AU Monitor brings news and critical analysis of the African Union. An editorial from the Africa Agenda criticizes the "Grand Debate on the African Union" as failing to look at the challenges facing the formation of a united continental government or follow through with commitments. The analysis therefore concluded that " It is up to civil society groups, activists and other proponents of the Union Government of Africa to work towards the realisation of Africa's redeeming dream by putting pressure on the African Union and the Heads of state". In other AU-related news, a resolution put forth by leaders from Ghana and South Africa at the International Conference on Traditional Leaders urges the AU to establish a Forum of African Traditional Leadership as an organ of the AU.

In regional news, ECOWAS held its first business forum in Accra, Ghana, in an effort to develop strategies for improving regional business operations and greater regional integration. The intent of the forum was to devise strategic plans to develop a common market, improve investment, and address common currency issues. Further, ECOSOCC elections of civil society organizations are being held this week in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

In peace and security news, the AU/UN Deputy Joint Special Representative Designate updated the Peace and Security Council on preparations to deploy the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) . Further, addressing the pending Darfur peace talks in Lybia, AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare urged all Sudanese parties to "demonstrate the necessary spirit of compromise and extend full cooperation to the AU and the United Nations." However, the UN announced the postponement of the scheduled Darfur talks for three more weeks. It is hoped that during this time, more rebel chiefs will come to the table. In other security news, private military contractors (PMC's) pledge an attempt to improve security measures in Africa, something they claim the UN missions and state militaries have failed to accomplish. In food security news, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) is encouraging policy-makers to recognize the benefits of using biofuel to increase food security and agricultural production in Africa.

In Pan-African news, at the conclusion of the 4 th meeting of the Ministerial Bureau of the 5th Pan-African conference in Namibia, African ministers pledged to improve governance and public administration on the continent. The ministers will present the African Public Service Charter to the AU, in hopes that it will be used as a standard for all countries to evaluate efficacy and ensure alignment in public service matters. Further, Ochieng' Ogodo reports on the need for 'good laboratory practice' in African labs in order to produce quality data, develop new medical drugs and technology, and improve product development initiatives.

In economic news, a group of German NGO's has taken a public stance against economic partnership agreements (EPA's), stating that the trade negotiations mostly benefit European corporations and harm the economy of local producers. Lastly, despite his country's long-lasting colonial ties in Africa, French President Nicolas Sarkozy's announced his attempts of "normalizing" France's relationship with Africa; however, it was acknowledged that there must first be a recognized shared interest in order for France to gain support in this initiative.

On the heels of the High Level Panel’s invitation for e-submissions, the AU Monitor urged African civil society and citizens to contribute to the process of a “Peoples’ Audit of the AU”. This week, the AU Monitor brings you the perspective of Charles Mutasa, AFRODAD Executive Director and Deputy Presiding Officer of ECOSOCC, which provides critique and analysis of ECOSOCC, along with a policy brief from AfriMap that provides recommendations for open, democratic and transparent AU policies and processes as well as a call from the Peoples’ Hurricane Relief Fund for the AU to increase its outreach, support and contribution to the African Diaspora.

Furthermore, heeding the call for a written submission before the completion of the panel’s first draft of their report, a joint preliminary civil society statement was formulated and endorsed by over twenty civil society organisations and coalitions working in over thirty countries. The high-level panel extended the days on which they were to convene, according to their working agenda, in order to hear the submission which was presented by a delegation of civil society representatives: myself, Hakima Abbas of Fahamu’s AU Monitor initiative, Eyob Balcha of Afroflag Youth Vision, Faiza Mohamed of Equality Now and the Solidarity for African Women’s Rights Coalition (SOAWR), and Alioune Tine of Recontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO).

During the meeting, we delivered the joint statement and provided reference documentation, including, the CSO Accra communiqué and the executive summary of the report Towards a People-Driven African Union. The floor was then given to each civil society representative to elaborate on the recommendations of the statement based on their areas of expertise. Eyob Balcha delivered a statement from a youth perspective in which he recommended the creation of an AU institutional framework through which the participation of African youth is mainstreamed in continental decision-making processes, including the inclusion of youth representatives in national delegations; the creation of a permanent continental youth body responsible for engagement with sub-regional and national youth initiatives; and the practical implementation of the agreed decisions and provisions of the African Youth Charter.

Following Eyob’s presentation, Faiza Mohamed offered recommendations and insight to the panel from a gender perspective. She recommended that the Commission be provided a mandate to monitor and report on the implementation of AU decisions by member states and that the AU consider imposing sanctions on member states that do not deliver on their commitments to ratify and domesticate the AU/OAU protocols. Also, noting that the Women, Gender and Development Directorate (WGDD) is under-resourced and that it has been a year since the position of director of the Directorate remains vacant, she urged the review panel to investigate the effects of such a lack of leadership on programs. She also recommended that the fifty-fifty gender balance policy of the African Union be strictly and promptly implemented at the Commission and that Member States be urged to consider implementing this gender balance in its representation at the Permanent Representatives Committee and Executive Council of the African Union.

Lastly, Alioune Tine addressed the panel regarding the need for democratic participation and governance with in the African Union. He noted the difficulties civil society have had in accessing important information, in obtaining visas for participation in AU summits and other meetings and the lack of public spaces within the AU compound itself (comparing the space to the United Nations building). He sited as an example of lack of information that, despite his organisation being a member of ECOSOCC, he was unaware, until his arrival in Addis, of the continental elections taking place on Monday October 31st. He noted that an example of successful partnership between civil society and the AU was participation in the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. However, he also noted that the criteria for observer status that requires organisations to be funded with a majority of resources derived from its membership is not realistic for most African NGOs. Finally, Alioune noted that the AU must take into further consideration geographic and linguistic spread in all its meetings so as to ensure that nobody is excluded based solely on our colonial experiences.

As the floor was opened to questions from the panel, further elaboration was requested and provided on access to information via the website, which we considered largely insufficient. For example, amendments to the consultative act are not available on the AU site and the ECOSOCC website is not up to date. In addition, it was noted that the media should have stronger interface with the AU so that information is popularised at the national level not just through the Internet (to which many do not have access) but also through TV, radio and print. The panel was reminded that the legitimacy of civil society is often based on a public mandate and that while we do not equate civil society with citizenry, we believe that a strong civil society interface with the AU will enable greater implementation of decisions at the national level. In addition, the panel were made aware of the public consultations that were held in ten countries in advance of the Accra summit that informed the CSO communiqué from Accra. In terms of ECOSOCC we brought attention to the fact that the Interim President of the General Assembly was not given official space to present her report at the last summit and that such disregard by Heads of States reflects badly on the potential policy influence of the council. More detail was presented regarding SOAWR activities and organisations as an example of how successful civil society engagement can push AU treaty processes forward and drive national implementation. In regard to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, we noted that there is a civil society coalition that has been very active in driving ratification and that complimentarity is needed vis a vis the protocol of the Court and the Commission – indeed, that it is necessary for there to be a thorough review of the complimentarity of treaties and protocols across the board. Lastly we remarked that civil society itself has taken the lead to strengthen our engagement with the AU, citing as an example that the AU Monitor was set up by a range of civil society organisations, though now led by Fahamu, to provide news, information and analysis to a broad range of organisations and citizens across Africa.

The Chairperson noted civil society’s commitment to engaging the audit process and reiterated that further documentation would be welcomed throughout the process. He also ensured us that the recommendations and ideas from civil society and citizens would be duly taken into account in the drafting processes.

In a report released by Deloitte, East African mobile operators loose a third of their revenues to governments by way of taxes and other government tariffs. The Deloitte study suggests that if Rwanda for example goes on to impose the proposed 10 percent excise tax on mobile telephones, it would have the second highest tax rate in Africa, behind Uganda

A new project to develop an integrated sugarcane facility in Kenya could be a boost for biofuels production in east Africa. The Ngima Project at Homa Bay on the shores of Lake Victoria (‘‘ngima’’ is the word for ‘‘life’’ in the local Luo language) is looking to foster a dual export and domestic system of sugarcane production, concentrating on both white sugar and biofuel production.

Félicien Kabuga has a reward of several million dollars on his head, and tops the list of fugitives of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Yet, he's managed to escape justice for years. The ICTR was set up in Arusha, northern Tanzania, by the United Nations in 1995 to bring high level perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide to justice. Between 800,000 and a million minority Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in the Central African nation over a period of about 100 days in 1994.

Mary Ndlovu presents some hard truths about life in Zimbabwe and questions those Pan Africanists who fall for Mugabe’s “anti-imperalist rhetoric”. She asks if there is hope? Yes there is but only if Pan Africanism is “turned on it’s head” and “seized by the people” away from leaders not just in Zimbabwe but across Africa who have consistently betrayed the people.

The government of south Sudan might pull its deputies out of the national parliament if Khartoum does not make more progress towards meeting southern demands, the vice president of the region said on Thursday. The southern Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) withdrew its ministers and presidential advisers from Khartoum two weeks ago, saying the central government had failed to carry out key parts of a north-south peace agreement, signed in 2005.

The United Nations African Union hybrid peacekeeping operation for Darfur (UNAMID) has begun operations at its El Fasher Headquarters in what the senior UN official there called a milestone for the strife-torn Sudanese region. “It is a great day for the United Nations and the African Union, the day of UNAMID's launch, which was only an idea three months ago but now it is a profound reality,” said Rodolphe Adada, the UN-AU Joint Special Representative for Darfur.

The Security Council has extended through next April the mandate of the United Nations mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO), which has been in the Territory since 1991 to monitor the ceasefire between Morocco and the Frente Polisario. In a unanimously adopted resolution, the Council called on the parties “to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to engage in substantive negotiations.”

As crisis worsens in Somalia, where 88,000 people fled their homes in recent days adding to a total displaced population nearly ten times that amount, the top United Nations humanitarian official there today called on all parties to facilitate access by aid workers to civilians in need of assistance.

Poor internet connectivity is one of the serious underlying causes of the digital divide between developing and industrialized countries, and is hampering the transition to the global information society. The recent emergence of national and regional research and education data communication networks in parts of the developing world have shown large benefits arising from collaboration amongst tertiary education institutes, says Anna Bon of Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.

A comprehensive examination of the work of the African Union (AU), with special emphasis on its capacity to meet the challenges of building and sustaining governance institutions and security mechanisms. Samual Makinda and F. Wafula Okumu show how Africa and, in particular, the AU can effectively address the challenges of building and sustaining governance institutions and security mechanisms only if they have strategic leadership. They also analyze current debates on, and criticisms of, leadership in Africa and examines key options for overcoming the constraints that African leaders face.

The economic partnership agreements (EPAs), proposed by the European Union (EU) to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, constitute a "neo-colonial instrument" which will destroy the economic and social basis in African states, according to some German non-governmental organisations. European opponents of EPAs say that, in general, the trade negotiations between the EU and the ACP countries have been driven predominantly by European corporate interests and those of a few privileged business elites in ACP countries.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/authors/Issa_Shivji.jpg“Mo Ibrahim’s prize for a retired African president which was awarded to Joachim Chissano of Mozambique was in my view an insult to the African people.” Issa Shivji raises a number of questions around the award such as how and what is “good governance” and why is it only applied to Africa? And most importantly “for which and whose democracy they are getting a prize”.

Punishment is to deter; often to take revenge. Reward is to encourage. Rewards can also be a recognition for outstanding, usually, individual achievements. Which acts are liable to punishment and which are rewarded depends on the dominant values of society. These can differ from society to society and from time to time within same society. Issues of democracy and dictatorship, of war and peace, of governance and state administration, do not fall within the realm of a system of punishment and rewards.

Of course, victorious powers recognise their war heroes and vanquished bury their martyrs with honour. But then heroes of the victor are mercenaries for the vanquished and the martyrs of the vanquished may be terrorists for the victor. In other words, the issues of war and peace are contentious issues and can only be understood in their historical and social context. And so are the issues of democracy and dictatorship. Therefore, it is naïve, if not mischievous, to award a person – moreover with a cash prize – for bringing peace or democracy to his country.

It is even worse to cite “good governance” as an achievement for awarding an individual president of a country. What is “good governance”? Who determines what is good and bad governance? What yardsticks are applied? And why are these yardsticks applied only to Africa? Why doesn’t any one award a Norwegian prime minister for good governance or include “good governance” conditionality to lend Mr. Bush assistance or fund Martin Athissari to advise Bush on good governance? (Remember Martin Athissari, funded by the World Bank, came to Tanzania to advise President Mkapa on good governance.)

The point about these rhetorical questions should be obvious. Mo Ibrahim’s prize for a retired African president which was awarded to Joachim Chissano of Mozambique was in my view an insult to the African people. First, it is belittling African people. Dictators and undemocratic rulers exist all over the world, including the West which has arrogated to itself the right to judge others as “good man” or punish them for being dictators (Saddam Hussein).

Despots and dictators are not a monopoly of Africa. African people, like other people elsewhere, have always struggled against them. If they have attained some success in these struggles, it is their collective achievement. Their success is not due to particular qualities of any single leader. Good leaders are as much a product of our societies as are the bad ones. It is for the people to decide who is a good or a bad leader and how to award a good one and punish a bad one. I certainly cannot imagine Mozambicans (or any African people for that matter) awarding a 5-million dollar prize to Mr. Chissano. First because Chissano’s goodness itself is, I am sure, a contentious issue in Mozambique. Secondly, Mozambican people, if at all, would have awarded their leader by including him in a list of honour or putting his picture on a postal stamp. And if they had 5 million dollars to spare, they would have probably built secondary schools to produce future good leaders rather than give it away to Chissano to “live a better life” and invest in business (which is what Chissano said in a BBC interview he would use the money for.)

The worst disappointment in the prize saga has been its uncritical and unqualified celebration by scribes and even academics and intellectuals. Since this prize to a retired president was for stepping down from power or “good governance’ or bringing democracy and peace to his country, it was expected that analysts would go beyond the superficial and the obvious to a deeper understanding and explanation of issues of war and peace and democracy and dictatorships in Africa. Before we celebrate, we must understand what it is that we are celebrating. Before we applaud this prize to Chissano we must understand the history, politics and forces which underpinned war and peace in Mozambique.

The people of Africa have been involved in a long struggle against war and for peace and democracy and the struggle continues. In this struggle, they are pitted against not only their own immediate rulers but also against the erstwhile colonial and imperialist powers supporting them. Our dictators were not simply made in Kinshasa (Mobutu) or Central African Republic (Bokassa) or Entebbe (Idi Amin) but also in Washington or Paris or London and Tel Aviv. The vicious war in Mozambique was not simply waged by RENAMO but fully supported and instigated by apartheid South Africa backed by the US and western powers. Apartheid South Africa also claimed the life of the liberation leader Samora Machel and his leading comrades.

Chissano took over from Samora and under the tutelage of Washington steered the neo-liberal course. It is under this new direction that the former freedom fighters like Chissano’s family and Gebuza and others (with some honourable exceptions) began accumulating wealth and became businessmen. Chissano’s son Nyimpine, a businessman, was implicated in the murder of a journalist Carlos Cardoso who was investigating the fraudulent disappearance of 14 million dollars from the Commercial Bank of Mozambique in 1996. The story of wealth accumulation by political leaders in Mozambique is not that different from what we have been witnessing and debating in Tanzania. It is even on a larger scale. In Tanzania Mwalimu’s ghost has had greater restraining power on vultures of wealth than Samora’s in Mozambique.

As with economics, so with politics. The opening up of space after one-party authoritarianism did not just come about on a silver platter. People in Tanzania, Mozambique and the rest of Africa struggled for it. But as usual the rulers and their imperialist backers pre-empted the struggle for real democracy by imposing their own truncated version of neo-liberal democracy

So, when our leaders receive prizes for their democratic achievements we should ask ourselves for which and whose democracy they are getting a prize. Are they getting the prize for a neo-liberal democracy under which the World Bank and “development partners” (read: developed predators!) impose privatization of national assets and resources; under which their diplomats pressurize our ministers and governments to sign utterly one-sided contracts with the likes of golden sharks; under which the parliament is literally ordered to pass laws which have been drafted by their consultants like the Mining Act, under which our political leaders in a free-for-all pandemonium overnight become “wajasiria mali” and bankers and big miners? Is this the democracy for which the peasants, workers, youth, and wamachinga fought? In short, before celebrating let us ask ourselves what are we celebrating and whose music we are dancing to.

Without such critical understanding, I am afraid, we can end up celebrating and legitimizing the shaming and ridiculing of the democratic struggles and achievements of our people.

Mr. Mo Ibrahim: you have made millions of dollars from the sweat and blood of the African people. If you want to return a few million to the people, build schools, dispensaries, and water wells in the south of your own country rather than giving them to Chisasanos of this world. Do not add insult to injury by robbing (poor) Peter to pay (rich) Paul.

© Issa Shivji.

* This article was first published in THE CITIZEN (Tanzania) in Saturday Palaver and is reproduced here with the kind permission of the author.

* Issa Shivji is one of Africa’s most radical and original thinkers and has written frequently for Pambazuka News. He is the author of several books, including the seminal Concept of Human Rights in Africa (1989) and, more recently, Let the People Speak: Tanzania down the road to neoliberalism (2006).

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

In the essay, A Flowering Evil, by Mark Seal that appeared in Vanity Fair Magazine (2006), we learn that there are two types of people living in Kenya — the White landowners and the Black, 'lawless, immigrant' Kenyans. Earlier this year it was announced that Julia Roberts will star in a movie to be shot in 2008 inspired by this essay. Wanjiku Wa Ngugi, Mukoma Wa Ngugi and Nducu Wa Ngugi deeply believe Kenyan White landowners should speak for themselves. Using direct quotes, they offer you the top ten reasons why you should read the full essay.

1) You get to know the true nature of the African.

“When I ask one Lake Naivasha landowner and his wife if the cure was more violent than the crime, he hands me a thick and wicked whip. "That's hippo skin," he says. "It hurts. The only thing these people respect is fear. The only way we can live here is by having them fear us." "For the Kikuyu the closest word to respect is 'I fear you,'" adds his wife.

2) You learn about the true Africa and things to avoid.

"Nothing happens halfway here. Everything is wild, violent, savage," a local woman tells me as the sky explodes in a thundering deluge and the mourners crowd around the bar in a tent after the memorial service. "People live dangerously in Africa," says another. "They crash planes, get killed by wild animals, have disastrous love affairs. My husband's mother got bitten by a hippo. A woman we know got hit by a train."

3) You learn about African marriage customs.

“Joan Root stood out, as did David Chege, who soon replaced his torn T-shirts and moldy swimming trunks with mitumba clothing, the second hand apparel that arrives in Africa by the bale. He took Joan's maid as his second wife, a badge of honor in a country where status is gauged by the number of wives a man has, and returned to poaching, although a much subtler form of it”…“He was a wily Kikuyu," says Joan's friend and former tenant Annabelle Thom of David Chege. A resident of the Karagita slum, Chege was a polygamist with two wives and four children.”

4) You learn about European marriage Customs.

Yet over time Alan entered into a relationship with Jenny Hammond, a married woman with two children, with whom Joan and Alan had been long time friends.
"I had an affair with Jenny, which was pretty tumultuous, but after a while I realized that I wanted to be with Joan," Alan tells me. "I had actually given Jenny a settlement and found her a place to live. She didn't want to go back to her husband, and she wasn't too happy that I'd decided to go back with Joan. But she accepted that.

5) You get to see the real eco-system, nature in the wild—Africans, wild animals and those that bravely tame them.

Her diary became filled with despair: sleepless nights, staff betrayals, neighbors getting robbed and shot, and, always, the insatiable needs of black Naivasha. "Isaac came to request a loan to buy [a]donkey to cart water," reads one diary entry. "Gave him a lecture about having seven children but loaned him 7,000 [shillings, or $96] for a start." Leopards killed her Thomson's gazelles, Masai tribesmen sent her and other white landowners menacing letters saying that they should "vacate Naivasha"—which the tribe still claims to own—and her increasingly undisciplined Task Force was falling apart.”

6) You Learn the Real African History.

“Decades before wildlife films such as March of the Penguins, Joan and Alan Root pioneered filming animal migrations without interference from human actors…They introduced American zoologist Dian Fossey to the gorillas she would later die trying to save, took Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis over Kenya in their balloon, and covered much of Africa in their famous single-engine Cessna…”

7) You get to learn about Lord Delamare’s Grandson Tom Cholmondeley.

Tom Cholmondeley in “2005 was arrested but never prosecuted after he had shot a plainclothes Masai game warden whom, he later explained, he had mistaken for a thief on his land. In May of this year, [2006] encountering a group he insists were poachers, who had bows and arrows and a pack of dogs and were hauling an impala across his land, Cholmondeley took aim again. He killed a black man who worked as a stonemason, and has been jailed and charged with murder.”

8) You get to see why for Tom Cholmondeley Justice is Blind.

"Desperate measures for desperate times," says Cholmondeley as he drives me across his vast acreage, [83,000 acres] where fat warthogs run in circles and where poachers can find plenty of places to hide.

"The balance of power had turned completely in their favor," says Tom Cholmondeley, who once watched the Task Force chase a poacher into a swamp, from which they later pulled his buffalo-mauled remains.

9) You see the other side of colonialism in Kenya and learn it was not all about hunting the Mau Mau.

“Joan was beautiful," remembers Parker, who was with four fellow soldiers on weekend leave from the Kenya Regiment in 1955 when they dared one another to ask out Nairobi's five prettiest girls, "whether we knew them or not." Parker chose Joan Thorpe, the tall, shy blonde who had an almost magical way with animals.

10) The article contains the best research on the African continent and its future.

"Welcome to Africa," a young, white big-game hunter says to me by way of consolation over drinks one midnight in Nairobi, insisting that this was just one more tragedy in a country full of them, and urging me to delay my return to the U.S. and go deeper into the continent. "We can investigate French forces fighting for control of oil in Chad, the war over conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone, the slaughter of the local Pygmy people by foreign tribes in the Congo, and the Chinese raping the rain forest. That," he says, "is deepest, darkest Africa."

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org