John Rocha sets out to answer two questions related to China’s role in Africa: To what extent would China’s growing influence in Africa either advance or undermine the African agenda? And what are the challenges and implications that these hold for African governments, the private sector and the international community?

Introduction

China’s burgeoning influence around the globe has captured the attention of governments, the private sector and civil society. With a large population and recent high economic growth rates, estimated at 9.5 per cent, China now comes only second to the United States of America (USA) in its consumption of oil.

Based on current projections, Chinese demand and consumption for mineral resources is expected to grow exponentially in the foreseeable future, so in an attempt to diversify its source of supply, China has set its sight on Africa as a natural partner.

Within Africa towards the beginning of the 21st century, African leaders adopted NEPAD and transformed the erstwhile Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into a more vibrant African Union (AU). The need to end the continued marginalisation of Africa and reverse the development chasm between Africa and the rest of the world was a core objective. From China’s viewpoint, it was adopting the prevailing global strategy aimed at opening opportunities for foreign investment in China as well as creating new markets for Chinese investments abroad. A key feature of both initiatives is an ardent desire to improve South–South relations in order to strengthen the role of developing countries in international affairs.

Notwithstanding the international communities’ commitment to double total overseas development assistance to Africa by an additional US$25 billion by 2010, the composition, scale and slow pace of delivery is generating a certain level of disillusionment with Africa’s traditional development partners.

There is also a growing realisation that traditional relations and partnerships with the West have not helped Africa overcome the structural obstacles to eradicating poverty and reversing its economic marginalisation. Rather than develop, Africa is haemorrhaging while the rest of the world accumulates wealth at its expense through the unbalanced exploitation of its natural resources and the enforcement of a distorted international economic system. Logically, strengthened cooperation with China is seen as a way of addressing some of these structural imbalances.

Current status and trends in China–Africa cooperation

According to the Chinese Ministry of Land and Natural Resources, there were 158 minerals with identified resources and reserves in China in 2004. However, these resources are insufficient to meet an ever-increasing domestic demand and to sustain China’s dramatic economic growth. For instance, based on projections by the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources, by 2010 domestic crude oil production will be able to meet 51–55 per cent of demand and only 34–40 per cent by 2020; while domestic iron production will be able to meet 38 per cent of demand by 2010 and only 29 per cent by 2020. It is estimated that by 2010 and 2020 the shortage of coal will reach 250 million and 700 million tons respectively. So China is looking to Africa to address some of its short- to long-term needs.

Historically, the availability of cheap raw materials and the prospects for huge returns on investments, particularly from the exploitation of natural resources, has always provided an incentive for the expansion and deepening of political and economic ties with Africa. Africa is blessed with an impressive endowment of mineral wealth, including near-global monopolies of platinum, chromium and diamonds; a high proportion of the world’s gold, cobalt and manganese reserves; and extensive reserves of bauxite, coal, uranium, copper and nickel. Of the proved oil reserves currently estimated, Africa accounts for 7 per cent of the global total. New oil discoveries have been made in Madagascar, Zambia and Uganda while extensive exploration is ongoing in Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania. It is estimated that by 2010, the Gulf of Guinea will contribute at least one out of every five new barrels onto the global market.

Currently, China derives a quarter of its oil imports from Africa through its oil interests in Algeria, Angola, Chad, Sudan and increasing stakes in Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Nigeria. Oil exploration rights were established in Sudan in 1995 by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) through ownership of a 40 per cent stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company where it is pumping over 300,000 barrels per day. Another Chinese firm, Sinopec, is constructing a 1,500-kilometre (932 miles) pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea, where China's Petroleum Engineering Construction Group is building a tanker terminal. China has invested more than US$8 billion worth of oil exploration contracts in the Sudan. In Nigeria, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) acquired a 45 per cent working interest in an offshore oil mining licence, OML 130, for US$2.268 billion cash; CNPC invested in the Port Harcourt refinery while Petro-China is interested in the Kaduna refinery. ONGC Mittal Energy Ltd (OMEL), the joint venture between the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation and the L. N. Mittal Group, will invest US$6 billion in railways, oil refining and power in exchange for oil drilling rights.

Similar investments have been made in Gabon by Sinopec and Unipec through a joint venture with Total while Pan-Ocean exploits the Tsiengui on-shore basin and is associated with Shell to explore Awokou-1. Gabon is now selling one-fifth of its annual oil output to China.

While Chinese oil deals have captured the attention of the world, much less is being said about China’s demand for the main base metals such as aluminium, copper, iron ore, nickel, zinc and other minerals. In the DRC, Feza Mining, a joint venture between the Chinese company Wambao Resources Corporation and some Congolese businessmen, is finishing a pyrometallurgic plant which, according to the DRC’s Ministry of Mines, should produce 1,000 tonnes of pure cobalt per year.

Features of Chinese investments in Africa

China’s approach to Africa has several distinct characteristics. For example, a key feature of Chinese cooperation with Africa is the strong links between the Chinese government’s foreign policy objectives and the role played by Chinese enterprises. By the end of June 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce had given approval to 602 Chinese enterprises to invest a total of US$1.173 billion in Africa. This had risen to 715 by the end of 2004. The range of activities that these companies are engaged in varies from trade, processing, manufacture, communication, transportation, roads and agriculture, to resources development.

For example in Angola, the US$2bn deal has lead to the rebuilding of national roads, the building of a new airport in the outskirts of Luanda and other major infrastructure development projects. In addition, a US$69 million agreement was signed between Angola's MundoStartel and China's ZTE Corporation and the Angolan Council of Ministers approved broader ZTE operations. These which will see ZTE invest US$400 million, of which US$300 million will be used to modernise and expand Angola Telekom to develop telephone networks in Angola. According to the Angolan government, the remaining US$100 million is to be invested in military communications, the development of a mobile telephone factory and the creation of a telecommunications training institute for Angolan employees. It is the multifaceted character of Chinese involvement in Africa that seems to be a major draw for African countries.

On a positive note, there is no doubt that Chinese investments in Africa are having and could continue to have some positive impacts. China is helping African countries to rebuild their infrastructure and providing other types of assistance to agriculture, water, health, education and other sectors. This could have very positive spin-offs in lowering transaction costs and assisting African governments to address social calamities such as poor health services, energy crisis, skills development, etc. Increased Chinese demand for raw materials has seen an upsurge in commodity prices, putting extra cash in the coffers of many resource-dependent economies. However, African countries should use this windfall to make provision for the future by investing heavily in education and training, diversifying the economy and strengthening the administrative and governance systems – political, economic and corporate – in order to be better able to maintain and sustain the current economic boom throughout the continent.

On a pessimistic note, the NEPAD framework extols the virtues of African self-reliance, ownership and leadership as well as good economic, political and corporate governance as the bedrock of its development agenda. The emergence of China as a key player in Africa could undermine the NEPAD vision since it could make African countries increasingly reliant on China rather than on their own domestic resources and the resourcefulness of their people. At present, China and not NEPAD or the domestic market is being seen as a more reliable source for resource mobilisation. There are also concerns about Chinese funded projects where in some cases, the ratio of Chinese expatriates (labour and enterprises) to locals contracted is as high as 70 per cent Chinese and 30 per cent local. This practice does not help Africa in addressing the problems of high unemployment and the scourge of poverty. Nor does it assist Africa’s private sector to grow both technically and financially. Instead it could entrench African dependence on external assistance.

The emergence of China has raised fears that China’s non-adherence to the West’s approach of imposing aid conditionalities has the potential to nullify all the progress made in fighting corruption and improving governance in Africa – implying that the problem of corruption in Africa is solely an African problem. There is a one-dimensional focus on Africa as the source of the problem whilst ignoring its global character. This brings us to the broader debate on capital flight. While it is correct that the revenue pilfered from Africa by its elites represents a major challenge to the economic growth and sustainable development of the continent, the haemorrhaging of money away from the continent also takes place in other forms. According to Raymond Baker, a renowned researcher on these matters, mispricing and transfer pricing are some of the tricks used to move money out of developing countries.

In my view, the effective and efficient management of public revenue and assets should not be limited to the public declaration of the proceeds accrued by African governments from the exploitation of natural resources. It should also entail ensuring that these transactions produce optimal benefits to the African people. For instance, there are issues related to the repatriation of profits, mispricing and transfer pricing which include but are not limited to the extractive industries. These practices are major contributors to increased corruption and have served as useful conduits for corrupt practices as well as capital flight. In addition, Africa is not only losing money through corruption and other money laundering activities but it is also the victim of a distorted international economic system.

Raising the stakes and the new scramble for Africa

The emergence of China as a dominant player in Africa raises two critical challenges for Africa and the international community. The first one pertains to Africa’s weak administrative systems (poor revenue generation, management and disbursement capacity), the absence of the rule of law and heavy dependence on natural resources. This situation is compounded by the lack of adequately skilled personnel and technological know-how, all of which are necessary ingredients for translating Africa’s natural resources into the development of the continent and its people. It is these acute weaknesses that make Africa susceptible to what is commonly known as the resources curse.

Second, it is abundantly clear that increased economic development over the next few decades, regardless of regional variations, will have a significant impact on increasing demand for vital resources. Consumption, in Africa as elsewhere, is bound to increase with improved standards of living.

Consequently, the dynamics of increased economic growth and development, growing populations, increasing consumption and dwindling resources will generate intense competition over access and control of natural resources. The impact of these developments will be particularly severe in Africa given the acute weaknesses described above.

The way forward

There is a general agreement that Africa’s wide variety of natural resources could be an essential tool in the fight against poverty, underdevelopment and marginalisation. The recent discovery of oil in Madagascar, Zambia and Uganda also demonstrates that Africa’s potential mineral resources are still a mystery to Africa and the world. Africa is a continent yet to be fully explored and its latent economic potential unleashed. However, there is a need for a paradigm shift on the part of Africa’s leadership both within the public and private sectors. The community at large and civil society organisations are crucial in ensuring that Africa’s natural resources are exploited and managed in a manner that contributes to the eradication of poverty as well as sustainable economic growth and development.

First, there is a need to place the broader national interest above short-term personal gain. In most African countries the state or the head of state are the custodians of natural resources on behalf of the people. The constitution enjoins them to exploit and manage these resources for the benefit of the nation. It is imperative that these constitutional provisions are strictly adhered to and implemented with vigour. The institutional, legislative, regulatory and enforcement capacity of the state must be strengthened so that it serves as a deterrent against unscrupulous and opportunistic behaviour. In order to ensure that Chinese or other multinational enterprises investing in Africa conduct their business in manner that enhances social cohesion and economic growth, the conduct of Africa’s leaders, public institutions, businesses and citizens need to be exemplary and beyond reproach.

Second, there currently seems to be no clear regional or continental strategy to deal effectively with the myriad of actors. This is resulting in a fragmented approach which weakens Africa’s bargaining position. In stark contrast, China and all the other actors are coming into Africa with well thought out and packaged proposals that enable them to maximise the benefits from any relationship with African countries. China, in particular, seems to have a purposeful strategy and is successfully delivering on all its objectives vis-à-vis Africa. The question is what is the driving force behind Africa’s sudden economic interest in China? Is it part of a well-calculated approach to unlock the continent’s true economic potential or is it merely a meek response to an unfolding development. Given Africa’s experience with the West before and after independence, the English saying ‘once bitten, twice shy’ is of particular relevance.

Further, while the super cycle of increasing demand for commodities and high prices is undoubtedly generating enormous benefits for African countries and is set to continue, the continent must guard against the Dutch Disease syndrome. Diversifying its economy and export base should be a key priority for Africa. By developing secondary and tertiary industries Africa would generate additional employment opportunities, bolster revenue for the state and enhance economic growth. Despite its major contribution as a supplier of raw materials, Africa’s development prospects are constrained by its heavy reliance on the primary sector as the dominant element in its economies. This situation is compounded by a distorted international system that facilitates the export of raw materials but inhibits and restricts the trade in processed goods from Africa. So far, China does not show any meaningful deviation from this well entrenched international practice.

However, as mentioned earlier, increasing international demand for commodities has resulted in a shift from a buyer’s market to a seller’s market. This is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, driven principally by the Asian boom under the leadership of China as well as India. Essentially, the emergence of new players provides an opportunity for resource endowed countries since they are now in a position of strength and spoilt for choice in trade negotiations.

This opportunity must be fully exploited and maximised if Africa is to extricate itself from the periphery and take centre stage in the global economy. For example, Africa must diversify its economy by identifying strategic niches and insisting on local beneficiation; negotiating better terms of trade at a bilateral and multilateral level as well as using its natural resources endowment as leverage in political and economic negotiations with international partners. However, for this to be effective Africa needs to adopt a more coordinated and integrated approach in its dealings, whether at bilateral or multilateral level. Unlike the Chinese and other major economies of this world that are backed up by strong political and economic clout, Africa’s ability and capacity to leverage is rather limited.

There is also room for enhanced civil society cooperation across Africa. At present community participation in the exploitation and management of natural resources is rather limited. Where it happens, the conduct and practices employed by communities can sometimes be self-destructive, as with the garimpeiros in Angola or the rebels in the Niger Delta. Another major opportunity for civil society is in the area of research and knowledge management. There is an information vacuum and this is having a negative impact on policy development and implementation.

The bottom-line is to ensure that the dialogue between the international community and Africa becomes more constructive and reinforces the NEPAD principles of partnership, mutual respect and benefit. The overarching objective of such a process should be to ensure that Africa’s natural resources are managed in an effective and sustainable manner for the benefit of the continent and the global economy. In other words, continental and global sustainable peace, security, stability and sustainable development should constitute the pillars for future cooperation in this vital sector.

• John Rocha is a senior analyst within the Peace and Security Programme at SaferAfrica where he is leading a process towards the development of minimum standards for the exploitation and management of natural resources in Africa. Rocha has a BA in human and social studies with specialisation in government, administration and development.

• This is a shortened version of an article by John Rocha . The full version, including references, will be available in a forthcoming book to be published in January by Fahamu and called ‘African perspectives on China in Africa’. The full articles will also be made available as .PDF files on the Pambazuka News website.

• Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

British aid money is being used to push water privatisation on poor countries -making it less likely that clean water will ever get to the poorest people. And while poor people lose out, a group of big UK companies are profiting from this aid.

Excessive rains in October and November in the Horn of Africa have resulted in the worst flooding in many years in parts of Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. The floods have severely damaged infrastructure and housing and caused crop, livestock and asset losses. By early December, heavy rains persisted in several areas, particularly in Kenya, and weather forecasts predict continued precipitation until the end of the year.

The water level of Lake Victoria has risen by four centimetres due to the heavy rains of the past month in the three countries sharing Africa's largest lake. A water expert in the Ministry of Water and Environment told The New Vision the heavy rains benefited the water levels, while causing problems in areas prone to floods, cholera and landslides.

The 1st Horn of Africa Regional Environment Meeting was opened here yesterday (4 December 2006) to officially announce a plan to establish the Horn of Africa Regional Environment Network and Centre. Opening the meeting' Coordinator Dr. Araya Asfaw of the Addis Ababa University said that the objective of the meeting was to exchange knowledge and experience among professionals of the region in the field and to officially launch the network.

It is reported that across large areas of Nigeria’s southeastern rainforest belt, hundreds of communities are threatened by erosion because of decades of uncontrolled deforestation and other types of pressure on the land. Joel Bisina explains that whereas both natural and human interventions can result in environment degradation, environmental destruction is a product of peoples’ unhealthy and unfriendly interaction with the environment.

The violence of the last ten years in the Niger Delta has brought to the front burner the issue of the environment, and its implication on regional peace and security. For four decades, ecological devastation on the one hand, and neglect arising from crude oil production on the other hand, have left much of the Niger Delta desolate, uninhabitable, and poor. The unholy contraception, or “joint venture partnership”, fraudulently contrived between the Nigerian state and the oil multinationals to the criminal exclusion of the inhabitants of the region presents a case study for now and the generations unborn.

Ours is a case of the goose that lays the golden egg. The Delta holds the bulk of the economic resources that sustains the public treasury in Nigeria. Yet, years of neglect and ecological devastation have left much of the Niger Delta despoiled and impoverished. This contradiction of riches is a constant refrain in most conflicts in the Delta. I cannot but agree with the summation contained in the UNDP human development report, “a delicate balance exists between the human population in the Niger Delta and its fragile ecosystem. There is a strong feeling in the region that the rate of environmental degradation is pushing the region towards ecological disaster.”

Conflicts in the region have often been blamed on among other things, neglect by government and oil companies, unemployment, military rule, the minority question, and a badly structured Nigerian federalism, especially as it concerns finances. While these factors separately or jointly bear on the conflict dynamics in the region, what has been lacking is their integration into an explanatory system in the addendum called environmental degradation.

I prefer to call it environmental destruction as against degradation. Whereas both natural and human interventions can result in environment degradation, destruction is a product of man’s unhealthy and unfriendly interaction with the environment. Okechukwu Ibeanu questioned if the factors are causal or only mediatory? (Ibeanu, 2000). He went further to query that if they are causal factors, are they principal, secondary, or tertiary, are they triggers, pivotal, mobilizing, or aggravating factors?

I will respond by saying that the environment factor is primary and is pivotal to the Niger Delta regional peace and conflict dynamics.

In attempting to underpin environmental degradation and its implication on peace and conflict dynamics in the Niger Delta, it will be necessary to try to examine the various contextual environments that present themselves and how they singularly or collectively interact to define the peace conflict spiral. Attempt will also be made to examine how this interaction dictates and reorders the peace security dynamics in the Niger Delta.

Natural Environment

Dr Egunjobi Layi in his paper published in Springlink Journal writes that “The relatively under-developed condition of the Delta Area of Nigeria is mainly due to its difficult natural environment. This is with particular reference to the mass, and complex maze, of water which floods the region, causing erosion and pollution, all of which adversely affect agricultural practice, transportation and other human activities.”

While I want to agree with the scholar to some extent, I beg to differ a little and state that attributing the under-development in the delta to a difficult natural environment is just over simplifying the problem. The natural Niger Delta environment we inherited from our forebears was an environment rich in bio diversity, varied species of wild life, dense population of marine and aquatic life, in fresh and salt water bodies, with rich mangrove and fresh water vegetation, flamboyant raffia and shrubs.

However, what we are now bequeathing for future generations is a natural environment whose lushness has disappeared completely, altered and degraded. This is due to canals that have been dredged, rivers and rivulets that have been blocked, streams and ponds that have silted to make way for oil drilling and exploitation. The resulting scenario is mass migration of fish species, destroying traditional livelihood systems. We now have polluted fresh water streams and rivers, fresh water vegetation completely wiped out by salt water encroachment caused by a combination of dredging and high tidal currents resulting from melting ice in the Arctic. The consequences of all these changes in the natural environment are poverty and frustration, resulting in tribes lashing out at one another or at the multi national corporations.

The Physical Environment

Our generation inherited a physical environment that was characterized by natural clean long stretch of sand beaches, fresh and healthy water lettuce that add their beauty and flavor to the environment. It is sad to say that we are bequeathing to our children an environment that is completely eroded or silted in some cases. We are bequeathing communities whose shorelines have been washed away or eroded due to the high volume of deep-sea exploration and exploitation activities. Once hilly and highland environments have been reduced to below sea level. Navigable creeks which once supported socio-economic activities among local dwellers have been silted with dredge dump, washed top surface soil arising from erosion and blocked canal of water ways to make way for oil activities; thus making them difficult for navigation.

We are beginning to find deserts in the delta due to pollution and oil spills, or forests that have been wiped out by bush fires caused by spills of petroleum products from aged or burst pipelines. The situation continues to reduce the land available for farming and infrastructural development. This has created unhealthy competition for available land space, further heightening cases of land related conflicts.

Our skylines are lit up with flares from gas, fumes and smoke associated with gas flare. In some of our communities it is difficult to differentiate between day and night.

Social Environment

The social safety nets of extended family system, communal labour, and communal ownership have broken or been replaced by greedy self-seeking and self-promoting values. I remember growing up as a child in the very strong sense of community that sustained peace and security for the environment.

There was this particular occasion, in 1971 when a stranger passerby pulled into our community in one of the evenings with a very small canoe. The stranger was in the middle of his small canoe, sitting on top of a huge red snapper because he does not want the fish to escape. Immediately when he got to our village he started asking who had set the fishing trap to the south of our community, and my elder sister came out and said, I am the one.

He pulled into our waterfront and said, please come take this fish, I saw it in one of your traps, it was almost escaping so I decided to rescue it and look for the owner. My mother was so moved by the act of courage, honesty and kindness that she told the stranger that he should wait so that they can butcher the fish to enable him to have some portion of the fish. As far as mama was concerned, the fish would have escaped from the trap, but for the resilience of the human spirit of honesty and kindness displayed by the man that rescued the fish. The man simply said, mama thank you for your kind gesture, but let it be next time because my journey is far before I get to my final destination, the portion would have decayed.

In another incident my mother lost her boat with the entire foodstuff she had bought for sale because the boat was not well tied to the shore. The next morning we went out looking for mama’s boat and her foodstuff. If you like, call it going out to search for mama’s shop or stall, because that mobile boat was the shop we had. In every community we got to, we would ask whether they found the boat or not. We finally located mama’s shop at the 8th community from our own. A hunter who had gone out in the night from that community found this strange boat shop and decided to take it to his water front hoping that the owner would show up. When we got there the entire content of mama’s shop boat was intact. The man did not remove a pin. My mother thanked him and we took our shop boat back without paying a dime.

The most exciting aspect of it was that the man even gave a portion from a bush pig he had killed that night, saying that mama’s shop boat brought him good luck that night. He claimed that for the past one week he had been going hunting without success, but that when he saw mama’s floating shop boat, he decided to bring it ashore and tie it firmly to his water front. He then decided to continue his hunting, and that not quite two kilometers away he ran into these bush pigs which by his explanation were mating and he was lucky to kill one of them, but the second one escaped. So not only did we recover our shop boat and its contents, we also had a very fresh portion of bush pig for meal that day.

These were the social settings that existed in our communities then. Communities that were driven by deep values of kindness, honesty and transparency, a communal philosophy of giving and sharing, where the haves have and keep for, on behalf of the whole not self. Societies where you could go to bed with your doors open; houses where there were no doors.

But today caution has been thrown to the wind and people brazenly even appropriate to self that which belongs to all. The social formations now create societies where some live in squalor and abject poverty, while others live in affluence at the expense of the whole. Today words that were alien to our lexicon have started to find their way into dominant pages. We now hear of sea piracy, hostage taking and kidnapping targeted at locals and strangers, highway and sea way robbery, heavily armed criminal gangs in our water ways who wreak all sorts of havoc, all in the name of the Niger Delta struggle. There is no longer trust for one another, not even at the community level.

Religious /Traditional Environment

The clash of traditional and western cultures, religions and belief systems also has opened up sacred shrines and places of worship for drilling and exploration for oil. Ancient landmarks have been pulled down and in some cases destroyed. We are now like a people without a past.

Legal Environment

By decrees, oil and gas became owned by the federal government, and progressively the region’s entitlements by way of derivation-based allocations declined from 50% to a mere 1½% in 1984 and later 3% in 1999 (Augustine Ekelegbe, The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region, p. 214).

The Northern hegemony taking advantage of military dictatorship began a regime of near total appropriation of the region’s oil resources through an intense over centralization and concentration of power and resources in the federal government. Oil resources were a major target. Various decrees and enactments were made to completely take away control of oil from the locals.

Under the Petroleum Act 1969, the entire ownership and control of all oil and gas in place within any land in Nigeria, under its territorial waters and the continental shelf, is vested in the state of Nigeria. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 further emphasized the state ownership in section 40(3), which provides that "the entire property in and control of all mineral oils and natural gas in, under or upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and shall be managed in such manner as may be established by law."

The implication of these laws is that the land available to the locals or people in the Niger Delta is further taken away from them on a daily basis as more oil is found in the land. As the land space gets smaller the struggle for its ownership and control increases and at the same time potential conflict over ownership of land increases.

The Local and International Economic Environment

Nigeria is a major player in the world energy market. It is the seventh largest producer of oil in the world. It supplies a fifth of United States oil imports. It is further becoming an important supplier in the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market. Instability in world oil supplies and the critical link of oil to the international economy has made Nigerian and more generally African oil to be more strategic than ever.

The irony is that the local economic environment is determined and driven by powers and economic forces that transcend beyond our borders - the IMF, the World Bank, Paris Club, Creditors Club, and so on.

We do not have any control over the oil we produce, the quantity to be produced, the price at which to sell, who to sell to and at what price to refine it. Nor do we have the powers to determine at what price we should sell to ourselves.

Other factors at the fore of regional conflicts are strong economic considerations, desperation and the need to amass wealth. Economies of crisis and war in the region have largely been underpinned by greed and high levels of corruption. There is also the profiting from conflicts by youth militias, rebels, armed gangs and even government soldiers. This involves plundering, bunkering, looting, and extortion, imposition of tolls, and robbery of local people, traders and farmers. Most youth militias are driven by the opportunity to acquire properties and riches. The economy underpins an extensive proliferation of arms and the pervasiveness of crime, violence and communal/ethnic conflicts.

The challenges of creating and ensuring access to these benefits have fuelled a deadly struggle among the ethnic and community leaderships, the elites, businessmen and politicians, youths, women and various other groups in the region. It has also fuelled deadly and violent conflicts as each group struggles to prove their relevance and capacity to disrupt the oil economy.

Individuals and groups struggle to control and dominate access and actual opportunities and benefits. The emerging greed, corruption and distributive conflicts underpin numerous incidents of community disturbances and criminal violence in the region.

Ibeanu (2002: 165) describes the situation as a ‘matrix of concentric circles of payoffs and rewards built on blackmail and violence.’ He continues:

The closer a person is to the centre, the greater his/her capacity to blackmail oil companies and therefore the greater his/her payoff. In time, members of the raucous inner circle fade away in a whimper and silence as a new core of vocal community leaders emerge: more blackmail, more payoffs.

Historical / Political Environment

The history of protests and conflicts of acrimony by the Niger Delta peoples against forced union and exploitation dates back to 1957 when testimonies were made in respect thereof before the Willink Commission of Inquiry into Minority Fears. What were those fears? They were fears of marginalization, neglect and the politics of exclusion, by the ethnic majority-based ruling political parties and governments of the then Eastern and Western Regions. Subsequently, several protests and clamors for justice have been registered to no avail.

Characteristically, both military and civilian governments have ignored clamors for equitable remedies, and forcibly smothered protests through use of overwhelming military might and other documented acts of state sanction and political violence.

The prevailing concept of federalism in Nigeria today falls short of expectations in both definition and practice. To the extent that it is being practiced as quasi-federalism, there has been an overly centralized control of resources by the Federal Government. This aberration continues to generate perpetual conflicts with indigenous rights; hence, it has become a major cause of conflicts in the Niger Delta Region, especially from notorious derivation principles for revenue allocation to states in the region.

The Way Forward

• Institutions of government and development interventionist agencies should, as a matter of urgency, fast track the process of environment remediation and ecosystem restoration.
• The issue of transparency and accountability should be taken more seriously.
• Legislations, decrees and enactments that are disempowering should be reviewed and where necessary abrogated as they continue to serve as an impediment to peace and security.
• Development priorities should be set by local communities.
• Local community participation in the resource mobilization, management and allocation should be given the attention it deserves. At least 30% of oil revenue should go directly to oil bearing communities.
• The political process should be made transparent and fair for free entry and exit of those with integrity and men whose vision and values are driven by the desire to serve not to be served.

• This paper was presented at the Niger Delta Environmental Roundtable at the Hotel Presidential Port Harcourt November 16, 2006.

• Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Reference:
[1] Augustine Ikelegbe - The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region
[2] Oke Ibeanu - Oiling the Friction; Environmental Conflict Management in the Niger Delta of Nigeria
[3] CYRIL Obi - Globalised Images of Environmental Security in Africa
[4] Actionaid - Policy Watch (Perspective on Peace Building)
[5] UNDP - Niger Delta Human Development Report
[6] Actionaid - Conflict and Human Security
[7] Joel Bisina - Oil and Corporate Recklessness in Nigeria
[8] Dr. Walter Abeng Mboto - Regional Resources Versus Environmental Conflict in the Niger Delta.
[9] Zak Harmon- World Bank, Big Oil and the Niger Delta.

While the recent stakeholders' conference on the Zambezi River Basin saw many good intentions expressed, it also served as a reminder of the persistent challenge posed by weak co-operation between Southern African states. At the conference, held in Windhoek, Namibia, on Nov. 22 and 23, participants from civil society raised concerns about the lack of a united driving force to develop the Zambezi watercourse.

Edward Zwick's movie brings to the fore Africa's diamond curse, reports Koigi in the Daily Nation. Diamonds are forever, so it is said, and so it seems, are movies themed on them. On December 8, the latest Hollywood depiction of this iconic symbol of love and the role it has played in fanning conflict in Africa will open in American theatres.

Elibariki Isaya, a pastoralist in northern Tanzania’s Kiteto District, has been caught in clashes between farmers in the area. "We are regarded as refugees in our own country," he said. "Farmers have thrown us off the land. We now have nowhere to take cattle, goats and sheep for grazing and drinking water."

The letter by Jeffrey Sachs, Mmegi Nov.1, "The environment fights back" contains several problems that most of the world is concerned about. When Prof. Sachs was to give a talk at the Royal Swedish Agriculture Academy in Stockholm at the end of January this year I sent him an email informing him that we are aware of "The need for a Green Revolution in Africa", as his title was in Stockholm.

Mount Kilimanjaro, known as "The roof of Africa," faces the threat of losing its beautiful icecap unless efforts are made to reverse environmental degradation and global warming. Environmentalists say Africa could lose the ice cover and glaciers on mountain peaks between 2018 and 2020 unless global campaigns to save the mountain's ecology are mounted.

Vulcanologist Celestin Kasereka Mahhinda said on Tuesday (28 November 2006) there was no immediate danger to the eastern Congolese city of Goma after the eruption of Mount Nyamulagira in the Democratic Republic of Congo. "There was no loss of life and no immediate threat to Goma because Nyamulagira lies 32 km to the north and has Mount Nyirangongo acting as a barrier against lava reaching the city," Kasereka, who is director of the Goma Volcano Observatory, said.

Legislation to ensure that oil exploration companies do not shortchange Kenyans is on the way, the ministry of Energy announced yesterday (27 November 2006). It seeks to, among other things, fix the percentage such companies should remit to the Government for the oil found and sold, said the ministry's chief geologist and director of geo-exploration, Mr Don Riaroh.

For many years there have been complaints that the land sector was an impediment to private sector investment and efficiency. Ten years ago in 1996, a report titled The Investors’ Road Map of Tanzania, outlined the many problems that a would-be investor faced, and access to land was cited as a critical one.

The biggest land grab in Uganda’s recent history has been going on in and around Kampala for the past two years. Government leaders have been allocating land on which state-owned schools, dilapidated public buildings, parks, and even churches, are sited, to developers in fishy midnight deals.

Recently, the South Africa government hosted the global launch of the UNDP 2006 Human Development Report. Patrick Bond and Greg Ruiters argue that “…South Africa is apparently considered the UN’s ideal-type setting – and maybe deservedly so, for what might be called ‘talk left’ policies accompanied by ‘turn right’ practices: turning the tap off, that is to say.”

A fortnight ago, the global launch of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 2006 (HDR) was in Cape Town, an appropriate choice in a diabolical way. South Africa is apparently considered the UN's ideal-type setting - and maybe deservedly so, for what might be called 'talk left' policies accompanied by 'turn right' practices: turning the water tap off for poor people.

The next day the Mail & Guardian newspaper carried an essay, 'Water is a human right', by Kemal Dervis and SA finance minister Trevor Manuel. Dervis served the World Bank from 1977-2001 before moving home to Turkey as minister for economic affairs. In 2005 he won the UN's third-highest job: UNDP chief administrator, taking over from Mark Malloch Brown (now Kofi Annan's chief of staff), whose prior job was public relations vice president at the Bank.

Manuel was chair of the board of governors of the Bank and IMF in 2000 and then ran their important Development Committee from 2001-2005. As SA finance minister he imposed - without consultation - a neoliberal economic policy in 1996, partly designed by World Bank economists using a Bank economic model whose predictions were disastrously off the mark.

The Bank, by the way, advised former SA water minister Kader Asmal in 1995 that he shouldn't provide the free water promised in the Reconstruction and Development Programme and instead needed 'a credible threat of disconnections'. By 2003, 275 000 families faced water cutoffs due to non-payment, according to former water director-general Mike Muller. In 1999 the Bank labeled its 1995 advice as 'instrumental' for the 'radical revision' of water pricing policy here.

But now Dervis and Manuel advocate water as a 'human right'. Are your bullshit detectors turned on, dear reader? As recently as mid-2003, Manuel told City Press that 'free water has not benefited the rural poor and is difficult and costly to implement'.

There are several problems. First, the UNDP's 20 liter per person daily target provides just one and a half flushes of the toilet. At least, recommend Dervis and Manuel, 'those who cannot afford to pay [should] get it for free.' They claim, 'In South Africa, the basic policy framework' along these lines 'is now in place' thanks to 'the adoption of a rights-based approach to water supply'.

In reality, although it did change from a straight neoliberal approach at the time of the 2000 municipal elections, SA's 'basic policy framework' for water pricing is still far from being rights-based. Its roots can be found in these post-apartheid decisions:

• the state drastically increased the price of municipal water since 1994, especially affecting low-income black people - e.g., in the largest 'market', Johannesburg, prices rose far higher than inflation, in part because of the onstruction of obscenely expensive Lesotho mega-dams whose raw water costs five times more than pre-dam water (conservation was not considered a serious option);

• operating subsidies from national to municipal governments were chopped during the 1990s by 85% in real terms, as one agency admitted, with especially large cuts in the national water budget that supported wretched ex-Bantustan towns;

• the much smaller municipal water subsidies together with the doubling of unemployment in the years after apartheid (thanks to Manuel's neoliberal macroeconomic GEAR policies) logically led to much higher non-payment rates for impoverished citizens, and then the disconnection of water supplies to roughly a million people per year, according to several studies;

• to deal with non-payment, the state began installing Ventilated Improved Pitlatrines ('VIPs') for poor people even in urban Johannesburg, as well as pre-paid water meters in low-income, black neighbourhoods, starting in Soweto; and

• meanwhile rural families relying on state-supplied communal water taps witnessed the breakdown of many, if not most, systems, once again because of affordability constraints that prevented the 'full cost recovery' required to keep the taps turned on.

Johannesburg Water adopted the pre-paid meter tactic shortly after the British government's 1998 banning of these same devices on grounds that self-disconnections due to poverty represent a public health threat - especially poignant for South Africa at a time of the HIV/AIDS crisis and in 2000-02 the country's worst-ever cholera outbreak. The matter is now being pursued by the Campaign Against Water Privatisation in the courts.

Then in July 2001, the world-famous 'Free Basic Water' policy was adopted, in an apparent policy U-turn. But even when implemented in the larger municipalities - for regrettably it does not exist in most smaller ones - the policy provides just six kiloliters per household per month no matter the size of the household (or number of HIV+ family members). After that relatively puny amount, the price rises to excruciating levels.

To illustrate this last point, the city where Free Basic Water policy originated, Durban, provided 6 kl/month free yet at the same time more than doubled 7+ kl/month water bills between 1997-2004. The result was the doubling of the average price of water paid by poor people: from R2 to R4/kl over that period.

What was the impact on the poorest one third of the city's water customers? Shockingly, in the city with the most acute AIDS, cholera and other water-related diseases, the poorest third of households lowered their consumption from 22 to 15 kiloliters from 1997-2004 (an extraordinary -0.55 'price elasticity', the measure economists use to study the impact of prices on consumption).

What about Durban's richest third of all households? Their cut-back was only 3 kl/month (from 35 to 32, a -0.10 elasticity). So the price increases did not have a substantial impact on rich households who waste the most water (in swimming pool evaporation or watering English-style gardens).

The HDR compares Durban water prices with four other major Third World cities and notes that from 7-20 kl/month, it is the highest priced, a third more costly than Dakar and seven times more pricey than Bangalore.

But ironically, the HDR then praises Durban in three bizarre and basically inaccurate ways:

• 'in Durban, South Africa, the lifeline tariff results in a progressive distribution of water subsidies because 98% of poor households are connected';

• 'Durban, South Africa, provides 25 litres of water a day free of charge-the lifeline or social tariff-with a steep increase above this level. This is an important part of the legislative framework for acting on the right to water';

• 'As part of a national strategy of water for all, South Africa transferred a water utility in Durban to a concession. Despite concerns about equity, there has been marked improvement in access among poor households.'

First, by no stretch of the imagination are 98% of poor households connected to Durban's water grid. Indeed there are ongoing evictions in still-proliferating shack settlements, which contain probably between 1/5th and 1/3rd of households.

Second, the 25 liters per day free of charge is an overestimate of what Durban provides larger families, for the 6 kl/month works out to those measly two flushes worth only if the family size is below eight. Women-headed households with AIDS orphans and backyard renters or room tenants are not atypical, and disputes over the small amounts of available water can be debilitating, especially at times of funerals or family events when much more water is needed.

Third, as far as a private concession goes, the UNDP HDR probably means not Durban but Dolphin Coast (since the latter is run by a French for-profit firm while Durban's managers are public sector executives who simply have a for-profit orientation). But sources as diverse as the South African government Human Sciences Research Council and New York Times report that the Dolphin Coast experiment is a failure with regard to poor people's access.

To promote 'core strategies for overcoming national inequalities in access to water', the UNDP report advocates 'establishing lifeline tariffs that provide sufficient water for basic needs free of charge or at affordable rates, as in South Africa.' But not only have municipalities sabotaged the African National Congress 2000 election manifesto promise: 'ANC-led local government will provide all residents with a free basic amount of water, electricity and other municipal services, so as to help the poor. Those who use more than the basic amounts will pay for the extra they use.' As noted, the convex shape of municipal water price tariffs negates this promise, a classic example of micro-neoliberalism.

In addition, the SA Treasury, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Department of Provincial and Local Government persistently sought for-profit partners - and some NGOs which also have a full-cost recovery mentality - to implement policy. The UNDP, World Bank, IMF and World Trade Organisation have been pushing water commercialization for years across Africa.

This is why it is amusing to read, from Dervis and Manuel: 'Too much of the policy discussion on water delivery has been dominated by a dead-end debate on privatisation versus state ownership'. They advocate 'some combination of public and private sector involvement.' These are weasel words, in view of the record of water privatisation in Africa: systematic failure.

On cross-border water transfers, the HDR notes 'the potential benefits of cooperation' by arguing that that the Lesotho Highlands Water Project 'is generating revenue for Lesotho and improved water for South Africa'. Unmentioned are the 1998 SA National Defense Force invasion of the Katse Dam site (when two dozen sleeping Basotho soldiers were killed), the massive ecological damage, the tens of thousands of peasants displaced, and the massive increase in water prices caused by this notoriously corrupt, apartheid-era sanctions-busting mega-dam scheme - or the alternative strategy (never attempted) of conservation and less uneven regional development.

In one painfully honest paragraph, however, the UNDP report concedes some problems: 'As the reforms have rolled out, they have generated a political debate over design and implementation. Some argue that the 25-litre threshold for free basic water is too low. Supplies in some areas have been erratic, forcing households to collect water from far away. Moreover, government pricing policies have led to supply cutoffs for nonpayment in some areas, raising concerns about affordability. Progress in sanitation has been less impressive than in water. There are still 16 million people- one in three South Africans-without access to basic sanitation. The absence of a consensus on an acceptable basic level of sanitation, allied to problems in generating demand, has contributed to the failure.' This is a damning indictment of post-apartheid water policy design and implementation mistakes.

It helps explain why SA witnessed nearly 6000 protests in a recent 12-month period (reported by the SA Police Services). South Africa's water wars have become world famous, as citizens' groups illegally reconnect pipes that have been cut off due to nonpayment, or destroy the hated pre-paid water meters, or dump excrement from the apartheid-era 'bucket system' of sanitation at the doors of their elected officials.

In addition, the UNDP report criticizes Johannesburg's controversial contract with Paris-based Suez, 'because delegation-the transfer of operating authority from local government to utility and from utility to third companies-can obscure accountability and delivery' and because Joburg metro is 'both utility shareholder and regulator.' Captive regulators are ubiquitous in SA, and the national government's failure to even 'name and shame' recalcitrant municipalities - as promised by then water minister Ronnie Kasrils in 2003 - is now legendary. The only serious watchdogs of the Joburg Water company have been the AntiPrivatisation Forum activists in several black townships who keep up pressure for human rights. A recent report by the APF notes the persistence of dissatisfaction regarding pre-paid meters in Soweto and Orange Farm, for example.

In its attempt to sanitise Pretoria's modified-neoliberal water policy, the UNDP HDR reports, incorrectly, that 'A minimum amount of water for drinking is now guaranteed as a legally enforceable right.' The UN officials should have made a short side-trip from Cape Town to Wallacedene. Community leader Irene Grootboom won a seminal Constitutional Court battle against government in September 2000 but her 700-member community still lacked the most essential water services years later.

In sum, the UNDP HDR and the Dervis/Manuel water-rights discourse are less absurd than SA health minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang's vegetable stall at the recent Toronto AIDS conference. But given the neoliberal devils in the details, water pricing reform is still long overdue in South Africa. Without it, government's 'talk left, turn right' will continue to be met by substantial community resistance.

• Patrick Bond directs the UKZN Centre for Civil Society and Greg Ruiters directs the Municipal Services Project at Rhodes University Institute for Social and Economic Research.
• Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Africa must develop a cost-effective integrated infrastructure to allow landlocked countries access to the sea and must press ahead with creating a single market to enhance trade, Vice President Joice Mujuru said yesterday (22 November 2006).

Geneva Call is launching its new report on mine action involving armed non-state actors (NSAs) within the framework of the Third Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons in Geneva, Switzerland.

Africa's poor are caught in the thick of a festering global water and sanitation crisis linked to pervasive violation of the basic human right to water by skewed power relations within and between states. In Africa, as elsewhere in the developing world, lack of clean water and toilets is taking a heavy toll on human security, and is a deadlier killer than the continent's endemic conflicts.

Delegates from all over the world are meeting in Nairobi to discuss climatic change. Among the issues that surfaced is emissions, where the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan admitted liability for the emission of toxic agents. While addressing a press conference at the UN offices located in Gigiri on Wednesday (22 November 2006), Annan said that stakeholders have to play a major role to achieve the targeted emission reduction.